

## **Chairman's non-paper: Basis for discussion, UNDC Working Group I**

19 April 2007

### **I. Introduction**

The Disarmament Commission considered item xx of its agenda, entitled "recommendations for achieving the objective of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons", in the light of relevant provisions of General Assembly resolutions on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

**~~It reaffirmed that~~ (sugg. By Peru) Achieving the objective of nuclear disarmament continues to be the highest priority. It remains alarmed by the threat to humanity posed by the continued existence of nuclear weapons and of their possible use or threat of use and deeply concerned over the slow pace of progress towards nuclear disarmament. (NAM)**

**While the final objectives of the efforts of all States should continue to be general and complete disarmament under effective international control, the immediate goal is that of the elimination of the danger of nuclear war and the implementation of efforts to halt and reverse the arms race and clear the path towards lasting peace. (NAM)**

### **II. General principles for achieving the objective of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons**

Member States reaffirmed the following principles:

- All States have the responsibility to avert the danger for all humankind of nuclear war. The maintenance of global strategic stability and of undiminished security for all is the basis of nuclear disarmament. **Failure in implementation of effective measures of nuclear disarmament increases the danger of proliferation of nuclear weapons (Iran)**
- The proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously increase the danger of nuclear war
- Multilateralism has a central role for achieving nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. **/unilateral, bilateral and regional initiatives that are consistent with these ends can also contribute to these efforts ( Russia)**

**The highest priority for efforts of states in the disarmament process remains the total elimination of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosives leading to general and complete disarmament under effective international control and verification. [Egypt]**

**Nuclear disarmament is achievable and implementable in the foreseeable future, if only the political will exists (Nigeria)**

#### **The inviolability of peaceful nuclear activities (Cuba)**

- Universality of treaties, the transparency, verification and irreversibility of nuclear arms stockpiles reductions and elimination are essential basis for disarmament and non-proliferation.
- The pursuit of the goal of the elimination of nuclear weapons through negotiations conducted in good faith.
- The maintenance of the weapon-free status of the outer space.
- The establishment of nuclear free zones is essential for the enhancement of global and regional peace and security.
- Free access of all States to Nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination.

They stressed that:

**Multilaterally disarmament and non-proliferation agreements, including those related to nuclear weapons provide the mechanism for states parties to consult one another and to cooperate in solving through political and diplomatic means any problems which may arise in relation to the objective of, or in application of, the provisions of the agreements. (Cuba)**

**Any resort to unilateral actions by member states in resolving their security concerns, including those relating to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons would jeopardize international peace and security and undermine confidence in the international security system as well as the foundations of the United Nations itself. (Cuba)**

**Disarmament and arms control, particularly in the nuclear field, are essential for the prevention of dangers of nuclear war and the strengthening of international peace and security. (NAM)**

- a) The continued existence of nuclear weapons and their possible use **or threat to use** (Iran) constitute **the gravest** (Iran) threat to humanity. **Therefore, nuclear disarmament and complete elimination of nuclear weapons are essential to remove the danger of nuclear war. (Iran)**The threat or use of nuclear weapons would be contrary to the rules of international law applicable to armed conflict, and in particular the principles and the rules of humanitarian law. Every effort should be made to avert the danger for all humankind of a nuclear war.

**In the task of achieving the goal of nuclear disarmament all the nuclear-weapon States, in particular those among them which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, have the primary responsibility (Iran)**

- b) ~~The demand for nuclear disarmament is legitimate~~ (Deletion agreed)The total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;
- c) Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons are ~~two~~ closely interlinked ~~[aspects of that undertaking]~~, and ~~both~~ serve the goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons;
- d) *The achievement of disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons through a gradual and balanced reduction of nuclear stockpiles is a compelling task ahead of humankind.*

**The integrity of the Non-proliferation Treaty should be preserved through full, effective and non-selective implementation of all its provisions, taking into account article VI of the Treaty, the 1995 and 2000 NPT Review Conference commitments. (Iran)**

**The achievement of nuclear disarmament through a gradual and balanced reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons is a compelling task ahead of humankind. (Egypt)**

**~~The achievement of disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons through a gradual and balanced reduction of nuclear stockpiles is a compelling task ahead of humankind. (USA)~~**

**The complete elimination of nuclear weapons through a gradual and balanced reduction of nuclear stockpiles is a compelling task ahead of humankind (Egypt, S-Africa)**

**The achievement of nuclear disarmament through a gradual and balanced reduction of nuclear stockpiles and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons are compelling tasks ahead of humankind. (Russia)**

**[after d, as new e]: Respect [compliance](US) for the legal commitments under disarmament and non-proliferation treaties is a key factor for international stability and an indispensable prerequisite for achieving the ultimate objective of a world free of nuclear weapons. (Brazil, Egypt)**

- e) In efforts towards the objective of nuclear disarmament, global and regional approaches and confidence building measures are complementary

**Efforts towards the objective of nuclear disarmament, global and regional approaches and confidence-building measures complement each other and should, wherever possible, be pursued simultaneously to promote regional and international peace and security (NAM)**

- f) The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. Preserving and strengthening the NPT is therefore vital to peace and security. The universal adherence to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) will contribute to international and regional peace and security.

**The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is the cornerstone of non-proliferation [regime](US), nuclear disarmament and the ability to develop and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Preserving and strengthening the NPT through the review process is therefore vital to peace and security. The universal adherence to and full compliance with the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) will contribute to international and regional peace and security. (Iran)**

(after f/as new bullet-point): **The importance of full and effective implementation by all States parties to the NPT of their obligations pursuant to the Treaty and the decisions of the resolution on the Middle East of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the Final Document adopted by consensus at the 2000 Review conference, including the 13 practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI of the Treaty, particularly the unequivocal undertaking by the Nuclear weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament. (Egypt)**

- g) The weaponization of outer space will affect the global strategic balance and will foster an arms race ~~in outer space (India)~~. (deletion requested by Russia) Its prohibition is an urgent task for the ~~[United Nations disarmament machinery~~ the international community] (India), [the international community, in particular the United Nations disarmament machinery]. (China)

[new h] Unilateral measures to create Global ballistic missile defense systems cannot be viewed as a purely defensive measure. It would upset the strategic balance, may lead to the development of a first strike capability, and may impel countries to respond by building up their strategic offensive weapons. (Russia)

- ~~h) A nuclear threat to one State or region is a threat to all States and all regions—indeed, to all humanity; (deletion requested by India)~~

- i) All States have the inalienable right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, without discrimination, in conformity with article IV of the NPT and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguard system, which is a fundamental pillar for consolidating and enhancing the compliance and verification system for the non-proliferation regime/ **All States have the inalienable right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, without discrimination, in conformity with article IV of the NPT and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards system, which is a fundamental pillar for consolidating and enhancing the compliance and verification system for the of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. (Iran)**

**Any attack or threat of attack against peaceful nuclear facilities – operational or under construction – poses a great danger to human beings and the environment, and constitutes a**

**grave violation of international law, principles and purposes of the UN Charter and the regulations of the IAEA. (Cuba)**

- j) The IAEA safeguards system is a fundamental pillar of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. It fosters confidence in the compliance of States Parties **[to the NPT] (India)** with their non-proliferation obligations, which is a prerequisite for unimpeded international cooperation for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. / **The IAEA safeguards system is a fundamental pillar of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. It fosters confidence in the compliance of States Parties [to the NPT] (India) with their non-proliferation obligations, which is a prerequisite for unimpeded international** can help to create an environment conducive to nuclear cooperation for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. (Iran)

**The balance between the rights and the obligations of the non-nuclear weapon States Parties to the NPT should be strictly observed. This balance guarantees the longevity of the Treaty by providing incentives for membership and compliance. (Iran)**

- k) Nuclear-weapon-free zones can play an important role in strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime and in extending the areas of the world that are nuclear-weapon-free.
- l) Civil society, including non-governmental organizations, play an important role in the promotion of disarmament and non-proliferation education;

### III. Recommendations

#### 1. Recommendations for nuclear disarmament

##### 1.1 Nuclear Disarmament

- a) Nuclear disarmament undertakings, including intermediate steps, should follow, **inter alia** (Iran), the guidelines of promoting a global strategic stability with undiminished security for all.(China)
- b) The nuclear weapon States should implement their commitment to diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in their security policies /doctrines by taking steps relating to de-alerting, de-targeting and other practical, ~~realistic~~ (deletion requested by Iran) and mutually reinforcing steps to further reduce the operational status of their nuclear weapon systems. This would minimize the risk that such weapons ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination; (India, China, NAM).
- c) Nuclear-weapon-states should take all necessary steps to avoid unauthorized, accidental or premature launches of nuclear weapons. (CRP.2, EU, China, India)
- d) The NPT should remain the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. The **[NPT]** (Iran) regime should be strengthened and improved. (Rep. of Korea).
- e) There should be greater transparency on compliance with NPT requirements and on the actual numbers of nuclear weapons (CRP.2 = Chile, Costa Rica, Brazil, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand and Sweden.).
- f) (EU) All states not party to the NPT should ~~should commit themselves to non-proliferation and disarmament~~ **adhere to the NPT.** (amendments req. by Iran)
- g) While ~~acknowledging~~ **noting** the nuclear arms reductions which have taken place since the end of the cold war, **stresses that reduction in deployments and in operational status can not**

**substitute for irreversible cuts in nuclear weapons and its total elimination and emphasizes on there is the need for more progress in the reduction of nuclear arsenals in the pursuit of gradual, systematic nuclear disarmament with a phased and time bound program** under Article VI of the NPT. (EU, CRP.2, China, NAM)/ (amendments requested by Iran)

- h) All States that have not yet done so should declare moratoria on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons purposes pending the negotiation of a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty in the CD. Steps should be taken to close and dismantle fissile material production facilities. (CRP.2, EU)

**Disarmament agreements should provide for adequate measures of verification satisfactory to all parties concerned in order to create the necessary confidence and ensure that they are being observed by all parties. (Iran)**

- i) The principle of irreversibility, **transparency and verifiability** (Indonesia) should be applied to guide all measures in the field of nuclear disarmament and arms control, (EU, CRP.2, China, NAM)/ **The principle of irreversibility as an integral part of the NPT 2000 Review Conference undertaking should be applied to guide all measures in the field of nuclear disarmament and arms control (amended version suggested by Iran)**
- j) Efforts should be pursued to secure transparency as a voluntary Confidence Building Measure to support further progress in nuclear disarmament (EU, NAM)/ **In accordance with the consensus Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, nuclear weapon States should provide increased transparency with regard to their nuclear capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant to article VI and as a voluntary confidence building measures to support further progress on nuclear disarmament.**(alternative provided by Iran)
- k) The nuclear-weapon States should accelerate the implementation of the 13 practical steps towards nuclear disarmament that were agreed upon at the 2000 Review Conference (NAM) which remain relevant today./**The call for the firm commitment by all States Parties to the Treaty to the implementation of all the provisions of the Treaty and the full implementation of the 13 practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI of the Treaty, particularly the unequivocal undertaking by the Nuclear Weapons States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament (alternative suggested by Indonesia)**

**The nuclear-weapon States should refrain from nuclear sharing for military purposes under any kind of security arrangements in conformity with their obligations. (Iran)**

**The nuclear-weapon States should forego any efforts to research and develop new types of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. (Iran)**

- l) **Nuclear Weapons States should fulfill with determination their nuclear disarmament obligations under Article VI, to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures towards cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament. (Indonesia)**
- m) All States should advance further in the field of nuclear non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament on the basis of universal, multilateral, non-discriminatory and transparent negotiations.
- n) It is urgent to mobilize concerted and more intensive global efforts to achieve nuclear non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament goals.

- o) A Nuclear Weapons Convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons and on their destruction, leading to the global, non-discriminatory and verifiable elimination with a specified timeframe should be negotiated. (India, NAM)
- p) The seven recommendations identified in the report of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters should be implemented in order to significantly reduce the risk of nuclear war (India)
  - o Promoting a wide-ranging international dialogue on cooperative security,
  - o Preliminary political and technical measures in preparation for the possibility of convening, at the appropriate time, a major international conference that would help to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers;
  - o De-alerting of nuclear weapons;
  - o Review of nuclear doctrines;
  - o Further reduction of tactical nuclear weapons as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process;
  - o Enhancing security at a global and a regional level by promoting increased transparency of all nuclear weapons programmes;
  - o Creating a climate for implementing nuclear disarmament measures. Programmes of education and training on the dangers of nuclear weapons would foster an informed world public opinion that would be able to exercise a positive influence on the political will to eliminate nuclear weapons.

## 1.2 Security Assurances

- a) The nuclear weapon States should undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapons States or nuclear-weapon-free zones, and to conclude relevant international legal instrument thereon; (China)
- b) Substantive discussions on negative security assurances should begin in the Conference on Disarmament. (China)
- c) [In-depth discussions on the issue of negative security assurances should, in the future, take place in a forum such as the Disarmament Commission, in which States not parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty are also represented]. (France)(**deletion requested by Iran**)
- d) Nuclear weapons states should ~~consider the issue of security assurances with~~ **engage in negotiations on the conclusion of an international legally binding instrument to assure the non-nuclear weapon States parties to the NPT that are in full compliance with all of their nuclear non-proliferation obligations under the Treaty against the use or threat to use of nuclear weapons pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons.** (EU, India, Rep. of Korea)(amendments suggested by Iran)
- e) Nuclear-weapon States should reaffirm existing security assurances noted by the United Nations Security Council in Resolution 984 (1995), **and not to act against these assurances such as listing NNWS as the targets of nuclear weapons (Iran)**, and sign and ratify the relevant protocols on nuclear-weapon-free zones, drawn up following the requisite consultations, recognizing that Treaty-based security assurances are available to such zones. (EU, NAM)
- f) Negotiations should be initiated of a global agreement among nuclear-weapons states on no-first-use of nuclear weapons. (India)
- g) Nuclear-weapons States should respect fully their existing commitments with regards to security assurances pending the conclusion of multilaterally negotiated legally binding security assurances for all non-nuclear-weapons States (NAM)

- h) A universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument on security assurances to non-nuclear-weapons States should be concluded (NAM)
- i) Nuclear-weapons States should honour commitments not to target their nuclear weapons against any countries that are States Parties to the NPT ~~and are in full compliance with all of their nuclear non-proliferation obligations under the Treaty~~. (deletion requested by Iran) (China, Rep of Korea);

**Alternative suggestion:**

- a) **The nuclear weapon States should undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapons States or nuclear-weapon-free zones, and negotiations should therefore be initiated on a universal, unconditional and legally binding agreement thereon. Pending that agreement the nuclear-weapons States should fully respect their existing commitments with regards to security assurances.**
- b) **[Substantive discussions on the issue of negative security assurances should begin as soon as possible in the Conference on Disarmament, but also in such forum as the Disarmament Commission, in which States not parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty are also represented]. (deletion requested by Iran)**
- c) **Nuclear weapons states should consider the issue of security assurances with the non-nuclear weapon States parties to the NPT that are in full compliance with all of their nuclear non-proliferation obligations under the Treaty./ Nuclear weapons states should ~~consider the issue of security assurances with~~ engage in negotiations on the conclusion of an international legally binding instrument to assure the non-nuclear weapon States parties to the NPT that are in full compliance with all of their nuclear non-proliferation obligations under the Treaty against the use or threat to use of nuclear weapons pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons.** (Iran's amendment)
- d) **Nuclear-weapon States should reaffirm existing security assurances noted by the United Nations Security Council in Resolution 984 (1995) and sign and ratify the relevant protocols on nuclear-weapon-free zones, drawn up following the requisite consultations, as elaborated in the guidelines adopted by the UNDC in its substantive session, recognizing that Treaty-based security assurances are available to such zones.**
- e) **Nuclear-weapons States should honour commitments not to target their nuclear weapons against any countries.**

**1.3 The Role of the Conference on Disarmament**

- a) All States should support the commencement by the Conference on Disarmament of negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, ~~without linkage to any other issue. (deletion requested by Syria)~~ Pending the entry into force of such a treaty, all States should maintain national moratoria on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices. (USA, CRP.2, EU)

A bis) Urges the CD to agree on a balanced and comprehensive program of work that includes, inter alia, immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral, internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, in accordance with the Report of the Special Coordinator (CD/1299) in 1995 and the mandate contained therein, within an appropriate ad-hoc committee in the CD. This would be a significant contribution to nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. (NAM)

- b) The Conference on Disarmament should reach a comprehensive and balanced programme of work so as to begin at an early date substantive discussions on negative security assurances.(China, India)
- c) The Conference on Disarmament should establish an Ad hoc Committee with a mandate to negotiate under the agenda item “ effective international arrangements to assure non –nuclear – weapons States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons” in order to reach an agreement at an early date on the elaboration of an international convention to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons (India, Russia );
- d) The Conference on Disarmament should establish an ad-hoc Committee on nuclear disarmament, **as the highest priority, taking into account all proposals which have been submitted by the members of the Group of 21 and the Five Ambassadors**, and commence negotiations of a phased programme of nuclear disarmament and for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time, including a nuclear weapon convention (NAM)
- e) The CD should start substantive work **on the agenda item “Prevention of an arms race in outer space”, to consider a Treaty on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space and the threat or use of force against outer space objects”** (NAM/Russia)

#### 1.4 Framework to achieve nuclear disarmament

- a) The IAEA must be supported so that it is capable of carrying out its assigned tasks in the areas of non-proliferation and ~~progress towards nuclear disarmament~~ (deletion requested by UK) [**peaceful uses of nuclear energy**]. (Syria, UK)
- b) The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is, and should be reaffirmed as, the cornerstone of nuclear disarmament, ~~and non-proliferation~~ **and peaceful use of nuclear energy. All provisions of the Treaty should be implemented without discrimination.** (Syria, China, EU)/(amendment by Iran)
- c) The universality of the NPT, **in particular in the areas of tension (Iran’s addition)**, should be promoted. (EU, Syria, African Union)
- d) Adequate support must be given to implementing nuclear disarmament resolutions adopted by the General Assembly and to activating United Nations disarmament mechanisms, including the First Committee, the Conference on Disarmament and the Disarmament Commission.(Syria)
- e) The Disarmament Commission is encouraged to reflect on the best ways of promoting universal adherence to the ~~existing regulatory framework~~ **international negotiated arms control and disarmament instruments**, especially the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. (France)/(amendment by Iran)
- f) The centrality of the UN Charter for peaceful resolution of disputes and the acceptance of the principle of “equal security for all States” should be reaffirmed (Pakistan)
- g) The relationship between the three non-NPT States and the NPT regime should be normalized (Pakistan)
- h) The UN disarmament machinery should be revitalized to address the international security, disarmament and proliferation challenges (Pakistan).
- i) **All States should fully support the implementation of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation Resolutions adopted by the UN General Assembly, The UN Disarmament Commission and the Conference on Disarmament.** (Cuba)

- j) **The UNDC should take note of General Assembly Resolution 61/67 and decide to undertake, at its 2009 substantive session to prepare elements of a draft declaration of the 2010s as the fourth disarmament decade and to submit them for consideration by the General Assembly at its sixty-fourth session. (Indonesia)**
- k) **To establish a comprehensive phased programme with agreed timeframes, for progressive and balanced reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery. (Indonesia)**

## **2. Recommendations for non-proliferation of nuclear weapons**

### **2.1 Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons**

- a) Nuclear Weapon States should reaffirm their commitment not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly, and not in any way to assist, encourage or induce any non-nuclear weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons (NAM)
- b) [NPT nuclear-weapon States parties should establish and enforce the controls necessary to ensure compliance with their Article I undertakings, and continue to consult among themselves periodically in an effort to ensure the application of all necessary control measures.](US) – (deletion requested by Iran)

**Alternative b) by Iran: NPT States Parties should abide themselves to implement the Treaty in all its aspects and to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, without hampering the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The universal adherence to the treaty and full compliance of all parties with its provisions are the best way to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.**

- c) [NPT non-nuclear weapons States parties **should refrain from activities designed to develop a nuclear-weapons capability**, adopt and enforce necessary national laws and regulations to comply with their NPT Article II and Article III undertakings, and provide transparency sufficient to demonstrate that their nuclear programmes conform to their non-proliferation obligations.](US) – (deletion requested by Iran)

**Alternative c) suggested by Iran: NPT States Parties have the obligation under article I, II, III of the treaty not to cooperate or give assistance in the nuclear or nuclear-related field to States not party to the treaty in a manner which assists them to manufacture nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.**

- d) [All NPT States parties should assess and enforce compliance with the Treaty's prohibitions on the manufacture and acquisition of nuclear weapons, as well as on seeking or receiving any assistance in the manufacture or acquisition of nuclear weapons, by non-nuclear weapon States. NPT States parties should identify and stop all such violations as early as possible, well before these activities result in the actual manufacture or acquisition of a nuclear weapon.](US) – (deletion requested by Iran)

**Alternative d) suggested by Iran: NPT States Parties reaffirms that IAEA is the competent authority responsible for verifying and assuring, in accordance with the statute of IAEA and its safeguards system, compliance with its safeguards agreements with States parties undertaken in fulfillment of their obligations under Article III, paragraph 1, of the NPT, with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.**

- e) [NPT States Parties should address material violations of the Treaty's non-proliferation obligations through appropriate means, including a halt to nuclear cooperation with the offending State party. The use of equipment or material acquired or produced as a result of a material

violation of the NPT's non-proliferation obligations would cease, and the offending State party would be required to return or eliminate such items].(US)- (deletion requested by Iran)

**Alternative e) suggested by Iran: NPT States Parties should enhance cooperation in the field of non-proliferation in all its aspects and seek solution to all concerns or issues related to n-n-proliferation of nuclear weapons in accordance with the obligations, procedures and mechanisms established by relevant international legal instruments.**

- f) [All States should support the activities of the Security Council when cases of nuclear proliferation, including non-compliance with Article I, II and III of the NPT, are brought to its attention. The Council should act promptly in such instances to determine a response, particularly when a case constitutes a threat to international peace and security].(US, EU) – (deletion requested by Iran)

Alternative f) suggested by Iran: **All States should support the IAEA Statute which has established a sound framework for international cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy and also mechanisms to deal with possible non-compliance with obligations undertaken under the safeguards agreements. All states should avoid unilateral measures which would undermine the authority and credibility of the Agency as well as its Statute.**

- g) [NPT supplier States parties should facilitate the fullest possible cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy by NPT compliant non-nuclear-weapon States, with due consideration for the needs of developing countries, and in ways consistent with the non-proliferation obligations and objectives of the Treaty]. (US) – (deletion requested by Iran)

**Alternative g) suggested by Iran: The undertakings of States parties to the NPT to facilitate participation in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be fully implemented.**

- h) [Nuclear cooperation should be suspended where the IAEA is not able to provide adequate assurances that a State's nuclear programme is designed exclusively for peaceful purposes, until such time as the Agency is able to provide such assurances]. (EU) – (deletion requested by Iran)
- i) [There should be an expansion of international partnerships, to include new donor and recipient States, in cooperative efforts, such as reducing global stockpiles of highly enriched uranium used in civil research reactors, and converting such reactors to the use of low-enriched uranium where possible. (US)] (deletion requested by Iran)
- j) The principles of transparency in the activities of States, support of, cooperation with, and providing the necessary assistance to the IAEA to carry out its assigned task must be firmly established. (Syria)
- k) To achieve the goal of prevention of nuclear weapons proliferation, States, as equal members of the international community, should promote dialogue and cooperation ~~as well as develop and improve the international nuclear non-proliferation regime.~~(deletion requested by Iran) (China)
- l) [Measures should be taken to discourage withdrawal from the NPT.] (EU) – (deletion requested by Iran)

**Alternative l) suggested by Iran: The full implementation of all provisions of the NPT without any discrimination, in particular non-discriminatory access to peaceful nuclear technology would be conducive to encourage and ensure the universality of the Treaty and preserve its durability.**

- m) **Nuclear proliferation should be addressed comprehensively by removing both its symptoms and its root causes. An enhanced security environment based on mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and cooperation for all members of the international community is critical to eliminate motivations of state to acquire, develop or maintain nuclear weapons.** (China)

- n) **Nuclear non-proliferation should be subject to and contribute to the maintenance of international and regional peace and stability as well as strengthening international non-proliferation regime. Thereby, concerns related to proliferation of nuclear weapons should be addressed through political and diplomatic means within the framework of existing international laws. (China)**
- o) **The fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory nature of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime should be preserved, while double standards discarded. Multilateralism is essential to the success of efforts in strengthening the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. The role of the United Nations and other international organizations should be given full play in this regard. (China)**
- p) **Nuclear non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy are complementary, and should be addressed in a balanced manner. While the legitimate rights of all countries for utilizing nuclear energy for peaceful purposes are guaranteed in compliance with the NPT, it is also necessary to prevent any states from engaging in proliferation under the pretext of peaceful uses. China)**
- q) **Non-proliferation measures should not jeopardize the full exercise of the inalienable rights of all States, without discrimination, to develop, acquire and use nuclear technology, equipment and material for the peaceful use of nuclear energy and to determine their peaceful nuclear programmes in accordance with their national priorities, needs and interests. (Iran)**
- r) **Nuclear Weapons States should withdraw and return all nuclear weapons deployed outside their own territories (Cuba)**
- s) **Nuclear Weapons States should stop immediately the qualitative improvement, development, production and stockpiling of nuclear warheads and their delivery systems. (Cuba)**

## 2.2 Prevention of risks of nuclear terrorism

- a) [All States should continue to comply with, and support the extension of, Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004), on preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and on strengthening export controls and nuclear material security.] (US,EU) – (deletion requested by Iran)
- b) All Member States should sign and ratify the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, facilitating its early entry into force **in accordance with their constitutional processes (Iran's addition).** (US)

**Egypt suggested replacing a) and b) with paragraph k) of 2.2: While recognizing that the most effective way to address the concern arising from non-State actors acquiring weapons of mass destruction is the total elimination of such weapons and noting SC resolution 1540 (2004), believes that measures to prevent non-state actors from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery and related materials should be adopted through a universally negotiated instrument.**

- c) **While reaffirming that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons (Iran), all States should undertake efforts to prevent, combat and counter nuclear terrorism, such as implementing the IAEA's Nuclear Security Action Plan, supporting the revised Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, and accelerating efforts to improve regulatory control of radioactive sources in more than 90 member States of the IAEA. (US, Rep. of Korea)**

- d) Measures should be taken to further strengthen **national** nuclear export control **in accordance with the respective international treaties**. ~~regimes and to support efforts by the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group in this regard (Rep. of Korea)/(amendments by Iran)~~
- e) The entry into force of the amended Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material at an early date should be promoted.
- f) There should be tighter security for high activity radioactive sources, ~~and G8 (deletion requested by Iran) and IAEA action in this regard should be supported (EU, US).~~ **Alternative suggestion by Egypt to f) and g): Proliferation concerns are best addressed through multilaterally negotiated, universal, comprehensive and non-discriminatory agreements. Non-proliferation control arrangements should be transparent and open to participation by all States and should ensure that they do not impose restrictions on access to material, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes required by developing countries for their continued development.**
- g) [In the light of the increased threat of nuclear proliferation and terrorism, the Proliferation Security Initiative, The Global Threat Reduction Initiative and the G8 Global Partnership Initiative should be approved.(EU)] (deletion requested by Iran)
- h) Effective export, transit, transshipment and re-export control, including appropriate laws and regulations for that purpose and criminal sanctions to deter illegal export, transit, brokering, trafficking and related financing, should be implemented at national level **in accordance with relevant international treaties** ~~compliance with SC Resolution 1540. (EU, US)/(amendment by Iran)~~
- i) All Member States should support international efforts within the United Nations framework to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery and urged all Member States to take an strengthen national measures, as appropriate, to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery and materials and technologies related to their manufacture (NAM).
- j) They should commit themselves to cooperating among themselves and with the IAEA and other relevant International Organizations to ensure that assistance is offered to States needing it for the implementation of the Resolution 1540 (2004) (Benin)
- k) **While recognizing that the most effective way to address the concern arising from non-State actors acquiring weapons of mass destruction is the total elimination of such weapons and noting SC resolution 1540 (2004), believes that** measures to prevent non-state actors from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery and related materials should be adopted through a universally negotiated instrument (NAM)

### 2.3 Nuclear Testing

- a) **Pending their ratification of the CTBT (Iran)**, All states should maintain national moratoria on nuclear testing (USA)
- b) The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty is an important step in the nuclear disarmament process. Countries, **in particular nuclear weapon States (Iran)** that have not done so should sign and ratify the Treaty, as soon as possible, so that it may enter into force at an early date according to its provisions, and the nuclear-weapon States should continue to observe their moratoria on nuclear testing. (China, CRP.2, France, EU, NAM)

- c) Nuclear-weapons States should refrain from conducting nuclear test explosions for the development or further improvement of nuclear weapons and maintain their voluntary moratorium on nuclear weapon test explosions since the CTBT's opening for signature. (NAM)

**Nuclear weapon States should refrain from conducting nuclear test explosions for the development or further improvement of nuclear weapons and maintaining their voluntary moratorium on nuclear weapon test explosions since the CTBT's opening for signature. (Iran)**

**Equal importance should be given to all verification components of the CTBT, and the integrity and credibility of the Treaty should be preserved. (Iran)**

- d) **Nuclear tests of any kind should be immediately stopped. In addition to undermining nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in all its aspects, nuclear tests are in themselves a threat to international peace and security. (Cuba)**
- e) **Nuclear Weapons States should aim at a diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination, in a way that promotes international stability and based on the principle of undiminished security for all. (reinsertion requested by Egypt)**
- f) **All Nuclear Weapons States should recognize that there is a genuine need to diminish the role of nuclear weapons in strategic doctrines and security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination. (Reinsertion requested by Egypt)**
- g) **All Nuclear Weapons States should stop immediately the qualitative improvement, development, production and stockpiling of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. (Reinsertion requested by Egypt)**

#### 2.4 Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones

**a pre) States in concluding agreements with a view to establishing new nuclear-weapon-free zones should apply guidelines adopted by the Disarmament Commission at its 1999 substantive session. (Russia)**

- a) The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, on the basis of arrangements freely entered into between States of the region concerned, should be encouraged as a step towards complete nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and towards reducing the danger of arms races in conflict zones. (Syria, CRP.2, EU, African Union, NAM, Pakistan)
- b) [The creation of a nuclear-weapons-free zone in the Middle East should be supported as a cornerstone for peace and security in the region] (Syria.)

**Supports the establishment in the Middle East of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and reaffirms the need for the speedy establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free-zone in the Middle East in accordance with the Security Council resolution 487 (1981) and the relevant General Assembly resolutions adopted by consensus and recalls that the 2000 NPT Review Conference reaffirmed the importance of Israel's accession to the NPT and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards, in realizing the goal of universal adherence to the Treaty in the Middle East. (NAM/SYRIA)**

- c) All States that have not yet done so should take measures to facilitate the entry into force of the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba). (AU)

- d) The competent authorities of the nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties should provide assistance to the States parties and signatories to those treaties so as to facilitate the accomplishment of the goals.
- e) The full participation of nuclear-weapons States is crucial for the effectiveness of nuclear-weapon-free-zones.

## 2.5 Safeguards and Peaceful Uses for Nuclear Energy

**Preservation of the balance between the promotional and regulatory activities of the IAEA is the best guarantee for integrity and credibility of the Agency. (Iran)**

**Reaffirms the basic and inalienable right of all States to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination. (NAM)**

**Expresses concern that undue restrictions on export to developing countries of material, equipment and technology, for peaceful purpose persist. (NAM)**

**Reaffirms that IAEA is the competent authority responsible for verifying and assuring, in accordance with the statute of IAEA and its safeguards system, compliance with its safeguards agreements with States parties undertaken in fulfillment of their obligations under Article III, paragraph 1, of the NPT, with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. (NAM)**

**Emphasizes that nothing shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable rights of all the parties to the NPT to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I, II and III of the Treaty. Reaffirms that each country's choices and decision in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be respected without jeopardizing its policies or international co-operation agreements and arrangements for peaceful uses of nuclear energy and its fuel-cycle policies. (NAM)**

- a) The universality of the IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols should be promoted. (China, EU, US, African Union)/**Alternative suggestion by Egypt: Comprehensive Safeguards and Additional Protocols should be universally applied once the complete elimination of nuclear weapons has been achieved.**
- b) NPT States parties should provide strong political and financial support for the rigorous implementation of IAEA safeguards, and provide to the IAEA credible information relevant to compliance with safeguards and obligations.(US) **NPT States parties should also provide strong political and financial support for technical cooperation in promoting peaceful uses of nuclear energy (China).**

**In order to meet the objectives of technical cooperation for peaceful purposes as enshrined in the Statute of the IAEA and in the NPT, sufficient resources together with full political support should be provided in order to ensure that the technical cooperation program remains firm, sustainable and predictable. (Iran)**

**The strengthening of IAEA Safeguards should not adversely affect the resources available for technical assistance and cooperation. The allocation of resources should take into account all of the Agencies statutory functions, including that of encouraging and assisting the development and practical application of atomic energy for peaceful uses with adequate technology transfer. (Iran)**

- c) All NPT non-nuclear-weapon States that have not done so should bring into force, at the earliest possible date, the safeguards agreement required by Article III.4 of the NPT, and thereby come into compliance with that Treaty obligation.(US)

- d) [All NPT States parties should endorse efforts to strengthen the ability of the IAEA to ensure that nations comply with safeguards agreements, including through the promotion of the work of the Committee on Safeguards and Verification of the IAEA Board of Governors.(US)] (deletion requested by Iran)

**(Alternative d) suggested by Iran) States Parties to the NPT should give their full and continuing support to the IAEA in fulfilling its verification responsibilities in accordance with its Statute.**

- e) All States should support the increased effectiveness of International Safeguards, verification measures, and national controls and laws to prevent proliferation (Pakistan)
- f) All States parties should cooperate with the IAEA at all times, including by granting ~~any~~ access ~~requested by the IAEA, consistent in accordance~~ with the **provisions of the** relevant safeguards agreement, ~~for purposes of facilitating confidence through enhanced transparency.~~  
(US)(amendments suggested by Iran)
- g) A clear distinction has to be made between the legal obligations of Member States under their respective safeguard agreements and their voluntary commitments, in order to ensure that such voluntary commitments are not turned into legal safeguards obligations (NAM)
- h) [The IAEA should act swiftly, in conformity with its Statute, to halt technical assistance and seek the return of any related materials from any IAEA member that fails to remedy non-compliance with an IAEA safeguards agreement in a reasonable period of time. (US)] (deletion requested by Iran)

**(Alternative h) suggested by Iran) The implementation of IAEA safeguard agreements should be in a manner designed to comply with article IV of the NPT, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development for the Parties or International Cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including of the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing undertakings of the States Parties to the NPT to facilitate participation in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy should be fully implemented.**

- i) [A reliable mechanism for providing nuclear fuel services at reasonable cost, through the establishment of international fuel centers as proposed by the Russian Federation and in GNEP and the Six Supplier States Proposal, should be assured for all NPT States parties that are in compliance with the Treaty and with their safeguards obligations, which possess civil nuclear power reactors (US, EU, Russia)] (Deletion requested by Iran as outside of DC mandate)
- j) NPT Supplier States parties **have the obligation to facilitate the fullest possible exchange of** ~~should provide~~ nuclear material, equipment, and technology to non-nuclear-weapon States **parties to the NPT. They should not impose or maintain any restriction with regard to NPT States Parties in particular those with comprehensive safeguards agreements.** ~~only if all their peaceful nuclear activities are under IAEA safeguards and they are in full compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations, including safeguards. NPT States parties in compliance with the Treaty should receive preference over non-NPT parties in regard to assistance to their peaceful nuclear programmes.~~(US)(amendment suggested by Iran)

**The States Parties to NPT should intensify their work in order to promote the implementation of inalienable rights of all States Parties, particularly the developing countries, to enjoy their established rights under the Treaty to have full access to nuclear materials, technologies, equipment, and scientific and technological information for peaceful purposes. (Iran)**

- k) [Nuclear-related dual-use items are not to be transferred to any non-nuclear-weapon State for any nuclear explosive activity or un-safeguarded nuclear fuel cycle activity, or if the transfers are contrary to preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, or when there is an unacceptable risk of nuclear terrorism. (US)] (deletion requested by Iran)

**(alternative k) by Iran) Imposition of undue restrictions on the rights of States Parties to the NPT for the peaceful applications of Nuclear Energy is a manifest violation of article IV obligations and challenges both the integrity and credibility of the Treaty.**

**Non-Proliferation Control arrangements should be transparent and open to participation by all States. Such arrangement should not impose restrictions on access for material, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes required by developing countries for their sustainable development. (Iran)**

- l) The amended Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material is important for setting standards for the protection of nuclear material used for peaceful purposes. All States should support efforts to strengthen the Convention and to increase the number of parties. (US)
- m) All States concerned should undertake to strengthen nuclear safety ~~and security measures~~ within **an international framework** ~~a global approach~~ aiming at promoting safe and accountable use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, taking into account the requirements for Non-Proliferation of nuclear weapons; (African Union); / (amendments by Iran)
- n) [The role of the UN Security Council should be strengthened, as a final arbiter, in order that it can take appropriate action in the event of non-compliance with NPT obligations, in keeping with the Statute of the IAEA, including the application of safeguards. (EU)] (deletion requested by Iran)

**The States Parties to the NPT should undertake not to take or assist, or encourage any action aimed at an armed attack by conventional or other means against nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes under full scope safeguards of the IAEA. (Iran)**

- o) Urging all States that have not yet done so to accede to the relevant conventions in order to strengthen nuclear safety, safe radioactive waste management and radiological protection (EU)
- p) Nuclear-weapon States should place under IAEA safeguards fissile materials transferred from military to peaceful uses to ensure that such materials remain permanently outside military programs (NAM)
- q) Each NPT State party's inalienable right to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in conformity with NPT Articles I, II and III should be respected (NAM)
- r) **There should be universal adherence by all NPT States parties to the IAEA Additional Protocol, and agreement among them that implementation of the Additional Protocol is a key standard by which to measure a party's commitment to its non-proliferation obligations under the NPT. (US)**
- s) **Adherence to the Additional Protocol also should constitute an essential new standard in the field of nuclear supply. (US)**
- t) **The adoption and implementation of Comprehensive Safeguards agreements, and Additional Protocols to them, is a pre-requisite to an effective and credible safeguards system and constitute a verification standard. (Germany)**