Nuclear Terrorism

Physics is on our side: no fissile material, no nuclear explosion, no nuclear terrorism.
- Dr. Graham Allison

• Introduction
• Key Issues
• Solutions
• Government and UN Resources
• NGO Resources
• Academic Resources
• Media Resources
  

I firmly believe that our generation can build a world of ever-expanding development, security and 
human rights - a world "in larger freedom". But I am equally aware that such a world could be put
irrevocably beyond our reach by a nuclear catastrophe in one of our great cities.

In the chaos and confusion of the immediate aftermath, there might be many questions.  Was this
an act of terrorism? Was it an act of aggression by a state?  Was it an accident? These may not be
equally probable, but all are possible. Imagine, just for a minute, what the consequences would be.
Tens, if not hundreds, of thousands of people would perish in an instant, and many more would die
from exposure to radiation.

The global impact would also be grave. The attention of world leaders would be riveted on this
existential threat. Carefully nurtured collective security mechanisms could be discredited. Hard-won
freedoms and human rights could be compromised. The sharing of nuclear technology for peaceful
uses could halt. Resources for development would likely dwindle. And world financial markets, trade
and transportation could be hard hit, with major economic consequences. This could drive millions
of people in poor countries into deeper deprivation and suffering. As shock gave way to anger and
despair, the leaders of every nation represented here at this conference - as well as those who are
not here - would have to ask: How did it come to this? Is my conscience clear? Could I have done
more to reduce the risk by strengthening the regime designed to do so?"

- Kofi Annan, UN Secretary-General, 2000 NPT Review Conference, 2 May 2005

On 26 October 1979, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material was adopted in Vienna. The Convention “desired to avert the potential dangers posed by the unlawful taking and use of nuclear material,” and to protect nuclear material in use, storage, and transfer.

This convention indicates that the idea of individuals or states illicitly acquiring nuclear materials and using them to nefarious ends is not a new concept. The threat of nuclear terrorism has been considered in the international community for decades. However, with the attacks on the United States in September 2001, Bali in October 2002, Madrid in March 2004, and London in July 2005, the spectre of its potentiality has exploded onto center stage. Though history has sported various forms of terrorist attacks, many consider terrorism one of the most prevalent security threats of the early twenty-first century, particularly in the West.

US President George W. Bush has declared nuclear terrorism the “most horrifying” threat to civilization today, and has (theoretically) given it the highest priority in his National Security Strategy. To date, no detonations of illicitly obtained nuclear weapons, improvised nuclear devices, or radiological dirty bombs have occurred. But the potential threat of nuclear terrorism, in all its forms, is perceived to be increasing.

The four forms of nuclear terrorism, varying in likelihood and destructiveness, are:

• Theft or purchase by terrorists of a nuclear weapon from the arsenals of the US, Russia, or other nuclear powers
• Acquisition by terrorists of highly enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium for use in an improvised nuclear device
• Terrorist attacks on or sabotage of nuclear reactors or transport vehicles
• The building and use of radiological dispersal devices (RRD’s, or “dirty bombs”)

Risk can be defined as the probability of an event multiplied by its consequences. The higher the probability or the consequences, the higher the risk.

A study put out by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) called The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism explains that terrorist acts “with the highest consequences are the least likely to occur because they are the most difficult to accomplish. Conversely, those acts with the least damaging consequences are the most likely to take place because they are the easiest to carry out. Constructing and detonating an [improvised nuclear device] IND, for example, is far more challenging than building and setting off an RRD, because the former weapon is far more complex technologically and the necessary materials are far more difficult to obtain. Thus, an IND presents a less likely threat than does an RRD. In contrast, the consequences from an IND explosion are orders of magnitude more devastating than the damage from use of an RRD.”

While this type of risk assessment calculation is helpful in determining the likely occurrences and consequences of each event, it results in an understanding of the nuclear terrorism threat as an either very grave or very imminent threat, or both. Not all experts believe this to be the case. The difficulty of obtaining a constructed nuclear weapon, or even the materials to construct an IND, is extremely high – though not completely prohibitive. In addition, the risk assessment calculation does not take into account psychological damage, only physical damage. Every one of these forms of nuclear terrorism would cause severe psychological damage.

Regardless of the calculations one makes, the fact that the risk of nuclear terrorism exists is enough to warrant serious efforts to reduce it. And it is evident that such a risk does exist. Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) illuminates the crux of the nuclear terrorist threat when he explains how IAEA inspections in Libya and Iran revealed “the existence of an extensive illicit market for the supply of nuclear items, which clearly thrived on demand.”

As long as the material to make nuclear weapons exists, so will the demand. The Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) points out that that under the 1991 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives, “Russia will convert 500 metric tons of HEU from dismantled warheads to LEU by 2013. However, Russia will still be left with more than 550 metric tons of HEU. The United States, which possesses more than 740 metric tons of HEU, plans to convert or dispose of 174 metric tons that it has designated as 'excess to its future military needs.' But this process will not be completed until 2016 or later, after which the U.S. military will still retain some 570 metric tons of HEU.”

The existence, insecurity, and vulnerability of this material are several of the key issues discussed below, along with the questions of who is interested in it, why, and how they might go about obtaining it.

Key Issues

(1) Insecure nuclear materials and facilities
Highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium, the fissile materials that fuel nuclear weapons (see RCW’s nuclear fuel cycle) , have become increasingly accessible to other states and non-state actors since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Poor security at nuclear stockpiles in the former Soviet republics (including Ukraine, Belarus, and Uzbekistan), the unknown amounts of HEU and plutonium in North Korea and other countries, and inadequately safeguarded radioactive material all over the world give terrorists ample opportunity to acquire nuclear material, technology, and equipment. Even stockpiles of fissile material and nuclear technology in the United States are vulnerable to theft and trade.

As Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei explains, “the relative ease with which a multinational illicit network could be set up and operated demonstrates clearly the inadequacy of the present export control system. The fact that so many companies and individuals could be involved (more than two dozen, by last count) – and that, in most cases, this could occur apparently without the knowledge of their own governments – points to the shortcomings of national systems for oversight of sensitive equipment and technology. It also points to the limitations of existing international cooperation on export controls, which relies on informal arrangements, does not include many countries with growing industrial capacity, and does not include sufficient sharing of export information with the IAEA. . . . In a modern society characterized by electronic information exchange, interlinked financial systems, and global trade, the control of access to nuclear weapons technology has grown increasingly difficult. The technical barriers to mastering the essential steps of uranium enrichment — and to designing weapons — have eroded over time. Much of the hardware in question is ‘dual use’, and the sheer diversity of technology has made it much more difficult to control or even track procurement and sales.”

The Four Faces report on nuclear terrorism and research by the Nuclear Threat Initiative outline some of the core problem areas regarding insecure nuclear materials and technology:

Newly Independent States (NIS) – former Soviet republics
The largest inventory of weapons-grade fissile material is located in these states (most in Russia, but also in smaller stocks in Kazakhstan, Belarus, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan). Research by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies demonstrates that due to “economic and political turmoil, this material is vulnerable to theft. Since 1991, there have been numerous reports of the theft of such nuclear material from facilities in the NIS, and a close examination of open source evidence reveals 14 confirmed cases of theft or attempted theft of weapons-useable material from NIS facilities between 1991 and 2001.” In addition to these fourteen cases, there have been others involving the theft or loss of HEU and plutonium from NIS facilities “about which there is insufficient open source evidence to reach any firm conclusions.”

Russia
Despite the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives and other agreements between the US and Russia regarding safeguards for nuclear materials and reduction of stockpiles, hundreds of tons of plutonium and weapon-grade uranium “have yet to receive even rudimentary security improvements, while stocks of Soviet-origin, weapons-usable uranium remain vulnerable at research centers in other former Soviet states.” Approximately 1350 metric tons of plutonium and HEU (enough fissile material to produce about 40,000 nuclear weapons) is stockpiled in Russia. About 600 metric tons of this material is stored at more than about 50 sites in non-weapon forms. The rest is contained within nuclear weapons. In addition, Russia deploys some of its most portable weapons in areas were security controls are the weakest, and is unwilling to relocate its tactical weapons to storage.

Pakistan
The sale of sensitive nuclear technology by Pakistani nuclear scientists led to much concern over the security of Pakistan’s nuclear technology. Dr. Abdual Qadeer Khan illicitly sold weapons technology to Libya, North Korea and Iran. While Libya has since given up its nuclear program, Iran and North Korea’s intentions remain unclear. The US has accused the Iranian government of sponsoring international terrorism.

United States and Western Europe
US-origin plutonium and weapons-grade uranium at foreign locations and in the US may be vulnerable to attack because of flaws in protective measures. US and European nuclear power plants and research facilities are also susceptible to attack or sabotage.

(2) Feasibility of terrorists building, acquiring, or using a nuclear weapon
There are reasonable arguments for and against the probability of nuclear terrorism becoming a major international threat. Some academics and experts argue that most terrorists groups have no conceivable interest in or capacity to acquire nuclear weapons, because:

• Processing nuclear materials and developing nuclear weapons requires vast amounts of expertise, time, natural resources, equipment, and space.
• Nuclear weapon materials and technologies are expensive, even on the black market.
• Many terrorist groups aim to one day control the geographic areas they attack in their campaigns, and therefore would not want to irrevocably destroy those areas.
• Using a nuclear weapon could undermine political support for the terrorists’ campaign.

All of these considerations against using nuclear or radioactive devices in a terrorist attack are rooted in the motivations and belief structures of the terrorists in question – they do not all necessarily apply to every party or in every case. For some analysts, these implementation, moral, and tactical impediments are strong enough disincentives. As Professor Thomas Homer-Dixon of the Trudeau Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies writes in an article on complex terrorism, the “threats [of nuclear terrorism] certainly deserve attention, but not to the neglect of the likelier and ultimately deadlier disruptions that could result from the clever exploitation by terrorists of our societies’ new and growing complexities.” Charles Ferguson from the Council on Foreign Relations agrees that is very difficult "for terrorists to acquire nuclear weapons or weapons-usable fissile material," and that "firing a high-yield nuclear weapon on a ballistic missile adds at least another layer of difficulty for terrorists." He argues that at most, terrorists would be able to build a low-yield improvised nuclear device (IND) and use "relatively low-tech delivery vehicles." Ferguson also points out that "locks and arming codes built into most Russian and US weapons prevent easy use if they are stolen."

However, other academics and policy makers believe the ability and desire of non-state actors to build a nuclear bomb is reasonably high. Dr. Graham Allison, Director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and author of Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe, argues, “the chilling reality is that a terrorist group today would not need to assemble such a talented team, or spend that amount of money [as the Manhattan Project], to get its bomb. It no longer takes the mind of an Oppenheimer or a Fermi to invent a nuclear weapon.” He offers an example of one non-state, non-endowed actor who had great success with such an invention: “Standing on the shoulders of these giants, with documents like the Los Alamos Primer easily accessible in the public domain, a Princeton undergraduate in the 1970s constructed what could be a perfect terrorist weapon: a bomb the size of a beach ball with a 10-kiloton yield. Members of the physics department at Princeton who had worked on the Manhattan Project believed that the young man's bomb would work. All that the design lacked, and the only true obstacle standing between terrorists and a similar bomb, was the 26 pounds of highly enriched uranium (HEU) or 9 pounds of plutonium. Even 60 years ago, the same Manhattan Project physicists deemed the "gun-type" Little Boy bomb design so reliable that they never bothered testing it before detonating it over Hiroshima.”

Francesco Calogero of the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs agrees with Dr. Allison’s argument, stating: “the individual(s) involved in this enterprise need not have any knowledge of nuclear physics or of engineering that could not be acquired in a few weeks by an intelligent technically educated person from completely open, and easily available, sources (such as encyclopedias); nor would skills be needed beyond those of a competent bricoleur; nor would any significant health hazards be encountered.”

Therefore, the problem is not manufacturing a nuclear explosive device, but obtaining the materials necessary for it. While a difficult task, it is not impossible, and there is evidence that terrorists have tried to obtain such materials before.

(3) Terrorist networks seeking nuclear materials and technologies
Many studies have shown “there is significant evidence that both terrorist groups and states hostile to U.S. interests have sought stolen nuclear weapons or weapons-usable nuclear materials, and have attempted to recruit nuclear-weapons expertise,” as a report by the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) put it. The same report on nuclear terrorism outlines some of this evidence, such as “incidents of terrorist teams carrying out reconnaissance at nuclear weapon storage sites and on nuclear weapon transport trains in Russia, whose locations and schedules were state secrets, reports that the 41 heavily armed terrorists who seized hundreds of hostages at a theater in Moscow in October 2002 considered seizing the Kurchatov Institute, a site with enough highly enriched uranium (HEU) for dozens of nuclear weapons, and the 2003 criminal case involving a Russian businessman who was offering $750,000 for stolen weapon-grade plutonium for sale to a foreign client – and succeeded in making contact with residents of the closed city of Sarov, home of one of Russia’s premier nuclear weapons research and development (R&D) centers, the equivalent to the US Los Alamos National Laboratory, to try to close the deal.”

For further incidents of this sort, see NTI’s Anecdotes of Nuclear Insecurity.

While there is no evidence to suggest al Qaeda has successfully acquired nuclear or radiological weapons, there is plenty of evidence to suggest they have tried. Documents seized after the invasion of Afghanistan indicate that al Qaeda was determined to obtain WMD materials and technologies, though it is difficult to assess how far they got. Al Qaeda’s nuclear weapons program “was seriously disrupted by the loss of its base of operations in Afghanistan,” but this does not mean the organization has retired its plans.

For varying perspectives on the issue of al Qaeda and nuclear weapons, see reports by David Albright, the Nuclear Threat Initiative, NTI’s Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials Report Card, and the RAND Corporation.

(4) Feasibility of terrorists attacking nuclear facilities or building RRD’s
The Four Faces report argues that while protecting nuclear facilities (in the US and abroad) is manageable, it is not an “inconsequential” challenge. Not all US reactors have been given the same security updates since September 11th; many have officially been deemed under par. There are also numerous research reactors at universities that have virtually no security. An article by United Press International analyzing the new guidelines mandated by the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission and entered into the Federal Register on Monday, Nov. 7 found that "more than four years after Sept. 11, 2001, the 103 civilian nuclear reactors in the United States are still defenseless against direct air attack, and their minimum requirement for ground security has only been upgraded by a single security guard each."

Testimony by a senior scientist with the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) reported that “more than three years after the 9/11 attacks, UCS continues to have serious concerns about the adequacy of NRC [Nuclear Regulatory Commission] efforts to reduce the vulnerability of nuclear power plants to radiological sabotage attacks. If a team of well-trained terrorists were to succeed in gaining forced entry to a nuclear power plant, within a matter of minutes it could do enough damage to cause a meltdown of the core and a failure of the containment structure. Such an attack would have a devastating and long-lasting impact on public health, the environment, and the economy. A groundswell of public opposition to nuclear power would likely result, making it difficult for utilities to continue to operate existing nuclear plants, much less to construct new ones.” He argued that “the NRC has become too self-satisfied with the way it does business, too evasive about potential hazards, too unresponsive to external criticism, and too close to the industry that it regulates.”

The same concerns evidently hold for British nuclear security. In 2002 and 2003, Greenpeace volunteers, peacefully and completely unopposed, broke into Britain’s Sizewell nuclear power plant wearing bright red suits and Homer Simpson costumes. In October 2002 it took 25 minutes for security guards to approach them after they breached the perimeter fence and occupied rooftops. In January 2003 the volunteers were able to climb onto reactor domes before private unarmed guards approached them. Alarms were not sounded on either occasion.

As for RRD’s, potent radioactive devices are used in medicine, industry, and research around the world, much of which has “fallen outside of regulatory control,” according to the IAEA. University and medical research facilities are not very secure against theft of radiological materials. Creating an RRD is also a fairly simple task: it is a conventional explosive (i.e. dynamite) packaged with radioactive material that disperses when detonated. Therefore, “the simplest dispersion devices would require little more than a familiarity with the use of high explosives.” An al Qaeda document seized after the fall of the Taliban showed a hand-drawn diagram of a dirty bomb, and it is widely believed that the network had access to “radioactive contaminants as strontium 90 and cesium 137, which could be used to make a dirty bomb.” (See the Council on Foreign Relations)

Solutions

(1) Lockdown and eliminate existing fissile material and nuclear weapons and facilities
Academics, government officials, NGOs, and international institutions all believe that one of the most important elements of reducing the threat of nuclear terrorism is to secure nuclear materials and technology. Indeed, improving security and containment at nuclear facilities would make attacking such facilities less attractive. Obviously, eliminating nuclear materials would seriously impede terrorist networks’ ability to acquire such materials.

Such security requires what the Director General of the IAEA calls a comprehensive strategy, which “must encompass not only power and research reactors and their related fuel cycle facilities; not only waste storage sites and vehicles used in domestic and international transport; but also relevant research and academic institutions; and agricultural, industrial and medical institutions and applications where nuclear or radioactive materials are involved.” The IAEA has developed a strategy “to guard against thefts of material and to protect related facilities against malicious acts,” based on three main points of focus: prevention, detection, and response. This plan is outlined on the IAEA’s Nuclear Security website and in ElBaradei’s article on “Nuclear Proliferation and the Potential Threat of Nuclear Terrorism.”

Others, including academics and government policymakers, have developed similar strategies for combating the threat of nuclear terrorism. In his talk “Keeping WMD out of Terrorists’ Hands,” given at the Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies/Nuclear Freeze Campaign Anniversary Symposium in Cambridge, MA on 21 October 2005, Dr. Graham Allison emphasized his strategic approach to prevent terrorists from acquiring nuclear weapons: The Doctrine of Three No’s:

• No Loose Nukes – immediately securing all nuclear weapons and weapons-usable material
• No New Nascent Nukes – no new national capabilities to enrich uranium or reprocess plutonium
• No New Nuclear Weapon States (NWS)

While the first of these No’s seems reasonable (difficult but not impossible), the other two might give one pause. The restriction of national capabilities to enrich uranium and reprocess plutonium violates the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which grants every state the right to process their own fuel for peaceful nuclear energy if they choose to do so. The same technology that is used to process these fuels for nuclear weapons is needed to process them for nuclear energy.

And while no new NWS’s is obviously a very sound strategic decision, the other half of the NPT bargain is no new NWS in exchange for the current NWS disarming. Thus, the only way for Dr. Allison's approach to be consistent with the cornerstone of international disarmament and non-proliferation law is for "No fissile material, no nuclear explosion, no nuclear terrorism" to become "no nukes, no nuclear explosion, no nuclear terrorism." Securing weapons and facilities is a good first step, but eliminating them is permanent and consistent with international law. Dr. Allison did note in his presentation that a fourth No could be added: No Nukes, period. At the very least, No Nukes in Politics.

To those who argue that fissile material cannot be eliminated completely because of the need to produce nuclear energy, many intelligent people might tell you to find an alternative source of energy. As one Greenpeace volunteer pointed out, “terrorists are unlikely to blow up a wind farm or make a dirty bomb from a solar panel.”

(2) Delegitimize nuclear weapons
While perhaps not intending to touch on this subject in the controversial way which it could, and should, be interpreted, the Four Faces report does create a bridge to the delegitimization of nuclear weapons when it suggests that “another component of a nuclear terrorism prevention program might involve stimulating a more public vetting of the immorality of resorting to nuclear terrorism, recognizing that certain religions and communities might contain strong anti-nuclear sentiments.” The delegitimization of nuclear terrorism could easily become the delegitimization of nuclear weapons.

Throughout the history of nuclear weapons, sane people have argued that the first step to preventing nuclear terrorism or war and inspiring peace is to eliminate nuclear weapons from the national strategies of the most powerful nations on earth. As John Burroughs of the Lawyers’ Committee on Nuclear Policy (LCNP) asks, “Please try to imagine how much more effective [the US] would be in preventing the spread and the possible terrorist use of nuclear weapons if in its own security policy the role of nuclear weapons was marginalized rather than given a central place.” The vast majority of the world's people and governments want nuclear weapons to be eliminated.

(3) Encourage international cooperation, foster international law
Multilateral and bilateral cooperation is imperative to reducing the threat of theft and illicit trafficking of nuclear material and technology. Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei emphasizes that “international cooperation has become the hallmark of these security efforts. While nuclear security is and should remain a national responsibility, some countries still lack the programmes and the resources to respond properly to the threat of nuclear and radiological terrorism. International efforts are focused both on assisting these countries in strengthening their programmes, and on building regional and global networks for combating transnational threats.”

The threat of nuclear terrorism can also be combated at the level of international law, through established treaties, customary law, and new conventions.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is intended to ensure that Non-Nuclear Weapon States do not acquire nuclear weapons and that Nuclear Weapon States disarm. If all States Parties conform to their legal obligations under the NPT, the availability of nuclear weapons and materials would diminish significantly. Unfortunately, disputes over double-standards and questionable actions by some States Parties have threatened the authority of the NPT in recent years. (Please see RCW's Iran Report)

The 1979 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material is one of twelve anti-terrorism treaties. John Burroughs of LCNP explains the treaty's relevance: "It sets standards for the protection of nuclear material being used for peaceful purposes. It applies mainly to material in international transport. States agree that they will only export or import nuclear material if they are assured of certain physical protections as laid out by the convention. States are required to criminalize acts including the theft and fraudulent acquisition of nuclear material, and to prosecute or extradite alleged offenders. In July of this year, states parties agreed to amend the treaty to apply its provisions to activities within national boundaries as well as in international transport. However, it will take years for the amendment to enter into effect."

The 1991 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNI) between the US and Russia marks the first step toward reducing and consolidating American and Russian tactical nuclear weapon and delivery vehicle arsenals. While not effectively verifiable or legally binding, these “reciprocal unilateral commitments” built bilateral and international confidence. They resulted in the withdrawal from service of 17,000 tactical nuclear weapons (TNW), the removal of all TNWs from South Korea and most from Europe, the closing of 142 storage sites worldwide, and the reduction in the number of Russian and US military units with nuclear capabilities.

However, due to the classified nature of TNW deployment, it is difficult to determine to what extent the Initiatives have been followed since the reductions made in the early 1990s. At the 2000 NPT Review Conference, the Russian delegation reported that it “fully and consistently implemented its declared unilateral initiatives” in the field of tactical arms reduction. A Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) analysis points out that "the PNIs demonstrated both benefits and pitfalls of this approach to arms control. On the positive side, this approach saves time on negotiations, allows flexibility in implementation, and is “easier” to adopt in the sense that it does not require verification, inspections, or exchange of sensitive information. Negative features of this arms control approach include its instability, the mutual suspicions and accusations that can result from the lack of verification, and the right of either country to abandon its pledges without notifying the other."

The Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, led by US Senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar, established a framework for lessening "the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction, to deactivate and to destroy these weapons, and to help the scientists formerly engaged in production of such weapons start working for peace." With the fall of the Soviet Union, both the US and Russia became worried about the vast stockpiles of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons material spread across Russia and the other newly independent states. Russia requested the US's assistance in securing this material, which led to what the Friend's Committee on National Legislation describes as "a broad set of programs across different agencies, primarily the Defense, Energy and State Departments. Together, these programs have helped to protect, secure, and begin destroying nuclear warheads, delivery vehicles (such as bombers, missiles, and submarines), and hundreds of metric tons of weapons-usable material. Additional programs have helped redirect weapons scientists and engineers from defense work to civilian employment. These scientists, many of whom live under severe economic distress due to Russia’s economic climate, may want to sell their skills to terrorist groups or states. Helping to redirect the skills of the weapons scientists to productive civilian industries reduces the likelihood that a terrorist group or non-nuclear state could construct a nuclear weapon."

The G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction was announced in a statement delivered in Kananaskis, Alberta, Canada during the 2002 G8 Summit. It established official solidarity throughout the G8 to "prevent terrorists, or those that harbour them, from acquiring or developing nuclear, chemical, radiological, or biological weapons, missiles, and related materials, equipment, and technology." To implement these principles, the statement's authors launched an initiative to "support specific cooperation projects, initially in Russia, to address non-proliferation, disarmament, counter-terrorism and nuclear safety issues. Among our priority concerns are the destruction of chemical weapons, the dismantlement of decommissioned nuclear submarines, the disposition of fissile materials and the employment of former weapons scientists." In 2002 the Partnership pledged $20 billion over ten years for WMD dismantlement and destruction. Norway, Czech Republic, South Korea, and ten other non-G8 states have agreed to take part in the Partnership.

On 28 September 2001, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1373 a "wide-ranging, comprehensive resolution with steps and strategies to combat international terrorism." Under terms of the text, the Council decided that "all States should prevent and suppress the financing of terrorism, as well as criminalize the willful provision or collection of funds for such acts. The funds, financial assets and economic resources of those who commit or attempt to commit terrorist acts or participate in or facilitate the commission of terrorist acts and of persons and entities acting on behalf of terrorists should also be frozen without delay. "

On 28 April 2005, the Security Council passed Resolution 1540 on the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The resolution was intended to address the potential of WMD acquisition by non-state actors. It calls upon all Member States to enact national legislation criminalizing the development, acquisition, manufacturing, possession, transport or transfer of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery by a non-state actor. All Member States of the United Nations are obliged under this resolution to report to the Security Council subcommittee on 1540 (the 1540 Committee) on their progress implementing this resolution. Most states have submitted their reports, indicating, according to John Burroughs of LCNP, that the resolution "has spurred states to accomplish tasks already on the international agenda: for example, criminalization of chemical weapons activities, as already required by the Chemical Weapons Convention; and acceptance of the additional protocol to IAEA safeguards agreements, which gives the IAEA the power to inspect undeclared facilities in a country."

The International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism was adopted by the General Assembly on 13 April 2005, and will enter into force once ratified by 22 states. This new convention "addresses terrorist acts using, threatening to use, or aiming to use nuclear weapons or radiological bombs or involving damage to a nuclear reactor or facility." John Burroughs of LCNP points out that "[the treaty] excludes activities of armed forces during an armed conflict, while also providing that it does not address the issue of the legality of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons by states."

Unfortunately, further action on a comphrensive treaty against all forms of terrorism, including nuclear terrorism, has been "put off until February due to differences over a raft of issues ranging from the battle against occupation to the actions of regular armed forces." This comes as a disappointment to many states and NGOs, and to Secretary General Kofi Annan, who said "the adoption of a comprehensive convention against terrorism by 31 December will be a wonderful New Year's gift to the peoples of the world."

A UN press release explains that "finalizing the convention has been elusive. A major point of difference has been lack of agreement on whether the activities of "armed forces" proper should be exempted from the scope of the treaty since they are governed by international humanitarian law, and whether the exemption should also cover armed resistance groups involved in struggles against colonial domination and foreign occupation. There is also disagreement regarding activities of a State's military forces and whether there should be any circumstance in which official actions could be considered acts of terrorism. By other terms of the draft approved yesterday, the Assembly would strongly condemn all acts, methods and practices of terrorism, and reiterate that all acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public were unjustifiable. It would reaffirm its call for States to adopt measures to prevent terrorism in line with the UN Charter and other relevant provisions of international law, reminding them of obligations to ensure that perpetrators of terrorist acts are brought to justice. States would also be called upon not to finance, encourage, provide training for, or otherwise support, terrorist activities. States would be urged to ensure that their nationals and others within their territory did not engage in activities on behalf of those intending to commit terrorism-related actions. All States would be urged to become parties to relevant instruments and cooperate in assisting other States to become parties."

(4) Address root causes – “insecurity breeds proliferation”
The first link in the chain of necessary conditions for a nuclear terror act is the founding and organizing of a terrorist group with the desire for destruction (physical and psychological) of another state, area, or people. A chain can be broken at any link – and the nearer to the first one, the better. It is more efficient, though not necessarily easier, to stop the problem before it begins. Professor Thomas Homer-Dixon argues that “until we understand the sources of terrorism and do something about them, we can arms ourselves to the teeth, rampage across the planet with our militaries, suspend many of our civil liberties, and still not protect ourselves from this menace.” Therefore, we need to understand, and change, the underlying factors that make the threat of nuclear terrorism more likely to emerge in the first place.

So what are these underlying factors? Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei has emphasized an insight that has been demonstrated repeatedly - insecurity breeds proliferation: “It is instructive that nearly all nuclear proliferation concerns arise in regions of longstanding tension. In other words, nuclear proliferation is a symptom, and the patient cannot ultimately be cured as long as we leave unaddressed the underlying causes of insecurity and instability – such as chronic disputes, the persistent lack of good governance and basic freedoms, the growing divide between rich and poor, and newly perceived schisms based on ethnic or religious differences.”

Proliferation, the increase in and spread of weapon materials and technology, is the second link in the terrorism chain, for without the availability of materials and technology, there can be no terrorist attack (no fissile material, no nuclear explosion, no nuclear terrorism). Insecurity leads not only to proliferation, but to the desire to acquire and use weapons.

Prof. Homer-Dixon points out some of the driving factors of insecurity. Demographic explosions in areas such as the Middle East and South Asia have “produced a huge bulge of urbanized, unemployed young men – the most dangerous social group of all, according to many social scientists.” He also points to environmental factors, such as shortages of cropland and fresh water, chronic conflict that have shattered economies and created vast refugee camps, corrupt, incompetent governments, and the international political system whose economic globalization undermines local traditions, human rights, and the well-being of the citizens of the world’s poorest countries. “The receptivity of young men to terror's radical message is enormously increased by this legacy of conflict, dislocation, and -- yes -- poverty in the region. From the refugee camps in Pakistan's Northwest Frontier Province to the squalid streets of Gaza, we have ignored -- for far too long -- festering wounds of discontent.”

Others who have first-hand experience working with people from the areas of the world currently producing the most feared terrorists agree that conflict, dislocation, and poverty, often products of economic globalization and disrespectful Western policies, fuel anger and frustration in these regions. John Burroughs of LCNP believes “that if we want to be successful in preventing catastrophic terrorism in coming years and decades, it is crucial to come to understand and to remedy the origins of that anger and rage. That is as important, or more important, than any policy measure identified at this conference, whether it be port security or securing nuclear materials.”

Government and UN Resources

Documents:

Mohamed ElBaradei, Nobel Lecture (Oslo: Nobel Foundation, 10 December 2005)

Mohamed ElBaradei, "Reflections on Nuclear Challenges Today," Statement of the Director General (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Alistair Buchan Lecture, 6 December 2005)

"Annan disappointed at failure to agree on comprehensive treaty on terrorism," UN News Service (New York: UN News Centre, 1 December 2005)

"Despite Annan's call for anti-terrorism pact by year's end, panel puts off action," UN News Service (New York: UN News Centre, 30 November 2005)

"Ad Hoc Body Elaborating Comprehensive Convention on Terrorism to Reconvene Early Next Year, Sixth Committee Decides," UN Press Release (New York: Department of Public Information, 29 November 2005)

Matthew Bunn, “The Case Against a Near-Term Decision to Reprocess Spent Fuel in the United States,” Testimony for the Subcommittee on Energy, Committee on Science, US House of Representatives, 16 June 2005.

International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, 4 April 2005.

“Report to the President,” Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington, D.C.: WMD Commission, 2005)

US Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations, 15 March 2005.

Sara Daly et al, “Aum Shinrikyo, Al Qaeda, and the Kinshasa Reactor: Implications of Three Cases for Combatting Nuclear Terrorism,” RAND Project AIR FORCE Document Briefing (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2005)

Jonathan Medalia, “Nuclear Terrorism: A Brief Review of Threats and Responses,” CRS Report for Congress RL32595 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Services, The Library of Congress, 22 September 2004)

“Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction,” report of a Committee of Privy Counsellors, Lord Butler, Chairman (London: House of Commons, July 2004)

Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, “Nuclear Proliferation and the Potential Threat of Nuclear Terrorism,” 8 November 2004.

Mary H. Cooper, “Nuclear Proliferation and Terrorism,” CQ Researcher, Vol. 14, No. 13 (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 2 April 2004)

“Protection of German nuclear power plants against the background of the terrorist attacks in the USA on 11 September 2001,” Summary of the GRS Study (Bonn: Federal Ministry for the Envrionment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Summary, 27 November 2002)

G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (2002)

Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (1979)

Websites:

Defense Threat Reduction Agency

Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program

Ready.gov: US Department of Homeland Security

Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction (Butler Review)

US Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention: Nuclear Terrorism and Health Effects

NGO and Think-Tank Resources

Documents:

Why Highly Enriched Uranium is a Threat, Nuclear Threat Initiative

Radiological Terrorism, Nuclear Threat Initiative

WMD 411 Chronology - 2006, Nuclear Threat Initiative

George Bunn, "Enforcing International Standards: Protecting Nuclear Materials From Terrorists Post-9/11," Arms Control Today, January/February 2007.

Paul Kerr, "China Updates Nuclear Export Regulations," Arms Control Today, January/February 2007.

Peter D. Zimmerman and Jeffrey G. Lewis, "The Bomb in the Backyard," Foreign Policy, November/December 2006.

Andy Oppenheimer, “Averting radiation terrorism,” Jane’s, 9 December 2005.

Dr. Edwin S. Lyman, “Military HEU Stockpiles in the US and Russia,” Global Security Program Factsheet (Cambridge, MA: Union of Concerned Scientists, 8 October 2005)

Nick Schwellenbach, "EMPty Threat?" Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, vol. 61, no. 5, September/October 2005.

Richard G. Lugar, "Redefining the threat: In the struggle to keep nuclear materials out of the wrong hands, add complacency to the list of enemies," Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, vol. 61, no. 5, September/October 2005.

James R. Holmes, "The right stuff: A fighter pilot's guide to nonproliferation," Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, vol. 61, no. 5, September/October 2005.

John Burroughs, “International Legal Regimes Relevant to Preventing Terrorist Access to Nuclear Materials and Explosives,” panel on Loose Nukes and Dirty Bombs at Sheild New York Against Nuclear and Bio-Terrorism: A Call to Action (New York: John Jay College of Criminal Justice, City University of New York, 30 September 2005)

Sam Nunn, "The Day After an Attack, What Would We Wish We Had Done? Why Aren't We Doing it Now?" testimony before the 9/11 Public Discourse Project, 27 June 2005.

Friends Committee on National Legislation, "Threat Reduction Programs (Nunn-Lugar)," Background on Cooperative Threat Reduction (Washington, DC: Friends Committee on National Legislation, 1 June 2005)

Dr. Edwin S. Lyman, “Testimony,” to the Subcommittee on Clean Air, Climate Change and Nuclear Safety, Committee on Environment and Public Works, United States Senate, 26 May 2005.

Joseph Cirincione, “A Critical Conference,” testimony before the Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation, 28 April 2005.

Charles D. Ferguson and William C. Potter, The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism (Monterey, CA: Monterey Institute of International Studies, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 2004)

Greenpeace International, “Terror cargo lands in France: Nuclear proliferation danger increases,” Greenpeace News, 6 October 2004.

Bruce Blair, “The Wrong Deterrence: The Threat of Loose Nukes Is One of Our Own Making,” Washington Post, 19 September 2004.

Andrew George, “Megatons to Megawatts: The US-Russia Highly Enriched Uranium Agreement,” Nuclear Issues (Washington, DC: Center for Defense Information, 14 May 2004)

Dr. Valery Yarynich, “The Ultimate Terrorism,” Washington Post, 30 April 2004.

Greenpeace International, “Greenpeace exposes terror targets: Plutonium shipments in France, reactors in Germany vulnerable,” Greenpeace News, 4 March 2004.

Council on Foreign Relations, “Dirty Bombs,” Terrorism: Questions & Answers (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 7 January 2004)

David Albright and Holly Higgins, “A bomb for the Ummah,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 59, no. 2 (Chicago: Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March/April 2003)

Greenpeace International, “Greenpeace warns that Nuclear Waste Shipment would create a floating radiological bomb,” Greenpeace News, 11 March 2003.

Greenpeace International, “Hello, anybody home?: Greenpeace volunteers get into ‘top security’ nuclear control centre,” Greenpeace News, 13 January 2003.

David Albright, “Al Queda’s Nuclear Program: Through the Window of Seized Documents,” Special Forum 47, Policy Forum Online (San Francisco, CA: Nautilus Institute, 6 November 2002)

Dr. Henry Kelly, “The Terrorist Nuclear Threat,” testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 6 March 2002.

David Albright et al, “Does Al Qaeda Have Nuclear Materials? Doubtful, But…” Nuclear Terrorism Findings (Washington, DC: Insitute for Science and International Security, 1 March 2002)

David Krieger, "Nuclear Terrorism and US Nuclear Policy," WagingPeace.org (Washington, DC: Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, February 2002)

David Albright et al, “Bin Laden and the bomb,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 58, no. 1 (Chicago: Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January/February 2002)

Francesco Calogero, “Nuclear Terrorism,” speech given at the Nobel Peace Prize Centennial Symposium ‘The Conflicts of the 20th century and the Solutions for the 21st century,’ 7 December 2001.

Kimberly McLoud and Matthew Osbourne, “WMD Terrorism and Usama bin Laden,” Monterey Institute for International Studies (Monterey, CA: Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 20 November 2001)

Pugwash Council, “The Dangers of Nuclear Terrorism,” Statement (London: Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, 12 November 2001)

Reaching Critical Will, “Defining Terrorism and its Root Causes: references to the definition of terrorism and its root causes as discussed in the UNGA debate ‘measures to eliminate international terrorism’” (New York: United Nations, 1-5 October 2001)

Websites:

Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS): Chart of al Queda’s WMD Activities

Center for Defense Information (CDI): Nuclear Issues

Council on Foreign Relations: Terrorism: Questions & Answers

Federation of American Scientists (FAS): Terrorism and WMD

Greenpeace International: Nuclear Weapons

Nuclear Files.org: Nuclear Terrorism

Nautilus Institute

Nuclear Control Institute (NCI): Nuclear Terrorism – How to Prevent It

Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI)

Three Mile Island Alert

Union of Concerned Scientists: Nuclear Terrorism

Academic Resources

Documents:

Matthew Bunn and Anthony Weir, Securing the Bomb 2006, Cambridge, MA: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, July 2006.

Eli Kintisch, "DOE Pushing Spent Fuel Reprocessing," Science, Vol. 310. no. 5753, 2 December 2005.

Matthew Bunn, “The Nuclear Campus,” Boston Globe, 20 October 2005.

Graham Allison, “Small Steps Toward Nuclear Control,” Defense News, 19 September 2005.

Graham Allison, “Lockdown of Nuclear Material Best Way to Protect Charleston,” The Post and Courier, 19 August 2005.

Graham Allison, “Thwart Terrorists’ Dream of American Hiroshima,” The Albuquerque Journal, 12 August 2005.

Thomas Homer-Dixon, “Brittle Cities are Easily Broken,” Globe and Mail, 23 July 2005.

Matthew Bunn, “Incentives for Nuclear Security,” Conference Paper, Institute for Nuclear Materials Management 46th Annual Meeting, Phoenix, Arizona, 10-14 July 2005.

Matthew Bunn, “Building a Genuine US-Russian Partnership for Nuclear Security,” Institute for Nuclear Materials Management 46th Annual Meeting, Phoenix, Arizona, 10-14 July 2005.

Ashton B. Carter, “Worst People and Worst Weapons,” Statement before the 9/11 Public Discourse Project’s Hearings on “The 9/11 Commission Report: The Unfinished Agenda,” 27 June 2005.

Timothy Roemer et al, “Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction,” Panel Discussion held by 9/11 Public Discourse Project, 27 June 2005.

Matthew Bunn and Anthony Weir, Securing the Bomb 2005: The New Global Imperatives, Cambridge, MA: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, May 2005.

Thomas Homer-Dixon, “The Rise of Complex Terrorism,” Foreign Policy, January/February 2002.

Thomas Homer-Dixon, “Why Root Causes are Important,” Globe and Mail, 26 September 2001.

Websites:

Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe

Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs (BCSIA)

Back to top

Media Resources

BBC, "Georgia and US foil uranium plot," BBC Online, 25 January 2007.

Alexander Zaitchik, "Saving the World By Stopping the Pentagon's Programs," AlterNet, 22 January 2007.

Samantha Maiden, "Albanese undermines Rudd rethink on uranium," The Australian, 17 January 2007.

Simon SC Tay and Gavin Chua Hearn Yuit, "Nuclear options seductive, but dangerous," Channel News Asia, 12 January 2007.

H. Josef Hebert, "Bush picks new head of nuclear agency," MercuryNews.com, 6 January 2007.

BBC, "Polonium-210 found in restaurant," BBC Online, 4 January 2007.

Israel News Agency, "Israel Signs Nuclear Terrorism Convention," Desastres.org, 31 December 2006.

Benny Avni, "Iranians Stand Outside Nuclear Terrorism Effort," The New York Sun, 29 December 2006.

Paul Rincon, "Sophistication behind spy's poisoning," BBC Online, 28 November 2006.

William Langewiesche, "How to Get a Nuclear Bomb," The Atlantic Monthly, December 2006.

CP, “N.B. port gets Canada's first radiation detector,” Brandon Sun, 13 December 2005.

Jack Stripling, “UF changes reactor security after ABC report,” Gainesville Sun, 11 December 2005.

Gordon Prather, “Nuclear terrorism,” World Daily News, 10 December 2005.

Jennifer Macey, “Regulator queries safety provisions at Lucas Heights nuclear reactor,” ABC Australia, 9 December 2005.

Australian Associated Press, “Martin outlines dirty bomb fears,” ABC News Online, 8 December 2005.

Reuters, "September 11 Panel Leaders Say US Still at Risk," New York Times, 4 December 2005.

Rob Edwards, "Over 200 ‘abnormal events’ at nuclear plants since 2000," Sunday Herald, 4 December 2005.

Andy Lenderman, "Feds deny plutonium missing from lab," The New Mexican, 3 December 2005.

Andy Lenderman, "Group faults lab on plutonium records," The New Mexican, 1 December 2005.

Reuters, “Niger guards get nuclear training,” CNN, 1 December 2005.

Keay Davidson, "Plutonium could be missing from lab - 600lbs unaccounted for, activist group says," San Francisco Chronicle, 30 November 2005.

Global Security Newswire, "Report Alleges Missing Plutonium at Los Alamos," Nuclear Threat Initiative, 30 November 2005.

Shaheen Chughtai, "American Hiroshima - the next 9/11?" Aljazeera.net, 27 November 2005.

David Stout, “Student From Virginia Is Convicted of Plotting with Al Qaeda to Assassinate Bush,” New York Times, 23 November 2005.

BBC News, “US ‘failing to stem terror risk’,” BBC Online, 15 November 2005.

Gemma Jones, "Nuclear plant in their sights," The Daily Telegraph, 15 November 2005.

Jonathan Porter, "Nuclear reactor 'not easy to attack," The Australian, 15 November 2005.

Richard Macey, "Panic the real risk if Lucas Heights bombed," The Age.com.au, 15 November 2005.

BBC News, “‘Nuclear link’ to terror suspects,” BBC Online, 14 November 2005.

The Age, "Threat to Lucas Heights not the first," The Age.com.au, 14 November 2005.

Martin Sieff, "U.S. reactors helpless against air attack," United Press International, 11 November 2005.

BBC News, “Scotland tests disaster response,” BBC Online, 14 September 2005.

Gary Thomas, "9/11 Commission Members Fault US Response on Nuclear Proliferation, Detainee Treatment," VOA News.com, 14 November 2005.

BBC News, “Armed policy patrol nuclear sites,” BBC Online, 10 September 2005.

BBC News, “Security step-up at nuclear plant,” BBC Online, 1 August 2005.

John Mintz, “US Called Unprepared for Nuclear Terrorism,” Washington Post, 3 May 2005.

DeNeen L. Brown, “Canada arrests 19 as security threats,” Washington Post, 23 August 2003, p. A20.

James Risen and Steven Engelberg, “Signs of Change in Terror Goals Went Unheeded,” New York Times, 14 October 2001.

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