REPORT
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
OFFICIAL RECORDS: THIRTY-EIGHTH SESSION
SUPPLEMENT No. 27 (A/38/27)

UNITED NATIONS
REPORT
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
OFFICIAL RECORDS: THIRTY-EIGHTH SESSION
SUPPLEMENT No. 27 (A/38/27)

UNITED NATIONS
New York, 1983
NOTE

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.
## CONTENTS

<p>| I. INTRODUCTION                              | 1  | 1 |
| II. ORGANIZATION OF WORK OF THE COMMITTEE    | 2 - 22 | 1 |
| A. 1983 Session of the Committee            | 2 - 4 | 1 |
| B. Participants in the work of the Committee | 5  | 1 |
| C. Agenda for the 1983 Session and Programme of Work for the First and Second Parts of the Session | 6 - 13 | 1 |
| D. Participation of States not Members of the Committee | 14 - 15 | 6 |
| E. Consideration of the modalities of the review of the membership of the Committee | 16 - 19 | 7 |
| F. Proposals for the improved and effective functioning of the Committee | 20 | 8 |
| G. Designation of the multilateral negotiating forum as a Conference | 21 | 8 |
| H. Communications from Non-Governmental Organizations | 22 | 9 |
| III. SUBSTANTIVE WORK OF THE COMMITTEE DURING ITS 1983 SESSION | 23 - 97 | 9 |
| A. Nuclear test ban                         | 27 - 32 | 11 |
| B. Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament; prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters | 33 - 73 | 22 |
| C. Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons | 74 - 76 | 40 |
| D. Chemical weapons                         | 77 - 80 | 53 |
| E. New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons | 81 - 86 | 118 |
| F. Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament   | 87 - 88 | 142 |
| G. Prevention of an arms race in outer space | 89 - 94 | 167 |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONTENTS (continued)</th>
<th>Paragraphs</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>H. Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant measures</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. Consideration and adoption of the annual report of the Committee and any other report as appropriate to the United Nations General Assembly</td>
<td>96 – 97</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Appendices**

| I. Consolidated list of participants in the work of the Committee | | 170 |
| II. List and text of documents issued by the Committee on Disarmament 1/ | | |
| III. Index of statements by country and subject and verbatim records of the Committee on Disarmament 1/ | | |

1/ To be issued as separate volumes of this report.
I. INTRODUCTION

1. The Committee on Disarmament submits to the thirty-eighth session of the United Nations General Assembly its annual report on its 1983 session, together with the pertinent documents and records.

II. ORGANIZATION OF WORK OF THE COMMITTEE

A. 1983 Session of the Committee

2. The Committee was in session from 1 February to 29 April and from 14 June to 30 August 1983. During this period, the Committee held 50 formal plenary meetings, at which member States as well as non-member States invited to participate in the discussions set forth their views and recommendations on the various questions before the Committee.

3. The Committee also held 27 informal meetings on its agenda, programme of work, organization and procedures, as well as on items of its agenda and other matters.

4. In accordance with rule 9 of the Rules of Procedure, the following member States assumed the Chairmanship of the Committee: Mongolia for February, Morocco for March, Netherlands for April and the recess between the first and second parts of the 1983 session of the Committee, Nigeria for June, Pakistan for July and Peru for August and the recess until the 1984 session of the Committee.

B. Participants in the Work of the Committee

5. Representatives of the following member States participated in the work of the Committee: Algeria; Argentina; Australia; Belgium; Brazil; Bulgaria; Burma; Canada; China; Cuba; Czechoslovakia; Egypt; Ethiopia; France; German Democratic Republic; Germany, Federal Republic of; Hungary; India; Indonesia; Islamic Republic of Iran; Italy; Japan; Kenya; Mexico; Mongolia; Morocco; Netherlands; Nigeria; Pakistan; Peru; Poland; Romania; Sri Lanka; Sweden; Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland; United States of America; Venezuela; Yugoslavia; and, Zaire. The consolidated list of participants in the first and second parts of the session is included as Appendix I to the report.

C. Agenda for the 1983 Session and Programme of Work for the First and Second Parts of the Session

6. At the 206th Plenary Meeting on 24 March 1983, the Chairman submitted a proposal on the provisional agenda for the 1983 session in conformity with rule 29 of the Rules of Procedure, and made the following statement (CD/PV.206):
"With respect to the adoption of the agenda for the year 1983, it is understood that the question of the nuclear neutron weapon is covered by item 2 of the agenda and can be considered under that agenda item."

7. At the same plenary meeting, the Committee adopted its agenda. Some delegations made statements in that connection.

8. At the 207th plenary meeting, on 29 March 1983, the Chairman also submitted a proposal concerning the programme of work for the first part of the 1983 session, in accordance with rule 29 of the Committee's Rules of Procedure. At the same meeting, the Committee adopted the programme of work.

9. The texts of the agenda and programme of work adopted by the Committee (documents CD/356 and Addendum 1) are given below:

"The Committee on Disarmament, as the multilateral negotiating forum, shall promote the attainment of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

The Committee, taking into account inter alia the relevant provisions of the Documents of the first and second special sessions of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, will deal with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant measures in the following areas:

I. Nuclear weapons in all aspects;
II. Chemical weapons;
III. Other weapons of mass destruction;
IV. Conventional weapons;
V. Reduction of military budgets;
VI. Reduction of armed forces;
VII. Disarmament and development;
VIII. Disarmament and international security;
IX. Collateral measures; confidence-building measures; effective verification methods in relation to appropriate disarmament measures, acceptable to all parties concerned;
X. Comprehensive programme of disarmament leading to general and complete disarmament under effective international control."
Within the above framework, the Committee on Disarmament adopts the following agenda for 1983 which includes items that, in conformity with the provisions of section VIII of its Rules of Procedure, would be considered by it:

1. Nuclear test ban.
2. Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament; prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters.
3. Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.
4. Chemical weapons.
5. New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons.
7. Prevention of an arms race in outer space.
8. Consideration and adoption of the annual report and any other report as appropriate to the General Assembly of the United Nations.

**Programme of Work**

In compliance with rule 28 of its Rules of Procedure, the Committee also adopts the following programme of work for the first part of its 1983 session:

- Statements in the plenary. Consideration of the agenda and programme of work as well as of the establishment of subsidiary bodies on items of the agenda.

1 February - 31 March
- Chemical weapons.
- Nuclear test ban.
- Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.
- Comprehensive programme of disarmament.

4 - 8 April
- Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

11 - 15 April
- New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons.

18 - 22 April
- Prevention of an arms race in outer space.

25 - 29 April
- Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters.
Informal meetings of the Committee will be held to continue consideration of the question of the review of its membership, as well as proposals submitted by members for its improved and effective functioning. Section II of General Assembly Resolution 37/99 K regarding the designation of the Committee will also be considered at informal meetings.

Meetings of ad hoc working groups will be convened after consultations between the Chairman of the Committee and the Chairmen of the ad hoc working groups according to the circumstances and needs of the groups.

The Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events met from 7 to 18 February.

In adopting its agenda and programme of work, the Committee has kept in mind the provisions of rules 30 and 31 of its Rules of Procedure.

10. At the 207th plenary meeting, the Committee also took a decision on the re-establishment of ad hoc working groups for the 1983 session. The decision reads as follows:

"The Committee decides to re-establish for the duration of its 1983 session the Ad Hoc Working Groups on a Nuclear Test Ban, Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States Against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, Chemical Weapons and Radiological Weapons, and to appoint Ambassador Herder of the German Democratic Republic as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban, Ambassador Ahmad of Pakistan as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States Against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, Ambassador McPhail of Canada as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons, and Ambassador Lidgard of Sweden as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons.

It is understood that the ad hoc working groups may start their work on the basis of their former mandates. The mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban may thereafter be revised as decided by the Committee which will consider this question with appropriate urgency.

The ad hoc working groups will report to the Committee on the progress of their work before the conclusion of its 1983 session."

11. At its 213th Plenary Meeting, the Committee decided to begin the second part of the 1983 session on 14 June 1983.
12. During the second part of the 1983 session of the Committee, the Chairman submitted, at the 217th plenary meeting on 14 June 1983, a proposal on the programme of work for the second part of the session. At the same meeting, the Committee adopted the programme of work proposed by the Chairman (CD/382). It reads as follows:

"In compliance with rule 28 of its Rules of Procedure, the Committee on Disarmament adopts the following programme of work for the second part of its 1983 session:

14-17 June Statements in plenary meetings. Consideration of the programme of work for the second part of the 1983 session.
20-24 June Nuclear test ban.
27 June-1 July Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.
4-8 July Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters.
11-15 July Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.
18-22 July Chemical weapons.
25-29 July New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons.
1-5 August Comprehensive programme of disarmament.
8-12 August Prevention of an arms race in outer space.
15-19 August Reports of ad hoc working groups; organizational questions.
22-26 August Consideration and adoption of the Annual Report to the General Assembly of the United Nations.
29-31 August (if necessary)

Informal meetings of the Committee will be held to continue consideration of the question of the review of its membership, as well as proposals submitted by members for its improved and effective functioning. Section II of General Assembly resolution 37/99 K regarding the designation of the Committee will also be considered at informal meetings."
Meetings of ad hoc working groups will be convened after consultations between the Chairman of the Committee and the Chairman of the ad hoc working groups according to the circumstances and needs of the groups.

As decided by the Committee at its 211th Plenary Meeting, the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events will meet from 11 to 22 July.

In adopting its programme of work, the Committee has kept in mind the provisions of rules 30 and 31 of its Rules of Procedure.

13. At its 237th plenary meeting, on 26 August 1983, the Committee decided to close its 1983 session on 30 August 1983.

D. Participation of States not Members of the Committee

14. In conformity with rule 32 of the Rules of Procedure, the following States non-members of the Committee attended plenary meetings of the Committee: Austria, Burundi, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Holy See, Ireland, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Senegal, Spain, Switzerland, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey and Viet Nam.

15. The Committee received and considered requests for participation in its work from States not members of the Committee. In accordance with the Rules of Procedure, the Committee invited:

(a) the representatives of Austria, Burundi, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Norway, Senegal and Spain to participate during 1983 in the discussions on the substantive items on the agenda at plenary and informal meetings of the Committee, as well as in the meetings of the ad hoc working groups established for the 1983 session;

(b) the representative of Portugal to participate during 1983 in the discussions on the substantive items on the agenda at plenary and informal meetings of the Committee, as well as in the meetings of the Ad Hoc Working Groups on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament and on Chemical Weapons;

(c) the representative of Turkey to participate during 1983 in the discussions on the substantive items on the agenda at plenary and informal meetings of the Committee, as well as in the meetings of the Ad Hoc Working Groups on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament and on a Nuclear Test Ban;
(a) the representative of Tunisia to participate during 1983 in the meetings of the Ad Hoc Working Groups on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament and on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States Against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons;

(e) the representative of Switzerland to participate during 1983 in the discussions on chemical weapons at plenary and informal meetings of the Committee, as well as in the meetings of the Ad Hoc Working Group established on that item;

(f) the representative of Viet Nam to make a statement on chemical weapons at the 213th plenary meeting on 19 April 1983; and

(g) the representatives of Austria, Denmark, Finland, New Zealand, Norway and Switzerland to participate in the informal meeting held to consider appropriate follow-up measures to the conclusions of the First Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof.

E. Consideration of the modalities of the review of the membership of the Committee

16. During the second part of its session the Committee considered the modalities of the review of its membership, including the question of an expansion as requested by the General Assembly, taking into account General Assembly resolution No. 37/99 K, Part I, and the interest shown by some States Members of the United Nations in seeking to become members of the Committee.

17. In connection with this question, the Federal Republic of Germany submitted document CD/404, dated 4 August 1983, where it is argued that the membership problem would be solved most effectively by several small enlargement steps over a period of time.

18. The Committee kept in mind the views expressed in Chapter IV of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, particularly that "for maximum effectiveness ... the negotiating body for the sake of convenience should have a relatively small membership", and that there is a "continuing requirement for a single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum of limited size taking decisions on the basis of consensus".
19. Bearing in mind the provisions of paragraph 120 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament and, inter alia, the need to assure its effective functioning, the Committee accepts in principle a limited expansion in its membership, subject to agreement by the Committee on the selection of new members and taking into account the necessity of maintaining balance in the Committee on Disarmament. Taking into consideration all relevant factors, the Committee is of the opinion that its membership may be increased by not more than four States. The Chairman of the Committee will conduct appropriate consultations with the members of the Committee, individually and collectively, according to established practice, in order to reach a decision as to the selection of additional members. The Committee will then inform the thirty-ninth regular session of the United Nations General Assembly of the agreement reached.

F. **Proposals for the improved and effective functioning of the Committee**

20. Various proposals concerning the improved and effective functioning of the Committee were put forward. The results of their examination by the Contact Group on the improved and effective functioning of the Committee are embodied in Working Paper No. 100, dated 5 August 1983. The Committee intends to continue consideration of this matter during its next annual session.

G. **Designation of the multilateral negotiating forum as a Conference**

21. The Committee, taking into account General Assembly resolution No. 37/99 K, Part II, decided to designate itself as "Conference on Disarmament". This decision will come into effect from the date of commencement of the 1984 annual session. It will be without prejudice to paragraph 120 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament. The new designation will have no financial or structural implications, and will have no effect on the rules of procedure which will remain the same, except for the words "Committee on Disarmament", being replaced by the words "Conference on Disarmament".
H. Communications from Non-Governmental Organizations

22. In accordance with rule 42 of the Rules of Procedure, lists of all communications from Non-Governmental Organizations and persons were circulated to the Committee. (document CD/NGO.7 and 8 and Add.1)

III. SUBSTANTIVE WORK OF THE COMMITTEE DURING ITS 1983 SESSION

23. The substantive work of the Committee during its 1983 session was based on its agenda and programme of work adopted for the year. The list of documents issued by the Committee, as well as the texts of those documents, are included as Appendix II to the report. An index of the verbatim records by country and subject, listing the statements made by delegations during 1983, and the verbatim records of the meetings of the Committee are attached as Appendix III to the report.

24. The Committee had before it a letter dated 1 February 1983 from the Secretary-General of the United Nations (CD/336) transmitting all the resolutions on disarmament adopted by the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session in 1982, including those entrusting specific responsibilities to the Committee on Disarmament:

37/72 "Cessation of all test explosions of nuclear weapons"
37/73 "Urgent need for a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty"
37/77 A "New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons"
37/78 C "Nuclear weapons in all aspects"
37/78 E "Prohibition of the nuclear neutron weapon"
37/78 F "Implementation of the recommendations and decisions of the tenth special session"
37/78 G "Report of the Committee on Disarmament"
37/78 I "Prevention of nuclear war"
37/80 "Conclusion of an international convention on the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons"
37/81 "Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons"
37/83 "Prevention of an arms race in outer space"
37/85 "Immediate cessation and prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests"
37/98 A "Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons"
37/98 B "Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons"
25. At the 194th plenary meeting of the Committee on 15 February 1983, the Secretary-General of the United Nations made a statement, in which he underlined the great responsibilities of the Committee, as the sole multilateral body for negotiating measures of disarmament, and the present crucial stage in the history of efforts at disarmament.

26. In addition to documents separately listed under specific items, the Committee received the following:

(a) Document CD/337, dated 1 February 1983, submitted by the delegation of Romania, entitled "Romania's position on disarmament";

(b) Document CD/338, dated 1 February 1983, submitted by the delegation of Czechooslovakia, entitled "Political declaration of the Warsaw Treaty Member States";


(d) Document CD/354, dated 18 March 1983, submitted by the delegation of India, entitled "Text of the New Delhi message and extracts from the political declaration adopted by Heads of State or Government at the Seventh Non-Aligned Summit held in New Delhi from 7 to 12 March 1983";


(f) Document CD/373, dated 11 April 1983, submitted by the delegation of Czechooslovakia, entitled "Extracts from the communiqué adopted at the meeting of the Committee of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Member States of the Warsaw Treaty Organization issued on 7 April 1983 in Prague";

(g) Document CD/379, dated 25 April 1983, submitted by the delegation of Japan, entitled "Verification of compliance in arms control and disarmament agreements";

(i) Document CD/386, dated 30 June 1983, submitted by the delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, entitled "Joint statement adopted at the meeting of Party and State leaders of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, the German Democratic Republic, the Hungarian People's Republic, the Polish People's Republic, the Socialist Republic of Romania and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, held in Moscow on 28 June 1983".


A. Nuclear test ban

27. The item on the agenda entitled "Nuclear test ban" was considered by the Committee, in accordance with its programme of work, during the periods 1 February-31 March and 20-24 June 1983.

28. The Committee had before it the progress reports on the fifteenth and sixteenth sessions of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, as contained in documents CD/348 and CD/399. The Ad Hoc Group met from 7 to 10 February and from 11 to 22 July 1983, under the Chairmanship of Dr. Ola Dahlman of Sweden. At its 21st and 230th plenary meetings, on 12 April and 2 August 1983, the Committee adopted the recommendations contained in the progress reports on the fifteenth and sixteenth sessions of the Ad Hoc Group. A number of delegations commented on those reports.

29. On 15 June 1983 the Secretary-General of the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) addressed a letter to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament in reply to the communication dated 31 August 1982 from the latter concerning the use of the Global Telecommunication System (GTS) of the World Weather Watch (WWW) on a regular basis for the transmission of specific data for the detection and identification of seismic events. By that letter the Secretary-General informed
the Chairman of the Committee that the Executive Council of the World Meteorological Organization, at its thirty-fifth session, held in Geneva in May-June 1983, approved Recommendation 18 (CBS-VIII) - Inclusion of seismic bulletins in the global exchange programme - and decided that this should be implemented as soon as possible, but not later than 1 December 1983. This information was brought to the attention of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events.

30. At the time of the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban (see paragraph 10 above), the Committee agreed that the question of the mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group would be discussed at the 209th plenary meeting on 5 April 1983. At that meeting several delegations made statements in connection with that question. At the end of the meeting, the Chairman stated that the discussion had not led to a consensus for a revision of the mandate of the Working Group. He also noted that new proposals for a mandate had been received from a group of socialist countries\(^2\) and the Group of 21\(^3\) and that these proposals will be the subject of informal consultations.

31. The list of new documents presented to the Committee during its 1983 session under the agenda item are listed in the report submitted by the Ad Hoc Working Group.

32. At its 236th plenary meeting on 23 August 1983, the Committee adopted the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group re-established by the Committee under the agenda item at its 207th plenary meeting (see paragraph 10 above). That report (CD/412) is an integral part of this report and reads as follows:

\(^2\) Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

\(^3\) Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Burma, Cuba, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Islamic Republic of Iran, Kenya, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zaire.
I. INTRODUCTION

1. In accordance with the Committee's decision at its 207th plenary meeting, on 29 March 1983, as contained in document CD/358, the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban was re-established on the basis of its former mandate, to continue to discuss and define, through substantive examination, issues relating to verification and compliance with a view to making further progress toward a nuclear test ban. The Committee also decided that the mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban might thereafter be revised as decided by the Committee which would consider this question with appropriate urgency. It further decided that the Ad Hoc Working Group would report to the Committee on the progress of its work before the conclusion of its 1983 session.

II. ORGANISATION OF WORK AND DOCUMENTATION

2. At its 207th plenary meeting, on 29 March 1983, the Committee on Disarmament appointed Ambassador Gerhard Herder of the German Democratic Republic as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group. At its 218th plenary meeting, on 16 June 1983, the Committee decided that the new representative of the German Democratic Republic, Ambassador Harald Rose, would succeed Ambassador Herder as Chairman of the Working Group. Mr. Victor Slipchenko, United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs, served as Secretary of the Working Group.

3. As was the case in 1982, the delegations of two nuclear-weapon States did not participate in the Ad Hoc Working Group. A number of delegations expressed their disappointment at this decision and reiterated their hope that it would be reconsidered.

4. At their request, the Committee on Disarmament decided to invite the representatives of the following States non members of the Committee to participate in the meetings of the Ad Hoc Working Group: Austria, Burundi, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Norway, Senegal, Spain and Turkey.

5. The Ad Hoc Working Group held 17 meetings between 8 April and 16 August 1983.

6. During the 1983 session the following official documents under item 1 of the agenda were presented to the Committee on Disarmament:

- Document CD/346, dated 16 February 1983, submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, entitled 'Letter dated 14 February 1983 from the Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Committee on Disarmament transmitting the 'Basic provisions of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests'
During the 1983 session, the following working papers were circulated to the Working Group:


- Document CD/384, dated 20 June 1983, submitted by Australia, entitled 'Institutional arrangements for a CTB verification system: an illustrative list of questions'

- Document CD/388, dated 8 July 1983, submitted by Japan, entitled 'Verification and compliance of a nuclear test ban'

- Document CD/389, dated 8 July 1983, submitted by Japan, entitled 'Views on a system of international exchange of seismic data'

- Document CD/390, dated 8 July 1983, submitted by Japan, entitled 'Working paper on a contribution to an international monitoring system using a newly installed small seismic array of Japan'

- Document CD/395, dated 19 July 1983, submitted by Norway, entitled 'Working paper: The role of international seismic data exchange under a comprehensive nuclear test ban'

- Document CD/400, dated 22 July 1983, submitted by Australia, entitled 'International management panel'

- Document CD/402, dated 1 August 1983, submitted by the United Kingdom, entitled 'Verification aspects of a comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT)'


- Document CD/405, dated 4 August 1983, submitted by Australia, entitled 'Proposal for the scope of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty'

During the 1983 session, the following working papers were circulated to the Working Group:

- CD/NTB/WP.3 submitted by the United Kingdom, entitled 'Working paper: Peaceful nuclear explosions in relation to a nuclear test ban' (also issued as CD/383)

- CD/NTB/WP.4 submitted by Australia, entitled 'Institutional arrangements for a CTB verification system: an illustrative list of questions' (also issued as CD/384)

- CD/NTB/WP.5 submitted by Belgium, entitled 'Analysis of 20 years' observation of atmospheric radioactivity in Belgium'

- CD/NTB/WP.6 submitted by Australia, entitled 'International management panel' (also issued as CD/400)

- CD/NTB/WP.7 submitted by the United Kingdom, entitled 'Working paper: Verification aspects of a comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT)' (also issued as CD/402)
The following Conference Room Papers were also submitted to the Working Group during its 1983 session:

- CD/NTB/WP.8 submitted by Australia, entitled 'Proposal for the scope of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty' (also issued as CD/405)

- CD/NTB/WP.9 submitted by Sweden, entitled 'Working paper: International surveillance of airborne radioactivity (ISAR)' (also issued as CD/405)

The following Conference Room Papers were also submitted to the Working Group during its 1983 session:

- CD/NTB/CRP.2 entitled 'Annotation by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on A Nuclear Test Ban on means of verification of compliance with a treaty on a nuclear test ban'

- CD/NTB/CRP.3 entitled 'Programme of Work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on A Nuclear Test Ban'

- CD/NTB/CRP.4 entitled 'Annotation by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on A Nuclear Test Ban on procedures and mechanisms for consultations and co-operation as well as on Committee of Experts (items 3 and 4 of the Programme of Work)'

- CT/NTB/CRP.5 entitled 'Annotation by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on A Nuclear Test Ban on procedures for complaints and on-site inspections (items 5 and 6 of the Programme of Work)'


III. SUBSTANTIVE WORK DURING THE 1983 SESSION

7. At its fourth meeting, on 29 April 1983, the Ad Hoc Working Group adopted the following programme of work:

['In discharging its mandate, the Ad Hoc Group on A Nuclear Test Ban will examine issues of verification of and compliance with a NTB with a view to making further progress towards a corresponding treaty which would be non-discriminatory and could attract the widest possible adherence.'

'The examination of issues relating to verification and compliance consideration should be given to all relevant aspects of a treaty on A Nuclear Test Ban.'

'After a general discussion on the subject matter entrusted to it the Ad Hoc Working Group will consider the following six items in the given order. Such consideration should be carried out in conformity with the provisions of paragraph 31 of the Final Document of the First SSOD. If necessary, the Chairman will submit annotations pertaining to the various items.'

1. Requirements and elements of verification

2. Means of verification, inter alia:
   (a) national technical means
   (b) international exchange of seismic data

3. Procedures and Mechanisms for Consultation and Co-operation
4. Committee of Experts

5. Procedures for Complaints

6. On-site inspection

"Pursuant to its mandate, the Ad Hoc Working Group on A Nuclear Test Ban will take into account all existing proposals and future initiatives. In addition, the Working Group will draw on the knowledge and experience that have been accumulated over the years in the consideration of a comprehensive test ban in the successive multilateral negotiating bodies and the trilateral negotiations. The Working Group will also take into account the work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events."

"In connection with the adoption of the programme of work a number of delegations expressed the view that the agreement reached would contribute to a fruitful and streamlined consideration of issues entrusted to the Working Group under its mandate. Several delegations made reservations to the effect that their agreement to include in the programme of work a general formulation concerning a future nuclear test ban treaty should not in any way prejudge negotiations on such a treaty.

"The Ad Hoc Working Group discussed and examined various documents submitted to the Committee during its 1983 session by the delegations of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (CD/346), Sweden (CD/381), the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (CD/383), Australia (CD/384 and CD/400), Japan (CD/388, CD/389 and CD/390), Belgium (CD/NTB/WP.5) and Norway (CD/395). It also had before it the documents submitted towards the end of the session by the United Kingdom (CD/402), Sweden (CD/403) and Australia (CD/405). Referring to certain proposals, in particular the 'Basic provisions of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests' tabled by the USSR (CD/346) and the 'Draft treaty banning any nuclear weapon test explosion in any environment', submitted by Sweden (CD/381), a number of delegations maintained that they provided sufficient material to proceed without further delay to negotiations on a nuclear test ban treaty. Some delegations disagreed with this view.

"In accordance with the programme of work, delegations exchanged views with regard to the scope of a nuclear test ban. A number of delegations stated that the nuclear-weapon States Parties to the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty were legally committed as per the preamble of that instrument to conclude a treaty banning nuclear-weapon tests in all environments for all time, and they had in the past acknowledged the distinction between nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes and nuclear-weapon tests. These delegations maintained that the attitude taken by certain delegations with regard to nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes was not in keeping with their obligations concerning peaceful uses of nuclear energy assumed under agreements in the field of arms limitation and introduced an element of discrimination which was totally unacceptable. They held that the question of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes could easily be taken care of by applying the general purpose criterion. They further expressed the view that nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes were far from posing a unique problem in that respect, noting that indeed, in the case of most disarmament measures, notably a ban on chemical weapons, the purpose criterion had been generally accepted by the international community. Several delegations, however, argued that a moratorium on nuclear tests would be an early step towards a nuclear test ban treaty."

"In connection with the adoption of the programme of work a number of delegations expressed the view that the agreement reached would contribute to a fruitful and streamlined consideration of issues entrusted to the Working Group under its mandate. Several delegations made reservations to the effect that their agreement to include in the programme of work a general formulation concerning a future nuclear test ban treaty should not in any way prejudge negotiations on such a treaty.

"Pursuant to its mandate, the Ad Hoc Working Group on A Nuclear Test Ban will take into account all existing proposals and future initiatives. In addition, the Working Group will draw on the knowledge and experience that have been accumulated over the years in the consideration of a comprehensive test ban in the successive multilateral negotiating bodies and the trilateral negotiations. The Working Group will also take into account the work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events."

"In accordance with the programme of work, delegations exchanged views with regard to the scope of a nuclear test ban. A number of delegations stated that the nuclear-weapon States Parties to the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty were legally committed as per the preamble of that instrument to conclude a treaty banning nuclear-weapon tests in all environments for all time, and they had in the past acknowledged the distinction between nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes and nuclear-weapon tests. These delegations maintained that the attitude taken by certain delegations with regard to nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes was not in keeping with their obligations concerning peaceful uses of nuclear energy assumed under agreements in the field of arms limitation and introduced an element of discrimination which was totally unacceptable. They held that the question of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes could easily be taken care of by applying the general purpose criterion. They further expressed the view that nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes were far from posing a unique problem in that respect, noting that indeed, in the case of most disarmament measures, notably a ban on chemical weapons, the purpose criterion had been generally accepted by the international community. Several delegations, however, argued that a moratorium on nuclear tests would be an early step towards a nuclear test ban treaty."

"In connection with the adoption of the programme of work a number of delegations expressed the view that the agreement reached would contribute to a fruitful and streamlined consideration of issues entrusted to the Working Group under its mandate. Several delegations made reservations to the effect that their agreement to include in the programme of work a general formulation concerning a future nuclear test ban treaty should not in any way prejudge negotiations on such a treaty.

"Pursuant to its mandate, the Ad Hoc Working Group on A Nuclear Test Ban will take into account all existing proposals and future initiatives. In addition, the Working Group will draw on the knowledge and experience that have been accumulated over the years in the consideration of a comprehensive test ban in the successive multilateral negotiating bodies and the trilateral negotiations. The Working Group will also take into account the work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events."

"In accordance with the programme of work, delegations exchanged views with regard to the scope of a nuclear test ban. A number of delegations stated that the nuclear-weapon States Parties to the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty were legally committed as per the preamble of that instrument to conclude a treaty banning nuclear-weapon tests in all environments for all time, and they had in the past acknowledged the distinction between nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes and nuclear-weapon tests. These delegations maintained that the attitude taken by certain delegations with regard to nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes was not in keeping with their obligations concerning peaceful uses of nuclear energy assumed under agreements in the field of arms limitation and introduced an element of discrimination which was totally unacceptable. They held that the question of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes could easily be taken care of by applying the general purpose criterion. They further expressed the view that nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes were far from posing a unique problem in that respect, noting that indeed, in the case of most disarmament measures, notably a ban on chemical weapons, the purpose criterion had been generally accepted by the international community. Several delegations, however, argued that a moratorium on nuclear tests would be an early step towards a nuclear test ban treaty."

"In connection with the adoption of the programme of work a number of delegations expressed the view that the agreement reached would contribute to a fruitful and streamlined consideration of issues entrusted to the Working Group under its mandate. Several delegations made reservations to the effect that their agreement to include in the programme of work a general formulation concerning a future nuclear test ban treaty should not in any way prejudge negotiations on such a treaty.

"Pursuant to its mandate, the Ad Hoc Working Group on A Nuclear Test Ban will take into account all existing proposals and future initiatives. In addition, the Working Group will draw on the knowledge and experience that have been accumulated over the years in the consideration of a comprehensive test ban in the successive multilateral negotiating bodies and the trilateral negotiations. The Working Group will also take into account the work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events."

"In accordance with the programme of work, delegations exchanged views with regard to the scope of a nuclear test ban. A number of delegations stated that the nuclear-weapon States Parties to the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty were legally committed as per the preamble of that instrument to conclude a treaty banning nuclear-weapon tests in all environments for all time, and they had in the past acknowledged the distinction between nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes and nuclear-weapon tests. These delegations maintained that the attitude taken by certain delegations with regard to nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes was not in keeping with their obligations concerning peaceful uses of nuclear energy assumed under agreements in the field of arms limitation and introduced an element of discrimination which was totally unacceptable. They held that the question of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes could easily be taken care of by applying the general purpose criterion. They further expressed the view that nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes were far from posing a unique problem in that respect, noting that indeed, in the case of most disarmament measures, notably a ban on chemical weapons, the purpose criterion had been generally accepted by the international community. Several delegations, however, argued that a moratorium on nuclear tests would be an early step towards a nuclear test ban treaty."

"In connection with the adoption of the programme of work a number of delegations expressed the view that the agreement reached would contribute to a fruitful and streamlined consideration of issues entrusted to the Working Group under its mandate. Several delegations made reservations to the effect that their agreement to include in the programme of work a general formulation concerning a future nuclear test ban treaty should not in any way prejudge negotiations on such a treaty.

"Pursuant to its mandate, the Ad Hoc Working Group on A Nuclear Test Ban will take into account all existing proposals and future initiatives. In addition, the Working Group will draw on the knowledge and experience that have been accumulated over the years in the consideration of a comprehensive test ban in the successive multilateral negotiating bodies and the trilateral negotiations. The Working Group will also take into account the work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events."

"In accordance with the programme of work, delegations exchanged views with regard to the scope of a nuclear test ban. A number of delegations stated that the nuclear-weapon States Parties to the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty were legally committed as per the preamble of that instrument to conclude a treaty banning nuclear-weapon tests in all environments for all time, and they had in the past acknowledged the distinction between nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes and nuclear-weapon tests. These delegations maintained that the attitude taken by certain delegations with regard to nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes was not in keeping with their obligations concerning peaceful uses of nuclear energy assumed under agreements in the field of arms limitation and introduced an element of discrimination which was totally unacceptable. They held that the question of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes could easily be taken care of by applying the general purpose criterion. They further expressed the view that nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes were far from posing a unique problem in that respect, noting that indeed, in the case of most disarmament measures, notably a ban on chemical weapons, the purpose criterion had been generally accepted by the international community. Several delegations, however, argued that a moratorium on nuclear tests would be an early step towards a nuclear test ban treaty."

"In connection with the adoption of the programme of work a number of delegations expressed the view that the agreement reached would contribute to a fruitful and streamlined consideration of issues entrusted to the Working Group under its mandate. Several delegations made reservations to the effect that their agreement to include in the programme of work a general formulation concerning a future nuclear test ban treaty should not in any way prejudge negotiations on such a treaty.

"Pursuant to its mandate, the Ad Hoc Working Group on A Nuclear Test Ban will take into account all existing proposals and future initiatives. In addition, the Working Group will draw on the knowledge and experience that have been accumulated over the years in the consideration of a comprehensive test ban in the successive multilateral negotiating bodies and the trilateral negotiations. The Working Group will also take into account the work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events."

"In accordance with the programme of work, delegations exchanged views with regard to the scope of a nuclear test ban. A number of delegations stated that the nuclear-weapon States Parties to the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty were legally committed as per the preamble of that instrument to conclude a treaty banning nuclear-weapon tests in all environments for all time, and they had in the past acknowledged the distinction between nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes and nuclear-weapon tests. These delegations maintained that the attitude taken by certain delegations with regard to nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes was not in keeping with their obligations concerning peaceful uses of nuclear energy assumed under agreements in the field of arms limitation and introduced an element of discrimination which was totally unacceptable. They held that the question of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes could easily be taken care of by applying the general purpose criterion. They further expressed the view that nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes were far from posing a unique problem in that respect, noting that indeed, in the case of most disarmament measures, notably a ban on chemical weapons, the purpose criterion had been generally accepted by the international community. Several delegations, however, argued that a moratorium on nuclear tests would be an early step towards a nuclear test ban treaty."
international community as the basis for solving the problems posed by the potential military applications of the relevant technology or materials. The question of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes was, as such, a peripheral matter, which should not be brought up to side-track the Committee from the central issue of achieving a nuclear test ban whose primary aim was to curtail the nuclear arms race.

"Several delegations, including those of two nuclear-weapon States, considered it essential that any future nuclear test ban should cover both nuclear-weapon tests and nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. They argued that this position, which they had always maintained, was consistent with the provisions of the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty and was based on their conviction that no distinction could be made between a nuclear-weapon test explosion and a nuclear explosion for peaceful purposes. It was, in their view, impossible in practice to work out a regime for conducting nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes that would preclude acquisition of military benefits. These delegations held that this was an issue of genuine concern in respect of the scope and verifiability of a nuclear test ban treaty. It would, in their view, be impossible to apply the general purpose criterion to a nuclear test ban given their conviction that any nuclear explosive device for peaceful purposes could also be employed as a weapon.

"The delegations of two nuclear-weapon States categorically rejected assertions made by other delegations, which were set out in other sections of this paragraph, explicit or implicit, regarding their national policies on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes and regarding any obligations they had assumed respecting nuclear explosions in international agreements. These delegations pointed out that there was no feasible way to ensure that military benefits would not be derived from any nuclear explosion and that to be effective as an arms control measure any ban on nuclear testing must include all nuclear explosions. In their view, all attempts at arguments to the contrary had not been persuasive. They regretted the introduction of issues which in their view were inappropriate to the work of the Working Group.

"A number of delegations, including that of one nuclear-weapon State, were of the view that a nuclear test ban treaty should prohibit all test explosions of nuclear weapons by all States in all environments and for all times. With a view to facilitating a speedy conclusion of such a treaty they proposed to establish a moratorium on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes until appropriate arrangements for conducting them were worked out. These delegations shared the view that the question of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes should not be used in order to divert attention from the urgent need to conclude a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. They noted that while two nuclear-weapon States had previously agreed to draw a clear distinction between nuclear-weapon tests and nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes and to provide for them different treatment under a treaty, at present they advocated a ban on all nuclear explosions. Those delegations also considered that the question of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes was a peripheral one in comparison with the aim of the complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests and could be resolved in the context of negotiations after the conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.

"11. There was also an exchange of views concerning participation in a nuclear test ban. It was generally recognised that the participation of all nuclear-weapon States was important to achieve an effective nuclear test ban treaty. Several delegations considered it essential that all nuclear-weapon States become Parties to it from the outset. Other delegations, conscious of the need to reach an early agreement on a nuclear test ban treaty, held that adherence by only the
USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States amongst the nuclear-weapon States should be a sufficient requirement for its entry into force. The remaining two nuclear-weapon States should then adhere to the treaty within a specified period of time.

"13. Requirements and elements of verification

"With regard to requirements of verification, a number of delegations maintained that a verification system of a nuclear test ban treaty should be nondiscriminatory and based on complete equality of rights and obligations of the Parties to a treaty. This system should be negotiated in a multilateral forum and should guarantee equal access to all States.

"It was widely felt that requirements of a verification system of a nuclear test ban treaty depend on the scope of such a treaty. It was pointed out in this connection by several delegations that any agreement with regard to requirements of a verification system could only be reached in a multilateral forum after negotiations on a treaty. Other delegations, however, maintained that even in the absence of negotiations common understanding could still be found on verification requirements.

"With regard to basic elements of a verification system of a nuclear test ban treaty it was generally recognized that such a system should be based on a combination of national and international measures and could include, inter alia: (a) national technical means; (b) international exchange of seismic data; (c) procedures and mechanisms for consultation and cooperation; (d) multilateral means or absence of States Parties; (e) procedure for complaints; (f) onsite inspection.

"14. Means of verification

"It was reaffirmed by a number of delegations including that of one nuclear-weapon State that the means of verification presently available were sufficient to provide reasonable assurance of compliance with a nuclear test ban treaty. In this connection, they referred to the statement made by the United Nations Secretary-General to the GC in 1972, in which he, inter alia, stated that all the technical and scientific aspects of the problem had been so fully explored that only a political decision was necessary in order to achieve final agreement. Other delegations, including those of two nuclear-weapon States, however, reiterated their view that the question of adequacy of means of verification could only be defined by each State individually on the basis of its national requirements.

"A number of delegations reaffirmed their view that the Working Group could usefully consider the institutional and administrative arrangements of a verification system of a nuclear test ban. Other delegations, however, were of the view that such arrangements should be looked into only in the context of negotiations on a treaty.
"(a) National Technical Means. It was widely felt that national technical means could play an important role in verifying compliance with a nuclear test ban treaty. In this connection, a number of delegations stressed the need to ensure that all Parties to a treaty have equal access to information obtained through national technical means. Some delegations, however, maintained that this information could only be provided on a voluntary basis.

"(b) International exchange of seismic data. It was generally recognized that an international exchange of seismic data constituted an essential element of a verification system of a nuclear test ban. It was further recognized that in setting up such an exchange the recommendations of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to consider international co-operative measures to detect and identify seismic events should be used as a basis. In accordance with these recommendations, an international exchange of seismic data could consist of the following main elements: (i) a network of seismic stations; (ii) an international exchange of seismic data over the Global Telecommunications System of the WHO; (iii) international data centers.

"Several delegations held that to be effective an international system for the exchange of seismic data should provide for the widest possible global coverage and use advanced technology that could ensure detection and identification of low-magnitude seismic events. Some of them pointed out that the global coverage of potential international seismic systems should be improved in areas where currently deficient, inter alia, in areas of the Southern Hemisphere. Several delegations maintained that such a system should be fully operational at the time of a treaty's entry into force. Other delegations, however, were of the view that detailed arrangements for an international exchange of seismic data could only be worked out when it was known which countries would become Parties to a treaty, i.e. after the treaty entered into force. They also felt that for the system to be accessible to all Parties it should be based on widely used technology which all Parties could afford. In this connection, they argued that the technology presently available was quite sufficient for the purposes of verifying compliance with a treaty. Those delegations further maintained that there was a close relationship between political negotiations on a nuclear test ban treaty and technical work on a verification system and that the latter should not be carried out as if it were an open-ended exercise that could go on indefinitely so as to take account of every scientific and technological advance. In their view, technical questions should not be used to endlessly postpone treaty negotiations. However, other delegations emphasized that a common view did not exist on all technical problems concerning verification of a nuclear test ban and that scientific and technological advances should be kept under review in order to render the envisaged data exchange system as efficient and effective as possible.

"Some delegations pointed to certain improvements that, in their view, should be introduced to the present means of verification in order to ensure better effectiveness of a verification system. In this connection, several delegations maintained that, apart from seismic monitoring network, means of verification of a nuclear test ban should include a similar network to monitor airborne radioactivity. Other delegations, however, questioned the need of establishing such a network.
15. Procedures and Mechanisms for Consultation and Co-operation

It was generally recognized that procedures and mechanisms for consultation and co-operation provide an important means for resolving issues of compliance among Parties to a treaty. In this connection, several delegations maintained that consultations should first be held on a bilateral basis and that only if they failed to resolve the issues involved Parties should then have recourse to multilateral procedures. One delegation suggested that, in its view, it would be desirable to address a request for consultations first to a multilateral organ of Parties.

16. Committee of Experts

The view was generally shared that it would be desirable for a nuclear test ban treaty to provide for a multilateral organ of States Parties to facilitate consultations and co-operation among those States. It was further recognized that such an organ could be supported by appropriate subsidiary bodies. A number of delegations held that a multilateral organ should be assisted by a technical expert group and a permanent secretariat. Other delegations, however, questioned the need for setting up a cumbersome machinery financed by the States Parties. Various suggestions were put forward with regard to the character and functions of a multilateral organ and its possible subsidiary bodies.

17. Procedures for Complaints

It was generally recognized that a nuclear test ban treaty should contain procedures for complaints. In this connection, a number of delegations expressed the view that the possibility of bringing complaints to the Security Council would provide an additional guarantee of compliance with a treaty. Some delegations suggested that complaints could also be brought to a multilateral organ of States Parties.

18. On-site inspection

It was widely felt that a system of verification of a nuclear test ban treaty should include a provision for on-site inspection. A number of delegations expressed the firm view that on-site inspections should be carried out by challenge or on a voluntary basis. Some delegations held that it was of crucial importance that a request for an on-site inspection would not meet with a refusal on the part of a State Party in whose territory it should be conducted. Several suggestions were made with regard to procedures of on-site inspections, and rights and functions of inspecting personnel.

IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

19. Pursuant to its programme of work, the Ad Hoc Working Group held a structured discussion to define issues relating to verification and compliance with a view to making further progress toward a nuclear test ban. A large number of delegations considered that the Ad Hoc Working Group had fulfilled its mandate by discussing and defining all the issues relating to verification and compliance of a nuclear test ban during its 1982 and 1983 sessions, and held that the mandate
of the Working Group should be changed in order to enable it to proceed without further delay to negotiations on a nuclear test ban treaty. Some delegations, however, maintained that the subject was not exhausted and that during the discussions a number of views were expressed which required further examination.

"In the absence of consensus, the Ad Hoc Working Group recalled the decision of the Committee on Disarmament that 'the mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban may thereafter be revised as decided by the Committee which will consider this question with appropriate urgency' (CD/358). In this connection, a large number of delegations requested that this matter should be taken up by the Committee on Disarmament at the beginning of its 1984 session."
B. Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament; prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters

33. The item on the agenda entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament; prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters", was considered by the Committee, in accordance with its programme of work, during the periods from 1 February to 31 March, 25 to 29 April and 27 June to 8 July 1983.

34. The following documents were submitted to the Committee in connection with the item during the 1983 session:

   (a) Document CD/340, dated 7 February 1983, submitted by the delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, entitled "Replies of Y.V. Andropov, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, to Questions from a Pravda Correspondent";


   (c) Document CD/344, dated 10 February 1983, submitted by the delegation of the German Democratic Republic on behalf of a group of socialist States, entitled "Prohibition of the Nuclear Neutron Weapon";

   (d) Document CD/345, dated 14 February 1983, submitted by the Group of Socialist Countries, entitled "Ensuring the Safe Development of Nuclear Energy";

   (e) Document CD/347, dated 18 February 1983, submitted by the delegation of France, entitled "Extracts from the Statement by Mr. François Mitterrand, President of the French Republic, before the Bundestag on 20 January 1983";

   (f) Document CD/351, dated 2 March 1983, submitted by the delegation of the German Democratic Republic, entitled "Reply by the Government of the German Democratic Republic to a Recent Swedish Initiative on the Establishment in Europe of a Zone Free of Battlefield Nuclear Weapons";

   (g) Document CD/352, dated 7 March 1983, submitted by the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany, entitled "Letter dated 16 February 1983 by the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, Helmut Kohl, to the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany and Chairman of the Council of State of the German Democratic Republic, Erich Honecker, concerning the establishment of a Nuclear-Weapon Free Zone in Central Europe";

(i) Document CD/357, dated 28 March 1983, submitted by the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany, entitled "Prevention of Nuclear War, Including All Related Matters";


(l) Document CD/386, dated 30 June 1983, submitted by the delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, entitled "Joint statement adopted at the meeting of Party and State leaders of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, the German Democratic Republic, the Hungarian People's Republic, the Polish People's Republic, the Socialist Republic of Romania and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, held in Moscow on 28 June 1983";

(m) Document CD/394, dated 18 July 1983, submitted by the delegation of France, entitled "Freeze on nuclear weapons";

(n) Document CD/406, dated 4 August 1983, submitted by the delegation of the German Democratic Republic, entitled "Working Paper containing a list of items which could be dealt with in the course of informal meetings of the Committee on Disarmament on the prevention of nuclear war";


and

(p) Document CD/411, dated 11 August 1983, submitted by the delegations of Australia; Belgium; Germany, Federal Republic of; Italy; Japan; and Netherlands, entitled "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters".
35. The Committee also had before it document CD/398 of 20 July 1983, entitled "Prevention of Nuclear War, Including All Related Matters". This compilation was prepared by the Secretariat at the request of the Committee (CD/PV.226).

36. In accordance with the decision taken at its 213th plenary meeting, the Committee held an informal meeting on 25 April to consider, inter alia, the question of the establishment of ad hoc working groups on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.

37. The proposals before the Committee for consideration were contained in documents CD/4 submitted by a group of socialist countries and entitled, "Negotiations on ending the production of all types of nuclear weapons and gradually reducing their stockpiles until they have been completely destroyed", CD/116 submitted by the Group of 21 and entitled, "Statement of the Group of 21 on the Establishment of Working Groups on Items on the Annual Agenda of the Committee on Disarmament in 1980", CD/116 submitted by the Group of 21 and entitled, "Working Paper on the Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and Nuclear Disarmament", CD/180 submitted by the Group of 21 and entitled, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament", CD/213, tabled by China and entitled, "Some Viewpoints on the Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and Nuclear Disarmament", CD/219 submitted by a group of socialist countries and entitled, "Statement on the need for the urgent establishment in the Committee on Disarmament of an Ad Hoc Working Group on the Prohibition, Stockpiling, Deployment and Use of Nuclear Neutron Weapons", CD/259, tabled by the German Democratic Republic and entitled, "Draft mandates for ad hoc working groups on a nuclear test ban, and the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament", and CD/344 submitted by the German Democratic Republic on behalf of a group of socialist States and entitled, "Prohibition of the nuclear neutron weapon". Two groups of States and some other States proposed to establish an ad hoc working group to carry out negotiations on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. Some delegations also proposed to create an ad hoc working group on the nuclear neutron weapon. Other delegations considered it inappropriate to form working groups as proposed and continued to hold the view that it was preferable to have substantive discussions on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament in informal meetings of the Committee. No consensus was reached during the 1983 session.
38. A number of delegations addressed various issues concerning the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament at plenary meetings of the Committee.

39. The members of the Group of 21 reaffirmed their conviction of the paramount need for urgent multilateral negotiations on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament through the adoption of concrete measures. In the opinion of the Group of 21, multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament have been long overdue and the fundamental prerequisite for their success was the political will of States, in particular of the nuclear-weapon States, to initiate such negotiations. The Group of 21 further stressed that the nuclear arms race, far from contributing to the strengthening of the security of all States, on the contrary, weakens it, and increases the danger of the outbreak of a nuclear war. In addition, the nuclear arms race thwarted efforts towards a greater relaxation of international tensions. On the other hand progress in the sphere of nuclear disarmament would help ensure international peace and security and improve the international climate, which would in turn facilitate further progress. The Group of 21 reiterated its belief that all nations, whether or not they possessed nuclear weapons, had a vital interest in nuclear disarmament measures because the existence of nuclear weapons in the arsenals of a handful of powers directly and fundamentally threatened the security of the entire world. The Group of 21 categorically rejected as politically and morally unjustifiable that the security of the whole world should be held hostage to the security requirements of nuclear-weapon States and their allies, as perceived by them. The obligation to undertake urgent negotiations for cessation of the nuclear arms race and for nuclear disarmament flowed from the very nature of these weapons and was not contingent upon any other factors like international stability and security or rules of international behaviour. While acknowledging the usefulness of negotiations among nuclear-weapon States, the Group of 21 noted
that they were unable so far to stop the quantitative accumulation and
qualitative refinement of nuclear weapons and that while the nuclear weapons
race had proceeded at a continuous, relentless and accelerated pace,
negotiations to limit and reduce such weapons had been discontinuous, halting
and sometimes even suspended in response to the vagaries of the state of
relations existing among the nuclear-weapon States. It was also stated
that in any event the bilateral negotiations, because of their limited scope
and the number of parties involved, can never replace or nullify the
genuinely multilateral search for concrete disarmament measures. The
Group of 21 stressed its firm belief that the Committee on Disarmament, whose
members included all the nuclear-weapon States as well as non-nuclear-weapon
States, should continue and intensify its search for a common approach which
would enable it to fulfill the tasks in the sphere of nuclear disarmament,
which had been entrusted to it by the United Nations General Assembly. For
all the above reasons, and with a view to the implementation of the
resolutions adopted in that connection by the General Assembly, the
Group of 21 reiterated the proposal it had made in document CD/180 regarding
the setting up of an ad hoc working group with the mandate to elaborate on
paragraph 50 of the Final Document and to identify substantive issues for
multilateral negotiations, as suggested in document CD/116.
40. A group of Socialist countries reiterated their proposal for negotiations
on ending the production of all types of nuclear weapons and gradually
reducing their stockpiles until they have been completely destroyed. They
pointed out that such negotiations should be conducted with the participation
of all nuclear-weapon States as well as of a certain number of Non-Nuclear
weapon States in accordance with paragraph 28 of the Final Document. The
degree of participation of individual nuclear-weapon States in measures at
each stage should be determined taking into account the quantitative and
qualitative importance of the existing arsenals of the nuclear-weapon States
and of other States concerned. The existing balance in the field of nuclear
strength, in their view, should remain undisturbed at all stages, with the
levels of nuclear strength being constantly reduced. These States advocated elaboration, adoption and stage-by-stage implementation of a nuclear disarmament programme. In this connection these States were in favour of the proposal put forward by the nuclear-weapon State belonging to this group that all nuclear-weapon powers should simultaneously freeze, both quantitatively and qualitatively, all nuclear weapons at their disposal. Such a freeze could, as they stressed, enter into effect initially with respect to the USSR and the United States on a given date subject to agreement, on the understanding that the other nuclear-weapon powers would act in a similar manner. This, in their view, would create a more favourable situation for the achievement of mutually acceptable arrangements at the current Soviet-United States talks on the limitation and reduction of strategic weapons and on the limitation of nuclear weapons in Europe, in accordance with the principle of equality and equal security. Those delegations underlined the importance of these negotiations for the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament and expressed their deep concern over the lack of progress in them. These States advocated an approach according to which efforts leading to nuclear disarmament should be exerted in several areas simultaneously. Thus they argued in favour of holding multilateral negotiations on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament in addition to the mentioned bilateral talks and to this end they came forward for the establishment of an ad hoc working group. This group of delegations reiterated their proposal for the Committee to undertake negotiations on a convention banning the nuclear neutron weapons and for the establishment of an ad hoc working group to this effect.

41. A number of other delegations, including those of three nuclear-weapon States, maintained that the bilateral talks between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on strategic arms reduction and intermediate range nuclear forces offered at present the best framework for achieving progress in the field of nuclear arms control and disarmament. Accordingly, they were of the view that the Committee should continue to address questions relating to nuclear disarmament in its plenary and informal
meetings, and not embark on negotiations in an ad hoc working group. They further held that nuclear disarmament should not be considered independently from conventional arms control and disarmament measures and should be pursued in such a way that international stability and security be enhanced. In their view, nuclear arms control and disarmament agreements therefore must necessarily be based on certain fundamental principles of international behaviour, particularly those enshrined in the United Nations Charter. With regard to the proposal for a nuclear weapons freeze, those delegations supported the view that a freeze, although apparently attractive, would detract from efforts already under way to reduce the nuclear arsenal and would perpetuate and accentuate dangerous asymmetries in the strategic balance. In their view, a freeze would not offer a sound basis for either major arms reductions or a more stable balance in the strategic equation and involved major problems of verification.

42. One nuclear-weapon State belonging to this group of delegations held that its nuclear potential was limited to the minimum level strictly necessary to guarantee its security and independence. It further stated that when the arsenals of two nuclear-weapon States were reduced to verified levels in such a way that it could be considered that the gap between potentials had changed in kind, and if significant progress had been made in the real reduction of conventional imbalances and towards the elimination of the chemical weapons threat, it would then be ready to join in efforts aimed at the limitation and reduction of nuclear arsenals.

43. Another nuclear-weapon State reaffirmed its stand in favour of the complete prohibition and total destruction of nuclear weapons. In this connection, it reiterated its view that it was of particular importance for the States with the largest nuclear arsenals to immediately halt their nuclear arms race and adopt effective nuclear disarmament measures. It further reiterated its statement made at the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament to the effect that if the two States with the largest nuclear arsenals took the lead in halting the testing, improvement and production of nuclear weapons and reducing by 50 per cent all types of their nuclear weapons and means of delivery, that nuclear-weapon State would nuclear

44. A nuclear-weapon State also stated that the proposal for a nuclear weapons freeze was attractive from a number of political and other perspectives, but it would not be a sufficient basis for nuclear disarmament.

45. A nuclear-weapon State also stressed that the proposal for a nuclear weapons freeze, although seemingly attractive, would detract from efforts already under way to reduce the nuclear arsenal and would perpetuate and accentuate dangerous asymmetries in the strategic balance. It further stated that a freeze would not offer a sound basis for either major arms reductions or a more stable balance in the strategic equation and involved major problems of verification.

46. In summary, by all significant indices, nuclear disarmament should proceed.
would be prepared to assume obligations through negotiations with all other nuclear-weapon States to stop the testing, improvement and production of nuclear weapons and to reduce them according to a rational ratio until their total destruction. It also held that, notwithstanding the on-going bilateral negotiations between the USSR and the United States, the Committee on Disarmament, as the sole international body charged with multilateral disarmament negotiations, should play its role in dealing with the urgent question of promoting nuclear disarmament, and therefore it supported the establishment of an ad hoc working group on this subject.

44. A number of delegations, while acknowledging that the States that possess the most important nuclear arsenals bear a special responsibility, considered that the effective cessation of the nuclear arms race meant that all States now possessing nuclear weapons should be willing to halt the further testing and development of their nuclear arsenals.

45. Other delegations considered that negotiations for a halt in testing of nuclear explosives should be considered within the over-all framework of the nuclear arms reduction efforts currently under way. One nuclear-weapon State recalled its position according to which, in conformity with paragraph 51 of the Final Document, the cessation of nuclear-weapon tests should be placed within the framework of an effective process of nuclear disarmament. Other delegations did not agree with such an interpretation of paragraph 51 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. In this connection the Group of Socialist countries reaffirmed its position that a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests is a matter of the highest priority and should be agreed upon as quickly as possible.

46. Some States held the view that the cessation of nuclear-weapon testing by all States would be in the interest of mankind. It would make a significant contribution to the aim of ending the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and the development of new types of such weapons and of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Therefore, all efforts should be made to conclude, as an important priority measure, a multilateral nuclear test ban treaty at the earliest possible date.
47. In this connection, it was pointed out that the halting of nuclear-weapon testing had long been considered by the international community as a matter of the highest priority. It was further stated that to place the problem in the context of a halt in the testing of "nuclear explosives" was an attempt to divert attention from the central issue of achieving the cessation of nuclear-weapon tests by all States for all times and to hinder access by developing countries to the full range of technological advances for economic and social development. Other delegations pointed out that the issue of a nuclear test ban had been explored under agenda item 1.

48. A number of delegations held that nuclear weapons, being weapons of mass destruction, should not be used as substitutes for conventional weapons and that, therefore, the adoption of measures for the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament should not be dependent on progress in the field of conventional disarmament. While these delegations recognized that the international situation obviously had an impact on disarmament negotiations, they pointed out that the continuation of the arms race ran counter to efforts to ease tensions and promote international co-operation. On the other hand, progress in disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament, would contribute significantly to improvement of the international situation and strengthening of international peace and security.

49. A view was expressed concerning the need to start negotiations in order to lower the number of tactical nuclear weapons, with the aim of their ultimate abolition. In this connection, several delegations commented on the proposal for the establishment in Europe of a zone free of battlefield nuclear weapons. Some delegations, while sharing the concern over the high concentration of nuclear weapons in Europe, attached special importance to creating such a zone on both sides of the dividing line between NATO and Warsaw Treaty Organization. Those States emphasized that every possible effort must be made to reduce and, indeed, completely eliminate nuclear weapons in Europe. In their view, the proposal on the establishment in Europe of a zone free of battlefield weapons offered an opportunity to move closer to this goal.
goal and to scale down military confrontation in Europe substantially. The proposal also conformed to their belief that the establishment of nuclear-weapon free zones in various parts of Europe may lessen the danger of nuclear war and give fresh impetus to détente and mutually beneficial co-operation. The delegation of one country belonging to this group of States stated the readiness of its government to make its entire territory available when such a zone was established, provided the principle of equality and equal security was observed. The delegation of one nuclear-weapon State also expressed its positive attitude to this proposal. Several other delegations noted that their main criterion for all arms control and disarmament proposals, including the creation of nuclear-weapon free zones, was the contribution such proposals could make towards the prevention of any war, including a conflict with conventional weapons in Europe, and noted that the initiative did not meet this requirement. They further noted that the determining factor for a territory to be under nuclear threat is not whether nuclear weapons are stationed there but whether nuclear weapons are aimed at it. Negotiations that merely result in moving the nuclear arsenals in Europe farther apart would therefore not enhance stability but would only create an illusion of greater security. They would detract from the ongoing negotiations on the reduction of nuclear weapons, thereby making it more difficult to reach prompt results.

50. The importance of nuclear-weapon-free zones in different parts of the world, including in Europe, was also underlined in this context; initiatives of different States were mentioned.

51. The nuclear-weapon States engaged in bilateral nuclear arms negotiations were reminded of the request contained in General Assembly resolution 37/78A, to transmit to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, not later than 1 September 1983, a joint report or two separate reports on the stage reached in their negotiations. In this connection, a view was expressed that a joint report or two separate reports should also be submitted to the Committee on Disarmament.
52. A number of delegations deplored that, although the Committee on Disarmament was the single multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament and nuclear weapons were a subject of the highest priority, it was not possible to establish a working group to initiate multilateral negotiations because of the opposition of certain nuclear-weapon States and their allies which based their security policy on the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons. In the view of these delegations, exchanges of views in plenary or informal meetings of the Committee could not, as past experience in the Committee demonstrated, promote the search for a common approach that would enable the Committee to fulfil its negotiating role. Other delegations maintained the view that informal meetings would be the most appropriate vehicle to determine such a common approach. In this context, these delegations also called attention to the description of their approach to arms control and disarmament as contained in paragraph 40 above. A large number of delegations stated in this regard that the perceptions of security and the approach to "arms control" and disarmament of some States could not be used as an excuse for opposing the establishment of an ad hoc Working Group on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.

53. With regard to "prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters", substantive matters were discussed during plenary meetings of the Committee. In working papers CD/341 and CD/355 the necessity of urgent negotiations of appropriate and practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war was emphasized. In this connection, the Group of 21 proposed the establishment of an Ad Hoc Working Group on the prevention of nuclear war. This proposal was supported by the Group of Socialist States. It was also supported by another nuclear-weapon State. Other delegations stated that in their view it would be premature to consider establishing a working group and suggested that the Committee hold a structured discussion on the subject in a series of informal meetings. Some of these delegations suggested in document CD/41l that these informal meetings identify possible practical and appropriate negotiable measures in this field. With reference to this suggestion many member States considered that those informal meetings would serve no purpose and that they could not, under any circumstances, be a substitute for the consideration of the question in a working group.
54. The Group of 21 reaffirmed the view that the greatest peril facing the world today was the threat of destruction from a nuclear war which would have devastating results on belligerents and non-belligerents alike. Members of the Group reiterated the message made by the VIIth Conference of Heads of State or Government in New Delhi in March 1983 which, inter alia, expressed a demand for "an immediate halt to the drift towards nuclear conflict which threatens not only the well-being of humanity in our times but of future generations as well". Members of the Group also stressed that they could not accept that the security of their countries and the survival of mankind should be in continual and increasing jeopardy as a result of the actions of a handful of nuclear-weapon States. In their view, since a nuclear war would have catastrophic consequences for the whole of mankind, all nations had a vital interest in urgent negotiation of appropriate and practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war. For that reason, the Group of 21 called for the initiation of multilateral negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament and, to that end, proposed the establishment of an Ad Hoc Working Group.

55. A group of socialist countries also stressed the importance and urgency of concrete steps for the prevention of nuclear war. They denounced certain strategic concepts or doctrines that were based on the assumption that it was possible to attain victory in a nuclear war. They pointed out that such doctrines also advocated the first use of nuclear weapons. In this respect they stressed the importance of the unilateral obligation of the nuclear-weapon State belonging to this group never to be the first to use nuclear weapons and expressed hope that other nuclear-weapon States which have not yet assumed such an obligation would eventually reconsider their positions. They also expressed concern on plans to deploy new medium-range missiles in Western Europe. These delegations called for the establishment of an Ad Hoc Working Group with a view to conducting negotiations for the elaboration of concrete steps for the prevention of nuclear war.
56. They believed that, in the first instance, it would be necessary to elaborate such practical measures as had already found broad international support and for whose implementation the political will of the corresponding States was required above all. In their view, the following were among such priority measures: the renunciation by all nuclear-weapon States of the first use of nuclear weapons; a freeze by all nuclear-weapon States on the production and deployment of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery as well as on the production of fissionable material, for the purpose of manufacturing various types of nuclear weapons, as a first step to the reduction, and eventually, the elimination of their nuclear arsenals, and the declaration by all nuclear-weapon States of a moratorium on all nuclear explosions until such time as a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests is concluded.

57. Another important step in their view, would be the conclusion of a world treaty on the non-use of force in international relations. They put forward a proposal to conclude between States members of the two major military-political alliances a treaty on the mutual renunciation of the use of military force and the maintenance of peaceful relations, which would contain as its core the mutual commitment not to be the first to use nuclear or conventional arms against one another, and thus not to be the first to use against one another military force in general. They also supported the proposal for the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and expressed their readiness to discuss other multilateral steps aimed at the prevention of nuclear war, such as prevention of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons and avoidance of surprise attacks. In their opinion, measures of a bilateral nature should be considered in relevant negotiations among interested States.

58. A number of delegations, including three nuclear weapon States, while sharing fully the concerns of other delegations about the need to prevent the danger of nuclear war, emphasized that the matter had to be considered in the broader context of the prevention of all wars. In this regard, they underscored the supreme importance of compliance by all States with their obligations under the Charter.
of the United Nations, especially the prohibition of use or threat of force under its Article 2. These delegations also emphasized as well the great importance of establishing and maintaining military balance and strategic stability and the significance that disarmament negotiations leading to deep reductions in nuclear arsenals had in this context. The same delegations recalled their view that a nuclear freeze and a non-first-use commitment limited to nuclear weapons would fail to prevent armed conflicts effectively. At the same time they reaffirmed the position of their States that none of their weapons, nuclear or conventional, will ever be used except in response to armed attack. These delegations stressed that nuclear arsenals had a single function, the prevention of war and preservation of peace and security through the strategy of deterrence. The elements of deterrence and defence together with arms control and disarmament are integral to the maintenance of peace and security.

59. The necessity for all States to conduct a policy of restraint to settle peacefully their disputes and to make full use of regional security arrangements, as well as a wide array of other practical measures, was emphasized in document CD/357. The significance of confidence building measures which would improve the international political climate and thereby diminish the danger of war, including nuclear war; the utility of measures against surprise attacks and measures to reduce the risk of accidental use of nuclear weapons; and other specific and concrete measures were also reflected in document CD/357 and further elaborated in document CD/380.

60. These delegations proposed that the Committee should hold a structured and comprehensive debate on the subject, at informal meetings, taking into account all the proposals and ideas that had been advanced, with a view to identifying appropriate and practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war in all its aspects.
61. The Group of 21 pointed out that their experience of such debates at informal meetings was discouraging. The Committee had held such informal meetings on cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament in 1981 without any results. In spite of that, the Group of 21 expressed its willingness to accept a series of informal meetings of the Committee provided these were to lead to the initiation of the negotiating process through the accepted mechanism of a working group to conclude an agreement on appropriate practical and effective measures for the prevention of nuclear war. This view was shared by a Group of Socialist countries and in document CD/406 a list of items was submitted to facilitate the consideration and negotiation of practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war. Another group of States did not accept that the outcome of informal meetings on the question of the prevention of nuclear war could be prejudged but reiterated their willingness, expressed inter alia in CD/411, to hold such informal consultations at an early date.

62. Several other delegations observed that there was a contradiction between expression of concern about the danger of nuclear war, on the one hand, and mixing up the urgent task of the prevention of nuclear war with a host of general issues, on the other. Moreover, the attempt to bring in broader and long term issues relating to the prevention of all wars in the consideration of the question of prevention of nuclear war amounted to disregarding the priority that the General Assembly has unanimously attached to the question of prevention of nuclear war. These delegations further stressed that the situation called for measures for preventing the waging of nuclear war rather than only avoiding the risk of accidental use of nuclear weapons.

63. Some delegations, among them the authors of the working papers mentioned in paragraph 59, rejected these allegations and pointed to the necessary inter-relationship between nuclear and conventional conflict, especially in view of the risk that any conventional war, including in regions of the Third World, might degenerate into a nuclear exchange. Their approach did in no way purport to deflect from the dangers of nuclear war nor to deny its specificity, but was designed to work for the prevention of nuclear war from a realistic and comprehensive perspective. If one looked at the possible causes of war, it became evident that the separation of various forms of conflict, as they might ultimately
In their view, it was for this reason that the Committee had decided to formulate the agenda item as it was. These delegations also pointed out that Article 2 of the United Nations Charter, in their view, prohibited the threat or use of force in all its forms. 64. The Group of 21 rejected this interpretation of item 2 of the agenda and maintained that this particular item especially pertained to nuclear disarmament and prevention of nuclear war. They recalled that they had always insisted on inclusion of prevention of nuclear war as a separate item on the agenda. This view was shared by the Group of Socialist countries.

65. A number of delegations stated that the placing of the consideration of the prevention of nuclear war in the context of the prevention of all wars was an attempt by some nuclear-weapon States and their allies, which relied on the possible use of nuclear weapons as a pillar of their security policy, to blur the fundamental difference between nuclear and conventional war inherent in the unique destructive power of nuclear weapons. Those delegations also referred to the recent report issued by the World Health Organization, entitled "Effects of nuclear war on health and health services", which abundantly illustrated the devastating consequences of the use of nuclear weapons. Those delegations underlined the statement contained in that report that "the introduction of nuclear weapons has added totally new dimensions to warfare". In their opinion, in view of the fact that nuclear weapons were weapons of mass destruction, Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations could not, under any circumstances, be invoked to justify the use of nuclear weapons in the exercise of the right of self-defence against conventional armed attack since nuclear war would threaten the very survival of mankind.

66. Other delegations maintained that no provision of the United Nations Charter limits the right of States to make use of the means they deem the most appropriate, subject to existing international agreements, in exercise of their inherent right of individual or collective self-defence as recognized in Article 51.
67. In this connection the Group of Socialist Countries recalled that in the Political Declaration of the Warsaw Treaty Member States which was adopted in Prague on 5 January 1983, it was stated that "any calculations on winning a nuclear war after unleashing it are senseless" and that "such a war would inevitably lead to the annihilation of whole peoples, colossal destruction and disastrous consequences for civilization and all life on Earth". It was further underlined that the military policy of States, in particular of the nuclear weapon States "should be based exclusively on defence purposes and that it should take into account the legitimate security interests of all States. It must not hamper the conclusion of agreements which would lead to an effective reduction of armed forces and armaments in strict compliance with the principle of equality and undiminished security."

68. One nuclear-weapon State maintained that in order to reduce and eliminate the danger of nuclear war it was required not only to take measures to halt the nuclear arms race and proceed to nuclear disarmament but also for all States to adhere strictly to the fundamental principles of the United Nations Charter and to refrain from the threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of other States. In its view, the two States possessing the largest nuclear arsenals should take the lead in achieving a substantial reduction in their arsenals. It endorsed the view that the use of nuclear weapons should be prohibited pending nuclear disarmament and reiterated its position that it would, at no time and under no circumstances, be the first to use nuclear weapons and that it unconditionally undertook not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. It also held that to ensure the prevention of nuclear war, appropriate conventional disarmament measures should be considered along with efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament.

69. One member State recalled that since April 1982, in the opinion it transmitted to the Secretary-General following the request made by the General Assembly in resolution 36/81 B, and which was reproduced in document CD/282, it stressed that the best way to prevent a nuclear war would be the adoption of effective
The measures as those described in paragraphs 47 and 50 of the Final Document. The Representative of this State, in the intervention he devoted entirely to this item at the 234th plenary meeting, held on 16 August, described five concrete measures to illustrate the nature of those which, in his opinion, deserve to be qualified as "appropriate and practical measures" for the objective sought in accordance with the recommendation of the General Assembly. The first four measures have been examined for some time by the General Assembly, the Committee on Disarmament, or both. The fifth and last measure, on the other hand, is entirely new since it would consist of the following: (a) merging into a single forum the two series of bilateral negotiations which the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have been conducting in Geneva for some time; (b) broadening the scope of such negotiations, so that they would include not only strategic weapons and the so-called intermediate or medium-range nuclear weapons, but also tactical nuclear weapons, of which several thousands are deployed in advanced positions in Europe; (c) enlarging also the number of participants in such negotiations, by including in them a Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who would perform a dual function: on the one hand, he would be there to safeguard the legitimate interests of the non-nuclear-weapon States which do not belong to any of the two major military alliances; on the other hand, he would, whenever it may seem advisable, help the two powerful parties out of the impasses which frequently block their conversations. Many Member States shared the opinions expressed above.

70. The delegation of the United States was of the opinion that the matters referred to above were within its competence. It expressed its understanding of the views and concerns expressed above and reaffirmed the importance it attaches to the prevention of nuclear war and to the achievement of substantial reductions in strategic and intermediate range nuclear forces to lower and more stable levels.
71. The delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shared the concerns stated above regarding an ever growing spiral of the nuclear arms race. It reaffirmed the readiness of the Soviet Union to reach an agreement which would leave no nuclear weapons — either medium-range or tactical ones — in Europe, as well as to freeze all the components of nuclear, including strategic, arsenals of the Soviet Union and the United States as a first step to their drastic reduction and eventual elimination.

72. Other delegations recalled that the General Assembly, in its resolution 37/78A of 9 December 1982, requested "the two negotiating parties to bear constantly in mind that not only their national interests but also the vital interests of all the peoples of the world are at stake in this question".

73. The Committee considered the proposals for the establishment of an ad hoc working group in CD/341 and CD/355, but there was no consensus on them.

C. Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons

74. The item on the agenda entitled "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons" was considered by the Committee, in accordance with its programme of work, during the periods from 4 to 8 April and from 11 to 15 July 1983.

75. The new documents presented to the Committee during its 1983 session under the agenda item are included in the report submitted by the Ad Hoc Working Group.

76. At its 236th plenary meeting on 23 August 1983, the Committee adopted the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group re-established by the Committee under the second item at its 207th plenary meeting (see paragraph 10 above). That report (CD/417) is an integral part of this report and reads as follows:

"1. adopt
documen...

"2. Appoi...

"3. The b...

"4. Ad Hoc...

"5. It was pa...
"I. Introduction

"1. At its 207th plenary meeting, on 29 March 1983, the Committee on Disarmament adopted the following decision, relating to item 6 on its agenda, contained in document CD/358, which, inter alia, reads:

... The Committee decides to re-establish for the duration of its 1983 session the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban, Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States Against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, Chemical Weapons and Radiological Weapons ...

'It is understood that the ad hoc working groups may start their work on the basis of their former mandates. The mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban may thereafter be revised as decided by the Committee which will consider this question with appropriate urgency.

'The ad hoc working groups will report to the Committee on the progress of their work before the conclusion of its 1983 session.'

"II. Organization of Work and Documentation

"2. At its 207th plenary meeting, on 29 March 1983, the Committee on Disarmament appointed Ambassador Mansur Ahmad, representative of Pakistan, as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group. Mr. S.K. Buo and Mr. M. Cassandra of the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs served as Secretary of the Ad Hoc Working Group during the first and second parts of the 1983 session respectively.

"3. The Ad Hoc Working Group held nine meetings between 26 April and 29 April and between 16 June and 22 August 1983.

"4. At their request, the Committee on Disarmament, at its 208th plenary meeting on 31 March 1983, decided to invite the representatives of the following States not members of the Committee to participate in the meetings of the Ad Hoc Working Group during the 1983 session: Austria, Finland, Norway.

"5. In carrying out its mandate, the Ad Hoc Working Group took into account paragraph 59 of the Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, in which '... the nuclear-weapon States are called upon to take steps to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The General Assembly notes the

-41-
declarations made by the nuclear-weapon States and urges them to pursue efforts to conclude, as appropriate, effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons'. During the course of its work, the Working Group also took into account other relevant paragraphs of the Final Document.

6. The Ad Hoc Working Group also took note of the letter of the Secretary-General in document CD/336 transmitting resolutions adopted by the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session, and took note in particular of resolutions 37/80 and 37/81. Paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of resolution 37/80 read as follows:

3. Requests the Committee on Disarmament to continue the negotiations on the question of the strengthening of the security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States during its session in 1983;

4. Calls once again upon all States participating in these negotiations to make efforts to elaborate and conclude an international instrument of a legally binding character, such as an international convention, on this matter;

5. Calls once again upon all nuclear-weapon States to make solemn declarations, identical in substance, concerning the non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States having no such weapons on their territories, as a first step towards the conclusion of an international convention, and recommends that the Security Council should examine such declarations and, if they all meet the above-mentioned objective, should adopt an appropriate resolution approving them.'

Paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of resolution 37/81 read as follows:

3. Appeals to all States, especially the nuclear-weapon States, to demonstrate the political will necessary to reach agreement on a common approach and, in particular, on a common formula which could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character;

4. Recommends that further intensive efforts should be devoted to the search for such a common approach or common formula and that the various alternative approaches, including in particular those considered in the Committee on Disarmament, should be further explored in order to overcome the difficulties;

5. Recommends that the Committee on Disarmament should actively continue negotiations with a view to reaching early agreement and concluding effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, taking into account the widespread support for the conclusion of an international convention and giving consideration to any other proposals designed to secure the same objective.'
7. In addition to the previous documents before the Ad Hoc Working Group listed in CD/SA/WP.1/Rev.4, two documents from the 1981 session were recirculated to the Group: a working paper presented by the Netherlands (CD/SA/CRP.6) and another presented by Pakistan (CD/SA/CRP.7). A working paper was prepared by the Secretariat during the 1983 session, entitled 'Declarations on Security Assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States made by the five nuclear-weapon States, including references to nuclear-weapon-free-zones; and Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America' (CD/SA/WP.10), which updated the declarations of the nuclear-weapon States contained in CD/SA/WP.2. The Group of 21 presented a document (CD/407) to the Committee on the subject. The Secretariat also prepared a document dated 20 April 1983, entitled 'A compilation of statements made at the twelfth special session of the General Assembly and during the thirty-seventh regular session of the General Assembly, in 1982, on the question of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons'.

SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATIONS

8. In pursuing the task entrusted to it, the Working Group bore particularly in mind its special report to the Committee on Disarmament in view of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament (CD/281/Rev.1) wherein it reviewed substantive negotiations on 'Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons' during the 1979, 1980 and 1981 sessions of the Committee on Disarmament, as well as the state of negotiations on the subject before the second special session in 1982. The Working Group had held no meetings since that report until it was re-established in 1983 and the prospect of further progress on this issue was debated.

9. A number of delegations generally regretted the fact that there had been little positive movement forward in the negotiations on the question since the Group last met a year ago and they reiterated the Group of 21's view, contained in document CD/280, that further negotiations in the Group were unlikely to be fruitful as long as nuclear-weapon States did not exhibit a genuine political

"1/ See Annex I.
"2/ See Annex II.
will to reach a satisfactory agreement. They were of the view that nuclear-weapon States were under the obligation to guarantee in clear and categorical terms that non-nuclear-weapon States will not be made victims of threats or attacks with nuclear weapons. One nuclear-weapon State emphasized that these appreciations should take full account of the movement in its position that occurred at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Many delegations, including two nuclear-weapon States, shared the view that political will was the central requirement for progress on this issue. In this regard other delegations pointed to the specific difficulties that had been revealed in negotiations which stemmed from the differing perceptions of the security interests of some nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States and showed that the question of negative security assurances, in their view, cannot in fact be divorced from the wider issues of security in general. Some delegations expressed their view on the inadmissibility of this concept and stated that perceptions of security interests could not be used as an excuse for not granting negative guarantees or for the placing of conditions on those declarations. One nuclear-weapon State declared that its unilateral commitment never to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against those States which renounce the production and acquisition of such weapons and do not have them on their territories was effective, reliable and met the vital interests of non-nuclear-weapon States. A number of delegations from non-nuclear-weapon States held that the inflexibility of the concerned nuclear-weapon States to remove the limitations, conditions and exceptions contained in their unilateral declarations reduced to nothing the credibility of their declarations. Three nuclear-weapon States rejected this argument and stated that the assurances they had provided had been solemnly and formally given and remained fully in force.

10. Some delegations held that the unilateral declarations of two nuclear-weapon States were incompatible with the obligations of those two States under Additional Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. Those delegations further noted that the effectiveness of the treaty had been adversely affected by interpretative declarations to the Protocols which they held imposed conditions contrary to the letter and spirit of the Treaty and derived from multilateral instruments that in their view were inherently discriminatory. They also stated that the interpretative declarations amounted to reservations since they modified the terms of the Treaty of Tlatelolco and recalled in that connection the provisions of Article I of Additional Protocol II. The nuclear-weapon States concerned disagreed that any such incompatibility existed. They maintained that
the declarations made on ratification of the Additional Protocols to the Treaty of Tlatelolco were entirely consistent with the provisions of those Protocols and the Treaty.

"11. The importance of effective security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States was re-affirmed. It was widely held that there was an urgent need to reach agreement on a 'common formula' which could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character. There was also no objection, in principle, to the idea of an international convention; however, the difficulties involved were also pointed out. Some delegations were of the view that the Working Group had exhausted its discussions on the subject.

"12. The Chairman suggested three mutually non-exclusive approaches for possible adoption by the Working Group in its consideration of the subject, namely, (1) to continue negotiations towards an agreement on a common formula which could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character; (2) to examine the relevance and the direct implications of the non-first-use of nuclear weapons to the so-called negative security assurances; and (3) to adopt any other approach which might help in the resolution of some of the problems.

"13. Some delegations expressed the view that the Working Group should proceed immediately to the concrete elaboration of an international convention. It was pointed out however that an agreement first on the substance of the assurances would facilitate an agreement on the form.

"14. An exchange of views was held on the relevance of non-first-use of nuclear weapons to security assurances offered to non-nuclear-weapon States. Some delegations felt that a non-first-use pledge evidently amounted to a clear guarantee that nuclear weapons would not be used against non-nuclear-weapon States since these States by virtue of their non-possession of nuclear weapons could never provoke retaliation.

"15. A number of delegations underlined the significance of the non-first-use obligations and pointed out that a unilateral non-first-use undertaking, if assumed by all nuclear-weapon States without exception, would constitute an important measure aimed at strengthening the security of non-nuclear-weapon States, and therefore had direct implications and relevance to the Group's work. Some other delegations stated that the commitment not to be the first to use nuclear weapons cannot constitute an effective and credible guarantee for non-nuclear-weapon States, in so far as its validity erga omnes may at any moment be called into question by the actions of another nuclear-weapon State. Divergent views on this issue remained.
"16. In the course of deliberations and with a view to clarifying the subject matter, a proposal was put forward that the question be examined according to the categories of non-nuclear-weapon States contained in the five unilateral declarations by the nuclear-weapon powers. These categories would be: (1) non-nuclear-weapon States that belong to a military alliance with nuclear-weapon States; (2) non-nuclear-weapon States that belong to a military alliance and have nuclear weapons stationed on their territory; (3) non-nuclear-weapon States that belong to a military alliance and do not have nuclear weapons stationed on their territory; (4) non-nuclear-weapon States who do not belong to a military alliance, but have military arrangements with a nuclear-weapon State involving nuclear weapon assurances; (5) non-nuclear-weapon States that do not belong to a military alliance and enjoy a demilitarized status deriving from their participation in a nuclear-weapon-free zone. In this context it was pointed out that some of the existing unilateral declarations made by the nuclear-weapon States specifically referred to non-nuclear-weapon States which are parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty or to other internationally binding commitments not to acquire nuclear explosive devices. Many delegations pointed out that non-nuclear-weapon States as a whole should be given clear and unambiguous guarantees against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Some delegations reiterated their position that in view of the manifest difficulties in providing effective assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States, at least those not belonging to any of the military alliances should receive such guarantees. The discussion on the suggested approach however remained inconclusive.

"17. Some delegations, referring to what, in their view, has come to be known as the geographic proliferation of nuclear weapons, noted that the increasing introduction and deployment of nuclear weapons in various areas of the world should be averted, as it has serious implications for the non-nuclear-weapon States in their respective regions. Other delegations stated that this notion of geographic proliferation fails to take into account existing geographic asymmetries.

"18. One nuclear-weapon State reiterated that it undertook unconditionally not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States and nuclear-free zones.

"19. One nuclear-weapon State stressed the importance of its unilateral obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. The same nuclear-weapon State confirmed that its unilateral commitment never to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against those States which renounce the production and acquisition of such weapons and do not have them on their territories remained fully valid.
"20. One nuclear-weapon State recalled the substantial expansion of its position presented during the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and as contained in document CD/SA/WP.10.

"21. Two nuclear-weapon States pointed out that their unilateral assurances had been offered in response to, and given in recognition of the security concerns expressed by the non-nuclear-weapon States, and that these assurances were credible and reliable and represented firm declarations of policy.

"22. In connection with those unilateral declarations, some delegations expressed the view that Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations cannot be invoked to justify the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons in the exercise of the right of self-defence in case of armed attack not involving the use of nuclear weapons. Other delegations maintained that no provision of the United Nations Charter limits the right of States to make use of the means they deem the most appropriate, subject to existing international agreements, in exercise of their inherent right of individual or collective self-defence as recognized in Art. 51.

"23. Many delegations reiterated their belief that nuclear disarmament constituted the most effective security assurance against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. A number of delegations further stated that if non-nuclear-weapon States were required to accept unilateral declarations, as a sufficient assurance of security, similarly nuclear-weapon States should accept unilateral declarations of non-nuclear-weapon States as sufficient assurance that they do not possess nuclear weapons nor intended to acquire such weapons.

"CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

"24. The Ad Hoc Working Group reaffirmed that non-nuclear-weapon States should be effectively assured by the nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons pending effective measures of nuclear disarmament. Negotiations on the substance of the effective arrangements however revealed that specific difficulties related to differing perceptions of security interests of some nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States persisted and that the complex nature of the issues involved in evolving a common formula acceptable to all continued to prevent agreement on such a formula, as well as on an international convention. Under these circumstances, no progress was achieved.

"25. Against this background, the Working Group recommends to the Committee on Disarmament that ways and means should be explored to overcome the difficulties encountered in the negotiations to reach an appropriate agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Accordingly, a working group should be re-established at the beginning of the 1984 session and consultations should take place in order to determine the most appropriate course of action, including the resumption of the activities of the working group itself."
"ANNEX I

"DECLARATIONS ON SECURITY ASSURANCES TO NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES MADE BY THE FIVE NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES, INCLUDING REFERENCES TO NUCLEAR WEAPON FREE ZONES; AND PROTOCOL II OF THE TREATY FOR THE PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN LATIN AMERICA

I. DECLARATIONS ON SECURITY ASSURANCES

"CHINA: 'Pending the realization of complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, all nuclear countries must undertake unconditionally not to use or threaten to use such weapons against non-nuclear countries and nuclear-free zones.

As is known to all, the Chinese Government has long declared on its own initiative and unilaterally that at no time and under no circumstances will China be the first to use nuclear weapons, and that it undertakes unconditionally not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear countries and nuclear-free zones.'


"FRANCE: declares that 'for its part ... it will not use nuclear arms against a State that does not have these weapons and has pledged not to seek them, except in the case of an act of aggression carried out in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon State against France or against a State with which France has a security commitment'.

Address by Mr. Claude Cheysson, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the 12th Special Session of the General Assembly (SSOD II) on 11 June 1982, A/S-12/PV.9, p.69.

"It remains also ready 'to negotiate with nuclear-free zones participants in order to contract effective and binding commitments, as appropriate, precluding any use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against the States of these zones'.

"USSR: From the rostrum of the special session our country declares that the Soviet Union will never use nuclear weapons against those States which renounce the production and acquisition of such weapons and do not have them on their territories.

We are aware of the responsibility which would thus fall on us as a result of such a commitment. But we are convinced that such a step to meet the wishes of non-nuclear States to have stronger security guarantees is in the interests of peace in the broadest sense of the word. We expect that the goodwill evinced by our country in this manner will lead to more active participation by a large number of States in strengthening the non-proliferation régime.

The Soviet Union is prepared to enter into an appropriate bilateral agreement with any non-nuclear State. We call upon all the other nuclear Powers to follow our example."

Address by Mr. A. Gromyko, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, to the 10th Special Session of the General Assembly (SSOS I), 26 May 1978, Official Records of the General Assembly Tenth Special Session Plenary Meetings, Verbatim Records, 5th meeting, paras. 84-86, p.78.

"UNITED KINGDOM: "The United Kingdom is now ready formally to give ... the following assurance ... to non-nuclear-weapon States which are parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty or to other internationally binding commitments not to manufacture or acquire nuclear explosive devices: Britain undertakes not to use nuclear weapons against such States except in the case of an attack on the United Kingdom, its dependent territories, its armed forces, or its allies by such a State in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon State."

United Kingdom Working Paper on the Subject of Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear Weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, CD/177 of 10 April 1981.

"UNITED STATES: "The United States will not use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty or any comparable internationally binding commitment not to acquire nuclear explosive devices, except in the case of an attack on the United States, its territories or armed forces, or its allies, by such a State allied to or associated with a nuclear-weapon State in carrying out or sustaining the attack."

"Most recently reaffirmed by Mr. Eugene Rostow, Director United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, at the 152nd plenary meeting of the CD on 9 February 1982 (CD/PV.152, p.15)."
"II. TREATY FOR THE PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN LATIN AMERICA (TATELOLCO)

"Additional Protocol II

"The undersigned Plenipotentiaries, furnished with full powers by their respective Governments,

"Convinced that the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, negotiated and signed in accordance with the recommendations of the General Assembly of the United Nations in Resolution 1911 (XVIII) of 27 November 1963, represents an important step towards ensuring the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons,

"Aware that the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is not an end in itself but, rather, a means of achieving general and complete disarmament at a later stage, and

"Desiring to contribute, so far as lies in their power, towards ending the arms race, especially in the field of nuclear weapons, and towards promoting and strengthening a world at peace, based on mutual respect and sovereign equality of States,

"Have agreed as follows:

"Article 1

"The statute of denuclearization of Latin America in respect of warlike purposes, as defined, delimited and set forth in the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America of which this instrument is an annex, shall be fully respected by the Parties to this Protocol in all its express aims and provisions.

"Article 2

"The Governments represented by the undersigned Plenipotentiaries undertake, therefore, not to contribute in any way to the performance of acts involving a violation of the obligations of article 1 of the Treaty in the territories to which the Treaty applies in accordance with article 4 thereof.

"Article 3

"The Governments represented by the undersigned Plenipotentiaries also undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the Contracting Parties of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America.

"Article 4

"The duration of this Protocol shall be the same as that of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America of which this Protocol is an annex, and the definitions of territory and nuclear weapons set forth in articles 3 and 5 of the Treaty shall be applicable to this Protocol, as well as the provisions
regarding ratification, reservations, denunciation, authentic texts and registration contained in articles, 26, 27, 30 and 31 of the Treaty.

"Article 5"

"This Protocol shall enter into force, for the States which have ratified it, on the date of the deposit of their respective instruments of ratification.

"IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned Plenipotentiaries, having deposited their full powers, found to be in good and due form, hereby sign this Additional Protocol on behalf of their respective Governments.

ANNEX II

STATEMENT OF THE GROUP OF 21 ON EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS TO ASSURE NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES AGAINST THE USE OR THREAT OF USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

1. In its statement (CD/280) of 14 April 1982 the group of 21 had stated that further negotiations in the ad hoc working group on this item are unlikely to be fruitful so long as the nuclear weapon States do not exhibit a genuine political will to reach a satisfactory agreement. The Group, therefore, urges the nuclear weapon States concerned to review their policies and to present revised positions on the subject to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament which shall fully take into account the position of the non-aligned, neutral and other non-nuclear weapon States.

2. At the second special session the Nuclear Weapon States failed to meet the concerns of the Group of 21 in this regard.

3. In subsequent discussions in the Working Group the nuclear weapon States have persistently upheld their existing unilateral declarations which reflect their own subjective approach, with the result that the negotiations on this item cannot be carried any further.

4. The Group of 21 deeply regrets this situation.

5. The Group of 21 reiterates its belief that the most effective assurances of security against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is nuclear disarmament and prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. The Group of 21 reaffirms its adherence to the principles enunciated in the Group's statement (CD/280) of 14 April 1982, regarding an agreement on the question of 'effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons'.

6. The nuclear weapon States have an obligation to guarantee in clear, unambiguous terms that the non-nuclear weapon States will not be threatened or attacked with nuclear weapons. The inflexibility of the concerned nuclear weapon States to remove the limitations, conditions and exceptions contained in their unilateral declarations runs counter to their obligations to extend credible assurances to the non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The resulting impasse is preventing the working group from proceeding to the elaboration of a common formula or common approach acceptable to all to be included in an international instrument as called for by the relevant resolutions of the United Nations.

7. The Group of 21, therefore, once again urges the concerned nuclear weapon States to display the necessary understanding and political will in this respect thus enabling the working group to resume work at the beginning of the next session.
D. Chemical weapons

77. The item on the agenda entitled "Chemical weapons" was considered by the Committee, in accordance with its programme of work, during the periods from 1 February to 31 March and from 18 to 22 July 1983.

78. The list of new documents presented to the Committee during its 1983 session under the agenda item are listed in the report submitted by the Ad Hoc Working Group. In addition to the documents considered by the Ad Hoc Working Group, the Committee had before it, in connection with the item, document CD/419, dated 23 August 1983, submitted by the delegation of the United States of America, entitled "Workshop on Verification of Chemical Weapons Stockpile Destruction".

79. At its 236th plenary meeting on 23 August 1983, the Committee adopted the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group re-established by the Committee under the agenda item at its 207th plenary meeting (see paragraph 10 above). That report (CD/416) is an integral part of this report and reads as follows:
I. INTRODUCTION

1. In accordance with the decision taken by the Committee on Disarmament at its 207th meeting held on 29 March 1983, as contained in document CD/358, the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons was re-established for the duration of the 1983 session on the basis of its former mandate. The Committee further decided that the Ad Hoc Working Group would report to it on the progress of its work before the conclusion of its 1983 session.

II. ORGANIZATION OF WORK AND DOCUMENTATION

2. At its 207th plenary meeting on 29 March 1983, the Committee on Disarmament appointed Ambassador D.S. McPhail of Canada as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group. Mr. Abdelkader Bensmail, Senior Political Affairs Officer, United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs continued to serve as Secretary of the Working Group.

3. The Ad Hoc Working Group held 23 meetings from 6 April to 22 August 1983. The Working Group benefited from the inclusion in delegations of national experts in the period 22 June to 22 July 1983. In addition, the Chairman held a number of informal consultations with delegations.

4. At the 216th plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group reported on the progress of its work.

5. At their request, the representatives of the following States, not members of the Committee on Disarmament, participated in the work of the Working Group: Austria, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland and Viet Nam.

6. During the 1983 session, the following official documents dealing with chemical weapons were presented to the Committee on Disarmament:


- Document CD/343, dated 10 February 1983, submitted by the United States of America, entitled 'United States detailed views on the contents of a chemical weapons ban'


- Document CD/353, dated 8 March 1983, submitted by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, entitled 'Verification of non-production of chemical weapons'

- Document CD/378, dated 21 April 1983, submitted by China, entitled 'On the prohibition regime of the future convention banning chemical weapons'

- Document CD/387, dated 6 July 1983, submitted by the United States of America, entitled 'Illustrative on-site inspection procedures for verification of chemical weapons stockpile destruction'


- Document CD/393, dated 13 July 1983, submitted by Yugoslavia, entitled 'Working Paper on some technical aspects of the verification process in a chemical weapons convention' (also issued as CD/CW/WP.55)

- Document CD/396, dated 19 July 1983, submitted by Norway, entitled 'Working Paper on verification of a chemical weapons convention: sampling and analysis of chemical warfare agents under winter conditions'

- Document CD/401, dated 29 July 1983, submitted by Yugoslavia, entitled 'Precursors - 'Key' Precursors' (also issued as CD/CW/CRP.82)
- Document CD/408, dated 9 August 1983, submitted by Egypt, entitled 'Proposals to promote respect for the Chemical Weapons Convention and compliance with its provisions'

7. In addition, the following Working Papers were circulated to the Working Group:

- CD/CW/ WP.46 submitted by the Netherlands, entitled 'Suggested list of key precursors - including those usable in multicomponent chemical weapon systems'
- CD/CW/ WP.47 submitted by the United States of America, entitled 'United States Delegation impressions of the CW technical consultations held in January 1983'
- CD/CW/ WP.48 submitted by the United States of America, entitled 'Working hypothesis on systematic, international on-site inspection of the destruction of declared stocks'
- CD/CW/ WP.49 entitled 'Statement by the Co-ordinator of Contact Group A'
- CD/CW/ WP.50 submitted by Poland, entitled 'Views of the Polish Delegation on the results of the consultations with delegations on technical issues held in the framework of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons during the period 17 January - 4 February 1983'
- CD/CW/ WP.51 submitted by the United States of America, entitled 'Preventing illegal production of key precursors of nerve gas'
- CD/CW/ WP.52 submitted by the United States of America, entitled 'Verification of non-production of chemical weapons'
- CD/CW/ WP.53 submitted by Bulgaria, entitled 'Working hypothesis on verification of destruction of declared stocks'
- CD/CW/ WP.54 submitted by France, entitled 'Precursors - Key Precursors'
- CD/CW/ WP.55 submitted by Yugoslavia, entitled 'Working Paper on some technical aspects of the verification process in a chemical weapons convention' (also issued as CD/393)
- CD/CW/ WP.56, entitled 'Draft Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons to the Committee on Disarmament'
- CD/CW/ WP.57, submitted by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, entitled 'Verification of Non-Production of Chemical Weapons'
8. The following Conference Room Papers were also submitted to the Working Group:

- CD/CW/CRP.67 entitled "Timetable for the Chairman's consultations on technical issues as presented in the report of the Working Group, CD/334, para. 12 on 15 September 1982, to be held 17 January - 4 February 1983"
- CD/CW/CRP.68 entitled "Work Schedule - April 1983"
- CD/CW/CRP.70* entitled "Contact Group C: Paper presented by the Co-ordinator"
- CD/CW/CRP.71 entitled "Contact Group C: Paper presented by the Co-ordinator: Criteria for the objective and impartial verification of a prohibition of use of chemical weapons"
- CD/CW/CRP.72 entitled "Chairman's summary of the discussions held in Contact Group A in April 1983"
- CD/CW/CRP.73 entitled "Progress Report by the Co-ordinator"
- CD/CW/CRP.74 + Rev. 1 and 2 entitled "Proposals by the Co-ordinator: Procedure for declaring possession or non-possession of chemical weapons and their possible components"
- CD/CW/CRP.75* entitled "Proposals by the Co-ordinator: The destruction or diversion of stocks of chemical weapons"
- CD/CW/CRP.76 and Corr.1 submitted by Yugoslavia, entitled "Definition of 'Key' Precursors"
- CD/CW/CRP.77 submitted by Australia, entitled "Diversion of chemical weapons stocks"
- CD/CW/CRP.78 submitted by Australia, entitled "Questions relating to the possible civilian use of chemicals containing the methyl-phosphorus bond"
- CD/CW/CRP.79 entitled "Report by the Co-ordinator on the 'Criteria for the objective and impartial verification of a prohibition of use of chemical weapons'"
- CD/CW/CRP.60 + Rev.1, 2, 3, 4, entitled 'Proposal by the Co-ordinator: Issues relevant to the incorporation of a use prohibition in the scope of the Convention'
- CD/CW/CRP.60/Rev.5 entitled 'Report of the Co-ordinator on Issues relevant to the incorporation of a use prohibition in the scope of the Convention'
- CD/CW/CRP.81/Rev.1 submitted by Australia/The Netherlands, entitled 'List of precursors for super-toxic lethal chemicals and incapacitating chemicals'
- CD/CW/CRP.82 submitted by Yugoslavia, entitled 'Precursors - 'Key' Precursors' (also issued as CD/401)
- CD/CW/CRP.83 submitted by Czechoslovakia, entitled 'Concept of precursors in the CW Convention'
- CD/CW/CRP.84 submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany, entitled 'List of key precursors'
- CD/CW/CRP.85 entitled 'Report of the Co-ordinator on the result of the work of Contact Group A'
- CD/CW/CRP.86 entitled 'Report of the Co-ordinator on the work of Contact Group D'
- CD/CW/CRP.87 entitled 'Report of the Co-ordinator on the Structure and functions of the Consultative Committee and its subsidiary organs'

"III. SUBSTANTIVE WORK DURING THE 1983 SESSION"

"9. During its 1983 session, the Working Group intensified its efforts aimed at elaborating a Convention on the basis of existing material and new proposals made by delegations. The main tasks of the Group were to attempt to resolve the remaining major items of substance on which there is still disagreement and to record the substance of agreement where this has already been reached. To this effect, it accepted the Chairman's proposal to set up four Contact Groups which dealt with specified aspects of the following spheres of the Convention as follows:

"(a) Contact Group A: Existing stockpiles
   (Co-ordinator: Colonel J. Cialowicz, Poland)

"(b) Contact Group B: Compliance provisions and verification issues
   (Co-ordinator: Mr. S. Duarte, Brazil)

"(c) Contact Group C: Prohibition of use
   (Co-ordinator: Mr. R.J. Ackerman, The Netherlands)

"(d) Contact Group D: Definitions
   (Co-ordinator: Dr. J. Lundin, Sweden)

"10. Having considered and remitted these matters to Contact Groups, the remaining two major issues considered in 1983 – destruction of existing means of production and non-production; and lesser issues requiring attention; were considered by the
Working Group itself. Areas of seeming consensus – much of the scope of prohibition, many definitions, certain co-operative and confidence-building measures, certain aspects of national implementation and international verification, and preambular and additional provisions relating to substance – were not discussed in detail, but of course were taken into account on the basis of earlier work in arriving at the Working Group's conclusions in 1983. Specifically, the Working Group considered:

(a) Existing means of production –

Differences in this area are among the most difficult to resolve; problems exist regarding the declaration of plants; the need to inspect, close and seal declared plants was explored, as well as approaches to their elimination; problems of timing of declarations, the specification of location, the method of elimination, possible special requirements for binary facilities were also considered; proposals for systematic international verification were advanced;

(b) Non-production of chemical weapons in the chemical industry –

Basic differences remain in this area, particularly with respect to possible restrictions on chemicals for permitted purposes and the development of lists of e.g. key precursors, and the verification measures which might be applied. (Subsequently remitted to Contact Group D);

(c) Prohibition of transfer –

Agreement was reached that transfers, except for elimination purposes, would be restricted but the allowable circumstances and amounts for such transfers require further consideration;

(d) Non-development –

While there is agreement that future development of chemical weapons should be prohibited, verification by any systematic means would appear difficult because of the need to preserve the right to undertake work on protection or other permitted purposes.

The Working Group did consider other items including certain definitions, small-scale production for permitted or protective purposes, stockpile elimination, military preparations for the use of chemical weapons and the preparatory commission, and the results in some cases were further remits to the existing Contact Groups, and in others, simply a reconfirmation of the state of play reported in earlier Contact Group reports.
11. The Working Group's agreed conclusions on substantive matters are recorded in the systematic and integrated manner set forth in annex 1 for the consideration of Governments. Both common and unagreed views on individual provisions of a convention appear. Annex 1 does not, however, necessarily take full account of certain instances which need further reflection on individual understandings or undertakings. In particular this applies to the definitions of a 'precursor', 'key precursor' and 'production facilities', existing stocks of chemical weapons, and the range of possible applications of on-site inspection.

IV. CONCLUSIONS ON THE SUBSTANCE OF A POSSIBLE CONVENTION

12. The Ad Hoc Working Group recommends to the Committee on Disarmament:

(a) that the views set forth in annex 1 to this report, substantive provisions to be included in a chemical weapons convention, be used as the basis for the further work of the Working Group;

(b) that the views contained in the 1983 reports of Contact Groups appended as annex II to this report, including the draft formulations for possible use in a future convention, together with other relevant previous reports and documents of the Committee and future ones, also be utilized in the further elaboration of a convention; and

(c) that the Working Group resume negotiations immediately at the outset of the 1984 session of the CD with a view to intensive negotiation aimed at the final elaboration of a Convention at the earliest date.
ANNEX I

The Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons considers the following substantive provisions should be included in a Chemical Weapons Convention. (Portions not agreed to by all delegations are indented and introduced by:

1. and, where they are additional proposals;
2. or, where they are alternatives to other texts).

I. GENERAL PROVISIONS

A. Purpose and Commitments

1. General Purpose of the Convention.

An undertaking to ban chemical weapons

2. Basic Undertakings

(a) An undertaking not to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain or transfer chemical weapons.

(b) An undertaking:

To exclude through the implementation of the provisions of the Convention, which complement the prohibitions of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, the use of chemical weapons in any armed conflict.
or not to use chemical weapons in any armed conflict
or not to use chemical weapons in any circumstances
or to observe, by States not parties to the Geneva Protocol on the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons the terms of its provisions, and to recall, by States parties to the Protocol, their commitments under it.

(c) An undertaking to eliminate existing stockpiles of chemical weapons.

(d) An undertaking to eliminate existing facilities for the production of chemical weapons.

(e) An undertaking not to assist, encourage or induce anyone to engage in activities prohibited by the Convention.

and An undertaking not to engage in any military preparations to use chemical weapons.

*/ As indicated on pages 71 and 72.
"B. Definitions and Criteria

1. Definitions

An understanding that, in accordance with the general purpose criterion of the Convention

"(a) Chemical weapons means:

"(i) super-toxic lethal, other lethal, or other harmful chemicals, and their precursors, regardless of the method of production, except for those intended for permitted purposes as long as the types and quantities involved are consistent with such purposes

"or

chemical warfare agents and their precursors;

(ii) munitions or devices specifically designed to cause death or other harm through the toxic properties or chemicals released as a result of the employment of such munitions or devices; or

"(iii) any equipment

and

specifically designed for use directly in connection with the employment of such munitions or devices.

"and

(b) Chemical warfare agents means:

e.g. toxic chemical substances whose types and quantities accord with hostile and military purposes and whose toxic effects are used to interfere directly with the normal functions of man, animals and plants in such a way as to lead them to death, temporary incapacitation, permanent injury, damage, and for the purposes of the Convention, chemical warfare agents can be divided into three categories, super-toxic lethal, other lethal, and other harmful chemicals.
"(a) Permitted purposes means:

"(i) non-hostile purposes, that is, industrial, agricultural, research, medical, law enforcement, or other peaceful purposes, or protective purposes; and

"(ii) military purposes which are not related to the use of chemical weapons.

and

(d) Protective purposes means:

purposes directly related to protection against chemical weapons.

"(e) Production facility means:

any building or equipment which in any degree was designed, constructed or used for the production of any chemicals, including key precursors, primarily useful for chemical weapons, or designed, constructed or used for filling chemical weapons.

or

(to be determined)

"(f) Precursor means:

a chemical that by any reaction takes part in the production of a toxic end product,\(^1\) which for the purposes of the Convention is defined as a chemical in accordance with the general purpose criterion.

"(g) Key precursor means:

a precursor which plays a most important role in the production of, or in determining the characteristics of the end product\(^2\) and has little peaceful use\(^3\) and used at the last stage of the synthesis.

---

\(^1\) Or, possibly, chemical warfare agent (to be determined, see page 64).

\(^2\) As determined in an annex to the Convention referred to below indicating the criteria for inclusion and measures for ensuring compliance with the Convention.
"2. Toxicity Criteria

An understanding that for the purpose of classifying chemicals according to their toxicity the following criteria apply:\(^2\) 

\(\text{(a)}\) a 'super-toxic lethal chemical' has a median lethal dose which is less than or equal to 0.5 mg/kg (subcutaneous administration) or 2,000 mg-min/m\(^3\) (by inhalation);

\(\text{(b)}\) an 'other lethal chemical' has a median lethal dose which is greater than 0.5 mg/kg (subcutaneous administration) or 2,000 mg-min/m\(^3\) (by inhalation) and less than or equal to 10 mg/kg (subcutaneous administration) or 20,000 mg-min/m\(^3\) (by inhalation); and

\(\text{(c)}\) an 'other harmful chemical' has a median lethal dose which is greater than 10 mg/kg (subcutaneous administration) or 20,000 mg-min/m\(^3\) (by inhalation).

"C. Compliance

1. National Implementation Measures

An undertaking to adopt measures in accordance with constitutional processes to implement the Convention, to monitor compliance with it, and to prohibit or prevent any activity under national jurisdiction or control in violation of it.

2. National Technical Means

An understanding that technical procedures for collecting information on compliance that are under national control will be utilized in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.

\(\text{\textsuperscript{2\text{/}}}\) When measured by an agreed method set forth in an annex to the Convention.
3. Systematic International Procedures
An undertaking to ensure systematic verification of compliance with the provisions of the Convention by:

(a) data reporting
   the provision of data on production and use and other information to the Consultative Committee on a periodic basis; and

(b) on-site inspections
   on-site monitoring utilizing automatic instruments and/or mandatory inspections by an international inspectorate

(i) 'on an immediate basis', i.e. involving the presence of inspectors as soon as feasible,

(ii) 'on a continuous basis', i.e. involving the presence of inspectors at all times during an operation,

(iii) 'on a periodic basis', i.e. involving regular visits to an operation at fixed intervals as established by the Consultative Committee,

(iv) 'on a quota basis', i.e. involving an agreed number of regular visits to be determined by the Consultative Committee on the basis of agreed criteria and data communicated by States,

(v) 'on a random basis', i.e. involving an agreed number of visits which follow an irregular pattern with limited advanced warning,

(vi) on any other agreed basis arranged bilaterally or by the Consultative Committee.

2/ In accordance with declarations referred to below and lists of chemicals set forth in annexes to the Convention that will be subject to revision by the Consultative Committee.

4/ On the basis of agreed procedures set forth in an annex to the Convention.
4. Challenge Procedure

"An undertaking to ensure non-routine verification of compliance with the provisions of the Convention by the application of fact-finding procedures including on-site inspection on a voluntary basis or on the basis of a stringent obligation to permit such inspection arranged bilaterally or by a justified request to the Consultative Committee.

II. SPECIFIC PROVISIONS FOR ELIMINATION

A. Existing Stocks of Chemical Weapons

1. Initial Declarations

"(a) An undertaking to submit initial declarations to the Consultative Committee:

"(i) not later than 30 days after entry into force or adherence to the Convention;

"(ii) stating the possession or non-possession of any chemical weapons regardless of the quantity or location;

"(iii) stating the presence of stocks of chemical weapons which are under the jurisdiction or control of someone else;

"(iv) stating the composition of all stocks of chemical weapons; all chemicals, including precursors comprised in such stocks, should be declared by their chemical names, toxicities, where applicable, and weights in metric tons in bulk and filled into munitions; munitions should be declared by types, calibres, quantities and chemical fill; devices and 'specifically designed' equipment should be declared,"

5/ On the basis of the provisions of the Convention and in accordance with procedures established by the Consultative Committee (note that this footnote applies to all declarations and reports referred to in this record).
by type and quantity, and for devices, also by size and chemical fill,
and declaration of locations of all stockpiles and composition of the stocks at each location;

"(v) certifying that the acquisition or transfer of chemical weapons
along with any assistance
or including technological equipment for the production of chemical weapons and relevant technical documentation
has ceased.

"(b) An undertaking to submit the initial declarations of stocks of chemical weapons to verification by means of systematic international on-site inspection on an immediate basis
or on a quota basis for those stocks stored at specialized facilities for the destruction of stocks
or challenge procedure

2. Interim and Other Measures

"(a) An undertaking to submit declared stocks to verification between the initial declarations and commencement of elimination by continuous monitoring with on-site instruments and systematic international on-site inspection on a periodic basis
or on a quota basis for those stocks stored at specialized facilities for the destruction of stocks
or challenge procedure

"(b) An undertaking not to move chemical weapons stocks from present locations after-entry into force or adherence to the Convention except for purposes of elimination or for protective purposes and other permitted purposes.
(c) An undertaking to submit to the Consultative Committee

30 days

or 6 months

after entry into force or adherence to the Convention, initial plans for the elimination of all stocks of chemical weapons including type of operation, schedules with respect to quantities and types of chemical weapons to be destroyed, and products; and simultaneously

or just before entry into operation locations of destruction plants to be used

(d) An undertaking to submit to the Consultative Committee

annual

or periodic

reports of progress on implementation of plans for the elimination of stocks of chemical weapons.

(e) An undertaking to submit to the Consultative Committee

annually

or 3 months before the implementation of each stage

detailed plans for elimination of stocks of chemical weapons during the next year

or stage.

(f) An undertaking to notify the Consultative Committee of the elimination of chemical weapons within 30 days of the completion of their elimination.

and "(g) An undertaking to submit notifications to the Consultative Committee concerning old stocks found after the initial declaration, as to
"(i) within 30 days, the estimated quantity and type, how, where and when they were found, why they were previously unknown, and where they are stored;

(ii) within 90 days, the exact quantity and type, including the chemical names, formulae and quantities of the chemicals found, and plans for their elimination, and

(iii) within 30 days after completion, certification of elimination.

and (h) An undertaking to accept international control of stocks until their final elimination;

3. Elimination of Stocks

(a) An undertaking to eliminate as rapidly as possible all stocks of chemical weapons, and including old stocks found after the initial declaration,

by destruction

or by destruction or diversion to permitted purposes following non-reversible procedures which will allow systematic international on-site inspection and in accordance with a schedule which will maintain a balance of security during the entire elimination stage, with commencement within

6 months and completion within 10 years

or 6 months in regard to binary and multicomponent chemical weapons only and completion of the operation within 2 years and commencement within 2 years in regard to all other chemical weapons and completion within 10 years after entry into force of the Convention.

6/ To be agreed and set forth in an annex to the Convention.
"(b) An undertaking to submit the elimination of stocks of chemical weapons to systematic international verification by continuous on-site monitoring with instruments, and by systematic international on-site inspection

on a continuous basis

or on a quota basis.

E. Existing Means of Production

1. Initial Declaration

"(a) An undertaking to submit declarations to the Consultative Committee not later than 30 days after entry into force or adherence to the Convention

"(i) stating the possession or non-possession of capacities for production of chemical weapons, the capacities themselves, and stating the presence or non-presence of production facilities and their capacities under the jurisdiction or control of someone else;

or stating whether or not any production facility is under its jurisdiction or control; stating the presence on its territory of any production facility, which is under the jurisdiction or control of anyone else and the location of any such facility; and stating the location, nature, capacity, types of products and chemical names of products for any production facility which has been under its jurisdiction or control at any time since ....................

"(ii) certifying that all production or filling in facilities possessed or present has ceased.

and (b) An undertaking to submit the initial declaration of production facilities to verification by systematic international on-site inspection

on an immediate basis.

or challenge procedure.
2. Interim and Other Measures

(a) An undertaking at entry into force or adherence to the Convention to cease all activities at any production facility except those required for closure and elimination or conversion to the destruction of chemical weapons stocks, and to close each facility in a manner which will render it inoperative in a verifiable way.

(b) An undertaking at entry into force or adherence to the Convention not to undertake construction of any new production facilities or the conversion of any other existing facilities for purposes of producing chemical weapons.

(c) An undertaking to submit the inactive status of production facilities to verification between the declaration of their location and commencement of elimination by continuous monitoring with on-site automatic instruments and systematic international on-site inspection on a periodic basis, or challenge procedure.

(d) An undertaking to submit to the Consultative Committee plans for the closing and destruction of all production facilities, 30 days after entry into force or adherence to the Convention or the elimination of each plant, one year before the commencement of its elimination, and its location.

(e) An undertaking to submit to the Consultative Committee annual or periodic reports of progress on implementation of plans for the elimination of production facilities.
"(f) An undertaking to submit to the Consultative Committee annually, detailed plans concerning elimination of production facilities for the next year, or 3 months before the implementation of each stage, notifications concerning elimination of production facilities, including their location, for the next stage.

"(g) An undertaking to certify to the Consultative Committee within 30 days that the elimination of production facilities has been completed.

"(h) An undertaking to submit to the Consultative Committee within 30 days of entry into force or adherence to the convention, or within the time period provided for in the plan for the destruction of stocks plans for the temporary conversion of any production facility for the destruction of stocks of chemical weapons, including its location.

"(i) An undertaking to notify the Consultative Committee within 30 days that the destruction of stocks of chemical weapons in a temporarily converted production facility has been completed.

"(j) Elimination of Production Facilities

"(a) An undertaking to eliminate all production facilities, including any facilities temporarily converted for the destruction of stocks of chemical weapons, by razing them, or destroying or dismantling them employing procedures which permit verification and in accordance with a schedule\(^{1}\) which will maintain

\(^{1}\) To be agreed and set forth in an annex to the Convention.
a balance of security during the entire elimination stage, with commencement within
6 months and completion within 10 years
or 6 months in regard to facilities producing binary
weapons with completion of elimination within
2 years; and commencement within 3 years in
regard to the facilities producing all other
chemical weapons and completion within 10 years.

\[ (b) \] An undertaking to submit the elimination of each
production facility to verification by
systematic international on-site inspections,
of each facility at an agreed level
or challenge procedure.

III. OTHER SUBSTANTIVE PROVISIONS

1. Future Chemical Weapons Non-Production Verification
An undertaking to submit the non-production of chemicals for use in
chemical weapons to systematic international verification in addition
to the use of a challenge procedure, by 8/

1. Super-toxic Lethal Chemicals
\[ (a) \] a limitation to an amount which is the lowest possible and
in any case does not exceed one metric ton of the aggregate
quantity of super-toxic lethal chemicals
and their key precursors
produced, diverted from stocks, or otherwise acquired
annually or possessed at any one time
for protective purposes
or for all permitted purposes?

8/ In accordance with procedures set forth in an annex and on the basis
of lists of chemicals, including those of particular risk, to be determined by
the Consultative Committee following agreed criteria.
"(b) a limitation of the production of these chemicals to a single small scale facility having a capacity limit of ___________

"(c) a notification to the Consultative Committee of the location and capacity of the small scale production facility within 30 days after entry into force or adherence to the Convention, or when constructed later, _____ days before the date of commencement of operations;

"(d) monitoring of the small scale production facility by annual data reporting with justification, on-site instruments, and systematic international on-site inspection

    on an agreed level

or on a quota basis

and 2. a prohibition of the production of compounds with methyl-phosphorus bond in commercial production facilities

    and to restrict such production to the single small-scale facility.

"3. Other Lethal and Other Harmful Chemicals

"(a) monitoring of production and use by annual data reporting;

    and (b) a declaration to the Consultative Committee of the location of facilities for the production of certain other lethal and other harmful chemicals deemed to pose a particular risk.

"4. Key precursors

"(a) Monitoring by annual data reporting of production and use

    and and declaration to the Consultative Committee of the location of facilities for the production of key precursors;

    and systematic international on-site inspection on a random basis.
"B. Verification of the Prohibition of Use
An understanding that provisions for international verification by means of a challenge procedure shall apply equally to complaints of the use of chemical weapons.

"C. Permitted Transfers
"1. Transfer for Elimination Purposes
" (a) An understanding that, by mutual agreement, chemical weapons may be transferred between parties for purposes of elimination.
" (b) An understanding that all declaration and verification provisions normally applicable to the elimination of stocks of chemical weapons will also apply to stocks transferred for purposes of elimination with an additional notification to the Consultative Committee immediately before commencement of the transfer.

"2. Transfer for other purposes
" (a) An undertaking not to transfer super-toxic lethal chemicals and their key precursors to non-parties;
" (b) An understanding to limit transfer to another party of super-toxic lethal chemicals and of their key precursors for permitted purposes or for protective purposes to a maximum of 100 grams or
in any 12 month period
" (c) An undertaking by both parties to submit an advance report to the Consultative Committee for each transfer and an annual summary report of all transfers including in both the chemical names, weights and destination.

"2/ On the basis of procedures to be agreed and set forth in an annex.
IV. OPERATIONAL PROVISIONS

A. National Means for Implementation

1. National Implementation Measures

(a) An undertaking to adopt measures necessary in accordance with constitutional processes to implement the Convention, and in particular to prohibit and prevent any activity in violation of the Convention anywhere under national jurisdiction or control.

(b) An undertaking to submit to the Consultative Committee information concerning the legislative and administrative measures taken.

2. Responsibilities

(a) An undertaking to provide, through any national organization or authority assigned to implement the Convention, assistance to the Consultative Committee including data reporting, assistance for international on-site inspections and a prompt response to all requests for the provision of expertise, information and laboratory support.

(b) An undertaking to co-operate fully with the Consultative Committee in the exercise of its verification activities and not to interfere in any manner with the conduct of legitimate verification activities.

B. National Technical Means

An understanding that national technical means may be utilized to collect information on compliance, that such means will not be interfered with, and that any State party that possesses national technical means of verification may place the information at the disposal of other parties.
or An understanding that where national technical means are utilized to collect information on compliance, and not interfered with, that all parties shall have access to such information.

or No provision

"C. International Means for Implementation"

"1. Depository

To be determined.

"2. Preparatory Commission

An undertaking to establish a Preparatory Commission composed of representatives of all signatory States to convene after the Convention is open for signature for the purpose of carrying out the necessary preparations for the entry into force of the provisions of the Convention and to prepare for the establishment of the Consultative Committee.10/

"3. Consultative Committee

"(a) An undertaking to establish a Consultative Committee11/ composed of representatives of all States Parties, which shall convene not later than 30 days after entry into force of the Convention, to carry out broad international consultations and co-operation among States Parties, to oversee the implementation of the Convention and to promote the verification of continued compliance by performing scientific and technical review functions and by providing a forum for discussion of any problem related to the implementation of the Convention.

and to decide on practical measures to be taken by parties to the Convention in case of violation.

10/ In accordance with guidelines set forth in an annex to the Convention.

11/ In accordance with specifications, organization and functions set forth in an annex to the Convention.
"(b) An undertaking to meet in regular sessions of the Consultative Committee every ... years, and to hold extraordinary sessions at the request of any State Party or the Executive Council.

"(c) An undertaking to establish an Executive Council composed of representatives of ... States Parties appointed by the Consultative Committee as well as a Technical Secretariat and other subsidiary bodies as necessary.

"(d) An understanding that the Executive Council will carry out the functions of the Consultative Committee when it is not in session and will also be responsible for receiving and disseminating data and information, receiving requests on challenge procedures and deciding on specific action to be taken, and overseeing systematic on-site inspections.

"(e) An understanding that the Technical Secretariat will provide administrative support to the Executive Council and the Consultative Committee and will render technical assistance to States Parties and the Executive Council.

V. CO-OPERATION AND CONFIDENCE-BUILDING PROVISIONS

1. Consultation and Co-operation

1. Bilateral Consultative Process

"(a) An undertaking to consult and co-operate, directly or through appropriate procedures, including the services of appropriate international organizations and of the Consultative Committee in any matter related to the implementation of the Convention, and to endeavour to clarify and resolve, through bilateral consultation, any situation which may give cause to doubts about compliance with the Convention, or which gives rise to concerns about a related situation which may be considered ambiguous.

"(b) An undertaking to provide information to assure compliance with the provisions of the Convention.
"2. International Consultative Procedures

(a) An undertaking to co-operate fully with the Consultative Committee and its subsidiary organs and/or international organizations, which may, as appropriate, give scientific, technical and administrative support to the Consultative Committee in order to facilitate fact-finding activities so as to ensure the speedy clarification of the situation which gave rise to the original request.\(^{12}\)

(b) An understanding that at any time a request may be submitted to the Consultative Committee or its appropriate subsidiary body to carry out a challenge procedure to clarify and resolve any situation considered to be ambiguous or which gives rise to suspicion about actions in breach of obligations deriving from the provisions of the Convention.\(^{13}\)

(c) An undertaking to treat favourably and in good faith a request for an on-site inspection by the Consultative Committee or its appropriate subsidiary body, and to submit a prompt and full explanation for the reasons for a refusal, which should be considered an exceptional response.

or

An undertaking to treat favourably and in good faith a request for an on-site inspection by the Consultative Committee or its appropriate subsidiary organ. A refusal should be accompanied by the submission of a prompt and full explanation of its reasons. The Consultative Committee shall assess the explanation submitted and may send another request, taking into account all relevant elements, including possible new elements received by the Consultative Committee after the original request. If a second request is refused, recourse may be had to appropriate procedures under the Charter of the United Nations.

\(^{12}\) In accordance with procedures set forth in an annex to the Convention.

\(^{13}\) In accordance with detailed procedures to be agreed and set forth in an annex to the Convention.
3. Assistance

(a) An undertaking to provide assistance and support the provision of assistance to a party to the Convention threatened or adversely affected as a result of the violation of the provisions of the Convention.

(b) An undertaking to provide assistance or support being provided in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations to any party to the Convention which has requested such assistance and which the Security Council decides has been exposed or is possibly being exposed to danger as a result of a violation of obligations assumed under the Convention by another party to it.

4. United Nations

(a) An understanding that parties will retain at all times their ability to take whatever action they deem necessary within the framework of the Convention or the Charter of the United Nations to resolve differences concerning the application of the Convention.

(b) An undertaking to co-operate in carrying out any investigation which the Security Council may initiate, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, on the basis of the complaint received by the Security Council which shall inform the parties to the Convention of the result of the investigation.

B. Protection of Population and Environment

An undertaking to protect the population and the environment in fulfilling the obligations connected with the elimination of stocks of chemical weapons and production facilities.

C. Promotion of Development Goals

An undertaking to facilitate the creation of favourable conditions for the economic and technical development and for international co-operation in the field of peaceful chemical activities while precluding interference with areas of activity unrelated to the purposes of the Convention.
VI. ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS

A. Preamble and Other Provisions

1. An undertaking that the Convention will not limit or detract from obligations assumed under other Treaties including:

(a) the 1925 Protocol for the Prohibition of Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare;

(b) The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction;

and (c) The Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques.

2. An undertaking to declare, within 30 days of entry into force or adherence to the Convention, the location and nature of any facility under jurisdiction or control designed, constructed or used since ____________ for the development of chemical weapons.

B. Withdrawal

An understanding that withdrawal may be exercised if extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the Convention have jeopardized the supreme interests of a State. Notice of withdrawal will be given three months in advance including a statement of the extraordinary events.
"ANNEX II

"Contents"

| "- Report of the Co-ordinator of Contact Group A  
  (Together with the Chairman's Terms of Reference) | Page |
|---------------------------------------------------|------|
| "- Reports of the Co-ordinator of Contact Group B  
  (Together with the Chairman's Terms of Reference) | 12 and 15 |
| "- Reports of the Co-ordinator of Contact Group C  
  (Together with the Chairman's Terms of Reference) | 19 and 21 |
| "- Report of the Co-ordinator of Contact Group D  
  (Together with the Chairman's Terms of Reference) | 28 |
In order to pursue its negotiations, the Ad Hoc Working Group needs to examine the issue of existing stockpiles in a comprehensive fashion. This involves consideration of, inter alia, the following areas:

1. Relative aspects in scope;
2. All declarations;
3. Timing of declarations;
4. Monitoring of declarations;
5. Destruction plans;
6. Timing of destruction;
7. Destruction methods;
8. Monitoring of destruction;
9. Other compliance requirements and confidence building measures; and
10. Resulting work requirements for national and international implementation organizations.

To assist the Working Group in its consideration of these matters, a contact group will be established.
"INSTRUCTIONS TO CONTACT GROUP A

"To further the Working Group's objectives, the contact group will examine and report on specific questions relating to treatment of the issue of existing stockpiles as requested by the Working Group chairman. Specifically it will consider:

- the techniques suitable for monitoring the destruction of stockpiles; and
- the basic content of declarations required.

"In examining these questions, the contact group should proceed in a systematic fashion, drawing on material from all areas as necessary, and taking national positions into account as alternatives to be considered. The contact group reports from 1982 should provide a useful starting point. The contact group should not focus on "technical matters" as such, although it should identify areas where existing technical advice is insufficient. Essentially, the contact group's task is to identify the political and operational decisions needed to permit the Working Group to negotiate successfully provisions on these questions for inclusion in a convention.

"The contact group chairman will report orally as necessary to the Working Group chairman and will submit a short written report prior to the last Working Group meeting in April. To assist the Working Group in its negotiations, the contact group in this report should note in particular the consensus reached and areas in respect of each question in which differences have not been resolved.

"MEETINGS OF CONTACT GROUP

"The contact group will meet at the discretion of its chairman and meeting times must be scheduled and announced through the Secretariat.

"Meetings will be informal, but interpretation services must be available,
"Report of the Co-ordinator on the Results of the Work of Contact Group A

"The terms of reference approved by the Working Group directed the Contact Group to concentrate its attention on the consideration of the two subjects:
- the techniques suitable for monitoring the destruction of stockpiles, and
- the basic content of declarations required.

"The Contact Group began to consider the actual steps of the destruction process for chemical weapons stocks in order to evaluate whether verification of destruction of stockpiles should be carried out by a quota system of inspections or by continuous inspections. In this connection the Contact Group took note of the United States document CD/387 of 6 July 1983, devoted to specific methods for on-site verification on a continuous basis. Other documents have been also discussed. Delegations continued to hold differing views, as reflected in CD/294, CD/343, and other documents.

"With respect to the consideration of the basic content of declarations, delegations continued to hold differing views, in particular, on the content of initial declarations of stockpiles, as reflected in CD/334.

"Some other questions related to the issue of existing stockpiles have also been discussed.

"Common Views and Topics for Further Discussion

"Based on consultations with delegations the co-ordinator presented, for consideration of the Contact Group, a paper outlining some points on stockpiles on which commonality of views appeared to exist and also outlining some points requiring further discussion. Consideration of the points confirmed that they could serve as a suitable basis for further work and future elaboration. These points are the following:
"A. Possession or non-possession of chemical weapons, as defined, should be declared within 30 days.

"B. The presence on a State's territory of stocks of chemical weapons under the jurisdiction or control of anyone else should also be declared within 30 days. (Thus, the same stocks would be declared by the possessing State and by the State on whose territory the stock is.)

"C. States which possess chemical weapons should also provide specific information on their chemical weapons stockpiles at the same time. The information should cover not only toxic chemicals but also precursors in the stockpiles, munitions and devices, and specifically designed equipment.

"D. Chemical weapons stocks should be destroyed/eliminated as rapidly as possible.

"E. To ensure that no party gains a unilateral advantage, destruction/elimination should be carried out according to a general schedule agreed during the negotiation of the convention.

"F. The destruction/elimination process should begin not later than ... months/years and be completed not later than 10 years.

"G. General plans for destruction/elimination of stocks should be declared within ... days/months. The plans should describe:

"(i) type of operation;

"(ii) details of implementation of the agreed general schedule;

"(iii) what is to be destroyed and at what location;

"(iv) destruction products.

"H. The destruction/elimination process should be carried out employing agreed procedures which permit systematic international on-site verification. The process should not be easily reversible.

"I. An annual/periodic notification should be provided regarding implementation of plans for destruction/elimination of chemical weapons stocks. The notification should include:

"(i) a progress report of stocks destroyed/eliminated during the last year/period including details of types, quantities, and destruction methods;

"* An understanding has been reached that here and subsequently in the wording destruction/elimination the first word ("destruction") reflects the approach of the delegations which are in favour of the complete destruction of the stocks of chemical weapons, while the second word ("elimination") corresponds to the approach of other delegations which envisage the possibility of both destruction and diversion of the stocks of chemical weapons for non-hostile purposes.

-86-
"(ii) plans for destruction/elimination during the next year/period including details of types, quantities, and destruction methods.

"J. A certification that all chemical weapons stocks have been destroyed/eliminated should be provided within 30 days after the process has been completed.

"K. Destruction of stocks should be subject to systematic international on-site verification, including systematic international on-site inspection.

"L. Provisions should be included regarding:
   (i) transfer of declared stocks from one party to another for the purpose of destruction; and,
   (ii) chemical weapons found after the initial declaration has been made.

"M. A chemical weapons production facility could be temporarily converted for destruction of chemical weapons. The converted facility would have to be destroyed as soon as it was no longer in use for destruction of stocks but not later than the deadline for completion of stockpile destruction.

"N. All necessary precautions should be taken for the protection of the population and the environment.

"O. Specific principles for verification of destruction.
   (Separate section under preparation.)*

"For further discussion:
- Should the location of CW stocks be declared as part of the initial declaration?
- What information should be provided about the CW stocks in the initial declaration?
- Should the declared stocks be subject to prompt and systematic international on-site inspection? If so, on what basis? Should the declared stocks be subject to systematic international on-site monitoring until they are eliminated? If so, on what basis?
- As an alternative to destruction, could some stocks also be eliminated by allowing them to be used for non-hostile purposes? If so, which chemicals could be used? What quantities? Under what verification provisions?

* This section has not yet been prepared.
- Specific measures for systematic international on-site verification:
  (separate section under preparation)*
- What should be the deadline for beginning the actual elimination of stocks?
- In what terms should the agreed general schedule for stockpile destruction be defined?
- What should be the nature of the provisions regarding:
  (a) transfer of declared stocks from one party to another for the purpose of destruction; and,
  (b) chemical weapons found after the initial declaration has been made?

"Co-ordinator's suggestions for more precise wording on certain points"

"In an attempt to reflect, in more precise wording, certain aspects of the common points set forth above, the Co-ordinator presented to the Contact Group his suggestions. In the course of their elaboration, the views of some delegations were taken into account. The Co-ordinator stated that his suggestions in no way committed delegations. The Co-ordinator's suggestions are as follows:

1. States Parties to the Convention shall be guided, in accordance with their resulting obligation, to declare possession and non-possession of chemical weapons and their possible components, by the following:

"Each State depending on whether or not it possesses chemical weapons, as defined in totality of paragraphs ... of the article ... (definition of chemical weapons) or in any one of those paragraphs individually, regardless of the quantity, on its own territory or elsewhere, under its authority:

"(a) within 30 days after the entry into force of the Convention will send to the Consultative Committee a declaration, which confirms the fact that it possesses chemical weapons, or will give a negative answer;

"(b) a State in possession of chemical weapons, not later than 30 days after the entry into force of the Convention, will declare its stocks of chemical weapons (procedure for declaring such stocks is subject to negotiation).

"Taking into account further consideration in Contact Group D of the questions connected with chemicals for permitted purposes, this formula could be supplemented by the provisions according to which each State Party, whether or not in possession

"*/ This section has not yet been prepared."
of chemical weapons, will also be required to make declarations, if it possesses stocks of key precursors of supertoxic lethal chemicals, to be used for permitted purposes, and if it possesses stocks of other lethal and/or harmful chemicals, to be used for permitted purposes.

"2. (i) Each State Party, having chemical weapons under its jurisdiction or control on the territory of any other State, regardless if the latter is a Party to the Convention or not, undertakes to declare the presence of its chemical weapons stockpiles on the territory of that other State not later than 30 days after the entry into force of the Convention or its accession to it; to withdraw those chemical weapons from the territory of such a State not later than (to be elaborated) after the entry into force of the Convention or its accession to it with a view to destroying/eliminating them; or to destroy/eliminate those chemical weapons stockpiles directly on the territory of that State in agreement with it, under the condition that the latter agrees to the verification procedures as provided for under this Convention.

"(2) Each State Party, having on its territory chemical weapons stockpiles which are under the jurisdiction or control of another State, regardless if the latter is a Party to the Convention or not, undertakes, not later than 30 days after the entry into force of the Convention or its accession to it, to declare the known presence of such weapons on its territory.

"3. The destruction/elimination of the stocks of chemical weapons shall be initiated by each State Party possessing such weapons not later than ... months/years and should be completed not later than 10 years after the Convention enters into force or accession of the State to it.

"4. Each State Party to the Convention having chemical weapons stocks under its jurisdiction or control, undertakes not later than 30 days after destruction/elimination of the stocks of chemical weapons to certify that all chemical weapons stocks have been destroyed/eliminated.

"5. (1) Each State Party is entitled to transfer its stockpiles of chemical weapons to another State Party for the purpose of their destruction.

"(2) All such stockpiles would, notwithstanding their transfer to another State for the purpose of destruction, be subject to the provisions of the Convention and its related annexes which apply to stockpiles in general (e.g. declarations of stockpiles, timing of destruction, including the need to ensure a balanced schedule of destruction, agreed procedures for destruction, periodic notification of progress in destruction, etc.).
"(3) Such transfers will be on the basis of an agreement between the participants, the text of which is to be elaborated in accordance with the guidelines contained in the annex and is to be transmitted to the Consultative Committee.

"(4) Each State Party transferring its stockpiles for destruction to another State Party should also undertake to declare, before the commencement of the operations on transfer and transportation, the time-table of transfers and transportation, including quantity and composition of stocks to be transferred at a given time and the location of the facility on the territory of another State Party at which the destruction of stockpiles will be carried out.

"(5) The State Party conducting the destruction of stockpiles of chemical weapons which belong to another State Party, should not later than 30 days after the completion of their destruction make an appropriate declaration about it.

"(6) The transfer of the stockpiles of chemical weapons for purposes of destruction by one Party to the Convention to another State Party, the transportation of the stockpiles and their destruction are subject to verification in full measure, as it is envisaged in Chapter ... of the Convention.

"(6) The destruction of stocks of chemical weapons shall be carried out by each such State Party at a specialized facility (facilities) or at facility (facilities) temporarily converted for such purposes, whose location and technical parameters shall be declared by this State Party in accordance with ... In case of temporarily converted facility (facilities) for the purposes of destruction, it (they) shall be destroyed in the agreed manner immediately after the termination of their use for the destruction of stocks and in any event not later than 10 years after the Convention enters into force or accession of the State to it.

"(7) Each State Party during the destruction/elimination of the stocks of chemical weapons, undertakes to take all necessary precautions for the protection of the population and the environment.
In order to pursue its negotiations, the Ad Hoc Working Group needs to examine in detail the procedures required for the resolution of compliance questions. This involves consideration of, inter alia, the following areas:

1. Information exchanges demonstrating compliance;
2. Sequence of events in resolution of compliance questions;
3. Evidence required to support challenges;
4. Fact-finding measures;
5. On-site inspections;
6. Obligations on nations;
7. Role of consultative committee;
8. Appeals to the United Nations;
9. Other relevant compliance procedures and confidence building measures; and
10. Resulting work requirements for national and international implementation organizations.

To assist the Working Group in its consideration of these matters, a contact group will be established.
"INSTRUCTIONS TO CONTACT GROUP B

"To further the Working Group's objectives, the contact group will examine and report on specific questions relating to treatment of the issue of non-compliance as requested by the Working Group chairman. Specifically it will consider:

- the fact-finding measures which should be in place for dealing with challenges on compliance;

- the nature of the evidence which should be available to justify initiation of a challenge and an on-site inspection; and

- the obligation on nations to accept on-site inspections as a result of a challenge.

"In examining these questions, the contact group should proceed in a systematic fashion, drawing on material from all areas as necessary, and taking national positions into account as alternatives to be considered. The contact group reports from 1982 should provide a useful starting point. The contact group should not focus on "technical matters" as such, although it should identify areas where existing technical advice is insufficient. Essentially, the contact group's task is to identify the political and operational decisions needed to permit the Working Group to negotiate successfully provisions on these questions for inclusion in a convention.

"The contact group chairman will report orally as necessary to the Working Group chairman and will submit a short written report prior to the last Working Group meeting in April. To assist the Working Group in its negotiations, the contact group in this report should note in particular the consensus reached and areas in respect of each question in which differences have not been resolved.

"MEETINGS OF CONTACT GROUP

"The contact group will meet at the discretion of its chairman and meeting times must be scheduled and announced through the Secretariat.

"Meetings will be informal, but interpretation services must be available."
"Progress Report by the Co-ordinator"

"The Contact Group examined the ten points contained in the general directions given to it by the Working Group, and in particular the three specific questions it was requested to consider. The following texts sum up the discussions held by the Contact Group.

"Text No. 1"

"On the fact-finding measures which should be in place for dealing with challenges on compliance", the Contact Group reviewed the contents of Element XIII (Consultative Committee) as it appears in the Annex to CD/334. It was generally felt that the Consultative Committee, composed of all States Parties to the Convention, should have as its subordinate bodies a technical secretariat and a sub-organ of reduced membership to operate on a permanent basis. The possibility of establishing additional sub-organs was not discussed. The technical secretariat would have routine administrative functions such as receiving requests from States parties, providing technical information, handling communications to and from States parties, organizing expert teams for action decided by the competent organ, etc. The other sub-organ would have a smaller membership than the Consultative Committee and would be composed of a fixed number of representatives of States parties chosen on a basis yet to be determined. Such a number should be small enough to ensure its speedy convening and practical functioning and at the same time representative enough to ensure its authority. The Contact Group considered alternatives for the name of such a body (‘Fact-Finding Panel’ and ‘Executive Council’ were suggested). It was also generally agreed that such a body should be able to be convened on short notice, and to take decisions on behalf of the Consultative Committee with regard inter alia to the following matters: to be seized with requests from States parties; deciding on specific action to be taken regarding the request (information, fact-finding, on-site inspections); evaluation of reports submitted to it as a result of the action decided; reporting to the Consultative Committee; requesting the convening of the Consultative Committee. In this respect, the decision-making process should be further discussed."
"Text No. 2

"On the nature of the evidence which should be available to justify initiation of a challenge and an on-site inspection and the obligation on nations to accept on-site inspections as a result of a challenge", the discussions in the Contact Group touched on a number of points recorded on CD/334 and CD/342, in particular the results of the work of the Contact Groups established during the 1982 Session of the Committee on Disarmament. The result of the discussion in the Contact Group is summed up below.

"It was generally considered desirable that in seeking the resolution of questions concerning compliance with the Convention, States parties follow the sequence of steps described in the text below. States parties should nevertheless retain at all times their ability to take whatever action they deemed necessary in the framework of the Convention or the Charter of the United Nations to resolve differences concerning the application of the Convention.

"It was also generally considered that a refusal by a State party to accept on-site inspections requested by the competent organ of the Convention should be exceptional and accompanied by a full explanation of the reasons for such a refusal.

1. States parties to this Convention undertake to consult and co-operate, directly among themselves or through appropriate procedures, including the services of appropriate international organizations and of the Consultative Committee in any matter related to the implementation of this Convention.

2. States parties to this Convention shall endeavour to clarify and resolve, through bilateral consultation, any situation which may give cause to doubts about compliance with this Convention, or which gives rise to concerns about a related situation which may be considered ambiguous. A State party seized with a request from another State party for clarification of a particular situation shall promptly provide the requesting State party with all relevant information in connection with the request with a view to the satisfactory conclusion of the issue.

3. In order to facilitate the satisfactory solution of situations referred to in Section 2 above, the States parties concerned may request the co-operation and good offices of the Consultative Committee, or its subsidiary organs for the solution of the issue.
4. Having regard to the procedures contained in Sections 2 and 3 above, any State party may request the Consultative Committee or its appropriate subsidiary organ to carry out, in the exercise of its functions, appropriate procedures with regard to itself or another State party to clarify and resolve any situation which may be considered ambiguous, or which gives rise to suspicion about actions by another State party in breach of obligations deriving from the provisions of this Convention. Such a request may include a request for an on-site inspection.

4.1 Requests sent to the Consultative Committee or its subsidiary organ under Section 4 above should contain objective and concrete elements supporting a suspicion of non-compliance with the Convention and should be directly relevant to the complaint.

4.2 All States parties undertake to co-operate fully with the Consultative Committee and its subsidiary organs and/or international organizations, which may, as appropriate, give scientific, technical and administrative support to the Consultative Committee in order to facilitate their fact-finding activities so as to ensure the speedy clarification of the situation which gave rise to the original request.

4.3 A request for an on-site inspection by the Consultative Committee or its appropriate subsidiary organ shall be treated favourably and in good faith by the State party which receives it. A refusal should be accompanied by the submission of a prompt and full explanation of its reasons. The Consultative Committee shall assess the explanation submitted and may send another request, taking into account all relevant elements, including possible new elements received by the Consultative Committee after the original request. If a second request is refused, the State party which originated the request may have recourse to appropriate procedures under the Charter of the United Nations.

4.4 The Consultative Committee shall notify all States parties of the initiation of any of the procedures referred to in Section 4 above and shall provide all available information related thereto to any State party upon request.
Report of the Co-ordinator
on the
Structure and Functions of the Consultative Committee
and its Subsidiary Organs

1. A Consultative Committee, composed of representatives of all States Parties to
the Convention and presided over by ...., shall be established within 30 days
after entry into force of the Convention.

2. The Consultative Committee shall convene in (venue) not later than (time)
after the Convention enters into force.

3. The Consultative Committee shall subsequently meet in regular sessions every
...... (time). Extraordinary sessions may be convened at the request of any
State Party or of the Executive Council.

4. ...... (time) after the Convention is open for signature, a Preparatory
Commission, composed of representatives of all signatory States, shall be convened
for the purpose of carrying out necessary preparations for the coming into force
of the Convention's provisions, including preparing the first session of the
Consultative Committee. The guidelines for the activities of the Preparatory
Commission are contained in Annex .... (suggestions: CD/343, page 10).

5. The Consultative Committee shall carry out broad international consultations
and co-operation among States Parties to the Convention, oversee the implementation
of the Convention, and promote the verification of the continued compliance with
the Convention, and for those purposes it shall:

(a) review new scientific and technical developments which could affect the
operation of the Convention;

(b) provide a forum for discussion of any questions relating to the
implementation of the Convention.

**/ Suggestions were made to the effect that a minimum number of signatures
should be required for the convening of the Preparatory Commission.

/**/ Suggestions were made to the effect that the Consultative Committee should
carry out the functions of a Review Conference of the Convention.
"6. In order to assist it in carrying out its functions, the Consultative Committee shall establish an Executive Council composed of representatives of ... (number) States Parties appointed by the Consultative Committee, as well as a Technical Secretariat (and other subsidiary bodies to be agreed upon).

"7. The Executive Council shall be responsible for carrying out the functions of the Consultative Committee specified in (a) and (b) of Section 5 above during the period when the latter is not in session. It shall also be responsible for the following functions:

'(a) co-operate with States Parties to ensure the implementation of, and compliance with the Convention;

'(b) obtain, keep and disseminate information submitted by States Parties regarding matters pertaining to the Convention;

'(c) render services to States Parties, facilitating consultations among them;

'(d) be seized with requests from States Parties;

'(e) decide on specific action to be taken regarding such requests;

'(f) receive the reports submitted to it as a result of the action undertaken;

'(g) report to the Consultative Committee;

'(h) request, when it deems necessary, the convening of the Consultative Committee;

'(i) oversee the carrying out of systematic on-site inspections to ensure:

- destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles
- monitoring of small-scale production of super-toxic lethal chemicals for [permitted purposes] [non-hostile military purposes]
- as may be agreed upon, compliance with other obligations (e.g. non-production of chemical weapons, non-use, elimination of production facilities, etc.).

"8. In addition to providing the necessary administrative support to the Consultative Committee and the Executive Council, the Technical Secretariat (and/or other subsidiary bodies to be further agreed upon)**/ shall:

'(a) render technical assistance to States Parties and to the Executive Council in implementing the provisions of the Convention;

'(b) receive from States Parties and distribute to them data relevant to the implementation of the Convention;

" */ Subject to further elaboration of relevant definitions.

"**/ See last sentence of Section 6 above.
"(c) elaborate technical questions relevant to the implementation of the Convention, such as drawing up for recommendation to the Consultative Committee (or the Executive Council) of lists of key precursors, technical procedures, etc.;

"(d) assist the Executive Council as further agreed upon in tasks related to information, fact-finding, systematic on-site inspection and challenge inspection.

9. The detailed specifications of the functions and organization of the Consultative Committee and its subsidiary organs shall be spelt out in an Annex to the Convention."
"AD HOC WORKING GROUP ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS"

"CONTACT GROUP C"

"In order to pursue its negotiations, the Ad Hoc Working Group needs to examine in depth the question of including a prohibition of use in the chemical weapons convention and its implications. This involves consideration of, inter alia, the following areas:

1. Alternative ways for including prohibition of use;
2. Relation to other items in scope;
3. Relation to similar provisions in other conventions;
4. Legal aspects relating to international law;
5. Application of general challenge and fact-finding procedures;
6. Requirements for special compliance and verification procedures;
7. Obligations on nations;
8. Role of consultative committee;
9. Other relevant aspects; and
10. Resulting work requirements for national and international implementation organizations.

"To assist the Working Group in its consideration of these matters, a contact group will be established."
"INSTRUCTIONS TO CONTACT GROUP C

"To further the Working Group's objectives, the contact group will examine and report on specific questions relating to treatment of the issue of prohibition of use as requested by the Working Group chairman. Specifically it will consider:

"- legal and other restrictions on including a measure for prohibition of use in a chemical weapons treaty; and

"- special requirements, if any, in addition to the normal challenge and fact-finding procedures necessary to investigate suspected use.

"In examining these questions, the contact group should proceed in a systematic fashion, drawing on material from all areas as necessary, and taking national positions into account as alternatives to be considered. The contact group reports from 1982 should provide a useful starting point. The contact group should not focus on "technical matters" as such, although it should identify areas where existing technical advice is insufficient. Essentially, the contact group's task is to identify the political and operational decisions needed to permit the Working Group to negotiate successfully provisions on these questions for inclusion in a convention.

"The contact group chairman will report orally as necessary to the Working Group chairman and will submit a short written report prior to the last Working Group meeting in April. To assist the Working Group in its negotiations, the contact group in this report should note in particular the consensus reached and areas in respect of each question in which differences have not been resolved.

"MEETINGS OF CONTACT GROUP

"The contact group will meet at the discretion of its chairman and meeting times must be scheduled and announced through the Secretariat.

"Meetings will be informal, but interpretation services must be available."
"Report by The Co-ordinator on the "Criteria for the objective and impartial verification of a prohibition of use of chemical weapons"

"I.1 The procedure assuring the verification of a prohibition of use of chemical weapons should allow for rapid action. This applies both to the administrative treatment of a request for verification, by the organ responsible under the Convention, and to access to site (if considered necessary). Access to site should at any rate take place within a time period after the reported event that would facilitate examination of any material including identification of symptoms in the human body of possible victims. Urgency would moreover be imperative in view of the seriousness of an allegation of use, the prohibition of which is after all the ultimate goal of the convention.

"I.2 If the Convention should specifically state a time limit, this should in any case be an indicative one. The procedures established within WHO for rapid dispatch of WHO epidemical teams might serve as an example. Possible co-operation with WHO could be explored. It was argued with respect to a time-limit, albeit indicative in nature, that generally speaking the longer the time allowed to lapse after a reported event before an investigation is undertaken, the less likely it will be that the team produce decisive evidence. The likelihood of finding decisive evidence would decrease with time. Climatological and other environmental factors could influence the time factor both ways. Suggestions for the commencement of investigations varied from as early as 24 hours after the reported event, to up to four weeks thereafter. It was suggested that the question of the speed with which an investigation should be initiated might be usefully worked out in guidelines under the responsibility of the Consultative Committee.

"II. The speed with which an investigation could proceed would depend to an important degree on the measure of preparation. A list of laboratories, equipment and qualified "inspectors" could be composed for the responsible treaty organ to draw from at short notice. A standardized methodology could be elaborated in the form of a guideline for the collection and analysis of information and samples, which would include an assured indisputable "chain of custody" with respect to a sample from the moment it was taken to the moment of its scientific analysis and identification."
"II.2 Preparation could also focus on the availability of technical equipment to be used by an investigation team in an on-site inspection, including protective equipment for such a team.

"II.3 Special arrangements should be concluded, preferably agreed beforehand, to ensure access to a zone of presumed use and to ensure safety if combat is imminent in the zone. A possible role for the International Committee of the Red Cross, as an organization with experience of working in conditions of armed conflict, was suggested. Danger could never be totally excluded and would have to be accepted.

"II.4 In the case of an intended on-site inspection under combat conditions the responsible organ under the Convention should launch a strong appeal for cessation of hostilities. It was believed that in certain types of conflict access to the zone of combat was not feasible without cessation of hostile action.

"II.5 The armed forces involved in the conflict could be asked to co-operate. National authorities of the State on whose territory use might have occurred should to the best of their ability assist the investigating team.

"II.6 The investigation would be of an international nature. The authorities representing the armed forces allegedly involved in use of chemical weapons as well as the national authorities mentioned in paragraph 5 above could be conferred the right to be represented on the investigating team on an ad hoc basis.

"II.7 It was suggested that wherever preparation was required as referred to above, a technical preparatory committee could be charged with the elaboration of the necessary details.

"III.1 The investigation should comprise a "forensic" procedure; in this context it could focus on defining the confines of the reported site; date and time of the reported event; weather conditions at the time of the reported event; methods and means of delivery of the reported agents; impact on plant, animal and human life. A series of events might have to be contemplated simultaneously. It was observed that such a chain of elements of evidence was as weak as its weakest element. Attention should therefore be focused on all elements alike, individually, as well as in their interrelations.

"III.2 For a final conclusion to be reached the availability of information on the presence of the chemicals under consideration in the region under consideration for reasons of a non-hostile nature could be essential. The same could be true for pathological phenomena related to contamination with or intoxication by chemicals of a non-hostile origin. The authorities in whose territory the phenomena occurred could extend useful assistance in providing such information.
"Report of the Co-ordinator on
"Issues relevant to the incorporation of a use
prohibition in the scope of the Convention
"Discussions have centred on the desired coverage of a use prohibition in the Convention. Commonality of views has been observed to take shape on the following aspects:
"- the prohibition should apply with respect to use against all States, not only States Parties to the Convention;
"- the prohibition should apply in any armed conflict (to be further defined, for example in an agreed understanding);
"- the Convention should provide for verification of alleged use of chemical weapons;
"- the Convention should provide for a clause of non-interference with the relevant international treaties;
"- the Convention should contain the 'traditional' withdrawal clause;
"- the Convention should in its preambular part contain a reference to the obligations set forth in the Geneva Protocol of 1925.
"Other aspects as yet eluded consensus:
"- whether the use prohibition should apply to riot control agents;
"- whether the use prohibition should apply to herbicides;
"Comment: a solution to these questions could be found in the framework of the definitions in the Convention.
"- how to uphold in law the deterrence value of remaining stocks in the period preceding their destruction;
"Comment: the right of any State to resort to reprisals seems not to be affected by any of the proposed draft texts. Rather the question seems to be how the States concerned could preserve, if they would choose to do so, a much broader right to retaliate during this period. The remaining question would then be in which form this concern could be met.
"- the extent to which the 1925 Geneva Protocol has been subsumed in customary international law and how this should be reflected in the (preambular part of the) Convention;
"Comment: though there was general recognition of the existence of a rule of customary international law regarding non-use of chemical weapons, positions varied as to the scope of such rule and, accordingly, as to the desirability and way to reflect such rule in the Convention.

"The Co-ordinator, in an attempt to take account of the commonality of views referred to above, suggested formulations that are contained in Appendix I."
"Preambular paragraph

'Taking cognizance of the obligations enshrined in the Protocol for the
Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases,
and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on
17 June, 1925.'

"Operative paragraphs

"I. [See Appendix II]

"II. The States Parties to this Convention, having accepted to be bound by the
obligation not to use chemical weapons in any armed conflict, in accordance
with Article ..., hereby accept that the procedure laid down in Article ...
shall apply to the verification of compliance with the said obligation.

"III. 1. Nothing in the Convention should be interpreted as in any way limiting
or detracting from the obligations assumed by any State under the Protocol for
the Prohibition of Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of
Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June, 1925.

"2. Nothing in the Convention should be interpreted as in any way limiting
or detracting from the obligations assumed under the Convention on the Prohibition
of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological)
and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction.

"3. Nothing in the Convention should be interpreted as in any way limiting
or detracting from the obligations assumed under the Convention on the Prohibition
of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques.

"IV. Each State Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right
to withdraw from the Convention if it decides that extraordinary events, related
to the subject matter of the Convention, have jeopardized the supreme interests
of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to
the Convention and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance.
Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as
having jeopardized its supreme interests.
Appendix II

"With regard to a first operative paragraph relating to non-use of chemical weapons, a suggestion was made for a formula in which an unequivocal undertaking to exclude the use of chemical weapons is placed in the framework of the recognition that such undertaking would complement the prohibitions in the 1925 Geneva Protocol. This formula, as drafted by the co-ordinator, reads as follows:

I. States Parties to the Convention undertake, through the implementation of the provisions of this Convention which complement the prohibitions of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, to exclude the use of chemical weapons in any armed conflict.

The possibility of making this formula the basis for further work has been considered; however no agreement could be reached thereupon and delegations felt that the matter had to be further studied.

Meanwhile, a number of delegations maintain preference for solution to the incorporation of a use prohibition in the scope of the Convention through direct inclusion of such a prohibition in Element I (of CD/CW/WP.33), while other delegations continue to prefer a solution whereby commitment of Parties as well as non-Parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol is reflected to observe the Protocol's provisions regarding prohibition of the use of chemical weapons in all armed conflicts.

The matter should be resolved in further intensive consultations.
In order to pursue its negotiations, the Ad Hoc Working Group needs to examine some definitions further and to develop the criteria necessary to identify and list chemicals whose production must be prohibited for chemical weapons purposes and for which compliance with the ban must be verified. This involves consideration of, inter alia, the following areas:

1. Scope of the prohibition;
2. The basic prohibitions/general purpose criterion;
3. All terms requiring definition for purposes of the convention;
4. Terms where adequate definition is still lacking;
5. Categories, if necessary, within which chemicals may be identified for control and verification of production;
6. Criteria for assigning chemicals to categories including toxicity criteria and chemical criteria;
7. The preparation of lists;
8. The use of categories, criteria and lists in verification;
9. Verification procedures; and
10. The effects of verification procedures in industry.

To assist the Working Group in its consideration of these matters, a contact group will be established.
"INSTRUCTIONS TO CONTACT GROUP D

"To further the Working Group's objectives, the contact group will examine and report on specific questions relating to definitions, criteria and precursors as requested by the Working Group chairman. Specifically, it will consider:

"- reaching common agreement on the definition of the terms chemical weapons, precursors and key precursors;

"- providing agreed criteria and one or more lists of precursors suitable for use in establishing controls and verification procedures to guarantee the non-production of chemicals for chemical weapons purposes; and

"- verification methods and limitations that might be devised on the basis of the agreed definitions and criteria.

"In examining these questions, the contact group should proceed in a systematic fashion, drawing on material from all areas as necessary, and taking national positions into account as alternatives to be considered. Previous contact group reports from 1982, the results from discussions in January 1983 and material already obtained in consultations and in the Working Group in 1983 should provide a useful starting point. The contact group should consider related technical information as necessary and identify the political and operational decisions needed to permit the Working Group to negotiate successfully provisions on these questions for inclusion in a convention.

"The contact group co-ordinator will report orally as necessary to the Working Group chairman and will submit a first report by 13 July 1983. To assist the Working Group in its negotiations the contact group in its reports should note in particular the consensus reached and areas in respect of each question in which differences have not been resolved.

"MEETINGS OF CONTACT GROUP

"The contact group will meet at the discretion of its chairman and meeting times will be scheduled and announced as agreed with the Secretariat."
"Report of the Co-ordinator on the work of Contact Group D

1. The discussions of the Contact Group concerned the mandate given to the Group by the Chairman of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons, specifically: definitions of chemical weapons; precursors and key precursors; criteria for, and one or more lists of, precursors, as well as procedures for verification of production of such precursors. The Group was later given the task of discussing also small-scale facilities for production of super-toxic lethal chemicals for agreed purposes.

2. The discussions were based on previously presented material as well as material presented during the discussions as given in the list of references attached to this report.

3. The report is set out in two parts. The first part contains views which the Co-ordinator feels have not met with objections from delegations participating in the discussions in the Contact Group although no delegation is bound by the specific formulations used. In the second part views, which have not met with full agreement, are recorded, including alternatives and objections which have been presented during the discussions.

PART 1

Structure

4. The convention should contain definitions of chemical weapon, precursor and key precursor, criteria for selecting key precursors as well as a list or, if agreed, lists of agreed key precursors.

Definitions

5. The following concepts regarding the definition of chemical weapon appearing in CD/334 seem to continue to obtain general support:

(a) The definition should comprise only such concepts as are necessary for the purpose of the convention.
"(b) The definition should express the typical effects of chemical weapons, i.e. that their effects are due to the utilization of the toxic properties of chemicals to cause death or other harm.

"(c) The term 'chemical weapon' should be applied to three different categories of items:

"(i) Toxic chemicals which meet certain criteria, and their precursors.

"(ii) Munitions and devices which meet certain criteria. This category includes binary and other multi-component munitions or devices.

"(iii) Equipment specifically designed for use directly in connection with the employment of such munitions or devices.

The toxicity criteria given in CD/334 were not discussed further in the Contact Group, since they seem to be generally agreed.

6. For the purpose of the convention precursor should be defined.

7. The definition of a key precursor should express the following concepts:

- It should be a substance which plays a most important role for the production of toxic chemicals for chemical weapons purposes/chemical warfare agents/*.

- For this reason production of a key precursor for permitted purposes might create conditions for the violation of the convention and should be subject to particular provisions under the convention.

- A key precursor should normally meet all agreed criteria in order to be selected for listing.

Criteria

8. Criteria, and provisions derived from them regarding key precursors could be the following:

- One criterion should be that it would be particularly important in determining the characteristics of the end product.

- Another criterion is that it has relatively little use for non-hostile purposes.

Criteria could be revised when scientific or other development so required.

The purpose of the criteria would be to select key precursors which should be placed in a list or, if agreed lists.

/* Pending final definition of chemical weapons.
"List of key precursors

9. There should be a list or, if agreed, lists containing chemical substances which meet all the agreed criteria of key precursors. In addition, a chemical substance, notwithstanding that it does not meet all the criteria, could be, as an exception, included in the list of key precursors on the basis of decision taken by the States Parties to the Convention. Such decision should take into consideration the potential role of a chemical substance for chemical weapons and its role in the commercial chemical industry. The list should be reviewed periodically and revised, if necessary, with the aim of adding chemical substances or deleting those which no longer meet all the agreed criteria, or no longer need to be included as exceptions.

"Permitted purposes

10. There was a common view that 'permitted purposes' had been expressed in an equal way in CD/294, CD/334 and CD/343. Differences in formulations did not detract from the common understanding of this issue in the three documents. Accordingly the concept of 'permitted purposes', as well as 'protection purposes' which form a sub-category of 'permitted purposes', could be used as a common basis for the discussion of the problems connected with a 'small-scale production facility'. A preliminary formulation might be the following:

"Permitted purposes means:
- Non-hostile purposes, that is: industrial, agricultural, research, medical or other peaceful purposes, law-enforcement purposes, or protective purposes;
- Military purposes which are not related to the use of chemical weapons.

"Small-scale production facility

11. With respect to provisions for a small-scale facility for protective/permitted purposes the following views below were expressed:

"/ The expression 'protective/permitted purposes' reflects the common understanding that the production of a declared single small-scale production facility should relate to 'protective purposes' which are part of 'permitted purposes', irrespective of whether delegations held that such production should relate to all permitted purposes or only to protective purposes.

-111-
"(a) Production of super-toxic lethal chemicals for protective/permitted purposes should be limited to a single declared small-scale facility for each party;

"(b) The capacity of the facility should not exceed an agreed limit;

"(c) The aggregate quantity of super-toxic lethal chemicals/and key precursors/for protective/permitted purposes should be as low as possible and not exceed an agreed limit;

"(d) The single, small-scale facility should be subject to systematic international on-site inspection.

"Verification procedures for non-production of key precursors for chemical weapons purposes

"12. In order to verify the declared production for permitted purposes of listed key precursors, it was considered generally agreed that such production would, like all aspects of the Convention, be subject to verification by challenge under the provisions of the Convention. It was also agreed that regular exchange of information regarding such production should be provided for in the Convention.

"The above-mentioned measures, or other measures to be agreed, should be set out alongside each chemical or class of chemicals on the list.

"PART 2 — ALTERNATIVE VIEWS

"Definition of chemical weapons

"13. Some delegations held that the definitions of chemical weapons should include the concept ‘chemical warfare agent’ as was suggested as an alternative also in CD/334. Different suggestions were put forward for this purpose in written and oral proposals submitted to the Committee on Disarmament, the Working Group and the Contact Group or were contained in earlier documents (see list of references).

"Definition of chemical warfare agent

"14. It was suggested that a definition of chemical warfare agent should be included in the Convention.

"Definition of precursor

"15. A suggestion for the definition of 'precursor' was the following: for the purpose of the convention a precursor is a chemical which, by isomerization; or reaction with another chemical, or both, lead to the formation of/chemical weapons/.
"A view was put forward that the definition of precursor should be based on the concept of chemical warfare agent.

Definitions of key precursors

16. Some delegations felt that a definition of key precursors contained in chemical weapons or military stockpiles would not be necessary since the key precursors falling under such a definition automatically would have to be declared and eliminated under the Convention. Only key precursors to be produced under supervision for permitted purposes need to be defined.

The definition shall contain the concept that the key precursor shall be listed together with:

(a) The criteria or other grounds which constitute the reasons for putting it on the list;

(b) The measures for ensuring compliance with the Convention, agreed individually for each key precursor.

Others felt that the definition of key precursors should be related to all the chemicals which meet all the demands of criteria of key precursors, irrespective of for which purposes they are produced and where they are stored.

Such a definition must serve for the purposes of composing a list of key precursors, declarations, destruction or diversion of stockpiles, and verification of limitation of production in the peaceful chemical industry.

The definition of key precursor should serve as a guide for the evaluation of criteria in the future.

A view was put forward that the definition of key-precursors should be based on the concept of chemical warfare agent.

Criteria

17. Some delegations considered that a third criterion for selecting key precursors should be that the precursor takes part in the final stage of the production of the toxic chemicals used for chemical weapons.

Other delegations thought that this criterion, to be acceptable, should specify the 'final stages'. For alternative suggestions see the list of references.

Some delegations did not find it necessary to include this criterion at all.

Criteria would also guide in a general way the measures of verification (e.g. exchange of information) which should accompany the selected key precursors on the list.
List of Key Precursors

18. With regard to the content of the list of key precursors several suggestions and variations of earlier suggestions were put forward. Although all delegations seemed able to accept the inclusion of certain chemicals in a list (or lists), views differed with respect to other chemicals and, to the reasons why they should be put on a list of key precursors.

A list, or, if agreed, lists of key precursors to be produced for permitted purposes under supervision could contain all or some of the chemicals or types of chemicals which had been suggested earlier (see list of references), together with agreed verification measures to be applied for each substance or class of chemicals listed.

Small-Scale Production Facility

19. In addition to the common views expressed on provisions for a small-scale production facility for protective/permited purposes, it was considered that the following issues need further discussion:

(a) Should production of key precursors for protective purposes be limited to a single small-scale facility for each Party?

(b) Should production of super-toxic lethal chemicals for permitted purposes other than protective purposes be restricted to a small-scale facility?

(c) Should production of key precursors for permitted purposes other than protective purposes be restricted to a small-scale facility?

(d) Should production for protective purposes of all compounds containing methyl-phosphorus bonds be restricted to a small-scale facility?

(e) Should production for permitted purposes of all compounds containing methyl-phosphorus bonds be restricted to a small-scale facility?

(f) What should be the agreed amount of super-toxic lethal chemicals and key precursors which a Party might have on hand for protective purposes?

(g) Should there be a limit on the amount of super-toxic lethal chemicals and key precursors which a Party might have on hand for all permitted purposes, including protective purposes? If so, what should be the agreed amount?

(h) What should be the agreed production/capacity limit for a small-scale production facility for protective purposes?

(i) What should be the agreed production/capacity/limit for production of super-toxic lethal chemicals at a small-scale production facility for permitted purposes?
"(j) If production for permitted purposes of super-toxic lethal chemicals and 
key precursors were allowed in commercial industry, should there be a 
production/capacity/limit?

"(k) What should the verification objectives and guidelines be for each of the 
possible production restrictions above?

"Verification procedures for non-production of key-precursors for chemical weapons 
purposes

"It was proposed by the Co-ordinator that the following topics should be further 
discussed:

"- Details on the kind of information to be exchanged, e.g. concerning declarations 
of production facility location and capacity, production level, civil use, etc.

"- On-site inspection on a random or periodic basis.

"The discussions did not deal with how the non-production of the chemicals or 
undeclared facilities could be verified."

"
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reference</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CD/294</td>
<td>Basic provisions of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CD/326</td>
<td>Proposals on 'Declaration', 'Verification' and the 'Consultative Committee'.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CD/343</td>
<td>United States detailed views on the contents of a chemical weapons ban.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CD/353</td>
<td>Verification of non-production of chemical weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CD/401</td>
<td>Precursors - key precursors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CD/CW/MP.46</td>
<td>Suggested list of key precursors, including those usable in multicomponent chemical weapon systems.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CD/CW/MP.51</td>
<td>Preventing illegal production of key precursors of nerve gas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CD/CW/MP.52</td>
<td>Verification of non-production of chemical weapons.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CD/CW/MP.54</td>
<td>Precursors - key precursors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CD/CW/CRP.76</td>
<td>Definition of 'key precursors'.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CD/CW/CRP.78</td>
<td>Questions relating to the possible civilian use of chemicals containing the methyl-phosphorus bond.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CD/CW/CRP.81/Rev.1</td>
<td>List of precursors for super-toxic chemicals and incapacitating chemicals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CD/CW/CRP.83</td>
<td>Concept of precursors in the CW Convention.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
"List of references (continued)"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CD/CW/CPR.84</td>
<td>Listing of key precursors.</td>
<td>Federal Republic of Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CD/CW/CPC.29</td>
<td>'Precursors' and 'key precursors'.</td>
<td>USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CD/CW/CPC.34</td>
<td>Definition of 'precursors' and 'key precursors'.</td>
<td>China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CD/CW/CPC.41</td>
<td>Illustrative list of binary chemical systems.</td>
<td>German Democratic Republic</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
80. At its 237th plenary meeting on Friday, 26 August 1983, the Committee on Disarmament decided that the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons will resume its activities on 16 January 1984.

E. New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons

81. The item on the agenda entitled "New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons" was considered by the Committee in accordance with its programme of work, during the periods from 11 to 15 April and from 25 to 29 April 1983.

82. The list of new documents presented to the Committee during its 1983 session under the agenda item are listed in the report submitted by the Ad Hoc Working Group.

83. At its 236th plenary meeting on 23 August 1983, the Committee adopted the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group re-established by the Committee under the agenda item at its 207th plenary meeting (see paragraph 10 above). That report (CD/414) is an integral part of this report and reads as follows:
I. INTRODUCTION

1. At its 207th plenary meeting, on 29 March 1983, the Committee on Disarmament adopted the following decision, relating to item 5 on its agenda, contained in document CD/358, which, inter alia, reads:

... The Committee decides to re-establish for the duration of its 1983 session the Ad Hoc Working Groups on a Nuclear Test Ban, Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States Against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, Chemical Weapons and Radiological Weapons ...

It is understood that the ad hoc working groups may start their work on the basis of their former mandates.

The ad hoc working groups will report to the Committee on the progress of their work before the conclusion of its 1983 session.

II. ORGANIZATION OF WORK AND DOCUMENTATION

2. At its 207th plenary meeting, on 29 March 1983, the Committee on Disarmament appointed Ambassador Curt Lidgard, representative of Sweden, as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group. Dr. Lin Kuo-Chung of the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs served as Secretary of the Ad Hoc Working Group.

3. The Ad Hoc Working Group held six meetings between 8 April and 29 April and between 13 June and 17 August 1983.

4. At its 1st meeting, on 8 April, the Ad Hoc Working Group, upon the Chairman's suggestion, decided to establish two groups (A and B) to undertake substantive examinations of the two major issues before the Working Group. */ Group A, under the coordinatorialship of the representative of the United States of America, would consider questions relating to "traditional radiological weapons subject matter" and Group B, under the coordinatorialship of the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, would examine issues related to prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities. It was the understanding that the question of linkage between these two issues would be left aside for the time being and would be considered in the Ad Hoc Working Group itself at the end of the current session.

*/ A delegation, while not opposing the establishment of Group B, abstained from participating in that Group.
5. At their request, representatives of the following States, not members of the Committee on Disarmament, were invited to participate in the meetings of the Ad Hoc Working Group during the 1983 session: Austria, Burundi, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Norway, Senegal and Spain.

6. In carrying out its mandate, the Ad Hoc Working Group took into account paragraph 76 of the Final Document of the First Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. It also took into consideration the relevant recommendations of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, in particular those adopted in connection with the Second Disarmament Decade in 1980. In addition to various resolutions adopted by the General Assembly on the subject at its previous sessions, the Working Group took into account in particular resolution 37/99C of the General Assembly. Paragraphs 1 and 2 of that resolution read as follows:

'1. Requests the Committee on Disarmament to continue negotiations with a view to an early conclusion of the elaboration of a treaty prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons, in order that it may be submitted to the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session;

'2. Further requests the Committee on Disarmament to continue its search for a solution to the question of prohibition of military attacks on nuclear facilities, including the scope of such prohibition, taking into account all proposals submitted to it to this end;'

7. During the 1983 session, the Ad Hoc Working Group had before it the following additional documents for consideration:

(1) CD/345
A Group of Socialist Countries: Ensuring the Safe Development of Nuclear Energy (14 February 1983);

(2) CD/RW/WP.41 (CD/374)
United Kingdom: Definition of Radiological Weapons and the scope of a Radiological Weapons Treaty (13 April 1983);

(3) CD/RW/WP.42
Chairman's Working Paper: Meetings in the First Part of 1983 Session (14 April 1983);

(4) CD/RW/WP.43
Chairman's Working Paper: Meetings in the Second Part of 1983 Session (26 April 1983);

(5) CD/RW/WP.44
Chairman's Working Paper, containing Coordinators' progress reports of Groups A and B (29 April 1983);

(6) CD/RW/WP.45 and Corr.1
Sweden: Compliance and Verification (21 June 1983);

(7) CD/RW/WP.46
Proposal by the delegation of the United States of America (16 June 1983);

(8) CD/RW/WP.47
United Kingdom: The Prohibition of Attacks on Nuclear Facilities (30 June 1983);
Group of 21: Proposal for an Article on "Peaceful Uses" (30 June 1983);

Japan: Proposal for Article I ("Definition") Article II ("Scope of Prohibition") and the related Article (6 July 1983);

A compilation of types or categories of nuclear facilities to be considered (9 August 1983);

A compilation of alternative mechanisms for the linkage between "traditional radiological weapons subject matter" and "prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities" (11 August 1983);

Suggestions by the Coordinator on the Issues of Definition, Peaceful Uses, and Relationship to Other Agreements (28 April 1983);

Suggestions by the Coordinator for the Structure of a Treaty Prohibiting Radiological Weapons (23 June 1983);

Submission by the Coordinator of Group A (3 August 1983);

Report of Group A (9 August 1983);

Report of Group B on the question of prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities (12 August 1983);

Draft Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons (11 August 1983);

A list of proposals regarding the question of prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities (10 August 1983).

During the course of deliberations in the Working Group, as well as in Groups A and B, the Secretariat also prepared a number of informal working papers with a view to assisting the work of the Groups. They are listed as follows:

Compilation of texts regarding "Definition" and "Scope of Prohibition" as contained in CD/31, CD/32, CD/RW/WP.20 and CD/RW/WP.39;

Compilation of texts regarding "Peaceful Uses" as contained in CD/31, CD/32, CD/RW/WP.20 and CD/RW/WP.39;

Compilation of texts regarding "Relationship with other disarmament measures and agreements" as contained in CD/31, CD/32, CD/RW/WP.20 and CD/RW/WP.39;

"(5) A list of proposed draft treaties on radiological weapons;

"(6) A list of proposals on the draft preamble part of the Treaty on Radiological Weapons;

"(7) A list of proposals on 'Definition' and 'Scope of Prohibition' parts of the Treaty on Radiological Weapons;

"(8) A list of proposals on 'Peaceful Uses' part of the Treaty on Radiological Weapons;

"(9) A list of proposals on 'Relationship with other disarmament measures and agreements' part of the Treaty on Radiological Weapons;

"(10) A list of proposals on 'Compliance and Verification' part of the Treaty on Radiological Weapons;

"(11) A list of proposals on 'Amendments', 'Review Conferences', 'Duration and Withdrawal', 'Adherence, Entry into Force, Depositary' parts of the Treaty on Radiological Weapons;

"(12) A list of proposals on 'Annex' part of the Treaty on Radiological Weapons;

"(13) A list of proposals regarding the question of prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities;

"(14) A compilation of texts of provisions contained in certain existing legal instruments regarding the question of prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities;

"(15) Compilation of specific proposals which may facilitate the formulation of a list of criteria regarding the scope of prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities;

"(16) A preliminary list of types or categories of nuclear facilities to be considered;

"(17) A compilation of alternative mechanisms for the linkage between "Traditional radiological weapons subject matter" and "prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities".

"III. SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE SUBJECT
DURING THE 1983 SESSION

"8. In accordance with the Programme of Work adopted by the Ad Hoc Working Group as contained in document CD/RW/WP.42, Groups A and B held three meetings each between 11 and 28 April, under the coordinatorship of Mr. Morris D. Busby (USA) and Mr. Yury Nazarkin (USSR) respectively. The Coordinators of Groups A and B submitted progress reports, as contained in Annexes I and II of document CD/RW/WP.44 respectively.
9. During the second part of the 1983 session, Group A held nine meetings between 13 June and 8 August, under the coordinatorship of Mr. Morris D. Busby (USA). The Coordinator submitted the report of the Group on its work to the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons, as contained in Annex I of this report. Group B held 11 meetings between 21 June and 12 August under the coordinatorship of Mr. Boris P. Prokofiev (USSR). The Coordinator submitted the report of the Group on its work to the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons, as contained in Annex II of this report.

10. At its 4th and 5th meetings, on 11 and 15 August, the Ad Hoc Working Group considered the question of linkage between the two major issues before the Working Group, namely 'traditional radiological weapons subject matter' and 'prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities'. Taking into account various suggestions and proposals made by delegations, the Secretariat prepared a compilation of alternative mechanisms for the linkage between them (CD/RW/WP.51).

The compilation contains the following alternative mechanisms:

(1) One single treaty on radiological weapons covering both issues, in light of the fact that attacks against nuclear facilities could be tantamount to the use of radiological weapons;

(2) One general treaty on radiological weapons containing two protocols, namely: Protocol I dealing with 'traditional radiological weapons subject matter' and Protocol II dealing with "prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities";

(3) One treaty with one protocol, either integral or optional, namely: the treaty itself dealing with 'traditional radiological weapons subject matter' and the protocol dealing with 'prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities';

(4) Two separate treaties dealing with the two issues with clauses of understanding that the conclusion of one treaty will be pending the conclusion of the other treaty;

(5) One treaty dealing with 'traditional radiological weapons subject matter', with clauses of understanding that the relevant provisions contained in the existing legal instruments, in particular, the Additional Protocol I of 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 should be amended in such a manner that the question of 'prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities' be fully covered;

(6) Two separate treaties dealing with the two issues independently without any linkage.

In addition the following alternative mechanisms were suggested:

(1) One treaty on the 'traditional radiological weapons subject matter' with the insertion of a clause stipulating that the Contracting Parties undertake to start negotiations as soon as possible on the prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities.

(2) One treaty dealing with the 'traditional radiological weapons subject matter' could have clauses of understanding to the effect that the question of prohibiting military attacks against nuclear facilities, including the question of the scope of such a prohibition, be further considered with a view to reaching agreement on these issues.
"On the basis of this compilation delegations had a general exchange of views. The discussions revealed that positions of delegations on this question continued to be considerably far apart from each other.

IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

11. Although certain outstanding issues continued to remain in the "traditional radiological weapons subject matter", the extensive discussions and intensive negotiations in Group A have further clarified many of the problems involved and would pave the way for future work on the subject. The substantive examination of the question of prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities in Group B was considered useful and necessary and to have led to a better comprehension of the problems. The various positions of delegations, especially as to the scope of prohibition and legal aspects of the issue, were clarified. The discussion contributed considerably to the examination of common approaches and of potential activities of the Group in the future.

12. It was recognized that the "traditional radiological weapons subject matter" and the question of prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities were important and that these issues needed solution. The Committee on Disarmament could continue to be the most appropriate forum to deal with them.

13. The Ad Hoc Working Group agreed to recommend to the Committee on Disarmament to re-establish an ad hoc working group at the beginning of its 1984 session to continue its work and in that context to review and assess how best to make progress on the subject matter."
"ANNEX I

"REPORT OF GROUP A

1. As requested by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons on 8 April 1983, Group A has considered the subject of radiological weapons in the 'traditional' sense. A separate group was requested to deal with the question of prohibition of military attacks on nuclear facilities. Group A held 12 meetings during the course of this session. The purpose of Group A, as defined by the Chairman, was to '...try to solve the still outstanding substantive issues and leave for the time being the question of the linkage between them.'

2. At its initial meeting on 11 April 1983, Group A decided on a working method whereby there would be substantive discussion of four outstanding issues: the question of a definition of radiological weapons; the question of an appropriate article in the treaty regarding peaceful uses; the question of undertakings and obligations of states in the related field of nuclear disarmament; and the question of compliance provisions. The Co-ordinator proposed, and the Group agreed, that negotiations should be held on these issues, based on all existing proposals as well as suggested compromise texts which the Co-ordinator would prepare and present to the Group, in order to arrive at accommodations. Group A would attempt to find consensus and to forward to the full RW Working Group an overall treaty text.

3. Based on previously submitted consolidated texts and all relevant proposals, Group A considered each of the four outstanding issues. In this context, Group A took note of and expressed appreciation for the efforts of previous chairmen of the Radiological Weapons Working Group, Ambassador Komives of Hungary and Ambassador Wegener of the Federal Republic of Germany. During the course of these deliberations, the Co-ordinator submitted, on his own responsibility, several suggestions for compromise (CD/RW/CRP.20) which were in turn discussed by the Group.

4. Differences on matters of substance remain. On 3 August 1983, the Co-ordinator prepared a consolidated negotiating text of a radiological weapons treaty (CD/RW/CRP.20/Rev.1) and submitted it to the Group. The purpose of the Co-ordinator's text was to reflect in a single document the state of the negotiations, including areas of agreement and disagreement. The Co-ordinator pointed out that the text contained internal brackets and in some cases alternative language. This method had been employed not to indicate agreement on the unbracketed portion of the text but, rather, to highlight key issues upon which subsequent negotiations should focus.

5. The Group considered the Co-ordinator's text. There was no agreement on the text, but the Group agreed that the Co-ordinator forward it, along with this report, to the Radiological Weapons Working Group, it being understood that the text was prepared on his own responsibility."
"Annex to ANNEX I

"Submission by the Co-ordinator

"Attached, for consideration of Group A, is a draft Treaty Prohibiting Radiological Weapons, which has been prepared following consultations with delegations, as agreed at the meeting of Group A on 9 July 1983. The draft includes provisions regarding verification and consultation/compliance procedures which it had not been possible to include in CD/RW/CRP.20.

"Attachment: as stated."
TREATY PROHIBITING RADIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

The States Parties to this Treaty,

Determined to strengthen international peace and security and to preserve mankind from the danger of new means of warfare,

Desiring to contribute to the cause of halting the arms race and recognizing that an agreement on the prohibition of radiological weapons would contribute to this end,

[Affirming the obligation of all States] Determined to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the prohibition of recognized weapons of mass destruction and to bring about general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Reaffirming in this regard the urgency of the pursuit and early conclusion of negotiations on effective measures aimed at the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament,

Noting the provisions contained in other agreements relating to this objective,

Conscious that the use of any form of radiological weapons could have devastating consequences for mankind,

Stressing therefore the particular importance of accession to this Treaty by the greatest possible number of States,

[Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of radioactive materials should be available to all States Parties to this Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing countries, and recognizing the need for peaceful uses of sources of radiation from radioactive decay in different fields of human activities,]

Recalling that the General Assembly of the United Nations has urged the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling, and use of radiological weapons,

have agreed as follows:

Article I

1. Each State Party to this Treaty undertakes never under any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile, otherwise acquire or possess, transfer, or use radiological weapons. For the purposes of this Treaty, the term 'radiological weapon' means:

(a) Any device, including any weapon or equipment, specifically designed to employ radioactive material by disseminating it to cause destruction, damage, or injury by means of the radiation produced by the decay of such material;
(b) Any radioactive material specifically [designed] for employment, by its dissemination, to cause destruction, damage, or injury by means of the radiation produced by the decay of such material.

2. Each State Party to this Treaty also undertakes never under any circumstances to employ deliberately, by its dissemination, any radioactive material to cause destruction, damage, or injury by means of the radiation produced by the decay of such material, whether or not such material is specifically defined as a radiological weapon in paragraph 1 of this article.

3. Each State Party to this Treaty also undertakes not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any person, State, group of States, or international organization to engage in any of the activities which the States Parties to the Treaty have undertaken not to engage in under the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 of this article.

[Article II]

1. Each State Party to this Treaty undertakes to contribute [to the fullest possible extent] [fully] to the strengthening of international co-operation in the peaceful uses of radioactive materials and of sources of radiation from radioactive decay, and to the development of adequate measures of protection for all States against harmful effects of radiation.

2. Each State Party to this Treaty undertakes to facilitate, and has the right to participate in, the [fullest possible] [full] exchange of equipment, materials, and scientific and technological information regarding the peaceful uses referred to in paragraph 1 of this article, taking into account the needs of the developing countries.

3. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of the States Parties to this Treaty to develop and apply their programmes for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to international co-operation in this field[, consistent with the need to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons]; and no provisions of this Treaty shall hinder the use of sources of radiation from radioactive decay for peaceful purposes, in accordance with generally recognized principles and applicable rules of international law concerning such use.

[Article III]

Each State Party to this Treaty undertakes to prevent loss of and to prohibit and prevent diversion to radiological weapons of radioactive materials that might be used for such weapons.

[Article IV]

Each State Party to this Treaty undertakes, in accordance with its constitutional procedures, to take any measures which it considers necessary to prohibit and prevent any activity in violation of the provisions of the Treaty anywhere under its jurisdiction or control.
"Article V

"[1. The provisions of this Treaty shall not apply to nuclear explosive devices or to radioactive material produced by them].

"2. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as in any way limiting or detracting from any existing rules of international law applicable in armed conflict or limiting or detracting from obligations assumed by the States Parties under any other relevant international agreement.

"[Article V bis

"The States Parties to this Treaty undertake to pursue urgently negotiations for the cessation of the nuclear arms race, the conclusion of effective measures to prevent the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, and the achievement of nuclear disarmament,]

"Article VI

"1. The States Parties to this Treaty undertake to consult one another and to co-operate in solving any problems which may be raised in relation to the objectives of, or in the application of the provisions of, the Treaty.

"2. Consultation and co-operation pursuant to this article may also be undertaken through appropriate international procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter. These international procedures may include the services of appropriate international organizations, as well as of a consultative committee and a fact-finding panel as provided for in article VII of this Treaty.

"3. The States Parties to this Treaty shall exchange to the fullest possible extent, bilaterally or multilaterally, information deemed necessary to provide assurance of fulfilment of their obligations under the Treaty.

"Article VII

"1. For the purpose of effective fulfilment of paragraph 2 of article VI of this Treaty, a consultative committee and a standing fact-finding panel shall be established. Their functions and rules of procedure are established in Annexes I and II, respectively, which constitute integral parts of the Treaty.

"2. Any State Party to this Treaty which has reasons to believe that any other State Party may not be in compliance with the provisions of the Treaty, or which has concerns about a related situation which may be considered ambiguous, and is not satisfied with the results of the consultations provided for under article VI of the Treaty, may request the Depositary to initiate an inquiry to ascertain the facts. Such a request should include all relevant information, as well as all possible evidence supporting its validity.

"3. For the purposes set forth in paragraph 2 of this article, the Depositary shall convene as soon as possible, and in any case within 10 days of the receipt of a request from any State Party, the standing fact-finding panel established pursuant to paragraph 1 of this article.
"4. If the possibilities for fact-finding pursuant to paragraphs 2 and 3 of this article have been exhausted without resolution of the problem, [five or more States Parties] [any State Party] may request the Depositary to convene a meeting of the consultative committee of States Parties to consider the matter.

"5. Each State Party to this Treaty undertakes to co-operate to the fullest possible extent with the consultative committee and with the fact-finding panel with a view to facilitating their work.

"6. Each State Party to this Treaty undertakes to provide assistance, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, to any State Party to the Treaty which has been harmed or is likely to be harmed as a result of violation of the Treaty.

"7. The provisions of this article shall not be interpreted as affecting the rights and duties of States Parties under the Charter of the United Nations, including bringing to the attention of the Security Council concerns about compliance with this Treaty.

"Article VIII

"1. Any State Party to this Treaty may propose amendments to the Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary, who shall promptly circulate it to all States Parties.

"2. Any State Party proposing amendments to this Treaty may request the Depositary to seek the views of the States Parties on whether a conference should be convened to consider the proposal. Thereupon, if requested to do so by a majority of the States Parties, the Depositary shall convene a conference to which he shall invite all States Parties to consider such a proposal.

"3. An amendment shall enter into force for all States Parties to this Treaty which have accepted it, upon the deposit with the Depositary of instruments of acceptance by a majority of the States Parties. Thereafter, it shall enter into force for any remaining State Party on the date of deposit of its instrument of acceptance.

"Article IX

"1. This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.

"2. Each State Party to this Treaty shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other States Parties[, [and to the Depositary, and to the United Nations Security Council] three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.
Article X

1. [Five] [Ten] years after entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of States Parties shall be convened by the Depositary to review the [scope and] operation of the Treaty, with a view to assuring that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized [and to consider any proposals for amendments then pending]. Such review shall take into account any new scientific and technological developments [likely to affect the provisions of] [relevant to] the Treaty. [States [not Parties] [signatories] to the Treaty shall be invited to the conference as observers.]

2. At intervals of five years thereafter, a majority of States Parties may obtain, by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary, the convening of further conferences with the same objectives.

3. If no review conference has been convened within 10 years following the conclusion of the previous review conference, the Depositary shall solicit the views of all States Parties on the holding of such a conference. If one-third or 10 of the States Parties, whichever number is less, respond affirmatively, the Depositary shall take immediate steps to convene the conference.

Article XI

1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 2 of this article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification or accession shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

3. This Treaty shall enter into force upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by [fifteen] [twenty] governments in accordance with paragraph 2 of this article.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited after the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The Depositary shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or accession, and the date of entry into force of this Treaty and of any amendments thereto, as well as of the receipt of other notices.

6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Article XII

This Treaty, of which the English, Arabic, Chinese, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall send certified copies thereof to the governments of the signatory and acceding States.
"ANNEX I

"[Consultative Committee]

"1. The consultative committee of States Parties[, in addition to establishing the fact-finding panel as provided for in annex II,] shall undertake to resolve any problem which may be raised by the [States Parties] [State Party] requesting a meeting of the committee. For this purpose, the assembled States Parties shall be entitled to request and receive any information which a State Party is in a position to communicate.

"2. The work of the consultative committee shall be organized in such a way as to permit it to perform the functions set forth in paragraph 1 of this annex. The committee shall [decide procedural questions relative to the organization of its work] [take decisions], where possible by consensus, but otherwise by a majority of those present and voting. [There shall be no voting on matters of substance.] The chairman shall have no vote.

"3. Any State Party may participate in the work of the consultative committee. Each representative on the committee may be assisted at meetings by advisers.

"4. The Depositary or his representative shall serve as chairman of the committee.

"5. The consultative committee shall be convened by its chairman:

(a) within 30 days after entry into force of this Treaty for the purpose of establishing the standing fact-finding panel;

(b)] as soon as possible and in any case within 30 days after a request for a meeting pursuant to paragraph 4 of article VII of the Treaty.

"6. Each State Party shall have the right, through the chairman, to request from States and from international organizations such information and assistance as the State Party considers desirable for the accomplishment of the committee’s work.

"7. A summary of any [problem-solving] meeting, incorporating all views and information presented during the meeting, shall be prepared. The chairman shall distribute the summary to all States Parties."
"ANNEX II

[Fact-Finding Panel]

1. The standing fact-finding panel shall undertake to make appropriate findings of fact and provide expert views relevant to any problem referred to it by the Depositary pursuant to paragraph 3 of article VII of this Treaty. [Pursuant to paragraph 5 of article VII of the Treaty, the fact-finding panel may carry out on-site investigations when necessary.]

2. The fact-finding panel shall be composed of not more than 15 members representing State Parties:

   (a) Ten members shall be appointed by the [chairman] [consultative committee] after consultation with States Parties. In selecting these members due regard shall be given to ensuring an appropriate geographic balance. Members shall be named for a two-year period, with five members being replaced each year;

   (b) In addition, those permanent members of the United Nations Security Council who are parties to the Treaty shall also be represented on the fact-finding panel.

3. Each member may be assisted by one or more advisers.

4. The Depositary or his representative shall serve as chairman of the panel[, unless the panel decides otherwise under the procedures established in paragraph 5 of this annex].

5. The work of the fact-finding panel shall be organized in such a way as to permit it to perform the functions set forth in paragraph 1 of this annex. [At the first meeting of the panel, to be held not later than 60 days after its establishment [by the consultative committee], the Depositary shall submit recommendations, based on consultations with States Parties and signatories, as to the organization of the work of the panel, including any necessary resources.]

   [The panel shall decide procedural questions relative to the organization of its work, where possible by consensus, but otherwise by a majority of those present and voting. There shall be no voting on matters of substance.]

   [The panel shall take decisions, where possible by consensus, but otherwise by a majority of those present and voting.] The chairman shall have no vote.
6. Each member shall have the right, through the chairman, to request from States and from international organizations such information and assistance as the member considers desirable for the accomplishment of the work of the panel.

7. The State Party requesting the inquiry and any State Party against which the inquiry is directed shall have the right to [participate in the work of the panel] [be represented at meetings but may not take part in decisions], whether or not they are members of the panel.

8. The fact-finding panel shall, without delay, transmit to [the Depositary] [all States Parties] a report on its work, including its findings of fact and incorporating all views and information presented to the panel during its proceedings[.], together with such recommendations as it may deem appropriate. If the panel is unable to secure sufficient data for factual findings, it shall state the reasons for that inability. [The Depositary shall distribute the report to all States Parties.]
ANNEX II

REPORT OF GROUP B ON THE QUESTION OF PROHIBITION OF ATTACKS AGAINST NUCLEAR FACILITIES

I. INTRODUCTION

1. In accordance with the decision adopted by the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons at its first meeting on 8 April 1983, Group B was established with the purpose of considering the question of prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities with the understanding that the question of linkage between this issue and the 'traditional radiological weapons subject matter' would be left aside for the time being.

2. In carrying out of its task, Group B took into account all relevant proposals submitted on the subject and held three meetings between 18 and 28 April, under the Co-ordinatorship of Mr. Yury K. Nazarkin, representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, during the first part of 1983 session. The Group devoted its efforts to the consideration of various issues involved in the subject such as scope, legal question, zones, as well as compliance and verification. At the conclusion of the first part of the 1983 session, the Co-ordinator submitted a progress report on the work of Group B of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons at its second meeting held on 29 April 1983, as contained in Annex II of document CD/RW/WF.44.

3. During the second part of 1983 session, Group B held 14 meetings between 21 June and 12 August under the Co-ordinatorship of Mr. Boris P. Prokofiev, representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. At the initial meeting of this period, the Group decided, upon the suggestion of the Co-ordinator to continue to concentrate its efforts on those issues which have been considered during the first part of the session.

4. In the course of its deliberations the Group also considered the various proposals, suggestions and commentaries contained in the documents and working papers submitted to the Committee and its subsidiary bodies before and during the 1983 session. The list of these documents is contained in document CD/RW/CRP.24, as annexed to the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group. In addition to these documents, the Group took into consideration the proposals made and the views expressed by delegations on the question of prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities in the Committee on Disarmament and the regular and special sessions of the United Nations General Assembly. In this connection a number of delegations stressed the importance of the question of ensuring the safe development of nuclear energy as proposed at the thirty-seventh session of the United Nations General Assembly, which was the other side of the problem of prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities.
II. SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS ON THE SUBJECT

"Objectives"

"5. The view was widely held that there was a need for effective international legal measures prohibiting attacks against nuclear facilities because such attacks could result in mass destruction. In this connection, a view was expressed that attacks on certain nuclear facilities might lead to such a destructive effect as that of a nuclear explosion. There was also an exchange of views concerning the precise nature of the objective to be pursued, namely, whether the purpose should be:

- to prohibit attacks on such facilities as a form of radiological weapon or, more precisely, as a means of radiological warfare;
- to avoid effects of weapons of mass destruction;
- to strengthen the existing legal protection of such facilities;
- to ensure the safe development of nuclear power energy; or
- a combination of the objectives mentioned above.

"While many delegations held that the objective, in keeping with the mandate of the Working Group, should be the avoidance of effects of mass destruction, no consensus could be reached on this issue. Some delegations argued that approaches which relied on the concept of an attack on a nuclear facility being equivalent to the use of a radiological weapon, or on concepts of 'mass destruction' were unlikely to be fruitful. They suggested that a more practical approach should be adopted which would try to establish the primary purpose of any further ban of attacks on nuclear facilities, determine practical limits to the scope of any now ban and from these considerations determine how far existing instruments were already adequate in this respect. Other delegations stated that attempts to thwart negotiations on a subject of such high importance to international community should also not be allowed to be fruitful. They pointed out that avoidance of possible mass destruction through radiological warfare by attacks on nuclear facilities was indeed the basis as well as the primary purpose of the Group's work. The existing instruments were entirely insufficient in this respect."

"Scope of prohibition"

"6. There was general understanding among the delegations that the question of a definition of the scope of the ban, or the kind of nuclear facilities to be protected, constituted one of the key issues of a future international instrument. In this connection a number of specific proposals and suggestions were made regarding categories or types of nuclear facilities to be covered by a possible agreement. Several main points of views were expressed in this regard and it was suggested that the prohibition of attacks should apply to:

- All nuclear facilities;
- All nuclear facilities in non-nuclear-weapon developing States;"
- Civilian nuclear facilities only;

- Civilian nuclear facilities above a specified power threshold for nuclear reactors and above a specified level of quality and quantity of radioactive materials for other facilities;

- All nuclear facilities subject to IAEA safeguards system.

"It was generally understood, however, that naval vessels, submarines, space vehicles as well as other devices having nuclear installations and designed as weapons systems would not be considered within the context of 'nuclear facilities' as referred to under the subject of prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities.

"7. In connection with the scope of the ban, some delegations drew attention to the fact that there was also a problem of dual-purpose nuclear facilities, that is, facilities which can be used both for peaceful and for military purposes, and a problem of distinguishing between military and civilian nuclear facilities. Other delegations stated that the difficulty in strictly distinguishing between military and civilian nuclear facilities was another important reason for all nuclear facilities to be protected. A view was expressed in this regard that an effective existing criterion to identify nuclear facilities for peaceful purposes is the IAEA safeguards system and that therefore among nuclear facilities for peaceful purposes at least those facilities under the IAEA safeguards should be included in the scope of protection. Other delegations considered that this criterion was not sufficient.

"8. Some delegations stated that all nuclear facilities in the non-nuclear-weapon States were civilian facilities, and at least, these should all enjoy protection from attacks. Other delegations held that the scope of any agreement should not automatically include all nuclear facilities whether located in non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear-weapon States. Further, a view was also expressed that the concept of 'generic danger' might be applied when identifying the types of facilities to be protected, and that that concept might also be used to determine the points in time when protection should begin and cease to operate.

"9. It was suggested that the scope of a possible future treaty could very well be limited to nuclear power and research reactors, nuclear fuel production and reprocessing plants as well as fissionable materials, spent fuel and high level waste storage.

"Legal aspects of the question"

"10. The Group examined some legal aspects of the problem of prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities. The discussion centered on questions whether certain relevant provisions in the existing international instruments, in particular Additional Protocol I (1977) to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, are adequate, as well as possible types of an agreement to be elaborated. In this connection some delegations stated that the existing international law provided for a substantial protection of the nuclear facilities in question, and that they had not been convinced of the necessity for additional protection. Other delegations held that since the protection covered by the Additional Protocol I was inadequate in scope, contained a number of reservations and allowed a subjective interpretation of its relevant provisions by military commanders on a
tactical level, there was a clear need for a new international agreement, for the necessary protection of nuclear facilities. In the course of discussion the question of the application of the EDMOD Convention to the issue of military attacks on civilian nuclear facilities was also raised.

"Zones"

"11. The Group also discussed the rationale of establishing protective zones around nuclear facilities to be protected. In this context zones based on circles with a definite radius were mentioned. However, substantial doubts were expressed as to the feasibility and usefulness of the concept of protective zones, especially in view of the existing differences in the design, typical inventory and location of the various facilities to be protected. Another view was held that there were difficulties with that concept in the case of nuclear power stations. It was suggested that, instead of protective zones, a provision should be included that an attacker should assume absolute liability if severe radiological consequences occur. The problem of clandestine use of protective zones for military purposes was also touched upon.

"Compliance and verification"

"12. With regard to matters concerning compliance and verification aspects of a possible agreement it was argued that consideration of those issues would depend to a great degree on the scope of prohibition. It was felt in this connection that solution of this problem would be possible only after the scope of the ban had been determined. Some delegations pointed out that the question of verification and compliance should be seen in its proper perspective and in seeking a ban on attacks on nuclear facilities it is the prohibited action, not the mechanism of control on the potential victim, which ought to be the subject of verification and compliance. Other delegations considered this view somewhat over-simplified. A view was also held that the issue of compliance and verification was irrelevant since it was sufficient to establish the fact of an attack. Some delegations were of the opinion that if the scope of the agreement would be limited to those facilities which were placed under the IAEA safeguards system the control procedure could be much simplified and made more efficient with respect to all such facilities, except those in the possession of nuclear-weapon States. Other delegations believed that such an approach was discriminatory and had no relevance to the question of compliance and verification.

"III. Conclusions"

"13. In spite of differences of opinion among delegations on specific matters, it was generally recognized that the question of prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities was an important issue which needed solution and that it was also a complex problem. The exchange of views on the subject in the Group was considered as necessary and useful. It helped to clarify the various positions of delegations, in particular the scope of prohibition and the relevant legal questions. It also contributed substantially to the examination of possible common approaches and potential main avenues of the activities of the Group in the future."

-138-
"ANNEX III

"A list of proposals regarding the question of prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Reference</th>
<th>Proposal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>CD/345</td>
<td>A group of socialist countries: Ensuring the Safe Development of Nuclear Energy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>CD/RW/ WP.3</td>
<td>Canada: Comments on major elements of a treaty prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>CD/RW/ WP.19</td>
<td>Sweden: Memorandum on certain aspects of a convention prohibiting radiological warfare.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>CD/RW/ WP.25/Add.1/Rev.1</td>
<td>Chairman's Amended Proposal for the organization of work during the opening.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>CD/RW/ WP.33</td>
<td>Chairman's Summary of suggested issues of initial relevance relating to protection of nuclear facilities for discussion during Working Group meetings on 26 March and 2 April 1982.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
14. CD/RM/WR.50
A compilation of types or categories of nuclear facilities to be considered (Prepared by the Secretariat)

15. CD/RM/CRP.13
The Netherlands: Proposal on invitation to the International Atomic Energy Agency.

16. CD/RM/CRP.16
Pakistan: Proposal on definition of facilities to be protected.
84. The Committee considered the question of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction at plenary meetings. Some delegations, recalling the proposals made earlier by them, noted that the most effective way of dealing with this question was to conclude a general international agreement on a comprehensive prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction. An annex could contain a list of types of weapons to be prohibited. The scope of such an agreement would permit the conclusion of separate agreements banning specific types of weapons of mass destruction. In that connection, they expressed deep concern regarding the development, testing and production of the "nuclear neutron weapon". As a first step, the permanent members of the Security Council and other militarily significant States should make declarations, identical in substance, pledging not to develop any new types of weapons of mass destruction, and their declarations should be endorsed by the Security Council. Furthermore, they reiterated that the Committee on Disarmament should set up an ad hoc group of qualified governmental experts to elaborate both a general agreement as well as separate agreements on specific new weapons of mass destruction.

85. Other members continued to believe that it would be more appropriate to negotiate agreements to ban potential new weapons of mass destruction on a case-by-case basis, as such weapons may be identified. They pointed out that no such weapon has been identified so far. A general prohibitory agreement would be too ambiguous to be useful in concrete situations and would not permit the definition and implementation of the appropriate verification measures. They still consider that the practice followed up to now - periodic informal meetings with the participation of experts - allows the Committee to follow this question in an appropriate manner and adequately to identify any cases which might require particular consideration and which would justify the opening of specific negotiations. They added that the so-called nuclear neutron weapon could not be considered as a new weapon of mass destruction nor was it based on new scientific principles. They also pointed out that any consideration of this subject belonged under agenda item 2 and drew attention to the Chairman's statement made at the time of the adoption of the Committee's 1983 agenda, to wit: "... it is understood that the question of the nuclear neutron weapon is covered by agenda item 2 of the agenda ...".

86. Several delegations emphasized the need to approach this problem, taking into account the priorities established within the Committee, in order to study the possibilities of elaborating a general agreement on several specific
agreements on the subject of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons. For this purpose, the idea of associating scientists in the work of the Committee on this subject through the establishment of an ad hoc body, with an appropriate mandate, has also been put forward.

F. Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament

87. The item on the agenda entitled "Comprehensive programme of disarmament" was considered by the Committee, in accordance with its programme of work, during the periods from 1 February to 31 March and from 1 to 5 August 1983.

88. At its 236th plenary meeting on 23 August 1983, the Committee adopted the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group re-established by the Committee under the agenda item at its 176th plenary meeting on 5 August 1982. That report (CD/415) is an integral part of this report and reads as follows:
"I. INTRODUCTION

1. At its 176th plenary meeting, on 5 August 1982, the Committee on Disarmament decided to re-establish the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament to continue negotiations on the Programme as envisaged in paragraph 109 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, with a view to submitting a revised draft Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament to the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session, taking into account the views expressed and the progress achieved on the subject at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. It was understood that the Ad Hoc Working Group would not conduct formal meetings during the remainder of the 1982 session of the Committee, but that informal consultations or meetings of an exploratory character would be held. In accordance with that decision, the Working Group resumed its work on 16 February 1983.

"II. ORGANIZATION OF WORK AND DOCUMENTATION

2. At its 176th plenary meeting on 5 August 1982, the Committee on Disarmament reappointed Ambassador Alfonso García Robles (Mexico) as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group. Miss Aida Luisa Levin, United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs, served as Secretary of the Working Group.

3. The Ad Hoc Working Group held 12 meetings between 16 February and 19 August 1983.

4. At their request, the Committee at its 208th plenary meeting on 31 March 1981 and 212th plenary meeting on 14 April 1982, decided to invite the representatives of the following States not members of the Committee to participate in the meetings of the Ad Hoc Working Group: Austria, Burundi, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Norway, Portugal, Senegal, Spain, Tunisia and Turkey.

5. The Ad Hoc Working Group had before it the documentation submitted during previous sessions of the Committee on Disarmament.

"III. SUBSTANTIATIVE WORK DURING THE 1983 SESSION

6. In accordance with its mandate, the Ad Hoc Working Group took as the basis for its work the texts that resulted from the negotiations on the Comprehensive Programme

\*\*\* The list of documents submitted during the previous sessions of the Committee on Disarmament may be found in the reports of the Ad Hoc Working Group to the Committee on Disarmament which are an integral part of the Committee's reports for those sessions (CD/139, CD/228 and CD/292).
of Disarmament at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament (A/5-12/32, Annex I), which, as stated in the report of the Ad Hoc Committee established at that session, reflected the persistence of significant differences of opinion on various aspects of the Programme, notably the chapter on Measures and stages of implementation (A/5-12/32, paragraph 28).

"7. The Ad Hoc Working Group decided to establish Contact Groups to proceed with the elaboration of the various sections of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament as follows: Contact Group on Objectives; Contact Group on Principles; Contact Group on Priorities; Contact Group on Measures and stages of implementation and Contact Group on Machinery and Procedures. The Working Group further decided to appoint Ambassador François de la Gorce (France) as Co-ordinator of the Contact Group on Objectives, Ambassador Baruch Grinberg (Bulgaria) as Co-ordinator of the Contact Group on Principles, Ambassador Celso Antonio de Souza e Silva (Brazil) as Co-ordinator of the Contact Group on Priorities, Ambassador Mansur Ahmad (Pakistan) as Co-ordinator of the Contact Group on Measures and stages of implementation, and Ambassador Curt Lidgard (Sweden) as Co-ordinator of the Contact Group on Machinery and Procedures. During the second part of the session, Ambassador Ahmad was unable to continue as Co-ordinator of the Contact Group on Measures and stages of implementation and, at his suggestion, the Chairman of the Working Group acted as Co-ordinator of that Contact Group. Also during the second part of the session, the Working Group appointed Ambassador Borislav Konstantinov (Bulgaria) as Co-ordinator of the Contact Group on Principles in view of the fact that Ambassador Grinberg could not continue performing that function.

"8. Efforts were made in the Contact Groups to achieve agreement on the sections of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament assigned to them. However, differences of view persisted. Further efforts to reconcile those differences were made in the Ad Hoc Working Group. In addition, informal consultations were held during June, July and August under the guidance of the Chairman of the Working Group. With a view to reaching agreement, where it was not possible to arrive at generally acceptable new formulations, the language of relevant paragraphs of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament was largely used.

"9. The resulting texts are included in the Annex to this report. As indicated therein, the texts of some paragraphs are pending. In addition, differences of view remain regarding the appropriateness of including certain paragraphs and the desire to add further paragraphs. It was agreed that their placement in the Programme should be decided at a later stage, bearing in mind that duplication should be avoided.

"10. In the time available to it, the Ad Hoc Working Group was not able to consider the Introduction. It agreed to include in the Annex to this report the draft of the Introduction prepared by the Chairman of the Working Group during the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament in his capacity as Chairman of the Working Group on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament that was established at that session, it being understood that this draft would, in any case, need to be redrafted in light of the over-all content of the Programme.

"11. The Ad Hoc Working Group was also unable to devote attention to questions relating to stages of implementation, time frames and nature of the Programme.
IV. CONCLUSION

12. The Ad Hoc Working Group agreed to submit to the Committee on Disarmament the texts that are annexed to this report, on the understanding that delegations could not take final positions until agreement was reached on outstanding points of difficulty and until the document was complete. The Working Group further agreed to recommend to the Committee that those texts be submitted to the General Assembly for further consideration at the Assembly's thirty-eighth session with a view to the final adoption of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament.
"ANNEX

"Texts for the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament submitted by the Ad Hoc Working Group

"I. Introduction /" 

"1. The threat to the very survival of mankind posed by the existence of nuclear weapons and the continuing arms race, which already in 1978 gave rise to the justified alarm of the General Assembly, far from disappearing has considerably increased during the four years that have elapsed since the holding of its first special session devoted to disarmament. It was thus natural not to unduly delay the convening of the second special session, which, with the same purpose as the first, had been explicitly provided for in the Final Document of that session.

"2. Both in the general debate of this second special session of the Assembly, in which an impressive number of heads of State or Government and Ministers of Foreign Affairs participated, as well as in the deliberations of the Ad Hoc Committee and the Working Groups, it became evident that there had been no erosion in the support of all fundamental conclusions of the Final Document, such as the following:

"(a) The objective of security, which is an inseparable element of peace, has always been one of the most profound aspirations of humanity. Yet the accumulation of weapons, particularly nuclear weapons, today constitutes much more a threat than a protection for the future of mankind since, far from helping to strengthen international security, it on the contrary weakens it, and since existing arsenals of nuclear weapons alone are sufficient to destroy all life on earth.

"(b) The arms race, particularly in its nuclear aspect, runs counter to efforts to achieve further relaxation of international tension, to establish international relations based on peaceful coexistence and trust between all States, and to develop broad international co-operation and understanding. The arms race impedes the realization of the purposes, and is incompatible with the principles, of the Charter of the United Nations, especially respect for sovereignty, refraining from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, the peaceful settlement of disputes and non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of States. On the other hand, progress on détente and progress on disarmament mutually complement and strengthen each other.

"(c) Military expenditures are reaching ever higher levels, the highest percentage of which can be attributed to the nuclear-weapon States and most of their allies, with prospects of further expansion and the danger of further increases in the expenditures of other countries. The hundreds of billions of dollars spent annually on the manufacture or improvement of weapons are in sombre and dramatic contrast to the want and poverty in which two thirds of the world's population live. This colossal waste of resources is even more serious in that it diverts to military purposes not only material but also technical and human resources which are urgently needed for development in all countries, particularly in the developing countries.

"/ Draft prepared by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group during the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament in his capacity as Chairman of the Working Group on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament established at that session. The draft was not discussed in the Ad Hoc Working Group.
"(d) Enduring international peace and security cannot be built on the accumulation of weaponry by military alliances nor be sustained by a precarious balance of deterrence or doctrines of strategic superiority. Genuine and lasting peace can only be created through the effective implementation of the security system provided for in the Charter of the United Nations and the speedy and substantial reduction of arms and armed forces, by international agreement and mutual example, leading ultimately to general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

"3. It was undoubtedly for reasons like the above that, in one of the last paragraphs of the Programme of Action outlined in the Final Document, the General Assembly decided that the implementation of the priorities defined therein should lead to general and complete disarmament under effective international control, which 'remains the ultimate goal of all efforts exerted in the field of disarmament'. The Assembly completed this statement adding that the negotiations on general and complete disarmament shall be conducted concurrently with negotiations on partial measures of disarmament and deciding that, with this purpose in mind, the Committee on Disarmament should undertake the elaboration of a 'comprehensive programme of disarmament encompassing all measures thought to be advisable in order to ensure that the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control becomes a reality in a world in which international peace and security prevail and in which the new international economic order is strengthened and consolidated'.

"4. The General Assembly did not only stress several times the importance of this goal which it called the 'ultimate goal' of all disarmament efforts. On more than one occasion it stated also its opinion as to which should be the 'immediate goal' defining it as 'the elimination of the danger of a nuclear war and the implementation of measures to halt the arms race and clear the path towards lasting peace'.

"5. Bearing in mind those antecedents and taking as the main basis for its deliberations the draft transmitted by the Committee on Disarmament, the General Assembly has elaborated this Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, which received the approval by consensus of all the States Members of the United Nations which participated in its second special session devoted to disarmament. In addition to the present introduction, the Programme comprises five chapters whose titles, clearly indicative of their contents, are the following: 'Objectives', 'Principles', 'Priorities', 'Measures and stages of implementation', and 'Machinery and procedures'.

"6. It has not been possible to reach agreement for the Comprehensive Programme to become a treaty, as some States would have preferred in order to make its provisions legally binding. There has been, however, unanimous support for the idea that all necessary steps must be taken to enhance the political and moral value of the Programme. It has thus been agreed that a special copy of the Programme shall be carried by a personal representative of the Secretary-General to the capitals of all States Members of the United Nations, in order to have it signed by the respective heads of State or Government. This symbolic act will be a clear sign that this time there is the required "political will" to proceed along the road of uninterrupted negotiations in good faith in the field of disarmament. Should there be some States where constitutional obstacles prevent recourse to the above procedures, alternative methods of similar significance should be employed. Thus the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, although not a treaty in itself, would indeed become a source of numerous successive treaties thanks to which mankind may start the twenty-first century in conditions totally different from those that prevail at present and are the cause of deepest concern.
II. Objectives

1. The immediate objectives of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament should be to eliminate the danger of war, in particular nuclear war, the prevention of which remains the most acute and urgent task of the present day, to implement measures to halt and reverse the arms race, in particular the nuclear arms race, and to clear the path towards lasting peace. To this end, the Programme will also aim:
   - To maintain and further the momentum generated by the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament;
   - To initiate or engage in further negotiations, to expedite the halting of the arms race in all its aspects, in particular the nuclear arms race;
   - To consolidate and develop the results reflected in agreements and treaties achieved so far, relevant to the problems of disarmament;
   - To open and accelerate the process of genuine disarmament on an internationally agreed basis.

2. The ultimate objective of the Comprehensive Programme is to ensure that general and complete disarmament under effective international control becomes a reality in a world in which international peace and security prevail and in which the new international economic order is fully achieved.

3. Throughout the implementation of the Programme towards the progressive reduction and final elimination of armaments and armed forces, the following objectives should be pursued:
   - To strengthen international peace and security, as well as the security of individual States, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations;
   - To contribute to the safeguarding of the sovereignty and independence of all States;
   - To make, through the implementation of the Programme, an effective contribution to the economic and social development of States, in particular developing States;
   - To increase international confidence and relaxation of international tension;
   - To establish international relations based on peaceful coexistence and trust between all States, and to develop broad international co-operation and understanding with a view to promoting conditions favourable to the implementation of the Programme;
   - To mobilize world public opinion in favour of disarmament, through balanced, factual and objective information and education in all regions of the world, so as to generate further understanding and support for the efforts to halt the arms race and achieve disarmament.

III. Principles

1. The Members of the United Nations are fully aware of the conviction of their peoples that the question of general and complete disarmament is of utmost importance and that peace, security and economic and social development are indivisible, and they have therefore recognized that the corresponding obligations and responsibilities are universal.

2. The ending of the arms race and the achievement of real disarmament are tasks of primary importance and urgency.

3. Progress on détente and progress on disarmament mutually complement and strengthen each other.

* The placement of this paragraph in the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament will be determined later.
4. All States Members of the United Nations reaffirm their full commitment to the purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and their obligation strictly to observe its principles as well as other relevant and generally accepted principles of international law relating to the maintenance of international peace and security. They stress the special importance of refraining from the threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or against peoples under colonial or foreign domination seeking to exercise their right to self-determination and to achieve independence, non-acquisition and non-annexation of territories by force and non-recognition of such acquisition or annexation, non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of other States; the inviolability of international frontiers; and the peaceful settlement of disputes, having regard to the inherent right of States to individual and collective self-defence in accordance with the Charter.

5. In order to create favourable conditions for success in the disarmament process, all States should strictly abide by the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, refrain from actions which might adversely affect efforts in the field of disarmament, and display a constructive approach to negotiations and the political will to reach agreements.

6. The arms race, particularly in its nuclear aspect, runs counter to efforts to achieve further relaxation of international tension, to establish international relations based on peaceful coexistence and trust between all States, and to develop broad international co-operation and understanding. The arms race impedes the realisation of the purposes, and is incompatible with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, especially respect for sovereignty, refraining from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, the peaceful settlement of disputes and non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of States.

7. Significant progress in disarmament, including nuclear disarmament, would be facilitated by parallel measures to strengthen the security of States and to improve the international situation in general.

8. Disarmament, relaxation of international tension, respect for the right to self-determination and national independence, the peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the strengthening of international peace and security are directly related to each other. Progress in any of these spheres has a beneficial effect on all of them; in turn, failure in one sphere has negative effects on others.

9. Enduring international peace and security cannot be built on the accumulation of weaponry by military alliances or be sustained by a precarious balance of deterrence or doctrines of strategic superiority. Genuine and lasting peace can only be created through the effective implementation of the security system provided for in the Charter of the United Nations and the speedy and substantial reduction of arms and armed forces, by international agreement and mutual example, leading ultimately to general and complete disarmament under effective international control.
At the same time, the causes of the arms race and threats to peace must be reduced and to this end effective action should be taken to eliminate tensions and settle disputes by peaceful means.

"10. Progress in disarmament should be accompanied by measures to strengthen institutions for maintaining peace and the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means.

"11. Negotiations should be based on the strict observance of the purposes and principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, with full recognition of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament and reflecting the vital interest of all the peoples of the world in this sphere.

"12. Since the process of disarmament affects the vital security interests of all States, they must all be actively concerned with and contribute to the measures of disarmament and arms limitation, which have an essential part to play in maintaining and strengthening international security.

"13. All the peoples of the world have a vital interest in the success of disarmament negotiations. Consequently, all States have the duty to contribute to efforts in the field of disarmament. All States have the right to participate in disarmament negotiations. They have the right to participate on an equal footing in those multilateral disarmament negotiations which have a direct bearing on their national security.

"14. In a world of finite resources, there is a close relationship between expenditure on armaments and economic and social development. The continuation of the arms race is detrimental to and incompatible with the implementation of the new international economic order based on justice, equity and cooperation. Consequently, there is a close relationship between disarmament and development. Progress in the former would help greatly in the realization of the latter and resources released as a result of the implementation of disarmament measures should be devoted to the economic and social development of all nations and contribute to the bridging of the economic gap between developed and developing countries.

"15. Disarmament and arms limitation, particularly in the nuclear field, are essential for the prevention of the danger of nuclear war and the strengthening of international peace and security and for the economic and social advancement of all peoples, thus facilitating the achievement of the new international economic order.

"16. Nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of civilization.

"17. The adoption of disarmament measures should take place in such an equitable and balanced manner as to ensure the right of each State to security and to ensure that no individual State or group of States may obtain advantages over others at any stage. At each stage the objective should be undiminished security at the lowest possible level of armaments and military forces.
18. In accordance with the Charter, the United Nations has a central role and primary responsibility in the field of disarmament. In order effectively to discharge this role and facilitate and encourage all measures in this field, the United Nations should be kept appropriately informed of all steps in this field, whether unilateral, bilateral, regional or multilateral, without prejudice to the progress of negotiations.

19. The process of nuclear disarmament should be carried out in such a way, and requires measures to ensure, that the security of all States is guaranteed at progressively lower levels of nuclear armaments, taking into account the relative qualitative and quantitative importance of the existing arsenals of the nuclear-weapon States and other States concerned.

20. Significant progress in nuclear disarmament would be facilitated both by parallel political or international legal measures to strengthen the security of States and by progress in the limitation and reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments of the nuclear-weapon States and other States in the regions concerned.

21. Together with negotiations on nuclear disarmament measures, negotiations should be carried out on the balanced reduction of armed forces and of conventional armaments, based on the principle of undiminished security of the parties with a view to promoting or enhancing stability at a lower military level, taking into account the need of all States to protect their security. These negotiations should be conducted with particular emphasis on armed forces and conventional weapons of nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant countries. **/

22. While disarmament is the responsibility of all States, all the nuclear-weapon States, in particular those among them which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, have the primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament and, together with other militarily significant States, for halting and reversing the arms race. It is therefore important to secure their active participation. ***/
25. Disarmament and arms limitation agreements should provide for adequate measures of verification satisfactory to all parties concerned in order to create the necessary confidence and ensure that they are being observed by all parties. The form and modalities of the verification to be provided for in any specific agreement depend upon and should be determined by the purposes, scope and nature of the agreement. Agreements should provide for the participation of parties directly or through the United Nations system in the verification process. Where appropriate, a combination of several methods of verification as well as other compliance procedures should be employed. Every effort should be made to develop appropriate methods and procedures which are non-discriminatory and which do not unduly interfere with the internal affairs of other States or jeopardize their economic and social development or prejudice their security.

26. Negotiations on partial measures of disarmament should be conducted concurrently with negotiations on more comprehensive measures and should be followed by negotiations leading to a treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

27. Qualitative and quantitative disarmament measures are both important for halting the arms race. Efforts so that end must include negotiations on the limitation and cessation of the qualitative improvement of armaments, especially weapons of mass destruction and the development of new means of warfare so that ultimately scientific and technological achievements may be used solely for peaceful purposes.

28. Universality of disarmament agreements helps create confidence among States. When multilateral agreements in the field of disarmament are negotiated, every effort should be made to ensure that they are universally acceptable. The full compliance of all parties with the provisions contained in such agreements would contribute to the attainment of that goal.

29. All States, in particular nuclear-weapon States, should consider various proposals designed to secure the avoidance of the use of nuclear weapons, and the prevention of nuclear war. In this context, while noting the declarations made by nuclear-weapon States, effective arrangements, as appropriate, to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons could strengthen the security of those States and international peace and security.

30. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of agreements or arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the zone concerned and the full compliance with those agreements or arrangements, thus ensuring that the zones are genuinely free from nuclear weapons, and respect for such zones by nuclear-weapon States constitute an important disarmament measure.

31. Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is a matter of universal concern. Measures of disarmament must be consistent with the inalienable right of all States, without discrimination, to develop, acquire and use nuclear technology, equipment and materials for the peaceful use of nuclear energy and to determine their peaceful nuclear programmes in accordance with their national priorities, needs and interests, bearing in mind the need to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. International co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be conducted under agreed and appropriate international safeguards applied on a non-discriminatory basis.
32. As security and stability should be assured in all regions taking into account the specific needs and requirements of their respective situations, bilateral and regional disarmament negotiations may also play an important role and could facilitate negotiations of multilateral agreements in the field of disarmament.

33. Agreements or other measures should be resolutely pursued on a bilateral, regional and multilateral basis with the aim of strengthening peace and security at a lower level of forces, by the limitation and reduction of armed forces and of conventional weapons, taking into account the need of States to protect their security, bearing in mind the inherent right of self-defence embodied in the Charter of the United Nations and without prejudice to the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples in accordance with the Charter, and the need to ensure balance at each stage and undiminished security of all States.

34. Bilateral, regional and multilateral consultations and conferences should be held where appropriate conditions exist with the participation of all the countries concerned for the consideration of different aspects of conventional disarmament, such as the initiative envisaged in the Declaration of Ayacucho subscribed to by eight Latin American countries on 9 December 1974.

35. It is essential that not only Governments but also the peoples of the world recognize and understand the dangers in the present situation. In order that an international conscience may develop and that world public opinion may exercise a positive influence, the United Nations should increase the dissemination of information on the armaments race and disarmament with the full co-operation of Member States.

36. Draft multilateral disarmament conventions should be subjected to the normal procedures applicable in the law of treaties. Those submitted to the General Assembly for its commendation should be subject to full review by the Assembly.

37. Collateral measures in both the nuclear and conventional fields, together with other measures specifically designed to build confidence, should be undertaken in order to contribute to the creation of favourable conditions for the adoption of additional disarmament measures and to further the relaxation of international tension.

38. Taking further steps in the field of disarmament and other measures aimed at promoting international peace and security would be facilitated by carrying out studies by the Secretary-General in this field with appropriate assistance from governmental or consultant experts.

39. In particular, publicity should be given to the decisions of the special sessions of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

IV. Priorities

1. In the implementation of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament for the achievement of general and complete disarmament under effective international control as the ultimate goal, the priorities which reflect the urgency attached to the measures for negotiations are:
   - nuclear weapons;
   - other weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons;
- conventional weapons, including any which may be deemed to be excessively
  injurious or to have indiscriminate effects; and
- reduction of armed forces.

"2. Effective measures of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war
   have the highest priority. Along with negotiations on these measures, effective
   measures should be negotiated to prohibit or prevent the development, production or
   use of other weapons of mass destruction, as well as on the balance, reduction of
   armed forces and of conventional armaments.

"3. Nothing should preclude States from conducting negotiations on all priority
   items concurrently. Bearing in mind these priorities, negotiations should be
   pursued on all measures which would lead to general and complete disarmament under
   effective international control.

"V. Measures and Stages of Implementation \(^{\dagger}\)

First Stage \(^{\dagger}\)

"Disarmament Measures

"A. Nuclear weapons

"1. Nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of
   civilization. It is essential to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race in all its
   aspects in order to avert the danger of war involving nuclear weapons. The
   ultimate goal in this context is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

\^{\dagger}\ The heading is without prejudice to the position of delegations with
   respect to questions relating to stages of implementation. The following text has
   been considered for eventual inclusion in the chapter on machinery and procedures:

"All efforts will be made by States, particularly through the conduct of
   negotiations in good faith on specific disarmament measures, to achieve the goal
   of General and Complete Disarmament, as defined in the Comprehensive Programme,
   by the year 2000. In order to assure continued progress towards the full
   realization of this ultimate goal, a special session of the General Assembly
   shall be convened periodically to review the implementation of the measures included
   in the various stages of the Comprehensive Programme. The first such special session
   of the General Assembly shall be held in (1987) (1988) (1989), and will:
   (a) review
   the implementation of the measures included in the first stage of the Comprehensive
   Programme; (b) consider the readjustments that need to be made in the Programme in
   the light of the review and the steps that need to be taken to stimulate progress
   in its implementation; (c) elaborate in more concrete terms the measures to be
   implemented in the second stage of the Programme, taking into account the progress
   made so far in other developments in international relations, as well as science
   and technology; and (d) decide on the time for the next special session to review
   the implementation of the measures included, and adjusted as necessary, in the
   second stage of the Comprehensive Programme, with the understanding that such
   session would be held not later than six years after the first."
"In the task of achieving the goals of nuclear disarmament, all the nuclear-weapon States, in particular those among them which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, bear a special responsibility.

"The process of nuclear disarmament should be carried out in such a way, and requires measures to ensure, that the security of all States is guaranteed at progressively lower levels of nuclear armaments, taking into account the relative qualitative and quantitative importance of the existing arsenals of the nuclear-weapon States and other States concerned.

"2. The achievement of nuclear disarmament will require urgent negotiation of agreements at appropriate stages and with adequate measures of verification satisfactory to the States concerned for:

"(a) Cessation of the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear-weapon systems;

"(b) Cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, and of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes;

"(c) A comprehensive, phased programme with agreed time-frames, whenever feasible, for progressive and balanced reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, leading to their ultimate and complete elimination at the earliest possible time.

"Consideration can be given in the course of the negotiations to mutual and agreed limitation or prohibition, without prejudice to the security of any State, of any types of nuclear armaments.

"3. Nuclear test ban:

"The cessation of nuclear-weapon testing by all States within the framework of an effective nuclear disarmament process would be in the interest of mankind. It would make a significant contribution to the aim of ending the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and the development of new types of such weapons and of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Therefore, all efforts should be made to conclude, as an important part of the process of nuclear disarmament, a multilateral nuclear test ban treaty at the earliest possible date. /2/

"4. Pending the conclusion of further agreements relating to nuclear disarmament, the USSR and the United States should, on a reciprocal basis, continue to refrain from actions which would undercut existing strategic arms agreements concluded between them.

"/2/ Some delegations reserved their position with respect to the first sentence of this text. Other delegations reserved their position with regard to the last sentence.
"5. USSR-United States strategic arms negotiations: */
   (Consultations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the text are underway.)

"6. Bilateral negotiations on the limitation and reduction of nuclear weapons in Europe: */
   (Consultations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the text are underway.)

"7. Multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament: */
   "The urgent initiation of multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations is of vital interest to the nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States. The conclusion of multilateral disarmament agreements would be facilitated by substantial progress in the bilateral negotiations in this area between the States which possess the most important arsenals and have a special responsibility in the field of nuclear disarmament. Also, multilateral negotiations are particularly important to achieve significant and universal progress toward the achievement of nuclear disarmament. This will require negotiation of agreements at appropriate stages, taking due account of the relative quantitative and qualitative importance of existing arsenals and the necessity of maintaining the undiminished security of all States, nuclear and non-nuclear, at each stage, and with adequate measures of verification satisfactory to all parties concerned, for the cessation of the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear-weapon systems, for the cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery and for the reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery.

   In the course of such negotiations, a combination of the measures as detailed in paragraph 2 above, or a combination of different elements of such measures, could be considered.

   "The over-all objective of the measures for nuclear disarmament outlined in the preceding paragraphs for negotiation during the first stage of the Comprehensive Programme, and of those included in subsequent stages, would be to achieve qualitative and quantitative limitations on and significant reductions of the nuclear-weapon arsenals existing at the beginning of the stage.

"8. Avoidance of the use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war:
   (Text pending.)

"9. Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons:
   "The nuclear-weapon States should take steps to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Bearing in mind the declarations made by the nuclear weapon States, efforts should be pursued to conclude, as appropriate, effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

*/ One delegation held that paragraphs 5 and 6 should be consolidated.

/** Two delegations reserved their position on the text of paragraph 7 pending the preparation of the text of paragraphs 5 and 6.
10. Nuclear non-proliferation:

"It is imperative, as an integral part of the effort to halt and reverse the arms race, to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The goal of nuclear non-proliferation is on the one hand to prevent the emergence of any additional nuclear-weapon States besides the existing five nuclear-weapon States, and on the other progressively to reduce and eventually eliminate nuclear weapons altogether. This involves obligations and responsibilities on the part of both nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States, the former undertaking to stop the nuclear arms race and to achieve nuclear disarmament by urgent application of the measures outlined in the relevant paragraphs of the Final Document, and all States undertaking to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

Effective measures can and should be taken at the national level and through international agreements to minimize the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons without jeopardizing energy supplies or the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Therefore, the nuclear-weapon States and the non-nuclear-weapon States should jointly take further steps to develop an international consensus of ways and means, on a universal and non-discriminatory basis, to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Full implementation of all the provisions of existing instruments on non-proliferation, such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and/or the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) by States parties to those instruments will be an important contribution to this end. Adherence to such instruments has increased in recent years and the hope has been expressed by the parties that this trend might continue.

Non-proliferation measures should not jeopardize the full exercise of the inalienable rights of all States to apply and develop their programmes for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for economic and social development in conformity with their priorities, interests and needs. All States should also have access to and be free to acquire technology, equipment and materials for peaceful uses of nuclear energy, taking into account the particular needs of the developing countries. International co-operation in this field should be under agreed and appropriate international safeguards applied through the International Atomic Energy Agency on a non-discriminatory basis in order to prevent effectively the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Each country's choices and decisions in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be respected without jeopardizing their respective fuel cycle policies or international co-operation, agreements and contracts for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, provided that the agreed safeguard measures mentioned above are applied.
"In accordance with the principles and provisions of General Assembly resolution 32/50 of 8 December 1977, international co-operation for the promotion of the transfer and utilization of nuclear technology for economic and social development, especially in the developing countries, should be strengthened.

11. Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones:

"The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of agreements or arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned constitute an important disarmament measure and should be encouraged with the ultimate objective of achieving a world entirely free of nuclear weapons, taking into account the characteristics of each region. The States participating in such zones should undertake to comply fully with all the objectives, purposes and principles of the agreements or arrangements establishing the zones, thus ensuring that they are genuinely free from nuclear weapons. The nuclear-weapon States are called upon to give undertakings, the modalities of which are to be negotiated, in particular: (i) to respect strictly the status of the nuclear-weapon-free zone; (ii) to refrain from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against the States of the zone.

"(a) Adoption by the States concerned of all relevant measures to ensure the full application of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco), taking into account the views expressed on the adherence to it at the tenth special session of the General Assembly, the General Conference of OPAANAL and other relevant fora, and including ratification of additional Protocol I by all States concerned.

"(b) In Africa, the Organization of African Unity has affirmed the denuclearization of the continent. The United Nations General Assembly in successive resolutions has supported the African initiative for the denuclearization of the continent and at its tenth special session the General Assembly, by consensus, called upon the Security Council to take appropriate effective steps to prevent the frustration of this objective.

"(c) The establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East in compliance with General Assembly resolution 35/147 would greatly enhance international peace and security. Pending the establishment of such a zone in the region, States of the region should solemnly declare that they will refrain on a reciprocal basis from producing, acquiring or in any other way possessing nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices and from permitting the stationing of nuclear weapons on their territory by any third party, and agree to place all their nuclear activities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. Consideration should be given to a Security Council role in advancing the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East."
(d) All States in the region of South Asia have expressed their determination to keep their countries free of nuclear weapons. No action should be taken by them which might deviate from that objective. In this context, the question of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia has been dealt with in several resolutions of the General Assembly, which is keeping the subject under consideration.

(e) Efforts to create nuclear-weapon-free zones in other regions of the world should be promoted at the initiative of States which intend to become part of the zone.

(f) Ensuring that the zones are genuinely free from nuclear weapons and respect for such zones by nuclear-weapon States constitute an important disarmament measure.

B. Other Weapons of Mass Destruction

1. All States should adhere to the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925.

2. All States which have not yet done so should consider adhering to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction.

3. It is necessary to make all possible efforts for the early conclusion of an international convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons and on their destruction.

4. An international treaty on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons should be concluded, bearing in mind the negotiations under way in the Committee on Disarmament and all proposals made in connection therewith.

5. Effective measures should be taken to avoid the danger and prevent the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction based on new scientific principles and achievements. Efforts should be appropriately pursued aiming at the prohibition of such types and systems of weapons. This question should be kept under continuing review.

C. Conventional weapons and armed forces

1. Together with negotiations on nuclear disarmament measures, the limitation and gradual reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons should be resolutely pursued within the framework of progress towards general and complete disarmament. States with the largest military arsenals have a special responsibility in pursuing the process of conventional armaments reductions. */

2. (Interested States will have to continue consultations on the text of paragraph on Europe).

*/ In the view of one delegation, the inclusion of this paragraph was dependent on the text that may be agreed for paragraph 21 of the chapter on Principles.
3. Agreements or other measures should be resolutely pursued on a bilateral, regional and multilateral basis with the aim of strengthening peace and security at a lower level of forces, by the limitation and reduction of armed forces and of conventional weapons, taking into account the need of States to protect their security, bearing in mind the inherent right of self-defence embodied in the Charter of the United Nations and without prejudice to the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples in accordance with the Charter and the need to ensure balance at each stage and undiminished security of all States. Such measures might include the following:

"(a) Bilateral, regional and multilateral consultations and conferences should be held where appropriate conditions exist with the participation of all the countries concerned for the consideration of different aspects of conventional disarmament, such as the initiative envisaged in the Declaration of Ayacucho subscribed to by eight Latin American countries on 9 December 1974.

"(b) Consultations should be carried out among major arms suppliers and recipient countries on the limitation of all types of international transfer of conventional weapons, based in particular on the principle of undiminished security of the parties with a view to promoting or enhancing stability at a lower military level, taking into account the need of all States to protect their security as well as the inalienable right to self-determination and independence of peoples under colonial or foreign domination and the obligations of States to respect such right, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States.

4. Prohibition or restrictions of use of certain conventional weapons, including those which may cause unnecessary suffering or which may have indiscriminate effects:

"(a) Adherence by all States to the agreement adopted by the United Nations Conference on Prohibition or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects.

"(b) Broadening of the prohibitions or restrictions of use of certain conventional weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects, either through amendments to the existing Protocols or through the conclusion of additional Protocols, in accordance with Article 8 of the Convention on Prohibition or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects.

"(c) The result of the above-mentioned Conference should be considered by all States, especially producer States, in regard to the question of the transfer of such weapons to other States.
D. Military budgets

"1. Gradual reduction of military budgets on a mutually agreed basis, for example, in absolute figures or in terms of percentage points, particularly by nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States, would be a measure that would contribute to curbing the arms race and would increase the possibilities of reallocation of resources now being used for military purposes to economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries.

"2. The basis for implementing this measure will have to be agreed by all participating States and will require ways and means of its implementation acceptable to all of them, taking account of the problems involved in assessing the relative significance of reductions as among different States and with due regard to the proposals of States on all the aspects of reduction of military budgets.

"3. The General Assembly should continue to consider what concrete steps should be taken to facilitate the reduction of military budgets, bearing in mind the relevant proposals and documents of the United Nations on this question.

E. Related measures

"1. Further steps to prohibit military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques:

Review of the need for a further prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques with a view to the adoption of further measures to eliminate the danger to mankind from such use.

"2. Further steps to prevent an arms race on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof:

Consideration of further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof in order to promote the peaceful use of, and to avoid an arms race in, that environment, taking into account the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the proposals made during the First and Second Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, as well as any relevant technological developments.

"3. In order to prevent an arms race in outer space, further measures should be taken and appropriate international negotiations held in accordance with the spirit of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies.

**Note:** Two delegations reserved their position with respect to the reference in this paragraph to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
"4. The establishment of zones of peace:

The establishment of zones of peace in various regions of the world under appropriate conditions, to be clearly defined and determined freely by the States concerned in the zone, taking into account the characteristics of the zone and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and in conformity with international law, can contribute to strengthening the security of States within such zones and to international peace and security as a whole.

"(a) South East Asia:

Steps should be taken by the States of the region towards the early establishment of a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality in South East Asia, taking into account the need for ensuring stability and for enhancing prospects for co-operation and development in the region.*/

"(b) (Interested States will have to continue consultations on text on Indian Ocean);

"(c) (Interested States will have to continue consultations on text on the Mediterranean).

"OTHER MEASURES

1. Confidence-building measures

"In order to facilitate the process of disarmament, it is necessary to take measures and pursue policies to strengthen international peace and security and to build confidence among States. Commitment to confidence-building measures could significantly contribute to preparing for further progress in disarmament. For this purpose, measures such as the following, and other measures yet to be agreed upon, should be undertaken:

"(a) The prevention of attacks which take place by accident, miscalculation or communications failure by taking steps to improve communications between Governments, particularly in areas of tensions, by the establishment of "hot lines" and other methods of reducing the risk of conflict;

"(b) States should assess the possible implications of their military research and development for existing agreements as well as for further efforts in the field of disarmament.

2. Prevention of the use of force in international relations

"(a) Strict adherence and full commitment by all States Members of the United Nations to the purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and their obligation strictly to observe its principles as well as other relevant and generally accepted principles of international law relating to the maintenance of international peace and security, in particular the principles of refraining from the threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of any States or against peoples under colonial or foreign domination seeking to exercise their right to self-determination and to achieve independence, non-acquisition and non-annexation of territories by force and

*/ Some delegations reserved their position on the present text of this subparagraph.
non-recognition of such acquisition or annexation, non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of other States; the inviolability of international frontiers; and the peaceful settlement of disputes, having regard to the inherent right of States to individual and collective self-defence in accordance with the Charter.

"(b) Strengthening the role of the United Nations in the maintenance of international peace and security and full implementation of the decisions of the Security Council by all States Members of the United Nations in accordance with their obligations under Article 25 of the United Nations Charter.

3. Mobilization of world public opinion in favour of disarmament

"In order to mobilize world public opinion in favour of disarmament, the specific measures set forth below, designed to increase the dissemination of information about the armaments race and the efforts to halt and reverse it, should be adopted in all regions of the world in a balanced, factual and objective manner:

"(a) Throughout the implementation of the Programme, therefore, governmental and non-governmental information organs of Member States and those of the United Nations and its specialized agencies as well as non-governmental organizations should, as appropriate, undertake further programmes of information relating to the danger of the armaments race as well as to disarmament efforts and negotiations and their results, particularly by means of annual activities conducted in connection with Disarmament Week. These actions should constitute a programme to further alert world opinion to the danger of war in general and nuclear war in particular.

"(b) With a view to contributing to a greater understanding and awareness of the problems created by the armaments race and of the need for disarmament, Governments and governmental and non-governmental international organizations are urged to take steps to develop programmes of education for disarmament and peace studies at all levels.

"(c) The World Disarmament Campaign, which was solemnly launched by the General Assembly at the opening meeting of its second special session devoted to disarmament, should provide an opportunity for discussion and debate in all countries on all points of view relating to disarmament issues, objectives and conditions. The Campaign has three primary purposes: to inform, to educate and to generate public understanding and support for the objectives of the United Nations in the field of arms limitation and disarmament.

"(d) As part of the process of facilitating the consideration of issues in the field of disarmament, studies on specific questions should be undertaken on the decision of the General Assembly, when necessary for preparing the ground for negotiations or reaching agreement. Also, studies pursued under the auspices of the United Nations, in particular by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research could bring a useful contribution to the knowledge and exploration of disarmament problems, especially in the long term.
(e) Member States should be encouraged to ensure a better flow of information with regard to the various aspects of disarmament to avoid dissemination of false and tendentious information concerning armaments, and to concentrate on the danger of escalation of the armaments race and on the need for general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

(f) In particular publicity should be given to the decisions of the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, especially the Final Document of the first special session.

4. Verification

(a) In order to facilitate the conclusion and effective implementation of disarmament agreements and to create confidence, States should accept appropriate provisions for verification in such agreements.

(b) In the context of international disarmament negotiations, the problem of verification should be further examined and adequate methods and procedures in this field be considered. Every effort should be made to develop appropriate methods and procedures which are non-discriminatory and which do not unduly interfere with the internal affairs of other States or jeopardize their economic and social development.

"Disarmament and Development"

1. In view of the relationship between expenditure on armaments and economic and social development, the implementation of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament should make an effective contribution to economic and social development of all States, in particular of the developing countries. In this context, it is of particular significance that substantial progress in disarmament should be made in accordance with the responsibility that each State bears in the field of disarmament, so that real resources now being used for military purposes can be released to economic and social development in the world, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries.

2. Disarmament would contribute over the long term to the effective economic and social development of all States, in particular developing countries, by contributing towards reducing the economic disparities between developed and developing countries and establishing the new international economic order on the basis of justice, equity and co-operation and towards solving other global problems.

3. The Secretary-General shall periodically submit reports to the General Assembly on the economic and social consequences of the armaments race and its extremely harmful effects on world peace and security.

"/ The placement of this paragraph in the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament will be determined later.

"/ Some delegations indicated a preference for the paragraphs under this heading to be amplified and given greater prominence, such as an introduction to Chapter V (Measures and stages of implementation) or as a separate Chapter preceding Chapter V. One delegation held that the paragraphs under this heading should form part of Chapter VI (Machinery and Procedures).

"/ The final placement of the second sentence of this paragraph will be determined later.
"DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY"

1. Progress in disarmament should be accompanied by measures to strengthen institutions for maintaining peace and the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means. During and after the implementation of the programme of general and complete disarmament, there should be taken, in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the necessary measures to maintain international peace and security, including the obligation of States to place at the disposal of the United Nations agreed manpower necessary for an international peace force to be equipped with agreed types of armaments. Arrangements for the use of this force should ensure that the United Nations can effectively deter or suppress any threat or use of arms in violation of the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

"Intermediate Stage */

"Last Stage */

"VI. Machinery and Procedures"

1. The United Nations, in accordance with the Charter, should continue to have a central role and primary responsibility in the sphere of disarmament.

2. Negotiations on multilateral measures of disarmament envisaged in the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament should, as a rule, be conducted in the Committee on Disarmament, the single multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament.

3. Bilateral and regional disarmament negotiations may also play an important role and could facilitate negotiations of multilateral agreements in the field of disarmament.

4. The United Nations should be kept duly informed through the General Assembly, or any other appropriate United Nations channel reaching all Members of the Organization, of all disarmament efforts outside its aegis without prejudice to the progress of negotiations.

"*/ The heading is without prejudice to the position of delegations with respect to questions relating to stages of implementation.
5. All efforts will be made by States, particularly through the conduct of negotiations in good faith on specific disarmament measures, to achieve the goal of General and Complete Disarmament, as defined in the Comprehensive Programme, by the year 2000. In order to assure continued progress towards the full realization of this ultimate goal, a special session of the General Assembly shall be convened periodically to review the implementation of the measures included in the various stages of the Comprehensive Programme. The first such special session of the General Assembly shall be held in (1987) (1988) (1989), and will: (a) review the implementation of the measures included in the first stage of the Comprehensive Programme; (b) consider the readjustments that need to be made in the Programme in the light of the review and the steps that need to be taken to stimulate progress in its implementation; (c) elaborate in more concrete terms the measures to be implemented in the second stage of the Programme, taking into account the progress made so far and other developments in international relations, as well as science and technology; and (d) decide on the time for the next special session to review the implementation of the measures included, and adjusted as necessary, in the second stage of the Comprehensive Programme, with the understanding that such session would be held not later than six years after the first. */

6. In addition to the periodic reviews to be carried out at special sessions, there should be an annual review of the implementation of the Programme. Therefore, an item entitled "Review of the implementation of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament" should be annually included on the agenda of the regular sessions of the General Assembly. To facilitate the work of the Assembly in this regard, the Secretary-General should annually submit a report to the General Assembly on progress in the implementation of the Programme.

7. During its annual review, or at its periodic special sessions to review the implementation of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, the General Assembly may, as appropriate, consider and recommend further measures and procedures to enhance the implementation of the Programme.

8. In the implementation of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, the Disarmament Commission shall continue functioning as a deliberative body, a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly, and shall consider and make recommendations on various problems in the field of disarmament.

9. Proposals listed in paragraph 125 of the Final Document of the first special session and annex II of the Concluding Document of the second special session devoted to disarmament should be considered, and decisions taken, at an appropriate time.

10. At the earliest appropriate time, a world disarmament conference should be convened with universal participation and with adequate preparation.

*/ This paragraph has not been discussed. Therefore, the issues dealt with therein remain open.
G. Prevention of an arms race in outer space

89. The item on the agenda entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space" was considered by the Committee, in accordance with its programme of work, during the periods from 18 to 22 April and from 8 to 12 August 1983.

90. The following new documents were before the Committee in connection with the item:

(a) Document CD/375, dated 14 April 1983, submitted by the delegation of France, entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space";
(b) Document CD/410, dated 9 August 1983, submitted by the delegation of Mongolia, entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space";
(c) Document CD/413, dated 17 August 1983, submitted by the delegations of Australia; Belgium; Canada; France; Germany, Federal Republic of; Italy; Japan; Netherlands; United Kingdom; and United States of America;
(d) Document CD/418, dated 23 August 1983, entitled "Statement by the Group of 21 - Prevention of an arms race in outer space".

91. The Committee considered the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space in plenary and informal meetings. The Committee also considered proposals for the establishment of an ad hoc working group under the agenda item. The Group of 21 reaffirmed its proposal, as contained in document CD/329, that a working group should be established immediately with the mandate of undertaking negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement or agreements as appropriate to prevent an arms race in outer space in all its aspects. The Group of 21 maintained that this was specifically requested by the General Assembly in its resolution 37/83. It would also be in fulfilment of paragraph 80 of the Final Document which...
stated that: "In order to prevent an arms race in outer space, further measures should be taken and appropriate international negotiations be held in accordance with the spirit of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activity of States in the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies".

China continued to support the proposal of the Group of 21 to establish an ad hoc working group with a view to negotiating appropriate treaties on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. A group of socialist countries also reiterated its proposal in document CD/272, that a working group be established with the mandate of negotiating on the text of an international treaty on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. They also indicated that they could support the proposal of the Group of 21. At the 235th plenary meeting, a group of Western delegations tabled document CD/413, which proposed that the Committee establish an ad hoc working group under the agenda item and requested the ad hoc working group to identify, through substantive examination, issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

§2. A group of socialist countries as well as a number of delegations of other States considered however that the threat of an arms race in outer space had increased and had become acute and in this context it could increase the danger of a nuclear war. In their view therefore it was necessary without further delay to start effective, and practical negotiations on elaborating international agreements to prevent an arms race in outer space. A group of socialist countries insisted in particular on the necessity to negotiate in the Committee a treaty on prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space. The draft of a relevant treaty was submitted to the Committee by a member State (CD/274). The same State drew the attention of the Committee to the new initiatives of its Government with a view to prevent an arms race in outer space (CD/420) and, in particular, to the draft Treaty on the prohibition of the use of force in outer space and from outer space with regard to earth submitted to the United Nations General Assembly. They also pointed out the obligation taken by this State not to deploy first in the outer space any kind of anti-satellite weapons, i.e. declared unilateral moratorium on such launches for the whole period until other States including the United States of America would refrain from deploying in space anti-satellite weapons of any kind. Other delegations reaffirmed their belief that any activity in outer space should be for peaceful purposes and carried out for the benefit of all peoples, irrespective of the degree of their economic and scientific development. Given the novelty and the complexity of the subject, they believed that it was...
essential that a working group on item 7 should begin by identifying the
issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space including an
in-depth review of existing agreements. They regretted that their proposal for
a mandate of an ad hoc working group on item 7, contained in document CD/413,
had not proved acceptable to one group of delegations. The Group of 21
reaffirmed the principle that outer space - the common heritage of mankind -
should be preserved exclusively for peaceful purposes. While the Group of 21
did not object to the identification through substantive examination of relevant
issues - as an initial stage of the task of the Working Group - it nevertheless
considered that the extension of an arms race to outer space and its use for
hostile purposes should be permanently outlawed. In this connection, a group
of socialist States expressed its disappointment that proposals for a mandate
of an ad hoc working group under item 7 contained in documents CD/272 and CD/329
had not proved acceptable to one group of delegations.

93. A contact group was established with the task of formulating an
appropriate mandate for an ad hoc working group under this item. The contact
group held a number of meetings under the guidance of the Chairman of the
Committee on Disarmament. Various proposals were submitted to the contact
group by the Group of 21, a group of socialist States and some other delegations.

94. There was no consensus in the Committee on the proposals contained in
documents CD/272, CD/329 and CD/413.

II. Consideration of other areas dealing with the
cessation of the arms race and disarmament
and other relevant measures

95. In accordance with the decision taken at its 225th plenary meeting, the
Committee held an informal meeting to exchange views on follow-up measures
to the conclusions of the First Review Conference of the Parties to the
Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other
Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the
Subsoil Thereof.

I. Consideration and adoption of the annual report of the
Committee and any other report as appropriate to the
United Nations General Assembly

96. The item on the agenda entitled "Consideration and adoption of the
annual report of the Committee and any other report as appropriate to
the United Nations General Assembly" was considered by the Committee in
accordance with its programme of work from 22 to 30 August 1983.

97. The present report, as adopted by the Committee on 30 August 1983,
is transmitted by the Chairman on behalf of the Committee on Disarmament.

(Signed)
Jorge Morelli Pando, Peru
Chairman of the Committee
APPENDIX I

CONSOLIDATED LIST OF PARTICIPANTS IN THE WORK OF THE COMMITTEE
(1983 Session)

Chairman of the Committee for February: Ambassador Dugersurengiin Erdembileg (Mongolia)
Chairman of the Committee for March: Ambassador Ali Skalli (Morocco)
Chairman of the Committee for April: Ambassador Frans Van Dongen (Netherlands)
Chairman of the Committee for June: Ambassador G.O. Ijewere (Nigeria)
Chairman of the Committee for July: Ambassador Mansur Ahmad (Pakistan)
Chairman of the Committee for August: Ambassador Jorge Morelli Pando (Peru)
Secretary of the Committee and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General: Mr. Rikhi Jaipal
Deputy Secretary of the Committee: Mr. Vicente Berasategui

Delegation of Algeria
Address: 308 route de Lausanne, 1293 Bellevue, Geneva. Tel. No. 74.19.86

*Mr. Bachir Ould-Rouis

*Mr. Abdelkader Ta`far

Mr. Mohamed Salah Maachi

Mrs. Fatma-Zohra Ksentinini

Mr. Cherif Leouar

Ambassador Permanent Representative to the United Nations Office at Geneva Head of Delegation
Counsellor Permanent Mission of Algeria to the United Nations Office at Geneva
Ministry of National Defence
Secretary
Ministry of National Defence

# Spouse present.
**Delegation of Argentina**  
Address: 110 avenue Louis-Casal, 1216 Geneva. Tel. No. 98.59.59

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Mr. Julio C. Carasales | *Ambassador*  
Special Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Special Mission for Disarmament in Geneva  
Head of Delegation |
| Mr. Roberto Garcia Morita | *Counsellor*  
Special Mission for Disarmament in Geneva  
Alternate Representative |
| Mr. Roberto Villambrosa | *First Secretary*  
Special Mission for Disarmament in Geneva  
Alternate Representative |
| Mr. Roberto R. Huber | *Colonel*  
Expert, Chemical Weapons  
Ministry of Defence  
Buenos Aires  
National Commission of Atomic Energy  
Buenos Aires |
| Mr. Miguel Estrada Oyuela | *Spouse present.* |

**Delegation of Australia**  
Address: 56-58 rue de Moillebeau, Peti.-Sacomex, Geneva. Tel. No. 34.62.00

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Mr. David Sadleir | *Ambassador*  
Permanent Representative to the United Nations Office at Geneva  
Head of Delegation |
| Mr. Rory Steele | *Counsellor*  
Permanent Mission of Australia to the United Nations Office at Geneva  
Deputy Head of Delegation |
| Mr. Trevor Findlay | *Second Secretary*  
Permanent Mission of Australia to the United Nations Office at Geneva  
Alternate Representative |
| Dr. Shirley Freeman | Defence Science and Technology Organization, Melbourne, Expert (Chemical Weapons) |
| Mr. Peter McGregor | Expert (Seismic)  
Bureau of Mineral Resources  
Canberra |

* Spouse present.
Delegation of Belgium
Address: 58 rue de Moillebeau, 1211 Geneva. Tel. No. 33.81.50

Mr. A. Onkelinx
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of Belgium to the United Nations Office at Geneva

Mr. Ch. Raulier
Minister Plenipotentiary
Director of Disarmament Service
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Brussels

Mr. J.M. Noirfalisse
First Secretary
Permanent Mission of Belgium to the United Nations Office at Geneva

Major G. Donnet
Expert (Chemical Weapons)

Captain H. de Bischof
Expert (Chemical Weapons)

Miss M. de Becker
Seismological Service of the Royal Observatory of Belgium

Mr. J.M. Van Gils
Chief
Seismological Service of the Royal Observatory of Belgium

Delegation of Brazil
Address: 17 rue Alfred Vincent, 1201 Geneva. Tel. No. 32.25.56/7

Mr. Celso Antonio de Souza e Silva
Ambassador
Representative to the Committee on Disarmament
Head of Delegation

Mr. Sergio de Queiroz Duarte
Minister
Deputy Representative

* Spouse present.
**Delegation of the People's Republic of Bulgaria**  
Address: 16 chemin des Crêtes-de-Fregy, 1218 Grand-Saconnex, Geneva.  
Tel. No. 98.03.00

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position and Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Konstantin Tellalov</td>
<td>Ambassador, Permanent Representative of the People's Republic of Bulgaria to the United Nations Office at Geneva, Head of Delegation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Borislav Konstantinov</td>
<td>Ambassador, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sofia, Deputy Head of Delegation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Dimitan Kostov</td>
<td>Ambassador, Chief of Department &quot;UNO and Disarmament&quot; at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sofia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Baruch Grinberg</td>
<td>Ambassador, Deputy Chief of Department &quot;UNO and Disarmament&quot; at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sofia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Ivan Sotirov</td>
<td>First Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sofia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Peter Poptchev</td>
<td>Second Secretary, Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of Bulgaria to the United Nations Office at Geneva</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Radoslav Deyanov</td>
<td>Second Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sofia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Klement Pramov</td>
<td>Third Secretary, Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of Bulgaria to the United Nations Office at Geneva</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Vitya Bozhkov</td>
<td>Third Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sofia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Nikolay Mikhailov</td>
<td>Expert (Chemical Weapons)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Ludmil Kristosakov</td>
<td>Expert (Seismic Events)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Spouse present.
Delegation of the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma
Address: 41 avenue Blano, 1202 Geneva. Tel. No. 31.75.40

U Maung Maung Gyi
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of Burma to the United Nations Office at Geneva
Head of Delegation

*U Tin Kyaw Hlaing
Deputy Permanent Representative
Permanent Mission of Burma to the United Nations Office at Geneva
Secretary cum Member

*U Than Tun
Second Secretary
Permanent Mission of Burma to the United Nations Office at Geneva
Member

Delegation of Canada
Address: 10A avenue de Budé, 1202 Geneva. Tel. No. 33.90.00

*Mr. D.S. McPhail
Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Canada to the Committee on Disarmament

*Mr. Gerald R. Skinner
Counsellor
Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations Office at Geneva
Deputy Representative

*Mr. R.J. Rochon
Counsellor
Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations Office at Geneva

*Mr. D. Dhavernas
First Secretary and Consul

Dr. M.C. Hamblin
Adviser

Dr. Peter Basham
Adviser

Colonel R. Cleminson
Adviser

Ms. Chantal de Varennes
Adviser

Dr. W. Oliver
Adviser

Dr. R. Sutherland
Adviser

Dr. E. Gilman
Adviser

*/ Spouse present.
Delegation of the People's Republic of China
Address: 11 chemin de Survillette, 1213 Petit-Lancy, Geneva.
Tel. No. 92-25-48

Mr. Qian Jia Tong
Ambassador, Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
Permanent Representative of China to the Committee on Disarmament, Head of Delegation

Mr. Li Luye
Ambassador
Permanent Representative to the United Nations Office
Head of Delegation

Mr. Tian Jin
Minister
Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations Office
Deputy Head of Delegation

Mrs. Wang Zhiyun
First Secretary, Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China at Geneva
Representative

Mr. Lin Cheng
First Secretary, Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China at Geneva

Mr. Li Changhe
Deputy Division Chief, Department of International Organizations and Conferences, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Representative

Mr. Pan Zhenqiang
Officer, Ministry of National Defence Representative

Mrs. Ge Yuyun
Official, Department of International Organizations and Conferences
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Representative

Mr. Pan Jusheng
Expert, Ministry of National Defence

Mr. Yu Zhongzhou
Expert, Ministry of National Defence

Mr. Hu Xiaodi
Third Secretary
Department of International Organizations and Conferences, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Adviser

Mrs. Zhou Yunhua
Expert, Ministry of National Defence

Mr. Chang Tong
Officer, Ministry of National Defence
Expert

* Spouse present.
Delegation of the Republic of Cuba
Address: 9 chemin de l'Ancienne Route, 1211 Geneva.
Tel. No. 98.91.82

*Dr. Luis Solá Vila
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of Cuba to the United Nations Office at Geneva

*Mr. Pedro Nuñez Mosquera
Second Secretary
Alternate Representative
Permanent Mission of Cuba to the United Nations Office at Geneva

Mr. Julio Heredia Pérez
First Secretary, Delegate
Permanent Mission of Cuba to the United Nations Office at Geneva
Advisor

Mr. Angel Victor González Pérez
Third Secretary, Delegate
Permanent Mission of Cuba to the United Nations Office at Geneva

Delegation of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic
Address: 36 rue de Lausanne, 1211 Geneva.
Tel. No. 31.35.60

*Mr. Miloš Vejvoda
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic to the United Nations Office at Geneva
Head of Delegation

Mr. Pavel Chlumský
Counsellor
Deputy Permanent Representative of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic to the United Nations Office at Geneva
Member of Delegation

Mrs. Marta Slámová
Counsellor
Member of Delegation

Mr. Andrej Címa
Deputy Head of Disarmament Section
Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Member of Delegation

* Spouse present.
Delegation of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic (continued)

*Mr. Jan Jirůšek

Third Secretary
Member of Delegation

Mr. Jiří Franěk

Expert

Delegation of Egypt

Address: 72 rue de Lausanne, 1202 Geneva.
Tel. No. 31.65.30

*Mr. El Sayed Abdel Raouf El Reedy

Ambassador
Permanent Representative of Egypt to the United Nations Office at Geneva

*Mr. Ibrahim Ali Hassan

Counsellor
Permanent Mission of Egypt to the United Nations Office at Geneva

*Mr. Waguih Hanafi

Second Secretary
Permanent Mission of Egypt to the United Nations Office at Geneva

Miss Wafaa Bassim

Third Secretary
Permanent Mission of Egypt to the United Nations Office at Geneva

*Mr. Ahmed Maher Abbas

Third Secretary
Permanent Mission of Egypt to the United Nations Office at Geneva

Delegation of Ethiopia

Address: 56 rue de Moillebeau, 1211 Geneva.
Tel. No. 33.07.50

*Mr. Tadesse Terrefe

Ambassador, Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
Permanent Representative of Ethiopia to the United Nations Office at Geneva
Head of Delegation

Miss Kongit Sinigiorgis

Counsellor
Deputy Permanent Representative
Permanent Mission of Ethiopia to the United Nations Office at Geneva
Representative

*Mr. Fesseha Yohannes

First Secretary
Permanent Mission of Ethiopia to the United Nations Office at Geneva
Alternate Representative

* Spouse present.
Delegation of France
Address: 36 route de Pregny, 1292 Chambésy, Geneva. Tel. No. 58.21.23

*Mr. François de la Gorde
Ambassador
Representative of France to the Committee on Disarmament

*Mr. Jacques de Beausse
First Counsellor
Deputy Representative

Mr. Benoit d'Aboville
Under Directorate of Disarmament
Ministry of External Relations
Paris

Colonel Gesbert
Ministry of Defence

Miss Lydie Ghazerian
Under Directorate of Disarmament
Ministry of External Relations
Paris

*Mr. Michel Couthures
First Secretary

Delegation of the German Democratic Republic
Address: 49 rue de Millebeau, 1209 Geneva. Tel. No. 33.67.50

*Dr. Gerhard Herder
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of the German Democratic Republic to the United Nations Office at Geneva
Head of Delegation
(first part of annual session)

*Dr. Harald Rose
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of the German Democratic Republic to the United Nations Office at Geneva
Head of Delegation
(second part of annual session)

*Dr. Hubert Thielicke
First Secretary
Permanent Mission of the German Democratic Republic to the United Nations Office at Geneva
Deputy Head of Delegation

 Colonel Dr. Friederich Sayatz
Ministry of National Defence

Mr. Manfred Nützel
First Secretary
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

* Spouse present.
### Delegation of the German Democratic Republic (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Title and Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ms. Hannelore Hoppe</td>
<td>Third Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the German Democratic Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Manfred Schneider</td>
<td>Adviser, Academy of Sciences of the German Democratic Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Ralf Trappe</td>
<td>Adviser, Academy of Sciences of the German Democratic Republic</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany

**Address:** 147 rue de Lausanne, (7ème étage, App. 62) 1202 Geneva.

**Tel. No.:** 31.97.70/79

*Dr. Henning Wegener*  
Ambassador  
Head of Delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany to the Committee on Disarmament

Mr. Frank Elbe  
Counsellor  
Alternate Representative  
Delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany to the Committee on Disarmament

Mr. Wolf-Eberhard von dem Hagen  
Colonel  
Military Adviser  
Delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany to the Committee on Disarmament

Dr. Wolfgang Röhr  
First Secretary  
Delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany to the Committee on Disarmament

Mr. Michael Gerdts  
Second Secretary  
Delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany to the Committee on Disarmament

Professor Dr. Johannes Pfirschke  
Adviser  
Federal Ministry of Defence

* Spouse present.
Delegation of the Hungarian People's Republic
Address: 81 avenue de Champel, 1206 Geneva. Tel. No. 46.03.23

#Dr. Imre Kőmives
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of the Hungarian People's Republic to the United Nations Office at Geneva
Head of Delegation

#Mr. Ferenc Gajda
Counsellor
Permanent Mission of the Hungarian People's Republic to the United Nations Office at Geneva
Deputy Head of Delegation

Mr. Tibor Tóth
Third Secretary
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Dr. Ede Bisztricsády
Professor of Seismology
Head of the Seismological Observatory of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences

Dr. László Mité
Expert
Colonel, Ministry of Defence

Dr. György Szentesi
Expert
Colonel, Ministry of Defence

Delegation of India
Address: 9 rue du Valais, 1202 Geneva. Tel. No. 32.08.59

#Mr. M. Dubey
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations Office at Geneva, Leader of Delegation

#Mr. Shyam Saran
First Secretary
Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations Office at Geneva
Alternate Representative (until 10 July 1983)

Mr. Sheel Kant Sharma
First Secretary
Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations Office at Geneva
Alternate Representative (from 11 July 1983)

#Ms. Lakshmi Puri
First Secretary
Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations Office at Geneva
Adviser

* Spouse present.
### Delegation of India (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Nikhil Seth</td>
<td>Third Secretary&lt;br&gt;Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations Office at Geneva Adviser</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Mohan Kumor</td>
<td>Third Secretary&lt;br&gt;Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations Office at Geneva</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Delegation of the Republic of Indonesia

**Address:** 16 rue de Saint-Jean, 1205 Geneva. Tel. No. 45.33.50

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Nana S. Sutresna</td>
<td>Ambassador&lt;br&gt;Deputy Permanent Representative&lt;br&gt;Permanent Mission of Indonesia to the United Nations, Geneva, Representative Head of Delegation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Noegroho Wisnoemoerti</td>
<td>Counsellor&lt;br&gt;Permanent Mission of Indonesia to the United Nations, Geneva Representative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Indra Damanik</td>
<td>Official&lt;br&gt;Directorate of International Organizations&lt;br&gt;Department of Foreign Affairs, Jakarta Representative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mrs. Pruistin Ramadhan</td>
<td>Second Secretary&lt;br&gt;Permanent Mission of Indonesia to the United Nations, Geneva Representative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Budiman Dermosutanto</td>
<td>Second Secretary&lt;br&gt;Permanent Mission of Indonesia to the United Nations, New York Representative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Miswar Jalaluddin</td>
<td>Attaché&lt;br&gt;Permanent Mission of Indonesia to the United Nations, Geneva Representative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Iwan Hs. Wiranatmadja</td>
<td>Official&lt;br&gt;Directorate of International Organizations&lt;br&gt;Department of Foreign Affairs, Jakarta Representative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigadier General Haryomataram</td>
<td>Department of Defence and Security, Jakarta, Adviser</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel Fauzy Qasim</td>
<td>Department of Defence and Security, Jakarta, Adviser</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Delegation of the Islamic Republic of Iran  
Address: 28 chemin du Petit-Saconnex, 1209 Geneva. Tel. No. 33.30.04

Dr. Nasrollah Kazemi Kamyab  
Ambassador  
Permanent Representative of the  
Islamic Republic of Iran to the  
United Nations Office at Geneva  
Head of Delegation  

Mr. Mohammad Jafar Mahallati  
Chargé d'Affaires a.i., Head of Delegation  

Mr. Farhad Shahabi Sirjani  
First Secretary  

Mr. Jalil Zahimia  
Third Secretary  
Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic  
of Iran to the United Nations Office at  
Geneva  

Mr. Mohammad Tahar Rahmanian  
Political Attaché  

Delegation of Italy  
Address: 10 chemin de l'Impératrice, 1292 Pregny, Geneva. Tel. No. 33.47.50

*Mr. Mario Michele Alessi  
Ambassador  
Permanent Representative of Italy to the  
Committee on Disarmament  
Head of Delegation  

*Mr. Bruno Cabras  
Counsellor  
Permanent Mission of Italy to the  
United Nations Office at Geneva  

*Mr. Carlo Maria Oliva  
First Secretary  
Permanent Mission of Italy to the  
United Nations Office at Geneva  

*Mr. Ettore Di Giovanni  
Captain (Navy), Military Counsellor  
Ministry of Defence  

Prof. Luigi Condorelli  
Legal Expert  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs  

Prof. Michele Caputo  
Seismic Expert  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs  

Dr. Rodolfo Console  
Seismic Expert  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs  

Maj. Roberto Di Carlo  
Expert  
Chemical Weapons  
Ministry of Defence  

* Spouse present.
Delegation of Japan
Address: 35 avenue de Budé, 1202 Geneva. Tel. No. 33.04.03

*Dr. Ryukichi Imai
--- Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
--- Leader of the Delegation

*M. Masaji Takahashi
--- Counsellor
--- Permanent Delegation to the Committee on Disarmament
--- Deputy Leader of the Delegation

*M. Masaki Konishi
--- Counsellor, Permanent Delegation to the Committee on Disarmament
--- Deputy Leader of the Delegation

*M. Toshiyuki Takano
--- Director, Disarmament Division
--- United Nations Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

*M. Teruo Kawakita
--- First Secretary, Permanent Delegation to the Committee on Disarmament

Mr. Kenji Tanaka
--- First Secretary, Permanent Delegation to the Committee on Disarmament

Mr. Tsutomu Ishiguri
--- Second Secretary, Permanent Delegation to the Committee on Disarmament
--- (from 15 August 1983)

Mr. Masahiro Yamamoto
--- Expert
--- Japan Meteorological Agency, Tokyo

Mr. Kenji Fukushima
--- Official, Disarmament Division
--- United Nations Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Dr. Ichiro Akiyama
--- Expert, Defence Agency, Tokyo

Mr. Shigeo Mori
--- Expert, Meteorological Agency, Tokyo
--- (from 11-24 July 1983)

Dr. Tadashi Okada
--- Expert, Defence Agency, Tokyo

*Mr. Tsutomu Arai
--- Third Secretary, Permanent Delegation to the Committee on Disarmament

* Spouse present
Delegation of Kenya
Address: Hotel Ramada (Room 34), Geneva. Tel. No. 31.02.41

Mr. Wafula Wabuge
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of Kenya to the United Nations, New York
Leader of Delegation

Dr. Daniel David Caroli Don Nanjira
Counsellor
Delegate

Mr. Paul Ngugi Mwaura
Second Secretary
Delegate

Delegation of Mexico
Address: 13 avenue de Budé, 1202 Geneva. Tel. No. 34.57.40

*Mr. Alfonso García Robles
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of Mexico to the Committee on Disarmament,
Head of Delegation

Ms. Zadalinda González y Reynero
Counsellor
Alternate Representative

Ms. Martha de los Angeles Romero
Second Secretary
Adviser

Mr. Pablo Macedo Riba
Third Secretary
Adviser

Ms. Luz María Chablais García
Secretary to the Delegation

Delegation of the Mongolian People’s Republic
Address: 4 chemin des Mollies, 1295 Bellevue, Geneva. Tel. No. 74.19.74

H.E. Mr. Dugersurengiin Erdembileg
Ambassador
Permanent Representative, Geneva
Head of Delegation

Mr. Luvsangiiin Erdenechuluun
First Secretary
Permanent Mission, New York

Mr. Jalbuugiin Choinkhor
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ulan Bator

Mr. Sukh-Ochir Bold
Third Secretary
Permanent Mission, Geneva

Mr. Odovyn Chimidregzen
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ulan Bator

* Spouse present
Delegation of the Kingdom of Morocco
Tel. No. 98.15.35

*Mr. Ali Skalli
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of the Kingdom of Morocco to the United Nations Office at Geneva
Head of Delegation

Mr. Sidi Mohamed Rahhali
Counsellor
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Mr. Mohammed Chraibi
First Secretary
Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of Morocco to the United Nations Office at Geneva

Mr. Omar Hilale
Second Secretary
Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of Morocco to the United Nations Office at Geneva

Delegation of the Kingdom of the Netherlands
Address: 56 rue de Moillebeau, 1209 Geneva. Tel. No. 33.73.50

*Dr. Frans van Dongen
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
Permanent Representative of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the United Nations Office at Geneva
Head of Delegation

Mr. Hendrik Wagenmakers
Counsellor
Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the United Nations Office at Geneva
Deputy Head of Delegation
(u until 28 February 1983)

*Mr. Jaap Ramaker
Counsellor
Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the United Nations Office at Geneva
Deputy Head of Delegation
(as from 1 March 1983)

Mr. Robert Jan Akkerman
Second Secretary
Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the United Nations Office at Geneva

* Spouse present
Delegation of the Kingdom of the Netherlands (continued)

Dr. A.J.J. Ooms
Expert (Chemical Weapons)
Director, Prins Maurits Laboratorium TNO
Delft, The Netherlands

Dr. A.R. Ritsema
Expert (Seismologist)
Royal Netherlands Meteorological Institute
De Bilt, The Netherlands

Mr. G. Houtgast
Expert (Seismologist)
Royal Netherlands Meteorological Institute
De Bilt, The Netherlands

Delegation of Nigeria
Address: 32 chemin des Volombettes, 1211 Geneva. Tel. No. 34.21.40/49

H.E. Dr. G.O. Ijewere
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
Permanent Mission of Nigeria to the
United Nations Office at Geneva
Head of Delegation

Mr. A.N.C. Nwaozomudoh
Counsellor
Permanent Mission of Nigeria to the
United Nations Office at Geneva
Alternative Representative

Mr. J.O. Oboh
Senior First Secretary
Permanent Mission of Nigeria to the
United Nations Office at Geneva
Alternative Representative

Mr. L.O. Akindele
Third Secretary
Permanent Mission of Nigeria to the
United Nations Office at Geneva
Delegate

Mr. A.A. Adepoju
Third Secretary
Permanent Mission of Nigeria to the
United Nations Office at Geneva
Delegate

Miss I.E.C. Ukeje
Third Secretary
Permanent Mission of Nigeria to the
United Nations Office at Geneva
Delegate

-186-
Delegation of Pakistan
Address: 56 rue de Moillebeau, 1211 Geneva. Tel. No. 34.77.60

Mr. Mansur Ahmad
Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations Office at Geneva

Mr. Rafat Mahdi
Counsellor
Permanent Mission of Pakistan to the United Nations Office at Geneva

Mr. Tariq Altaf
First Secretary
Permanent Mission of Pakistan to the United Nations Office at Geneva

Mr. Salman Bashir
Second Secretary
Permanent Mission of Pakistan to the United Nations Office at Geneva

Delegation of Peru
Address: 65 rue de Lausanne, 1202 Geneva. Tel. No. 31.11.30/31.11.39

Mr. Jorge Morelli Pando
Ambassador
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Peru
Head of Delegation

Mr. Peter Cannock
Ambassador
Alternate Permanent Representative of Peru to the United Nations Office at Geneva

Mr. Eduardo Ponce Vivanco
Minister Counsellor
Permanent Mission of Peru to the United Nations Office at Geneva
Deputy Permanent Representative

Mr. César Castillo Ramírez
First Secretary
Permanent Mission of Peru to the United Nations Office at Geneva

Mr. Vicente Rojas
Second Secretary
Permanent Mission of Peru to the United Nations Office at Geneva

Mr. Augusto Thornberry
Second Secretary
Permanent Mission of Peru to the United Nations Office at Geneva

*/ Spouse present.
Delegation of the Polish People's Republic
Address: 15 chemin de l'Ancienne Route, 1218 Grand Saconnex, Geneva, Tel.No. 98.11.61

Mr. Bogumil Sujka
Ambassador
Head of Delegation
(until 6 February 1983)

Mr. Stanislaw Turbanski
Ambassador
Head of Delegation

Mr. Jerzy Zawalonka
Counsellor - Minister Plenipotentiary
Deputy Permanent Representative of Poland
to the Office of the United Nations in Geneva
Acting Head of the Delegation from
6 February 1983

Mr. Stanislaw Konik
Adviser to the Minister of Foreign Affairs

Colonel Janusz Cialowicz
Ministry of Defence
Warsaw

Mr. Tadeusz Strojwas
First Secretary
Permanent Representation of Poland
to the Office of the United Nations in Geneva

Mr. Gromoslaw Czempinski
First Secretary
Permanent Representation of Poland
to the Office of the United Nations in Geneva

Delegation of the Socialist Republic of Romania
Address: 6 chemin de la Perrière, 1223 Cologny, Geneva. Tel. No. 52.10.90

Mr. Ion Datcu
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of the Socialist Republic of Romania to the United Nations Office at Geneva
Head of Delegation

Mr. Teodor Melescanu
Counsellor
Permanent Mission of the Socialist Republic of Romania to the United Nations Office at Geneva
Deputy Head of Delegation

Mr. Leon Toader
Counsellor
Permanent Mission of the Socialist Republic of Romania to the United Nations Office at Geneva

*/ Spouse present.
Delegation of the Socialist Republic of Romania (continued)

Mr. Mihail Bichir
First Secretary
Permanent Mission of the Socialist Republic of Romania to the United Nations Office at Geneva

Mr. Tache Panait
First Secretary
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Col. Dr. Ing. Mihai Stefan Dogaru
Counsellor
Ministry of National Defence

Delegation of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka
Address: 56, rue de Moillebeau, 1211 Geneva. Tel. No. 34.93.40

Mr. A.T. Jayakody
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Mr. H.M.C.S. Palihkakara
Third Secretary

Mr. Prasad Kariyawasam
Third Secretary

Delegation of Sweden
Address: 62 rue de Vermont, 1202 Geneva. Tel. No. 34.36.00

Mrs. Maj Britt Theorin
Ambassador
Member of Parliament
Chairman of the Swedish Disarmament Commission
Head of Delegation - ex officio when in attendance

Mr. Wolf Ekeus
Ambassador
Head of Delegation

Mr. Curt Lidgard
Ambassador
Head of Delegation

Mr. Carl-Magnus Hyltenius
Counsellor
Deputy Head of Delegation

*/ Spouse present.

-189-
Delegation of Sweden (continued)

Mr. Georg Andersson
Member of Parliament
Mr. Sture Ericson
Member of Parliament
Mrs. Gunnel Jonling
Member of Parliament
Mrs. Ingrid Sundberg
Member of Parliament
Mr. Rune Angström
Member of Parliament
Mr. Björn Skala
Director
Ministry for Foreign Affairs
31 January - 4 February
Mr. Lars Norberg
Deputy Director
Ministry for Foreign Affairs
7 February - 11 February
Mr. Gustav Ekholm
Minister Plenipotentiary
Ministry for Foreign Affairs
Mr. Sten Ask
Counsellor
Ministry for Foreign Affairs
Assistant to Mrs. Theorin
31 January - 10 February
Mr. Bernt Jonsson
Expert
Ministry for Foreign Affairs
Assistant to Mrs. Theorin
31 January - 10 February
*Mr. Hans Berglund
Colonel
Military Adviser
*Dr. Johan Lundin
Director of Research
National Defence Research Institute
Dr. Jan Prawitz
Ministry of Defence
Scientific Adviser
Dr. Cla Dahlman
Director of Research
National Defence Research Institute
Scientific Adviser
Mr. Lars Eric de Geer
National Defence Research Institute
Scientific Adviser
Mr. Per Olof Granbom
National Defence Research Institute
Scientific Adviser
Dr. Hans Israelsson
National Defence Research Institute
Scientific Adviser

*Spouse present.
Delegation of Sweden (continued)

Mrs. Annmari Leu-Eriksson  National Defence Research Institute
Sciientific Adviser

Dr. Harriet Olsson  National Defence Research Institute
Scientific Adviser

Delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Adresse: 4 chemin du Champ de Ble, 1292 Chambesy, Geneva.
Tel. No. 58.10.05

Mr. Victor L. Issraelyan  Head of Delegation
Ambassador
Member of Collegium of the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, Representative
of the USSR to the Committee on
Disarmament

Mr. Boris P. Prokofiev  Deputy Head of Delegation,
Envoy
Deputy Director, Department of
International Organizations
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Mr. Roland M. Timerbaev  Deputy Head of Delegation
Envoy
Deputy Director, Department of
International Organizations
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Mr. Yury K. Nazarkin  Deputy Head of Delegation
Envoy
Deputy Director, Department of
International Organizations
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Mr. Victor M. Tatarnikov  Adviser, Major-General
Ministry of Defence

Mr. Vitaly M. Ganja  Adviser, Colonel
Ministry of Defence

Mr. Lev A. Naumov  Adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Mr. Timur F. Dmitritchev  Adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Mr. Michail F. Trepikhalin  Adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Mr. Gennady Vorontzov  Adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Mr. Valery V. Loshchinine  Counsellor
Permanent Representation of the USSR
to the Office of the United Nations
and other International Organizations
in Geneva
Delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Leonid P. Malev</td>
<td>Expert, Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Yury V. Kostenko</td>
<td>Expert, Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Grigory V. Berdennikov</td>
<td>First Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Vladimir F. Priakhin</td>
<td>Expert, Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Igor N. Scherbak</td>
<td>Expert, Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Vladimir A. Krokha</td>
<td>Expert, Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Grigory N. Vashadze</td>
<td>Expert, Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Vladimir A. Evdokoushin</td>
<td>Second Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Gennady V. Antsiferov</td>
<td>Third Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Alexander P. Koutepov</td>
<td>Expert</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Vitaly L. Kotujansky</td>
<td>Expert</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Nicolai I. Tchugunov</td>
<td>Expert</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Oleg M. Lisov</td>
<td>Expert</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Yury M. Novosadov</td>
<td>Expert</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Vladimir M. Tcherecnichenko</td>
<td>Expert</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Ivan P. Pasetchnik</td>
<td>Expert</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Oleg K. Kedrov</td>
<td>Expert</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Delegation of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Address: 37-39 rue de Vermont, 1202 Geneva. Tel. No. 34.38.00

*Dr. R. Ian T. Cromartie CMG
Ambassador
Leader of the United Kingdom Delegation to the Committee on Disarmament

*Mr. Lawrence J. Middleton
Counsellor
United Kingdom Delegation to the Committee on Disarmament

*Mr. Barry P. Noble
Counsellor
Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom to the United Nations Office at Geneva

The Hon. M.A. Pakenham
Arms Control and Disarmament Department
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Dr. Thomas D. Inch
Ministry of Defence

*Ms. Joan I. Link
First Secretary
United Kingdom Delegation to the Committee on Disarmament

Mr. E. Glover
Arms Control and Disarmament Department
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Dr. Graham H. Cooper
Ministry of Defence

Mr. F.H. Glover
Seismological Research Centre

Ms. Joanna E.F. Wright
Third Secretary
United Kingdom Delegation to the Committee on Disarmament

Delegation of the United States of America
Address: 11, Route de Pregny, 1292 Chambesy, Geneva
Tel. No. 99.02.11

The Honourable Louis G. Fields, Jr.
Ambassador
United States Representative to the Committee on Disarmament

Mr. Morris D. Busby
Alternate United States Representative to the Committee on Disarmament

Mr. Harold L. Brown, II
Colonel, USA
Multilateral Affairs Bureau
United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

*Spouse present.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Delegation of the United States of America (continued)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mr. John Egan McAteer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Pierce S. Corden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Howard B. Durham</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Lawrence Madsen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. John Gundersen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Robert Norman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Charles Bay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Richard L. Horne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Robert Mikulak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Roger F. Scott</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. John Tierney</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. John Doesburg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms. Blair Murray</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Delegation of the United States of America (continued)

GROUP OF SCIENTIFIC EXPERTS

Mr. Ralph Alewine
Ms. Ann Kerr
Mr. Donald Springer
Mr. Lawrence Turnbull

Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
United States Department of State

Delegation of the Republic of Venezuela
Address: 22 chemin François-Lehmann, 1218 Grand-Saconnex, Geneva
Tel. No. 96.26.21

Mr. Alberto López Oliver
Mr. Teófilo Labrador Rubio
*Mr. Hugo Suárez Mora
Mr. Oscar García García

Ambassador
Counsellor
First Secretary
Second Secretary

Permanent Representative of Venezuela to the United Nations Office at Geneva
Permanent Mission of Venezuela to the United Nations Office at Geneva
Permanent Mission of Venezuela to the United Nations Office at Geneva
Permanent Mission of Venezuela to the United Nations, New York

Delegation of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
Address: 5 chemin Thury, 1206 Geneva. Tel. No. 46.44.33

*Mr. Kazimir Vidas
*Mr. Miodrag Mihajlović
Mr. Dragomir Djokić
Dr. Dušan Minić
Professor Dr. Milorad Radotić

Ambassador
Minister Counsellor
Special Counsellor at the Federal Secretariat for Foreign Affairs
Expert (Chemical Weapons)

Deputy Head of Delegation
Member of Delegation

*Spouse present.
Delegation of the Republic of Zaire
Address: 32 rue de l'Athénée, 1206 Geneva. Tel. No. 47.83.22

*Mr. Bagbeni Adeito Nzengeya
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of the
Republic of Zaire to the United Nations
Office at Geneva
Head of Delegation

Mr. Mukamba Kadiata-Nzemba
Ambassador of Zaire to Switzerland and
Permanent Representative of the
Republic of Zaire to the United Nations
Office at Geneva
Head of Delegation

*Ms. Esaki-Ekanga Kabeya
First Secretary
Permanent Mission of the Republic of
Zaire to the United Nations Office at
Geneva

*Mr. Gnok Osil
Second Secretary
Permanent Mission of the Republic of
Zaire to the United Nations Office at
Geneva

*Spouse present.
HOW TO OBTAIN UNITED NATIONS PUBLICATIONS

United Nations publications may be obtained from bookstores and distributors throughout the world. Consult your bookstore or write to: United Nations, Sales Section, New York or Geneva.

COMMENT SE PROCURER LES PUBLICATIONS DES NATIONS UNIES


КАК ПОЛУЧИТЬ ИЗДАНИЯ ОРГАНИЗАЦИИ ОБЪЕДИНЕНИХ НАЦИЙ

Издания Организации Объединенных Наций можно купить в книжных магазинах и агентствах во всех районах мира. Наведите справки об изданиях в вашем книжном магазине или пишите по адресу: Организация Объединенных Наций, Секция по продаже изданий, Нью-Йорк или Женева.

COMO CONSEGUIR PUBLICACIONES DE LAS NACIONES UNIDAS

Las publicaciones de las Naciones Unidas están en venta en librerías y casas distribuidoras en todas partes del mundo. Consulte a su librero o diríjase a: Naciones Unidas, Sección de Ventas, Nueva York o Ginebra.