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Depleted Uranium
This fact sheet is also available in printable
PDF format.
Please also see the WILPF Norway report on
Uranium Weapons,
and the RCW Report on the Fourth International
Conference on DU Weapons.
Introduction
DU is a by-product left over when natural uranium ore is enriched
for use in nuclear reactors and nuclear weapons. It is a toxic,
dense, hard metal. If it is ingested, inhaled, or enters the body
through other means, it creates risks as both as a toxic heavy metal
and as a radioactive material. DU munitions explode upon impact
and release uranium oxide dust. It has been used by the US and other
militaries in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and both recent conflicts in
Iraq.
Uses
of depleted uranium
Because of its extreme density, and the need to dispose of the
stockpiles of depleted uranium generated by nuclear enrichment,
DU has been used in both the military and civilian sectors. DU is
pyrophoric, thus 30% of the mass of DU munitions explode upon impact,
increasing penetration efficacy and releasing uranium oxide dust.
It has been used by the US and other militaries in Kosovo, Afghanistan,
and both conflicts in Iraq.
Military:
-Tank armor/shielding
-Anti-armor munitions
Military and Civilian:
- Radiation shielding
- Helicopter counterweights
- Yacht keels
- Ballasts in aircraft
As a byproduct
of nuclear energy and weapons production, “DU is stored
by the U.S. Department of Energy, which allegedly gives it free-of-charge
to U.S. armaments companies and sells it to more than twenty other
countries.”
United Nations
and World Health Organization positions
In a resolution regarding weapons of mass destruction,
the UN
Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of
Minorities passed a resolution
urging “all States to be guided in their national policies
by the need to curb the production and the spread of weapons of
mass destruction or with indiscriminate effect, in particular nuclear
weapons, chemical weapons, fuel-air bombs, napalm, cluster bombs,
biological weaponry and weaponry containing depleted uranium.”
British and American coalition forces using depleted uranium (DU)
shells in the war against Iraq are deliberately contravening this
United Nations resolution which classifies the munitions as weapons
of mass destruction.
The WHO’s depleted
uranium fact sheet notes an increased probability of lung cancer
in uranium mine workers, but attributes this to the miners’
exposure to radioactive materials other than depleted uranium. The
WHO further states that no reproductive or developmental effects
have been reported in humans. However, uranium released from embedded
fragments (ie shrapnel wounds) may accumulate in the central nervous
system (CNS) tissue, and some animal and human studies are suggestive
of effects on CNS function, it is difficult to draw firm conclusions
from the few studies reported. The one area of potentially demonstrable
health hazard is liver and kidney damage due to long-term exposure,
because both the kidneys and liver help to filter ingested uranium
out of the human body.
UN General
Assembly Resolutions
In 2002, Iraq sponsored draft resolution
A/C.1/57/L.14
in the General Assembly, entitled "Effects of the use of depleted
uranium in armaments." According to this draft resolution,
the Assembly would request the Secretary-General to seek the views
of States and relevant organizations on all aspects of the effects
of the use of depleted uranium in weapons and report to the Assembly.
Paragraph 4 of 57/L.14
reads: "Taking into account the facts that have come to light on
the use of depleted uranium shells in military operations during
recent years, inasmuch as such ammunition, when used, releases radioactive
particles and chemical dust that are spread through the air over
large areas and contaminate animal and plant life and the soil."
The resolution, unlike the vast majority of other resolutions tabled
at the First Committee, did not pass.
In 2007, the Non-Aligned Movement tabled
draft resolution A/C.1/62/L.18,
"Effects of the use of armaments and ammunitions containing
depleted uranium." The resolution considers the potential harm
caused by DU armaments and ammunitions on human health and the environment,
and subsequently requests the Secretary-General "seek the view
of Member States and relevant international organizations"
on these harmful effects and submit a report to the General Assembly
next year. It also requests member states "refrain from using
armaments and ammunitions containing depleted uranium until studies
to determine the effects of such armaments and ammunitions on human
health and the environment are completed."
Before voting commenced in the First Committee,
the Non-Aligned Movement tabled a revised version of the draft resolution.
The new text, A/C.1/62/L.18/Rev.1,
does not contain operative paragraph 2, which requested member states
“refrain from using armaments and ammunitions containing depleted
uranium until studies to determine the effects of such armaments
and ammunitions on human health and the environment are completed.”
The deletion of this paragraph means the resolutiononly requested
the UN Secretary-General “seek the views of Member States
and relevant international organizations on the effects of the use
of armaments and ammunitions containing depleted uranium,”
and “submit a report on this subject to the General Assembly
at its sixty-third session.” Though the revised text is significantly
less substantive than the original, the deletion of this paragraph
was key to its adoption—and was instrumental for dividing
NATO member states. Of the 26 NATO countries, only five voted against
the resolution. France, the United Kingdom, and the United States
rejected it, along with the Czech Republic and the Netherlands,
but Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Denmark, Estonia, Greece, Hungary,
Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Norway, Poland, Portugal,
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, and Turkey abstained, while
Germany and Italy voted in favour.
Indonesia's
delegate, speaking on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement to
present the revised text before the vote, argued, “There is
not yet a clear understanding of the full impact that fine particles
of DU may have on the human body,” and the International Atomic
Energy Agency, the World Health Organization, and the UN Environment
Programme “have all stated that more research is needed with
respect to the immediate and/or long-term health or environmental
effects of DU munitions.” He also indicated that L.18/Rev.1
“excludes controversial issues that were introduced in a previous
resolution on this issue to the First Committee.” However,
in her explanation of vote before the vote, Ambassador Rocca of
the United
States insisted that L.18/Rev.1 ignores scientific evidence
on the subject, and encouraged delegations to “wisely defeat”
the resolution as they did in 2002. Fortunately, delegates ignored
this call, and adopted the resolution with 122 in favour, 6 against,
and 35 abstentions. The NAM, encouraged that the issue is now inscribed
on the First Committee's agenda, intends to return with a stronger
resolution in the sixty-third session.
For coverage of this resolution at the United Nations,
please see the First Committee Monitor Week
3 and Final
Edition.
NATO and European
Perspectives
NATO
In 2001, the governments of many NATO countries
called for urgent investigations into the use of depleted uranium
(DU) in weapons in Bosnia and Kosovo after soldiers from nine countries
reported developing leukaemia, and the UN found radioactive contamination
at sites where DU weapons were used. At the time, the US, Germany,
the UK, Spain, and Turkey argued they found no evidence of a link
between DU and increased cancer rates among peacekeepers serving
in the region, but Italy, France, Belgium, the Czech Republic, and
Portugal expressed apprehension and called for further investigation
of the issue. The Secretary General of NATO established an Ad
Hoc Committee on Depleted Uranium, which concluded
in November 2001 that “at present there is no scientific link
established between DU and health complaints.”
European Parliament
On Jan. 17, 2001 the European Parliament
resolved, among other things, to “[Call] on the Member States
that are also NATO members to propose that a moratorium be placed
on the use of depleted uranium weapons in accordance with the precautionary
principle as defined in the Council resolution adopted at the European
Council meeting in Nice and the European Parliament's resolution
on the subject.”
Likewise on Feb. 13, 2003, the EP called on its executive
body the European Council, “to support independent and thorough
investigations into the possible harmful effects of the use of depleted
uranium ammunition (and other types of uranium warheads) in military
operations in areas such as the Balkans, Afghanistan and other regions;
[especially] on military personnel serving in affected areas and
the effects on civilians and their land; [and called] for the results
of these investigations to be presented to Parliament …
The 2003 resolution further called for “Member States -- in
order to play their leadership role in full -- to immediately implement
a moratorium on the further use of cluster ammunition and depleted
uranium ammunition (and other uranium warheads), pending the conclusions
of a comprehensive study of the requirements of international humanitarian
law..."
On 17 November 2005, the European Parliament
issued for the third time a call for a moratorium on the use of
so-called "depleted” uranium munitions. The resolution regarding
depleted uranium is part of an 11-page document entitled, “Texts
adopted by European Parliament, on non-proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction; A role for the European Parliament.”
The Resolution's section No. 82 says the EP, “Reiterates its
call for a moratorium -- with a view to the introduction of a total
ban -- on the use of so-called ‘depleted uranium munitions.’”
The legal basis for the moratorium was detailed early in the document,
which stated that “all European Union Member States are Parties
to the major multilateral agreements that make up the non-proliferation
regime, namely the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT),
the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), the 1993
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the 1996 Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty (CTBT).”
The Resolution made pointed mention of the fact that, “two
Member States, the UK and France, are nuclear-weapon states as defined
in the NPT, and that U.S. tactical weapons are stationed on the
territories of many more Member States: Germany, Italy, the United
Kingdom, Greece, the Netherlands and Belgium and states applying
for EU membership, Turkey in particular.”
(Thanks to Davey Garland of NucNews for the EU report.)
Beglium's moratorium
In March 2007, citing among other reasons the precautionary
principle, Belgium became the first country to ban
the manufacture, use, storage, sale, acquisition, supply, and transfer
of DU ammunitions and armour in its territory. Belgium is not a
user of DU, but US DU shipments travel regularly through its port
of Antwerp. Unfortunately, Belgium abstained from L.18/Rev.1. In
a general statement before voting commenced, Cuba's Rodolfo Benítez
Verson expressed regret that certain states did not vote in favour—not
because they necessarily disagreed with the text, but because they
felt they needed to show political solidarity to their respective
alignments.
Other perspectives
A recent
news article reported that “Although the Pentagon has
sent mixed signals about the effects of depleted uranium, Iraqi
doctors believe that it is responsible for a significant increase
in cancer and birth defects in the region. Many researchers outside
Iraq, and several U.S. veterans organizations, agree; they also
suspect depleted uranium of playing a role in Gulf War Syndrome,
the still-unexplained malady that has plagued hundreds of thousands
of Gulf War veterans.”
After
conflicts such as those in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the former
Yugoslavia, “the extent of environmental contamination from
DU particles and penetrator fragments left in the soil depends on
corrosion rates, the amount of soil resuspension, the depth of DU
penetrators buried in the soil, and the water sources that feed
into local water supplies - which may also influence the extent
of DU uptake by plants and animals. However, uncertainties in estimates
about inhalation intakes, as well as exposure from food and water
after a conflict, result from a lack of knowledge about local soil
conditions and human behavior, and a lack of empirical information
on human DU exposure.” Although the US government has not
taken significant action to screen veterans for DU exposure or provide
training prior to combat duty, some states such as Connecticut have
taken such actions towards these ends. The Department of Defense
has done some study of DU effects, but this needs to be taken further,
and performed by researchers outside of the military who do not
have vested interests in the maintenance of DU usage or minimizing
Department of Defense liability or negative publicity related to
DU health hazards.
Resources
Featured Resources:
Uranium
Weapons: Consequences for Health and Environment
by Eva Fidjestøl, WILPF Norway
Translated from Norwegian by Government Authorized
Translator Ada Kahrs
WILPF Norway (IKFF) is one of 35 national sections
of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom. It has
been actively engaged in campaigns about many aspects of the nuclear
age, including nuclear weapons, nuclear energy, and radioactive
waste.
In this new report by WILPF Norway, Physicist Eva
Fidjestøl manages to show the complex problems related to
uranium weapons clearly and simply. She explains the wide
range of problems related to the uranium industry - from
the initial chemical-physical processes on to its military
uses, from research in the field of health and environment in addition
to the political and economical aspects of production and the
disposal of waste. She calls attention to the false assumptions
on which the debate on uranium weapons has been based, and to the
silence about the threat to mankind by the use of these weapons
in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Kosovo.
The report is written in a way that enables both
to the lay reader as well as the specialist to find something of
interest in it. It can be recommended to teachers, readers/lecturers,
doctors, health personnel, students, and private persons.
Hardcopy editions of the report are available by contacting:
IKFF-Bergen
c/o Susanne Urban, Torgallmenning 7
E-mail: susanne@urbanrabbe.no
Tel: 0047-55 36 66 00
Report
on the Fourth International Conference on DU Weapons
by Anna Walther, Reaching Critical Will, WILPF
Conference hosted by the International
Coalition to Ban Uranium Weapons (ICBUW)
Joint
Communique from Scientists on the UN resolution concerning DU weapons
drafted by Katsumi Furitsu M.D., Ph.D. and Gretel Munroe,
20 November 2007
Additional Resources:
Saltzman, Rachel, “Innocent until Proven Guilty: Military
Use of Depleted Uranium,” Roosevelt Review, Summer 2005. http://rooseveltinstitution.org/news-files/review/saltzman.pdf
UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection
of Minorities Resolution 1996/16, August 29, 1996, E/CN.4/SUB.2/RES/1996/16,
http://prop1.org/2000/du/resource/000310un.htm#res1
World Health Organization, Depleted Uranium Fact Sheet, http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs257/en/
Larry Johnson, “Iraqi cancerns, birth defects blamed on U.S.
Depleted uranium,” Seattlepi.com, 12 November 2002, http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/national/95178_du12.shtml
Hilborne, Lee H. and Beatrice Alexandra
Golomb. "A Review of Scientific Literature as it Pertains to Gulf
War llnesses," Infectious Diseases, 2000, Vol. 1. http://www.gulflink.osd.mil/library/randrep/infectious_paper/
"Depleted Uranium: Scientific Basis
for Assessing Risk," Nuclear Policy Research Institute,
July 2003, p22, 22p. http://www.nuclearpolicy.org/Documents/DU_report_final_7_6.pdf
Bertell, Rosalie, Ph. D, "Gulf War
Veterans and Depleted Uranium," Prepared for the Hague Peace Conference,
May 1999. http://www.ccnr.org/du_hague.html
Fahey, Dan. "Science or Science Fiction?
Facts, Myths and Propaganda in the Debate Over Depleted Uranium
Weapons." March 2003.
http://www.antenna.nl/wise/uranium/pdf/dumyths.pdf
Mackay, Neil. "US Forces' Use of Depleted
Uranium Weapons is Illegal," Sunday Herald, March 30, 2005.
http://www.sundayherald.com/32522
Caldicott, Helen. Editorial, Baltimore
Sun, October 6, 2002. http://traprockpeace.org/caldicottondu.html
Pellmar TC, Fuciarelli AF, Ejnik
JW, Hamilton M, Hogan J, Strocko S, Emond C, Mottaz HM, Landauer
MR. "Distribution
of uranium in rats implanted with depleted uranium pellets."
Toxicol Sci. 1999 May;49(1):29-39.
Moret, Leuren. "Depleted Uranium: Dirty Bombs, Dirty Missiles,
Dirty Bullets," San Francisco Bay View, August 2004. http://www.sfbayview.com/081804/Depleteduranium081804.shtml.
Government
Sources
British
Ministry of Defense: background and briefs
British
Ministry of Defense Oversight Committee on Depleted Uranium (DUOB):
fact sheets, information, meeting agendas
U.S.
Department of Defense Deployment Health Support Directorate:
military website with background information, uses of DU, statistics,
links to governmental reports
U.S.
Department of Energy: DU management information, documents,
news and events, glossary
NGO Resources
Abolition 2000 working group: basic information and links
Awakened
Women Project: e-magazine articles
BBC
News page: excellent resource for DU news
Campaign
Against Depleted Uranium (CADU) : history, CADU News since 2000
The diagram on the Campaign Against Depleted Uranium (CADU) website
shows how DU enters the body.
Christian
Science Monitor: "Trail of a Bullet: The Depleted Uranium
Issue," links and articles
Energy
Justice: email lists, national legislation, reports, and websites
For
Mother Earth: DU campaign
The
Guardian: articles
Information
Clearing House: Military DU video
Institute
for Energy and Environmental Research
International
Action Center: Depleted Uranium Education Project, news articles,
Medal of Dishonor
The
International Coalition to Ban Uranium Weapons: factsheet series,
articles
International
Depleted Uranium Study Team: articles, books and videos, and
documents. This NGO is made up of international researchers, activists
and scientists with a global strategy to stop the use of DU in military
weapons by the year 2010.
Medical
Association for Prevention of War: http://www.mapw.org.au/mapw-policy/03-11uranium.html
for full policy
Nuclear
Policy Research Institute: scientific documents, power point
presentations, information about DU usage in the 2003 Iraq war,
articles, media files
Pandora DU Research
Project: links, articles, health effects
The Post-Conflict Assessment Unit (PCAU): United Nations Environment
Programme
Stop
NATO: Depleted Uranium Watch: articles and links
Traprock
Peace Center: projects, interviews, articles
Uranium
Medical Research Center: research, papers, articles, conferences,
and background information
Victorian
Peace Network: animation, lists and links
WILPF
Australia
World
Depleted Uranium Weapons Conference
World Information Service on Energy (WISE): background info,
civilian use, military use
Reaching Critical Will articles and reports:
The
Dirty Dozen report - Alliant
Techsystems is the largest supplier of large and small
caliber munitions employing depleted uranium penetrators.
News in Review, 3 May 2004
News in Review, 2 May
2003
News in Review, 12 May
2000
First Committee Monitor, October
20-24, 2003
777 UN Plaza - 6th Floor - New York, NY - 10017 - Ph: 212.682.1265 - Fax: 212.286.8211 - info@reachingcriticalwill.org
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