Madam President,

Let me first congratulate you on the skillful and honest manner with which you have been steering our work and express our sincere appreciation for your efforts to continue to find a way for the CD to resume its substantive work in the near future. I think you have done everything possible under the present circumstances.

Madam President,
Distinguished Delegates,

Hungary fully aligns itself with the statement delivered by the European Union.

The Government of Hungary remains fully committed to the process of nuclear disarmament and as a first step thereof, to the establishment of a legally binding treaty banning the production of fissile materials for weapons purposes. Besides the political support for the early start of treaty negotiations, we are ready and able to contribute to the necessary technical discussions, as was demonstrated by the active participation of an expert of the Hungarian Atomic Energy Authority in the Experts Side Event on FMCT Definitions organized by Australia and Japan in February 2011.

Madam President,

Last week, we heard a number of statements on the importance of nuclear disarmament, considered by many member states as their top priority. In our view, the elimination of nuclear weapons is not a single act, but rather a step-by-step process, as foreseen by the founding fathers of the CD in the outcome document of SSOD I. Hungary is convinced that at this juncture, banning the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes is indeed the long overdue “next logical step” in this process. The proposal to start negotiations of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices has been an integral part of the considerations on the CD’s program of work since the elaboration of the Shannon mandate of 1995, and is contained in the last Program of Work adopted by consensus, CD/1864.

The priority given to the commencement of FMCT negotiations has been reaffirmed by important decisions and documents of different multilateral fora. Just a few months after the adoption of CD/1864, the UN Security Council, at its high-level session chaired by the
President of the United States, adopted Resolution 1887 (2009), which, in its operative paragraph 8 “Calls upon the Conference on Disarmament to negotiate a Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices as soon as possible... [...]”. Furthermore, Action 15 of the 2010 NPT Action Plan, adopted by consensus, urged states parties of the CD to “immediately begin negotiation of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in accordance with the report of the Special Coordinator of 1995 (CD/1299) and the mandate contained therein”, providing the only negotiation mandate in the 2010 NPT Action Plan. The UN General Assembly has also repeated earlier calls for starting the negotiations on FMCT during its current session; UNGA resolution 67/53 on a treaty banning the production of fissile material in its operative paragraph 1 “Urges the Conference on Disarmament to agree and implement in early 2013 a balanced and comprehensive programme of work that includes the immediate commencement of negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices on the basis of document CD/1299 and the mandate contained therein”. The same resolution established a Group of Governmental Experts (GGE), which is due to convene next year. The GGE clearly marks the frustration of the majority of member states over the long delay of FMCT negotiations in the CD. We hope that the work of the experts will give the FMCT process the necessary impetus it has lacked for so long.

Madam President,

The potential of FMCT to safeguard and increase international security is, in our view, convincing enough not to delay negotiations anymore. By banning and verifying the production of fissile materials, FMCT would contribute to the implementation of Article VI of the NPT and through limiting the amount of direct use materials that may be accessible to non-state actors for building improvised nuclear explosive devices it may also significantly limit the opportunities for nuclear terrorist acts.

The CD, with its unique set-up and modalities, is the right place to start our work. We encourage incoming CD presidents to continue to consult on this issue.

Thank you, Madam President!