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Negative Security Assurances
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Definitions
A negative security assurance is a guarantee by a nuclear
weapon state (a state that possess nuclear weapons) that it
will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear
weapon states (states that do not possess nuclear weapons).
A positive security assurance is a guarantee by a
nuclear weapon state that it will come to the aid of a non-nuclear
weapon state if it is attacked by another state with nuclear
weapons.
No international legally-binding treaty or resolution containing
negative security assurances exists, despite repeated calls
by a number of non-nuclear weapon states. This undermines
a sense of security for states that have renounced nuclear
weapons and reinforces the misconception that the possession
of and right to use nuclear weapons will deter aggression
and increase security.
History of negative security assurances
In 1968 the UN Security Council adopted Resolution
255, “Question Relating to Measures to Safeguard
Non-Nuclear-Weapon States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons.” This resolution offered positive
security assurances to non-nuclear weapon statess that were
concerned that by joining the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,
which prohibits them from acquiring nuclear weapons, they
would be more at risk from a nuclear attack. Resolution 255
“Welcomes the intention expressed by certain States
that they will provide or support immediate assistance, in
accordance with the Charter, to any non-nuclear-weapon State
Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
that is a victim of an act or an object of a threat of aggression
in which nuclear weapons are used.”
Although this positive security assurance was designed to
encourage non-nuclear weapon states to join the NPT, after
this resolution the non-nuclear weapon members of the NPT
began pushing for legally-binding negative security assurances,
which they felt offered more protection.
The first legally-binding negative security assurance was
contained in the Treaty
of Tlatelolco (1969), which made Latin America
and the Caribbean a nuclear weapon free
zone. The United States was very supportive of this Treaty
and signed an agreement promising not to use, or threaten
to use, nuclear weapons against the Treaty signatories. However,
the United States said it was exempt from these conditions
if it was attacked by a contracting party of the Treaty working
in conjunction with a nuclear weapon state.
In 1978 the final document of the First
Special Session of the General Assembly on Disarmament
asked nuclear weapon states to “pursue efforts to conclude
appropriate, effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon
States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.”
Beginning in 1980, the Conference
on Disarmament (CD) began discussing the topic of negative
security assurances annually from 1983–1994 in an ad
hoc committee. In 1998 the CD reconvened this committee but
it did not make any progress. The CD has not convened any
ad hoc committees since 1999, although many states continue
to press for action on NSAs in the CD.
Since 1990, Pakistan has annually introduced a resolution
on NSAs to the UN General Assembly. Unchanged in recent years,
both in terms of substantive content and level of support,
the resolution urges active “intensive negotiations”
in the CD on effective international arrangements. NATO and
the European Union have traditionally abstained from this
resolution, however, in 2006 the United States changed its
position to become the single state in opposition. (Read the
2007
resolution and the United
States' explanation of its negative vote.)
In 1995, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution
984, which moved towards protecting non-nuclear weapon
states. The resolution says that non-nuclear weapon members
of the NPT would receive assurances that “the Security
Council, and above all its nuclear-weapon State permanent
members will act immediately in accordance with the relevant
provisions of the Charter of the United Nations” to
protect non-nuclear weapon states against attacks or threats
of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used. Again, these
assurances are positive assurances rather than negative assurances;
thus states in the Non-Aligned Movement were disappointed
that the Security Council did not take stronger action.
While negative security assurances are regularly addressed
at the Preparatory
Committees and Review Conferences of the NPT, these meetings
have not made progress on making them legally-binding. The
final
document of the 2000 Review Conference made no
mention of a possible international treaty on negative security
assurances, but reaffirmed the role of the NPT as a forum
for dealing with them and called upon the Preparatory Committee
to make recommendations to the 2005 Review Conference. The
2005 NPT Review Conference failed to adopt a final
document, thus no progress was made.
Unilateral declarations by the NPT nuclear weapon states
The five NPT nuclear weapon states have made several pledges
regarding negative security assurances. Ahead of the NPT Review
Conference in 1995, the nuclear weapon states circulated renewed
pledges on NSAs to the UN General Assembly and Security Council.
China: China has a strict policy to never to be the
first to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons. It has also
pledged not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against
non-nuclear weapon states or nuclear weapon free zones at
any time or under any circumstances. {S/1995/265}
France: France pledged not use nuclear weapons against
non-nuclear weapon states that belong to the NPT, except in
invasion or attack on it or any of its territories or its
armed forces, its allies, or a state toward which it has a
security commitment, if it conducts or sustains this attack
in alliance with a nuclear weapon state. After requests by
many different countries, France sought to make its negative
assurances similar to the Russia Federation, the United Kingdom,
and the United States. Now all four of the countries’
negative security assurances are practically identical. {S/1995/264}
Russian Federation: Like France, the United Kingdom
is committed to not using nuclear force unless it or any of
its allies or territories is invaded or attacked in any other
way by a non-nuclear weapon state in conjunction with a nuclear
weapon state. {S/1995/261}
United Kingdom: Like France and Russia, the United
Kingdom is committed to not using nuclear force unless it
or any of its allies or territories is invaded or attacked
in any other way by anon-nuclear weapon state in conjunction
with a nuclear weapon state. {S/1995/262}
United States: Like France, Russia, and the United
Kingdom, the United States is committed to not using nuclear
force unless it or any of its allies or territories is invaded
or attacked in any other way by anon-nuclear weapon state
in conjunction with a nuclear weapon state. {S/1995/263}
However, the United States reserves the right to use nuclear
weapons in the case of a biological or chemical weapons attack
as well. Since 2000, the United States has started backing
away from negative security assurances, especially after 11
September 2001. In 2001 the new US
Nuclear Posture Review included contingencies for possible
use of nuclear weapons against certain non-nuclear weapon
states.
Resources for more information
Arms
Control Reporter, Vol. 25: 2006
“Global Nuclear Disarmament”
Reaching Critical Will
Guide
to the CD | First
Committee Monitor | News
in Review
Arms Control Association
“Negative
Security Assurances”
Nuclear Threat Initiative
“The
Role of Security Assurances”
777 UN Plaza - 6th Floor - New York, NY - 10017 - Ph: 212.682.1265 - Fax: 212.286.8211 - info@reachingcriticalwill.org
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