Joint Communiqué from Scientists
On the UN Resolution Concerning Depleted Uranium Weapons
On November the 1st, the resolution entitled 'Effects of the use
of armaments and ammunitions containing depleted uranium' was passed
at the UN First Committee by an overwhelming majority. The resolution
was drafted by the Movement of Non-Aligned States and submitted
by Indonesia. We the scientists who have been concerned about the
harmful effects of depleted uranium (DU) weapons, welcome this resolution.
The resolution was adopted, because the majority of UN member states
took ‘into consideration the potential harmful effects of
the use of armaments and ammunitions containing depleted uranium
on human health and the environment’ (Preparatory Paragraph:
PP 4); ‘convinced that as humankind is more aware of the need
to take immediate
measures to protect the environment, any event that could jeopardize
such efforts requires urgent attention to implement the required
measures’ (PP 3). It was also ‘guided by the purposes
and principles enshrined in the Charter of the UN and the rules
of Humanitarian International Law’ (PP 1) and showed the determination
‘to carry forward negotiations on arms regulation and disarmament’
(PP 2) on the issue of DU weapons.
We are convinced that, and expect that, this resolution will be
the first step to place the issue of DU weapons on the disarmament
agenda, following the issues of Landmines and Cluster Munitions,
and the beginning of a serious discussion about the deleterious
nature of DU weapons and a possible ban, among the member nations
of the UN.
We really respect and appreciate the effort of the leading countries
on behalf of this resolution. We also appreciate the support from
all the countries that voted for the resolution. We request and
believe that these supportive countries will vote for the resolution
again at the Plenary Session in December.
We strongly urge the countries that abstained from voting, to seriously
reconsider the international meaning of the resolution stated in
the PPs and to vote in its support at the Plenary Session, based
on the independent political will of each country.
There is mounting scientific research, including studies reported
in the most recently peer -reviewed papers, which clearly indicate
‘the potential harmful effects of the use of armaments and
ammunitions containing depleted uranium on human health and the
environment’. We think that the previous reports from a number
of governmental bodies
and international organizations have not yet fully reflected and
referenced these scientific studies. They mainly focus on the radiological
toxicity to the lung and the chemical toxicity to the kidneys. It
is not right to vote against the resolution based on those previous
reports, without considering these omissions.
The countries which voted against the resolution, should seriously
consider such circumstances, take account of the multilateralism
and dialogue with many other countries which are concerned about
the effect of these weapons and at least come to the table to discuss
the issue. Therefore, we urge these countries to change their previous
stance and vote to support the resolution at the coming Plenary
Session.
We, the scientists who have been working as specialists in different
scientific fields including medicine, chemistry, biology, physics,
environmental science and epidemiology, have been deeply concerned
about the potentially harmful effects on the environment and human
health, which may be caused by the radioactive and chemical toxicity
of DU following the use of DU weapons.
DU is ‘nuclear waste’ produced from the enrichment
process and is mostly made up of the alpha emitting isotope Uranium
238 and is depleted in the fissionable isotope Uranium 235, as compared
to concentrated natural uranium (NU). DU is somewhat less radioactive
than NU, yet has about 60% of the radioactivity of concentrated
NU (NU in nature is a thousand times less concentrated). DU is mostly
an alpha emitter, a very damaging type of radioactivity inside the
body. DU and NU are identical in terms of the chemical toxicity,
which is also a source of potential damage to the body. With regard
to DU’s radioactivity, it is well known that concentrated
DU is one of a number of radioactive materials, which are strictly
controlled by laws in most of the countries of the world.
Uranium’s high density gives DU shells increased range and
penetrative power. This density, combined with uranium’s pyrophoric
nature, results in a high-energy kinetic weapon that can punch and
burn through armour plating. Striking a hard target, DU munitions
create extremely high temperatures of more than 3000oC. The uranium
immediately burns and vaporizes into an aerosol, which is easily
diffused in the environment, while the shell is penetrating the
target. The uranium particles formed by this heat are unlike forms
of naturally formed uranium in terms of their size (10 to 100 times
smaller). These extremely small particle sizes are known to be much
more toxic and more rapidly absorbed from the lungs than larger
(micron-sized) particles.
Aerosolized DU dust can easily spread over the battlefield, and
can be re-suspended by the winds especially where the climate is
dry, spreading over civilian areas, sometimes even crossing international
borders. Therefore, not only the military personnel but also the
civilians, including children who are very sensitive to such toxic
substances, might inhale the fine DU particles and internalize them
in their bodies. It was also recognized that DU weapons were actually
used even in highly populated residential areas. The contamination
also continues after the cessation of hostilities. DU particles
will remain in the environment and retain their radiation for decades
and centuries if not longer. Taking these aspects of DU weapons
into account, we consider that DU weapons are illegal under binding
international humanitarian, human rights and environmental law and
is one of the inhumane weapons of ‘indiscriminate destruction’.
Uranium is a radioactive element naturally distributed in the environment.
However, we repeat that the very fine particles of DU created at
the extremely high temperatures that result from the impact of a
DU shell on a tank are micron- and nano-sized and can travel in
the body once inhaled. They have no analogue in history. In addition,
the high temperatures at impact sublimate the metals in the tank
around the penetrating holes and in the shell casing, adding
tiny particles of these metals and their oxides to the aerosol which
can be internalized if inhaled, like the uranium, and which are
toxic to the body. We have been facing an entirely new type of contamination
to humans and the environment through these weapons.
It is true that we do not, as yet, understand the full impact of
fine particles of DU oxide on the human body. However, there is
a considerable amount of basic scientific evidence from both animal
and cellular studies (including studies of human lung cells) that
suggest deleterious effects on human health from inhaled DU particles
through both radiological action and chemical toxicity. These data
clearly indicate that the internalized uranium (both soluble component
and insoluble particles) has genotoxic effect (carcinogenic, mutagenic),
for it affects directly and/or indirectly the DNA, which codes the
genetic information of the cell. It has also been pointed out that
the internalized uranium may affect the intracellular organelles
and/or enzyme proteins and damage some of the repair mechanisms
of the cells. These harmful effects are possibly produced in the
various tissues and organs in a body, including potential damage
to the immune and nervous systems. If genotoxic effects are produced
in the germ line cells, it might lead to trans-generational effects.
A teratogenic effect to the fetus was detected in animal studies
where rodents were exposed to DU during gestation; also a number
of Gulf War veterans were found to have DU in their semen. We should
in addition consider the possible synergistic effect of radio-toxicity
and chemical-toxicity from DU exposure.
We think it critical to immediately launch a full-dress, long-lasting
and independent environmental monitoring as well as health and medical
research on possibly exposed populations, both military and civilian,
in the areas where the DU weapons have been used. We should also
pay serious attention to the contamination and possible harmful
health effects due to the manufacturing of DU weapons; a recent
study clearly indicates that the workers of the DU weapons-producing
factory as well as residents living nearby were contaminated by
DU. However, we should also note that it may take many years, even
decades, before we get statistically significant results on affected
populations from epidemiological studies.
In the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, which was
adapted at the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development
(Earth Summit) in Rio de Janeiro, they stated: ‘In order to
protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely
applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are
threats of
serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty
shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures
to prevent environmental degradation; Principle 15.’ This
‘precautionary principle’ has been confirmed repeatedly
in the UN. It is also recognized widely in the international community
as one of the most important principles concerning the international
as well as the domestic policies for environmental and public health
protection. It is also a valuable and logical principle for us,
scientists, when we take responsibility for our society. The issue
of DU weapons
should be also discussed seriously based on the 'precautionary principle'
among the UN member countries.
Considering the basic scientific evidence we already have, it is
not right to continue using DU weapons making the excuse that ‘no
definitive conclusions had been reached’ in the present limited
risk assessments of the health and environmental impact of DU. We
request all the UN member countries to discuss seriously what concrete
measures are needed, including the immediate clearance of contaminated
remnants, and the protection of the environment and the public health
of contaminated populations following the use of DU weapons. We
request the member nations of the UN to refrain from using DU weapons,
unless they are proved to be completely safe. The burden of proof
is on the users. Furthermore, we hope very much that the international
community will go forward to ban DU weapons, one of the inhumane
weapons of ‘indiscriminate destruction’.
References:
Keith Baverstock,”Presentation to the Defence Committee of
the Belgian House of Representatives, 20 November 2006”, http://www.bandepleteduranium.org/en/docs/15.pdf.
Rosalie Bertell, “Depleted Uranium: All the Questions about
DU and Gulf War Syndrome are not yet Answered”, International
Journal of Health Services 36(3), 503-520, 2006.
Wayne Briner and Jennifer Murray, “Effects of short-term
and long-term depleted uranium exposure on open-field behavior and
brain lipid oxidation in rats”, Neurotoxicology and Teratology
27, 135-144, 2005.
V. Chazel et al, Characterisation anddissolution of depleted uranium
aerosols produced during impacts of kinetic energy penetrators against
a tank. Radiat. Prot. Dosim. 105, 163-166, 2003.
Cooper, J.R. et al. "The behaviour of uranium-233 oxide and
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421-433, 1982.
Virginia Coryell and Diane Stearns, “Molecular analysis of
s hprt mutations generated in Chinese hamster ovary EM9 cells by
uranyl acetate, by hydrogen peroxide, and spontaneously”,
Molecular Carcinogenesis 45(1), 60-72, 2006.
J.L. Domingo, Reproductive and developmental toxicity of natural
and depleted uranium: a review, Reproductive Toxicology 15, pp.
603-609, 2001.
Wendy J. Hartsock et al, “Uranyl Acetate as a Direct Inhibitor
of DNA-Binding Proteins”, Chem. Res. Toxicol. 20, 784-789,
2007.
Arjun Makhijani et al., “Science for the Vulnerable: Setting
Radiation and Multiple Exposure Environmental Health Standards to
Protect Those Most at Risk”, Institute for Energy and Environmental
Research (IEER), October 19, 2006. (http://www.ieer.org)
Melissa A. McDiarmid et al, “Health Effects of Depleted Uranium
on Exposed Gulf War Veterans”, Environmental Research Section
A 82, 168-180, 2000 ,(p. 172 on DU in semen of Gulf War veterans).
Alexandra C. Miller (editor), Depleted Uranium: Properties, Uses,
and Health Consequences, Boca Raton: CRC Press, Taylor and Francis
Group, 2007. See Chapter 1 by David McClain and A.C. Miller and
Chapter 4 by Wayne Briner (Neurotoxicology of depleted uranium in
Adult and Developing Rodents), as well as other chapters.
A.C. Miller et al., “Observation of Radiation-Specific Damage
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Marjorie Monleau et al. “Genotoxic and Inflammatory Effects
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Randall R. Parrish et al., “Depleted uranium contamination
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years: implications for human health assessment”, Science
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Adaikkappan Periyakarupan et al, “Uranium induces oxidative
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Diane M. Stearns et al., “Uranyl acetate induces hprt mutations
and uranium-DNA adducts in Chinese hamster ovary EM9 cells”,
Mutagenesis 20(6), 417-423, 2005.
G.N. Stradling et al. "The metabolism of ceramic and nonceramic
forms of uranium dioxide after deposition in the rat lung."
Human Toxicol. 7, 133-139, 1988.
Bin Wan et al. “In Vitro Immune Toxicity of Depleted Uranium:
Effects on Murine Macrophages, CD+T Cells, and Gene Expression Profiles”,
Environmental Health Perspectives 114(1), 85-91, 2006.
H.B. Wilson et al. "Relation of particle size of uranium dioxide
dust to toxicity following ingalation by animals: II." Archives
of Industrial Hygiene and Occupational Medicine 6(2), 93-104, 1952.
H.B. Wilson et al. "Relation of particle size of U3O8 dust
to toxicity following inhalation in animals." Arch. of Indust.
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Sandra S. Wise et al, “Particulate Depleted Uranium Is Cytotoxic
and Clastogenic to Human Lung Cells”, Chem. Res. Toxicol.
20(5), 815-820, 2007.
(Originally drafted by Katsumi Furitsu M.D. Ph.D. and Gretel
Munroe. Nov. 20. 2007)
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