Home About News Action Donate Contact
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
Conference on Disarmament
General Assembly First Committee
UN Disarmament Commission
Special Session on Disarmament
Other...
Critical Issues
Publications
Treaties
NGO Contacts
Government Contacts
Calendar
Other...
Join

History of the Missile Control Regime

Bilateral and Multilateral Agreements

In September 1971 the United States and the Soviet Union signed the Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War, which entered into force from the moment of its signature and has an unlimited duration. The Agreement inter alia provides for an obligation of both Parties to notify the other Party in advance of planned missile launches in case missiles are launched beyond its national territory in the direction of the other Party.

In May 1972 the governments of the United States and the Soviet Union concluded the Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents on and Over the High Seas. The Agreement entered into force upon signature and remains valid for every following period of three years unless one of the Parties expresses its intent to terminate it. In accordance with this Agreement the Parties should notify each other in advance through Notices to Airmen and Mariners of their activities on the high seas presenting danger to military ships navigation or military aircraft in flight. Planned ballistic missile launches related to the use of international waterways pose such a danger, which makes it necessary to provide appropriate notifications. Through such notifications certain areas of the high seas are declared closed for navigation and aircraft in flight, though it is not required to report the character of the danger in the area. Notifications shall be presented not later than three or five days before beginning of dangerous activities at sea.

The Treaty between the USSR and the USA on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT II), which was signed but did not enter into force, contained an obligation for each Party to notify the other Party in advance of the conduct of multiple ICBM launches as well as single ICBM launches outside of its national territory in any direction. At the same time notifications of single ICBM launches were not provided for, if they were not planned to be conducted outside of national territory. Neither were envisaged notifications of submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) launches. It should be emphasized that not one of these earlier agreements provided for a comprehensive notification of all strategic ballistic missile launches- ICBM and SLBM.

In May 1988 the USSR and the USA concluded the Agreement on Notifications of Launches of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles which entered into force on the day of its signing and has an unlimited duration. According to the Agreement each Party presents a notification of the launch date, launch area and reentry impact area no less than 24 hours in advance of the planned launch as applied to any launch of a strategic ballistic missile: intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) or submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLAM). This Agreement was a new important step reflecting the intention of the Parties to reduce the danger of an outbreak of a nuclear war, particularly as a result of misinterpretation, miscalculation or accident.

The START I Treaty which was signed in 1991 and entered into force in 1994, contains the obligation of the Parties to notify of any ICBM or SLBM flight tests, including their launches to place objects into the upper atmosphere or space. In addition to the information included into advance notifications under the 1988 Agreements, the START I Treaty also provides for reporting certain important additional parameters of missile launches, - telemetry broadcast frequencies and modulation types used during the launches, etc. The provision of such additional data on planned missile launches increases transparency of activities undertaken by each of the Parties in the missile fields, decreases the possibility of appearance of a surprise factor in the strategic relationship between them and, as a consequence, contributes to global stability.

The Agreement between the USSR and the USA on Establishing Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, signed in 1987, was an important step in establishing mechanisms of notifications of the ballistic missile launches. These centers have been used, and continue to be used, to transmit appropriate notifications the list of which changes as new agreements are reached. To the present time notifications or ballistic missile launches are transmitted through these Centers under the above-mentioned agreements and treaties in force.

In addition to the Russian-American agreements on notifications of launches of ballistic missiles there exist mechanisms based on the principle of good will according to which such States as Great Britain and Norway notify Russia in advance of planned launches of their missiles and at the same time Norway notifies of sounding rocket launches inasmuch as since they are conducted in the areas observed by the Russian early warning system and may increase the danger of misinterpretation of the situation. This is a positive example of States cooperation with regard to controlling mechanisms in the missile sphere. Without doubt such forms of cooperation contribute to enhancing confidence between States and strengthening regional and global stability.

Since 1999 there an agreement has existed between India and Pakistan related to notifications of ballistic missiles launches.

The Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space which was opened for signing in 1975 and entered into force in 1976 provides a useful legal experience in the context of the problems we are discussing today. Any State may join the Convention at any time. This Convention established a registration mechanism of space objects that operates with the direct participation of the United Nations in the process. Information provided by the States to the UN for registration of space objects is fully accessible. Each State reports the following information on such objects:

- name of the State providing information on the object for its registration;

- designation of the object or its registration number in the national register;

- date and territory or site of launch;

- main parameters of the orbit of the object;

- general purpose of the object.

States may, at their own discretion, provide the UN with additional information on registered space objects. It should be noted that the registration of a space object takes place after its launch into space.
The Convention on Registration of Space Objects received a worldwide support and has already been in force for about 25 years. At the same time, it should be admitted that there is still no regime or practice of advance notification of launches of space delivery vehicles.

Source:
http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/mtcr/news/GSC_content.htm#concept

Global Control System
An international meeting of experts was held on 16 March 2000 in Moscow to discuss the Russian proposal to create a Global Control System (GCS) for the non-proliferation of missiles and missile technology. This new mechanism would be based on voluntary cooperation among the participating states and would involve no military enforcement measures or sanctions.

The GCS, with an emphasis on openness, would be a universal transparency regime for launches of ballistic missiles and space delivery vehicles, including, as a component, a multilateral advance notification regime for planned launches of such missiles, as suggested by several states on various occasions.

The GCS could involve:

- a regime of transparency and mutual information on missile launches. This would entail exchanging information on launches of missiles and spacecraft, and could be facilitated by the creation of an international technical centre dedicated, in particular, to observation;

- a security guarantee mechanism for the participating states having renounced the possession of WMD delivery systems, in order to protect those countries against any threat to their security;

- an incentive arrangement for those same states, involving, for example, international aid which could take the form of a contribution to the development of their national space programmes or to some other form of participation in space activities;

- an international consultation mechanism in order to improve upon the tools and mechanisms of the GCS and to resolve any problems encountered. Such a mechanism would guarantee the effective functioning of the system.

An important confidence-building component of the GCS is the Joint Data Exchange Center (JDEC), with the maintenance of the center's infrastructure under the auspices of a UN body. The JDEC would have the following primary tasks:

- to receive, process, and systematize data on planned and conducted launches of ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles;

- to formulate and convey reports containing information on planned and conducted launches of ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles to regime participants;

- to organize operational consultations of representatives of participating states on issues related to the conduct of launches of ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles;

A second important confidence-building component of the GCS is the missile launch transparency regime. This would provide for the voluntary provision of information (the timing, scope and format of which shall be agreed) on ballistic missile and space launch vehicle launches being prepared or already conducted, as well as the technical monitoring of missile launches with the help of detection and observation means. The implementation of the missile launch transparency regime could be assigned to a suitable international technical center. The Russians have suggested that the establishment of the transparency regime and corresponding international technical center should be based upon multilateral agreement.

Sources:
http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/mtcr/news/GSC_content.htm#concept
http://www.ceip.org/files/Publications/PikayevGlobalControlSystem.asp?from=pubdate
MTCR1
, p. 34 and 46

777 UN Plaza - 6th Floor - New York, NY - 10017 - Ph: 212.682.1265 - Fax: 212.286.8211 - info@reachingcriticalwill.org
This site was created by Kache Productions ©2008