# Conference on Disarmament

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## REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS

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I. INTRODUCTION

1. The Conference on Disarmament submits to the forty-first session of the United Nations General Assembly its annual report on its 1986 session, together with the pertinent documents and records.

II. ORGANIZATION OF WORK OF THE CONFERENCE

A. 1986 Session of the Conference

2. The Conference was in session from 4 February to 25 April and from 10 June to 29 August 1986. During this period, the Conference held 49 formal plenary meetings, at which member States as well as non-member States invited to participate in the discussions set forth their views and recommendations on the various questions before the Conference.

3. The Conference also held 35 informal meetings on its agenda, programme of work, organization and procedures, as well as on items of its agenda and other matters.

4. In accordance with rule 9 of the Rules of Procedure, the following member States assumed the Presidency of the Conference: Australia for February, Belgium for March, Brazil for April and the recess between the first and second parts of the 1986 session of the Conference, Bulgaria for June, Burma for July and Canada for August and the recess until the 1987 session of the Conference.

B. Participants in the Work of the Conference

5. Representatives of the following member States participated in the work of the Conference: Algeria; Argentina; Australia; Belgium; Brazil; Bulgaria; Burma; Canada; China; Cuba; Czechoslovakia; Egypt; Ethiopia; France; German Democratic Republic; Germany, Federal Republic of; Hungary; India; Indonesia; Islamic Republic of Iran; Italy; Japan; Kenya; Mexico; Mongolia; Morocco; Netherlands; Nigeria; Pakistan; Peru; Poland; Romania; Sri Lanka; Sweden; Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland; United States of America; Venezuela; Yugoslavia; and Zaire.

C. Agenda for the 1986 Session and Programme of Work for the First and Second Parts of the Session

6. At the 336th Plenary Meeting on 4 February 1986, the President submitted a proposal on the provisional agenda for the 1986 session and the programme of work for the first part of the annual session in conformity with rule 29 of the Rules of Procedure, and made the following statement (CD/PV.336):

"With respect to the adoption of the agenda for the year 1986, it is understood that the question of the nuclear neutron weapon is covered by item 2 of the agenda and can be considered under that agenda item."
7. At the same plenary meeting, the Conference adopted its agenda for the year and the programme of work for the first part of the annual session. The text of the agenda and programme of work (Document CD/653) reads as follows:

"The Conference on Disarmament, as the multilateral negotiating forum, shall promote the attainment of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

"The Conference, taking into account, inter alia, the relevant provisions of the Documents of the first and second special sessions of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, will deal with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant measures in the following areas:

I. Nuclear weapons in all aspects;
II. Chemical Weapons;
III. Other weapons of mass destruction;
IV. Conventional weapons;
V. Reduction of military budgets;
VI. Reduction of armed forces;
VII. Disarmament and development;
VIII. Disarmament and international security;
IX. Collateral measures, confidence-building measures; effective verification methods in relation to appropriate disarmament measures, acceptable to all parties concerned;
X. Comprehensive programme of disarmament leading to general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

"Within the above framework, the Conference on Disarmament adopts the following agenda for 1986 which includes items that, in conformity with the provisions of Section VIII of its Rules of Procedure, would be considered by it:

1. Nuclear test ban.
2. Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.
3. Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters.
4. Chemical weapons.
5. Prevention of an arms race in outer space."
6. Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

7. New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons.


9. Consideration and adoption of the annual report and any other report as appropriate to the General Assembly of the United Nations.

**Programme of Work**

"In compliance with rule 28 of its Rules of Procedure, the Conference on Disarmament also adopts the following programme of work for the first part of its 1986 session:

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<td>4-14 February</td>
<td>Statements in plenary meetings. Consideration of the agenda and programme of work, as well as of the establishment of subsidiary bodies on items of the agenda and other organizational questions.</td>
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<td>17-28 February</td>
<td>Nuclear test ban. Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.</td>
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<tr>
<td>3-14 March</td>
<td>Prevention of an arms race in outer space.</td>
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<tr>
<td>17-21 March</td>
<td>Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters</td>
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<td>24 March-4 April</td>
<td>Chemical weapons.</td>
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| 7-11 April    | Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Comprehensi
| 14-18 April   | New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons. |
| 21-25 April   | Further consideration of outstanding matters.                            |

"The Conference will continue consideration of its improved and effective functioning."
"The Conference will intensify its consultations in pursuance of paragraphs 18 and 19 of its report (CD/642) with a view to taking a positive decision at its 1986 annual session with regard to expansion of its membership by not more than four States having in mind that candidates for membership should be nominated, two by the Group of 21, one by the Socialist Group, and one by the Western Group, so as to maintain balance in the membership of the Conference.

"Meetings of subsidiary bodies will be convened after consultations between the President of the Conference and the Chairmen of the subsidiary bodies, according to the circumstances and needs of those bodies.

"The Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events will meet from 10 to 21 March 1986.

"In adopting its programme of work, the Conference has kept in mind the provisions of rules 30 and 31 of its Rules of Procedure."

8. At its 359th plenary meeting, the Conference decided to begin the second part of the 1986 session on 10 June 1986.

9. During the second part of the 1986 session of the Conference, the President submitted, at the 363rd plenary meeting on 19 June 1986, a proposal on the programme of work for the second part of the session. In addition, the President stated that, in view of the financial situation of the United Nations, it was necessary for the Conference to consider how to implement the target reduction of 30 per cent in services allocated to it. He also noted that, after a number of consultations held by members, the advice of the technical services of the United Nations Office at Geneva and the Department of Conference Services in New York, it was clear that those savings would be better effected by agreeing on an arrangement to allocate to the Conference ten weekly meetings during the whole session except for 15 weekly meetings during the Twenty-second Session of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events.

10. At the same plenary meeting, the Conference agreed to the proposals of the President concerning savings in the services allocated to it. One group of delegations made statements in that connection. The Conference also adopted the programme of work proposed by the President (CD/705). It reads as follows:

"In compliance with rule 28 of its Rules of Procedure, the Conference on Disarmament adopts the following programme of work for the second part of its 1986 session:

10-13 June Statements in plenary meetings.
Consideration of the programme of work, as well as of the establishment of subsidiary bodies on items of the agenda and other organizational questions."
16-27 June  Nuclear test ban.  
Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.

30 June-4 July  Prevention of an arms race in outer space.

7-11 July  Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters.

14-25 July  Chemical weapons.

28 July-1 August  Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Comprehensive programme of disarmament.

4-8 August  New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons.

11-29 August  Reports of ad hoc subsidiary bodies; consideration and adoption of the Annual Report to the General Assembly of the United Nations.

"The Conference will continue consideration of its improved and effective functioning.

"The Conference will intensify its consultations in pursuance of paragraphs 18 and 19 of its report (CD/642) with a view to taking a positive decision at its 1986 annual session with regard to expansion of its membership by not more than four States having in mind that candidates for membership should be nominated, two by the Group of 21, one by the Socialist Group, and one by the Western Group, so as to maintain balance in the membership of the Conference.

"Meetings of subsidiary bodies will be convened after consultations between the President of the Conference and the Chairmen of the subsidiary bodies, according to the circumstances and needs of those bodies.

"The Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events will meet from 21 July to 1 August 1986.

"In adopting its programme of work, the Conference has kept in mind the provisions of rules 30 and 31 of its Rules of Procedure."
11. At its 337th plenary meeting on 6 February, the Conference decided to re-establish, for the duration of its 1986 session, the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons (CD/654). At the same meeting the President made a statement noting that there was no need to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament and that its Chairman would continue to preside over that subsidiary body. At its 344th and 359th plenary meetings on 4 March and 24 April, the Conference decided to re-establish, for the duration of its 1986 session, the Ad Hoc Committees on Radiological Weapons and the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (CD/674 and CD/694). Some delegations made statements in connection with the re-establishment of those Ad Hoc Committees.

D. Participation of States not Members of the Conference

12. In conformity with rule 32 of the Rules of Procedure, the following States non-members of the Conference attended plenary meetings of the Conference: Austria, Bangladesh, Cameroon, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Holy See, Iraq, Ireland, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Senegal, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, Uruguay and Viet Nam.

13. The Conference received and considered requests for participation in its work from States not members of the Conference. In accordance with the Rules of Procedure, the Conference invited:

(a) The representatives of Norway and Finland to participate during 1986 in the plenary meetings, in the informal meetings on the substance of agenda item 2 and in the subsidiary bodies on Chemical Weapons, Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, Radiological Weapons and the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament.

(b) The representative of Turkey to participate during 1986 in the plenary meetings and in the subsidiary bodies on Chemical Weapons, Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, Radiological Weapons, the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, as well as to participate in the work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events.

(c) The representatives of Greece, Portugal and Spain to participate during 1986 in the plenary meetings and in the subsidiary bodies on Chemical Weapons, Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, Radiological Weapons and the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament.

(d) The representatives of Austria, Denmark and New Zealand to participate during 1986 in the plenary meetings and in the subsidiary bodies on Chemical Weapons and the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space.

(e) The representative of Switzerland to participate during 1986 in the plenary meetings and in the subsidiary bodies on Chemical Weapons and Radiological Weapons.

(f) The representative of Ireland to participate during 1986 in plenary meetings and in the subsidiary body on Chemical Weapons.
(q) The representative of Bangladesh to participate during 1986 in the plenary meetings and in the subsidiary body on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament.

(h) The representative of Viet Nam to address the plenary during 1986 on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament.

E. Expansion of the membership of the Conference

14. The urgency attached to the question of the expansion of its membership is duly recognized by the Conference.

15. The Conference had before it the requests for membership received during previous sessions from the following non-member States, in chronological order: Norway, Finland, Austria, Turkey, Senegal, Bangladesh, Spain, Viet Nam, Ireland, Tunisia, Ecuador, Cameroon and Greece.

16. During its 1986 session, the Presidents of the Conference conducted continuous consultations with the members, in accordance with established practice, on the selection of additional members. Members of the Conference also engaged in consultations on this important question. Those consultations were held in pursuance of paragraphs 18 and 19 of the Report of the Conference to the fortieth session of the General Assembly (CD/642). In that connection, the Conference recorded its decision that its membership might be increased by not more than four States and agreed that candidates for membership should be nominated, two by the Group of 21, one by the Socialist Group and one by the Western Group so as to maintain balance in the membership of the Conference. The Socialist Group and the Western Group announced that their candidates for membership were Viet Nam (CD/PV.345) and Norway (CD/PV.351), respectively. The Group of 21 noted that it would select its candidates when there is agreement on concrete ways and means for implementing the above-mentioned decision.

17. The Conference will further intensify its consultations with a view to taking a positive decision at its next annual session and will inform accordingly the forty-second session of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

F. Proposals for the improved and effective functioning of the Conference

18. The Conference continued the consideration of its improved and effective functioning at informal open-ended consultations. A number of proposals were put forward during the annual session. The Conference considered those proposals, having in mind the need for all members of the Conference to be fully informed and to have the opportunity to contribute to the consideration of the subject. The Conference will continue its consideration of the subject during the 1987 session.
G. Measures Relating to the Financial Situation of the United Nations

19. On 10 April 1986, the Personal Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General and Secretary-General of the Conference advanced a number of technical suggestions designed to meet the budgetary limitations resulting from the financial situation of the United Nations. Those suggestions dealt with the effective utilization of conference resources, reductions in the number and nature of the official documents circulated in the Conference, the preparation of official records, avoidance of duplication in documentation and the shortening of reports of subsidiary bodies and of the annual report to the General Assembly of the United Nations. At an informal meeting on 22 April, the Conference accepted the proposals of the Secretariat to proceed with the technical measures suggested and to maintain the matter under review, keeping in mind the results of the resumed session of the General Assembly devoted to the financial situation of the Organization.

H. Communications from Non-Governmental Organizations

20. In accordance with rule 42 of the Rules of Procedure, lists of all communications from Non-Governmental Organizations and persons were circulated to the Conference (Documents CD/NGC.13 and CD/NGC.14).

III. SUBSTANTIVE WORK OF THE CONFERENCE DURING ITS 1986 SESSION

21. The substantive work of the Conference during its 1986 session was based on its agenda and programme of work. The list of documents issued by the Conference, as well as the texts of those documents, are included as Appendix I to the report. An index of the verbatim records by country and subject, listing the statements made by delegations during 1986, and the verbatim records of the meetings of the Conference are attached as Appendix II to the report.

22. The Conference had before it a letter dated 1 February 1986 from the Secretary-General of the United Nations (CD/650) transmitting all the resolutions on disarmament adopted by the General Assembly at its fortieth session in 1985, including those entrusting specific responsibilities to the Conference on Disarmament:

40/6 "Armed Israeli aggression against the Iraqi nuclear installations and its grave consequences for the established international system concerning the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and international peace and security"

40/80 A "Cessation of all test explosions of nuclear weapons"

40/81 "Urgent need for a comprehensive nuclear-test ban treaty"

40/85 "Conclusion of an international convention on the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons"
"Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons"

"Prevention of an arms race in outer space"

"Implementation of General Assembly resolution 39/60 on the immediate cessation and prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests"

"Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons"

"Prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons"

"Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons"

"Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons"

"Prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons"

"Prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes"

"Further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed, the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof"

"Convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons"

"Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war"

"Nuclear weapons in all aspects"

"Comprehensive programme of disarmament"

"Prohibition of the nuclear neutron weapon"

"Implementation of the recommendations and decisions of the tenth special session"

"Review and appraisal of the implementation of the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade"

"Report of the Conference on Disarmament"

"Implementation of the recommendations and decisions of the tenth special session"
23. At the 336th plenary meeting of the Conference on 4 February 1986, the Personal Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General and Secretary-General of the Conference conveyed to the Conference a message from the Secretary-General of the United Nations at the opening of the 1986 session (CD/PV.336).

24. In addition to documents separately listed under specific items, the Conference received the following:

(a) Document CD/645, dated 3 December 1985, submitted by the delegation of Bulgaria, entitled "Declaration issued on 23 October 1985 at Sofia by the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty Organization".

(b) Document CD/649, dated 20 January 1986, submitted by the delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, entitled "Statement of the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Mikhail Gorbachev, made on 15 January 1986".


(f) Document CD/671, dated 20 February 1986, submitted by the delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, entitled "Message dated 18 February 1986 from the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Mikhail S. Gorbachev, to the Conference on Disarmament".

(g) Document CD/686, dated 4 April 1986, submitted by the delegation of Poland, entitled "Communiqué of the Meeting of the Committee of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty held in Warsaw on 19-20 March 1986".

(h) Document CD/693, dated 22 April 1986, submitted by the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany, entitled "Letter dated 7 March 1986 addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament by the Representative of the Federal Republic of Germany".
A. Nuclear Test Ban

25. The item on the agenda entitled "Nuclear Test Ban" was considered by the Conference, in accordance with its programme of work, during the periods 17-28 February and 16-27 June 1986.

26. During the first part of the annual session, the Conference had before it both a provisional summary of the fourth report (CD/681) and the Progress Report on the twenty-first session (CD/682) of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events. The Ad Hoc Group met from 10 to 21 March, under the Chairmanship of Dr. Ola Dahlman of Sweden. At its 354th plenary meeting, on 8 April 1986, the Conference took note of the provisional summary to the fourth report of the Ad Hoc Group and adopted the recommendation contained in its Progress Report. A number of delegations commented on them.

27. During the second part of the annual session, the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events met from 21 July to 1 August, under the Chairmanship of Dr. Ola Dahlman of Sweden. As a result of its deliberations, the Ad Hoc Group submitted to the Conference the following documents:

   (a) CD/681/Rev.1, entitled "Summary of the Fourth Report to the Conference on Disarmament of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events (CD/720); Report on the Group of Scientific Experts' Technical Test (GSETT) 1984".

   (b) CD/720, entitled "Fourth Report to the Conference on Disarmament of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events; Report on the Group of Scientific Experts' Technical Test (GSETT) 1984".

   (c) CD/721, entitled "Progress Report to the Conference on Disarmament on the Twenty-Second Session of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events".
28. At its 381st plenary meeting, the Conference adopted the recommendations contained in the Progress Report (CD/721). Also at its 382nd plenary meeting, the Conference took note of the Fourth Report of the Ad Hoc Group (CD/720) as well as of the Summary of that Report (CD/681/Rev.1). Several delegations commented on the documentation submitted by the Ad Hoc Group and advanced proposals relating to its future work.

29. The following documents were submitted to the Conference in connection with the item during the 1986 session:

(a) Document CD/647, dated 17 January 1986, submitted by the delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, entitled "Nuclear Explosions Must be Banned".

(b) Document CD/676, dated 10 March 1986, submitted by the delegations of Argentina, India, Mexico and Sweden, entitled "Joint Message dated 28 February 1986 addressed to the President of the United States of America and the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union by the Signatories of the Delhi Declaration of 28 January 1985".

(c) Document CD/680, dated 18 March 1986, submitted by the delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, entitled "Response by M.S. Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, to the Joint Message from the Leaders of Argentina, India, Mexico, Tanzania, Sweden and Greece".

(d) Document CD/520/Rev. 2, dated 21 March 1986, submitted by the Group of 21, 1/ entitled "Draft Mandate for the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban".

(e) Document CD/684, dated 27 March 1986, submitted by the delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, entitled "Appeal from the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to the United States Congress".

(f) Document CD/690, dated 14 April 1986, submitted by the delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, entitled "Statement by the Soviet Government Published on 12 April 1986".

(g) Document CD/692, dated 17 April 1986, submitted by a Group of Socialist Countries, 2/ entitled "Statement by a Group of Socialist Countries".

1/ Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Burma, Cuba, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Islamic Republic of Iran, Kenya, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Venezuela, Yugoslavia and Zaire.

2/ Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

(i) Document CD/696, dated 16 May 1986, submitted by the delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, entitled "Statement by M.S. Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, on Soviet Television".


(m) Document CD/717, dated 18 July 1986, submitted by the delegation of Australia, entitled "Proposal for the Immediate Establishment of a Global Seismic Network as Part of a Monitoring and Verification System for the Future Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban".

(n) Document CD/723, dated 15 August 1986, submitted by the delegations of Argentina, India, Mexico and Sweden, transmitting two documents, entitled "Declaration of Mexico" and "Document issued at the Mexico Summit on Verification Measures", adopted at Ixtapa, Mexico, on 7 August 1986.

(o) Document CD/724, dated 15 August 1986, submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, entitled "Seismic Verification of the Non-conducting of Nuclear Tests".

(p) Document CD/725, dated 19 August 1986, submitted by the delegations of Argentina, India, Mexico and Sweden, transmitting "Texts of Letters Addressed on 7 August 1986 to the President of the United States of America, Mr. Ronald Reagan, and to the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Mr. Mikhail Gorbachev".

(q) Document CD/729, dated 25 August 1986, submitted by the delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, entitled "Text of the Speech of the General Secretary of the CPSU, Mikhail Gorbachev, made on Soviet television of 18 August 1986".

(r) Document CD/730, dated 27 August 1986, submitted by the delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, entitled "Reply of Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, to the Address of the Leaders of Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden and Tanzania".

30. In accordance with its programme of work, dealing with the consideration of the question of the establishment of subsidiary bodies on items of its agenda, the Conference held, at the beginning of the first part of the session, a number of informal consultations on the establishment of an ad hoc committee on item 1.

31. At the 343rd plenary meeting, on 27 February 1986, the President of the Conference for that month reported on the outcome of those consultations. He informed the Conference that representatives of all groups had reiterated the great importance they attached to the subject matter of agenda item 1 as well as their wish to see an ad hoc committee established as soon as possible. The President further referred to an informal paper, subsequently revised, which had been prepared by him upon request as a basis for consideration of the ad hoc committee's mandate and outlined the positions of various groups with regard to his proposals. Inter alia, the President reported that one group stated that if the President's proposal were acceptable to other groups as a basis for the establishment of an ad hoc committee, then that group could agree to action being taken in those terms. Another group said that it was not in a position to accept the President's proposal and called for flexibility to be shown by others in order that agreement could be reached on that issue. Another group said it could see nothing that could be achieved through acceptance of the President's proposal that could not be achieved by proceeding on the basis of its own mandate and programme of work proposals. Yet another delegation, not belonging to any group, reaffirmed its flexibility on the issue. In summing up the consideration of the issue during the month of February, the President stated his belief that there was a wish shared by all groups, that consultations on item 1 of the agenda should continue because of the great importance placed on it by all delegations.

32. Commenting on the President's statement, one delegation, on behalf of the Group of 21, expressed regret that the position of the group of Western States had remained unchanged with respect to their previous stand on the matter. The Group of 21 found that situation even more disappointing in the light of the fact that, in its view, the Group itself, the group of Socialist States and China had all displayed flexible attitudes in that regard. The Group of 21 further reiterated its willingness to pursue urgent consultations on the establishment of an ad hoc committee on item 1, with a view to finding a solution acceptable to all. It finally stated that should no solution be found in the consultation process, the Group of 21 would request that the matter be ultimately referred to the Plenary of the Conference for a decision.

33. Speaking on behalf of a group of Socialist countries, one delegation reaffirmed their interest in commencing practical work on the item as a matter of urgency. Accordingly, while believing that its own draft mandate contained in CD/522/Rev.1, which provided for the establishment of an ad hoc committee to carry out practical negotiations with a view to elaborating a treaty prohibiting all nuclear-weapon tests, taking into account all existing drafts, proposals and future initiatives, would best serve this purpose, the group had displayed a high degree of flexibility by indicating in the course of consultations their acceptance of the President's proposal, provided it could also be acceptable to other groups. The group further regretted what it considered as the negative response to that proposal by the Western group and felt that endeavours should be relentlessly pursued to start work on a comprehensive test ban treaty and to continue consultations to that end.
At the 351st meeting, on 27 March 1986, after receiving a request from the Group of 21, the President put before the Conference for decision a proposal of that Group, contained in document CD/520/Rev.2, on the mandate of an ad hoc committee on item 1 of the agenda. Document CD/520/Rev.2 proposed the establishment of an ad hoc committee to initiate the multilateral negotiation of a treaty for the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests and requested it to take into account all existing proposals and future initiatives, as well as previous work done on the subject. While introducing the proposal contained in document CD/520/Rev.2, the co-ordinator of the Group of 21 stressed once again the fundamental importance of the question of a nuclear test ban and the great responsibility of the Conference in that matter. He expressed the hope that a consensus could be reached on the Group's proposal.

The co-ordinator of a group of Socialist States recalled that for many years its members had been pressing for an international treaty on the complete cessation of all nuclear-weapon tests which they regarded as the first but crucial step along the way to terminating the nuclear arms race and initiating disarmament. While recalling that one of the members of the Group had launched a far-reaching initiative to promote understanding, particularly with its unilateral moratorium and the proposals in the programme presented on 15 January 1986, the co-ordinator expressed the support of his group for the draft mandate contained in CD/520/Rev.2 and appealed to all other delegations to join in a consensus on it.

Speaking in its capacity as co-ordinator of a group of Western delegations for agenda item 1, one delegation stated that there was no consensus for the mandate contained in document CD/520/Rev.2. In the view of that group, the consultations which had been in train to try to establish common ground were by no means exhausted and, therefore, efforts to achieve a consensus should be continued. For that reason, the Western co-sponsors were not putting to a decision their draft mandate in document CD/521. They would continue the search for agreement on a formula that would allow the Conference to undertake practical work on the nuclear test ban issue. These efforts could include the discussion of possible programmes of work. In that connection, the co-ordinator referred to the draft programme of work submitted by a group of Western countries in document CD/621. These countries believed that a considerable amount of useful work could be accomplished and they remained ready to discuss this. He further strongly urged others to join his group in seeking agreement. He finally stressed that the group of Western countries, on whose behalf he was speaking, wanted to undertake serious work on the item at the current session and noted, as a further indication of their seriousness, a number of working papers tabled by Western delegations last year in order to contribute to the substantive consideration of the subject.

As a result of the discussion held, the President noted that there was then no consensus on the draft contained in document CD/520/Rev.2. The Group of 21 expressed disappointment at the position taken by the group of Western countries which, in its view, prevented the commencement of negotiations on the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. In the view of that group, it was regrettable that the single multilateral disarmament negotiating body could not take up in a practical and serious manner an issue of such enormous importance which had the highest priority in the disarmament sphere.
Nevertheless, the Group of 21 expressed again its intention not to relax its efforts to find a suitable solution for the commencement, as rapidly as possible, of a negotiating process on agenda item 1, and to continue to display flexibility in attaining that solution. Finally, one delegation, belonging to the group of Socialist States, reaffirmed its position in favour of resolving, as rapidly as possible, the question of discontinuing and prohibiting nuclear-weapon tests and expressed the view that neither the group of Socialist States nor the Group of 21 could assume responsibility for the situation in the Conference on Disarmament on that issue.

38. At the 359th meeting, on 24 April 1986, the final meeting of the first part of the session, the President of the Conference for that month reported that no progress had been achieved in the course of his consultations on the item.

39. At the 365th meeting, on 26 June 1986, the President of the Conference for that month reported on his consultations with regard to agenda item 1. He stated, inter alia, that during his tenure he had continued the search for ways and means of fostering meaningful multilateral action on the item which included the submission of his own informal proposal on the mandate of an ad hoc committee. Although it had not been possible to achieve consensus during the month, the President stated that there was a general feeling that consultations should continue on that important matter.

40. At the 375th meeting, on 31 July 1986, the President of the Conference for that month reported that the intensive consultations he had carried out with a view to finding ways and means of reaching consensus on the draft mandate for the ad hoc committee on agenda item 1 had not been successful. He, however, believed that those efforts had not been wasted and expressed support for the continuing efforts to reach consensus on a draft mandate. He stated that it was imperative that the Conference on Disarmament establish a subsidiary body on agenda item 1, now that the two major nuclear-weapon States had started their bilateral talks on nuclear testing.

41. Some delegations expressed the view that the preventing of negotiations on a CTB was contrary to the wish of the great majority of governments, as embodied in numerous United Nations General Assembly resolutions and the Final Declaration of the Third NPT Review Conference. It was stated that it is not at the discretion of the nuclear-weapon States concerned to decide whether or not to conduct negotiations on a nuclear test ban.

42. A number of delegations addressed the issues concerning a nuclear test ban at plenary meetings of the Conference. Those statements appear in the verbatim records and other official documents of the Conference.

43. The Group of 21 repeatedly stressed the urgent need for a comprehensive treaty on the complete prohibition of testing of all types of nuclear weapons in all environments by all States, an objective which had been pursued for more than 25 years and which continued to be a matter of the highest priority for them. The Group believed that the continued nuclear-weapon testing intensified the nuclear arms race and increased the danger of nuclear war. The Group deplored the fact that, owing to the situation described in paragraphs 32 and 37 of the present report, the Conference on Disarmament had
been unable to initiate multilateral negotiations on a treaty for the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests and considered that there was no valid reason for delaying the conclusion of such a treaty. Members of the Group of 21 also believed that the existing means of verification were adequate to ensure compliance with a nuclear test ban and maintained that assertions about the absence of such means should not be used as grounds for further development and refinement of nuclear weapons. Members of the Group of 21 further stressed that while negotiations were under way for a nuclear-weapon test ban treaty, there should be a moratorium on all testing, production and development of nuclear weapons. In this context, they drew attention to the appeal made by the leaders of the Five Continent Peace Initiative to the United States and the Soviet Union in October 1985 and reiterated in March and April 1986 for putting an end to all nuclear testing as well as the offer to lend their good offices to establish verification mechanisms to monitor such a moratorium. Members of the Group of 21 also called upon one of those major nuclear-weapon States to stop nuclear-weapon tests and requested the other major nuclear-weapon State to continue to refrain from testing in accordance with the unilateral moratorium it had declared in August 1985, until an agreement was reached on a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty or at least until the next Summit meeting between the United States and the Soviet Union. With regard to the activity of the Conference on Disarmament on item 1 of its agenda, members of the Group of 21 generally deplored the fact that no consensus had been reached for a third consecutive year on a negotiating mandate for the renewal of the work of the subsidiary body on that priority item, despite flexibility shown by them as to the terms of reference and possible structure of such a body. Reference was made in this connection to the recommendation contained in the United Nations General Assembly resolution 40/80 A. Several members of the Group also drew attention to the provisions of the United Nations General Assembly resolution 40/80 B as a means of achieving the goal of complete prohibition of nuclear testing.

44. One member of the Group of 21 stated that while supporting all measures that could promote the goal of a test ban, only multilateral talks within the Conference on Disarmament would effectively contribute to a globally acceptable agreement and a reliable verification and control system based on world-wide co-operation. It considered that an ad hoc committee on the subject of a nuclear test ban should immediately be established within the Conference. It introduced working paper CD/712 on Nuclear Test Ban Verification which concludes that it should be possible to create a verification system that would provide confidence in the compliance of a nuclear test ban. In CD/712 several evasion scenarios are analysed such as cavity-decoupling, multiple explosions, hide-in earthquakes. In the view of this delegation test explosions could be identified and it could be possible to monitor nuclear test explosions to any requested level. The verification limit would depend on the number of seismic stations used, their location and technical performance. It finally recommended the development and testing of a "CD monitoring station" as a contribution to the verification of a nuclear test ban.

45. Members of the group of Socialist States continued to regard the cessation of nuclear tests as a highly significant and easily achievable measure towards nuclear disarmament, which would prevent the improvement of
nuclear weapons and the creation of new types of such weapons. In their view, the road to achieving this goal lay in a mutual moratorium of the two major nuclear-weapon States on nuclear explosions and the immediate start of negotiations on a complete ban on nuclear tests under the strictest supervision. They welcomed the repeated extensions by one of them of its unilateral moratorium and called on the other to follow suit. They regretted the refusal of this State to refrain from nuclear testing, thus missing a practical opportunity to put an end to the modernization of nuclear arms. They also called on other nuclear-weapon States to cease nuclear testing and to take steps toward the early conclusion of an agreement on a general ban on such tests. The Socialist countries advocated the immediate commencement of multilateral negotiations on a nuclear test ban at the Conference on Disarmament, which, in their view, could be conducted in parallel with bilateral or trilateral negotiations in the case that they were initiated. They also expressed their readiness for reaching agreement to broaden the scope of the 1963 Moscow Treaty Banning Nuclear-Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, with a view to including underground tests of nuclear weapons, as called for by the United Nations General Assembly at its 40th session. With regard to the work of the Conference on Disarmament on this item, the Socialist countries expressed their readiness to agree to any format of such work which would permit the Conference to pursue, in good faith, its search for the solution of all problems involved in a comprehensive test ban treaty. They regretted that, regarding a mandate for an ad hoc committee, the Western Group rejected all other proposals and did not move away from its old draft mandate. For their part, they presented a working paper (CD/701) relating to a possible structure and other aspects of such work. In particular, the Socialist countries stressed their interest in an effective verification system of a nuclear test ban which, in their view, could be considered simultaneously with other substantive issues related to such a ban. In this connection, they expressed their appreciation of the proposal made by the signatories of the Delhi Declaration, who offered assistance in verifying any halt in nuclear testing. They maintained that a verification problem does no longer exist and that today's verification techniques, which rely on seismic stations, are of such a sophisticated nature that they guarantee full and credible verification. They further explained their position that a realistic assessment clearly establishes that there are no practical possibilities for clandestine nuclear explosions either and that even the use of concealment measures does not provide an opportunity to carry out a nuclear explosion without detection. The Socialist countries stated that the establishment of a permanent system for seismic data exchange required some minimal conditions, such as the participation by the other major nuclear-weapon State in the moratorium on nuclear testing observed by the nuclear-weapon State belonging to this group and negotiations started on the NTB. They warned that otherwise the premature establishment of a permanent system for seismic data exchange could create the misleading impression that something is being done to prevent the continued nuclear testing. They stressed that a verification system could only serve as a means to ensure compliance with a test ban and not to monitor continued testing. In their view, references to the problem of verification cannot warrant the evasion of negotiations.
46. One nuclear-weapon State, member of that group, repeatedly stressed the need for an immediate halt to nuclear testing as an indispensable practical step towards eliminating nuclear weapons. In its view, a reduction in nuclear arsenals alone, without prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, did not offer a way out of the dilemma of the nuclear threat, since the remaining weapons would be modernized and there would still remain the possibility of developing increasingly sophisticated and lethal nuclear weapons and of evaluating such new types of weapons at test sites. Guided by that approach, it had declared, as of 6 August 1985, a unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosions which was repeatedly extended up to 6 August 1986, and consistently urged the other major nuclear-weapon State to join it. It also proposed to that State to meet, without delay, in the capital of any European State or in Hiroshima in order to reach agreement on a nuclear test ban. It further reaffirmed its proposal to commence, as soon as possible, negotiations on a complete ban on nuclear-weapon tests without linkage to any other questions and expressed its readiness for any form of such talks -- bilateral, trilateral or multilateral -- and for any type of agreement on that score, provided matters advanced towards the achievement of an accord. With regard to the questions of verifying compliance with a future agreement, it was convinced that there were no insurmountable difficulties in that area and, for its part, was ready for the most stringent verification, up to and including on-site inspections as well as using all the achievements of seismology. In that connection, it proposed that the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events begin to develop a system of operative transmission of Level II data to serve as a basis for international seismic verification of a nuclear test ban. It also proposed that an international experiment on the exchange of Level II data should be carried out, for example, in 1988 using both the GTS/WMO and other possible channels. Its preparation should be entrusted to the GSE. In addition, it informed the Conference that its Government welcomed the initiative of the USSR Academy of Sciences and the United States Natural Resources Defense Council which had concluded an agreement under which American and Soviet scientists installed seismic equipment on Soviet territory near the testing site in the area of Semipalatinsk. It stated that its Government was assisting and would continue to assist the Soviet and American scientists in carrying out their initiative with the use of special equipment to verify that nuclear explosions were not being carried out. In its view, the mentioned initiative of the USSR and United States scientists proved the possibility of joint verification of the complete prohibition of nuclear tests. It noted that the initiative of the USSR and United States scientists received wide support at the Conference from States belonging to different Groups. On 18 August 1986, it was announced that this nuclear-weapon State had once again decided to extend its unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosions until 1 January 1987. On this occasion it appealed to the other major nuclear-weapon State not to miss another historical chance on the way towards ending the arms race. It also suggested that agreements on ending nuclear tests could be reached speedily and signed already in 1986 at the Summit meeting of the leaders of the two major nuclear-weapon States. In its response to the leaders of the six States authors of the Mexico Declaration this nuclear-weapon State expressed agreement to the proposal to hold a meeting of experts on the question of a CTB which could, in its view, become a starting point of an active and business-like multilateral dialogue on the issue. It also reiterated its readiness to agree to the proposal of the Six on their participation in the verification of a nuclear test stop provided this proposal was also agreed to by the other side.
47. A group of Western countries, on numerous occasions during the session, emphasized the great importance they attached to item 1 of the Conference's agenda. In particular, they recognized the commitment that was addressed in relevant international instruments and treaties towards the goal of bringing about a cessation of all nuclear tests; they emphasized that a comprehensive test ban treaty would have to be an instrument open for accession by all States, compliance with which could be fully and confidently verified, and they indicated their willingness to begin work, immediately, on a substantive examination of essential issues that would be involved in a comprehensive test ban treaty, in particular, the issues of scope, verification and compliance. In addition, these countries pointed to concrete actions taken by them in order to illustrate their conviction and determination on the issue, inter alia the tabling of a draft mandate for an ad hoc committee under item 1 (CD/521). In their view that mandate, if adopted, would lead immediately to the creation of an ad hoc committee, in which a substantive examination of central issues relevant to the formulation of a comprehensive test ban treaty could be undertaken "with a view to negotiation of a treaty on this subject". They exemplified their position in a detailed way by submitting a suggested programme of work for an ad hoc committee (CD/621) and by tabling a number of documents prepared by individual members of the Group on the issues involved in the substantive examination of the item. It was a source of concern that failure to establish an ad hoc committee on item 1 had meant, inter alia, that these papers had not been given serious consideration by the Conference. In addition, individual Western nations distributed other substantive materials. In particular, one member of the group made available to the Conference a three-volume compendium of CD statements on verification from 1962 through 1984 and a publication on seismic verification. It was further planning to hold, in October 1986, an international workshop on seismic verification. One other member announced its intention to conduct an exchange of Level II data with the co-operation of a number of countries by the end of this year. Two members of the group also announced their Governments' decisions with regard to upgrading their national seismic networks. Another member informed the Conference about the establishment of a national seismic data centre being accessible to every country in the world by direct computer-to-computer links. Another member proposed that the Conference agree to the principle of the proposal made in document CD/717, which it had submitted to the Conference this year, to establish a global seismological network, which it considered to lie at the heart of the verification régime needed to support a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty. One of the members of the group proposed that the Conference make the best use of the plenary meetings to facilitate substantive examination of issues relating to item 1 of the agenda, while pursuing a solution to the mandate question. A group of Western countries pointed out that in their view all inherent technical problems of the indispensable prerequisite of a future CTBT -- namely verification -- had not yet been solved in their entirety and therefore further work was required. Some delegations reminded the Conference of proposals for a gradual interim solution. It was argued this could be done on a continuous basis, in the framework of a dynamically conceived, self-perfecting monitoring and verification system. Another member of the group proposed that, as the two major nuclear Powers were to agree progressively to reduce their nuclear arsenals, they should simultaneously and in relation to these reductions agree to reduce nuclear tests, both quantitatively and qualitatively. Members of the group stated that the reasons advanced for the lack of consensus on a
mandate had not, in their view, been persuasive. In the view of members of
the group, there were real differences in the Conference on the vital elements
of a future comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty which were complex and
difficult. Such differences could, in their view, be resolved in an
appropriately mandated ad hoc committee. In this context they stated that the
terms of the draft mandate in document CD/521 should be considered and the
adoption of that mandate should occur at the earliest possible moment.

48. One nuclear-weapon State, member of the Western group of delegations,
reiterated that a nuclear test ban remained for it an objective to be achieved
in due course, in the context of significant reductions in the existing
arsenals of nuclear weapons and the development of substantially improved
verification measures. It also expressed the view that testing played a role
in ensuring the security of the Western Alliance. It further reiterated its
well-known objections to moratoria on nuclear testing. With regard to the
activity of the Conference on the item, it believed that more work was
necessary in the field of seismic verification, and in other areas such as
on-site inspection, and expressed its readiness to carry forward this
practical work under the mandate in CD/521.

49. Another nuclear-weapon State, belonging to the same group of delegations,
reiterated that a nuclear test ban remained an objective of its overall arms
control policy. It, however, stressed its continuing concern on verification
of the effectiveness necessary in this case, which remained a serious problem,
since key security interests would be involved in any treaty. The risks posed
by undetected non-compliance would be especially grave. Nor was this just a
technical matter. A political judgement, including confidence in compliance,
was also involved. A number of useful immediate steps could be taken,
including the establishment of an ad hoc committee in the Conference to
examine issues of scope and verification; enhancement of the work of the
Group of Scientific Experts on seismological monitoring; and bilateral
contacts which could lead to ratification of the 1974 TTB and 1976 PNE
treaties. At the same time, significant steps should be taken in the
reduction of nuclear arsenals. This would, in its view, help build the degree
of confidence necessary to complement technical advances, and allow progress
in other important areas like nuclear testing.

50. Another Western nuclear-weapon State reiterated its view that
international commitments which could be undertaken in this field could be
considered only in relation to the ultimate progress achieved in the process
of nuclear disarmament; it was first and foremost for the two countries which
possessed by far the largest nuclear arsenals and had conducted the greatest
number of tests to negotiate bilateral agreements on the reduction of nuclear
weapons; the parallel pursuit of nuclear testing contributed considerably to
the safety and the reliability of such weapons. The delegation concerned was
not in a position to participate in work, the objective of which was the
negotiation of an agreement to which the country it represented could not
subscribe.

51. Yet another nuclear-weapon State, not belonging to any group, reiterated
that it would be prepared, once the two States with the largest nuclear
 arsenals had taken the lead in halting the testing, production and deployment
of nuclear weapons and drastically reducing their nuclear arsenals, to take
corresponding measures. It also announced that its country had not conducted nuclear tests in the atmosphere for many years and would no longer conduct such tests in the future. It further reiterated its willingness to participate in a subsidiary body on item 1 of the agenda, provided such a body was established in 1986, and stated its flexible approach with regard to that body's terms of reference.

52. A State member of the Group of 21 emphasized that resolution 40/80 A of the General Assembly -- the resolution that obtained the largest number of votes on the question of a nuclear test ban, in its view, involved concessions of such magnitude that, if reciprocated even in a small degree, would have permitted the beginning of serious negotiations on the matter. That State recalled that the resolution contemplated the establishment of an ad hoc committee with two working groups which would deal, respectively, with the interrelated issues of structure and scope of the treaty on the one hand, and compliance and verification on the other.

53. That State member of the Group of 21 recalled that the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament stated, inter alia, that "Enduring international peace and security cannot be built on the accumulation of weaponry by military alliances".

54. Many delegations belonging to different groups stressed that, as stated in paragraph 31 of the Final Document, the formulation and modalities of a verification system depend on the purposes, scope and nature of the corresponding agreement and, therefore, from their point of view, the requirements of a verification system acceptable to all parties should be considered in the context of negotiations. Only in that context it can be expected that it will be possible to reach agreement on adequate measures of verification satisfactory to all interested parties, for in the absence of negotiations it cannot be expected that the necessary concessions will be made to arrive at generally acceptable solutions. These delegations did not accept the view that negotiation of a treaty prohibiting nuclear-weapon tests should wait until verification issues have been resolved. They pointed out that on another item active negotiations had been carried out for a number of years and that no-one had insisted that the related issues of verification be resolved prior to negotiation.

55. Speaking on behalf of the Group of 21, one delegation stressed that bilateral and multilateral efforts should be mutually complementary in the field of disarmament, if effective agreements with universal adherence are to be achieved. Accordingly, being aware that the two major nuclear-weapon States are actually engaged in bilateral conversations on the question of nuclear tests and bearing in mind that, in spite of their special responsibilities for disarmament measures (Final Document, paragraph 48), they are both responsible for the largest number of those tests, the Group of 21 considers that it is incumbent upon them to report to and inform the Conference on Disarmament on their joint endeavours, so that bilateral and multilateral efforts may usefully complement each other. It also recalled that this request of the Group of 21 is, in its view, in line not only with the obligations of both countries to co-operate for the compliance of the mandate assigned to the Conference on Disarmament but also with previous practice, the last of which was the submission to the Conference of the
Tripartite Report on the status of the negotiations on a treaty prohibiting nuclear-weapon test explosions in all environments and a protocol covering nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes (CD/130 of 30 July 1980).

56. One nuclear-weapon State which had once again extended its unilateral moratorium recalled that at the 381st plenary meeting, it had responded to the request for information recorded in the previous paragraph, and expressed agreement that bilateral and multilateral efforts should be mutually complementary.

57. The representative of one of the six States whose leaders met in Ixtapa, Mexico, on 6 and 7 August, presented a summary of the contents of the two main documents approved therein -- the Mexico Declaration and the Document on Verification Measures -- and explained their meaning and scope, in particular with relation to nuclear disarmament and the complete prohibition of nuclear tests. He stressed what the six Statesmen had declared that "what has so far been a unilateral moratorium by one of the two major nuclear States should soon become at least a bilateral moratorium", as well as that "no issue is more urgent and crucial today than bringing to an end all nuclear tests".

58. In conclusion, regret was expressed repeatedly in the Conference, at the failure to establish an ad hoc committee under item 1 of the Conference agenda. It was widely hoped that this would prove possible early in the 1987 session of the Conference.

B. Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and Nuclear Disarmament

59. The item on the agenda entitled "Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and Nuclear Disarmament" was considered by the Conference, in accordance with its programme of work, during the periods 17-28 February and 16-27 June 1986. At its 357th plenary meeting on 17 April, the Conference decided to hold informal meetings on the substance of the agenda item. The Conference held nine informal meetings devoted to the substance of the subject during the annual session.

60. The following new documents were submitted to the Conference in connection with the item during the 1986 session:


   (b) Document CD/672, dated 21 February 1986, submitted by Viet Nam, entitled "Statements by Vietnamese Leaders concerning the Statement of the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Mikhail Gorbachev, made on 15 January 1986".

   (c) Document CD/687, dated 10 April 1986, submitted by the delegation of Bulgaria, entitled "Address of the Member States of the Warsaw Treaty Organization to the European States, the United States of America and Canada on the issues of establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones in Europe".
61. Following consultations under the guidance of the President of the Conference on the procedure to be followed to deal with agenda item 2, the Conference, at its 357th meeting on 17 April 1986, decided to hold informal meetings on the substance of the item during its 1986 session. Some delegations stated that their agreement with that decision should not be construed as representing a change in their position of principle, namely, that an ad hoc committee should be established for the consideration of the item.

62. Many delegations addressed various issues relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament at plenary and informal meetings.

63. The Group of 21 regretted that, although the Conference on Disarmament was the single multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament and nuclear weapons were a subject of the highest priority, it had not been possible to date to establish an ad hoc committee under agenda item 2. Members of the Group of 21 considered that, in the absence of an ad hoc committee, discussions in informal meetings should aim at clarifying issues and positions regarding the various subjects relating to the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament, with a view to preparing the ground for eventual negotiations within the framework of an ad hoc committee. To that end, the Group of 21 suggested a number of topics for discussion: (a) elaboration of the stages of nuclear disarmament envisaged in paragraph 50 of the Final Document; (b) clarification of the issues involved in eliminating reliance on doctrines of nuclear deterrence; (c) the relationship between the role of the Conference on Disarmament and negotiations relating to nuclear disarmament conducted in other forums; (d) the relationship between offensive and defensive nuclear weapons; and (e) the relationship between nuclear and conventional disarmament. Members of the Group of 21 expressed disappointment that the consideration of the agenda item during the 1986 session still lacked structure and purpose and, consequently, did not advance the search for a common approach that would enable the Conference to discharge its responsibilities with respect to agenda item 2. While welcoming the ongoing bilateral negotiations, the Group of 21 held that they in no way detracted from the need for multilateral negotiations on the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament. The Group stressed that bilateral and multilateral negotiations on disarmament should facilitate and complement each other. In that connection, while welcoming recent unofficial briefings to the members of the Conference and official statements at plenary meetings by the two sides in the bilateral negotiations, members of the Group of 21 called on the negotiating parties to keep the Conference officially informed of the progress of their negotiations. The Group reiterated its conviction that all nations have a vital interest in negotiations on nuclear disarmament, since the existence of nuclear weapons in the arsenals of a handful of States directly and fundamentally jeopardized the vital security interests of both nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States alike. The Group of 21 reaffirmed that, as stated in the Final Document, nuclear weapons posed the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of civilization, that it was essential to halt and reverse the nuclear-arms race in all its aspects and that the ultimate goal was the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. In this context, the Group of 21 also recalled paragraph 50 of the Final Document which, in its view, sets out the stages of nuclear disarmament. Accordingly, the Group reiterated its proposal for the establishment of an ad hoc committee to
elaborate on paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament and to submit recommendations to the Conference as to how best it could initiate multilateral negotiations of agreements with adequate measures of verification, in appropriate stages, for (a) the cessation of the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear-weapon systems, (b) the cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery and of the production of fissionable material for weapon purposes and (c) the substantial reduction in existing nuclear weapons with a view to their ultimate elimination. Members of the Group of 21 considered that a priority aspect of the process of nuclear disarmament was the cessation of the qualitative and quantitative development of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery and, accordingly, should comprise the halting of the testing, development, production and deployment of nuclear-weapon systems. In their view, the adoption of such measures would create favourable prospects for negotiations on reductions. Furthermore, it would ensure that reductions that might be negotiated would not be nullified by the development and production of new nuclear weapons. In this connection, members of the Group of 21 drew attention to repeated calls by the General Assembly for a freeze on nuclear weapons. They also reiterated their support for the Delhi Declaration issued by the Heads of State or Government of Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden and Tanzania on 28 February 1985, by which they appealed to the nuclear-weapon States for an all-embracing halt to the testing, production and deployment of such weapons to be followed immediately by substantial reductions in nuclear forces leading to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. In this context members of the Group of 21 noted, and in some cases commented upon, the very important programme for the achievement of nuclear disarmament by the year 2000 put forward by the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Mikhail Gorbachev, in a statement on 15 January 1986. Some members of the Group of 21 placed particular emphasis on the cessation of nuclear-weapon tests as a necessary first step to halt the qualitative development of nuclear weapons. Members of the Group of 21 reaffirmed that military doctrines based on the possession and/or use of nuclear weapons were unacceptable, as the future of mankind was being made hostage to the perceived security requirements of a few States possessing nuclear weapons and their allies. They also believed that such doctrines, far from contributing to the maintenance of international peace and security, lay at the root of the action-reaction process that perpetuated the nuclear-arms race and with it the threat of the annihilation of mankind. In this connection, members of the Group of 21 referred to the statement of the Secretary-General of the United Nations in the General Assembly on 12 December 1984, and reaffirmed that "... to rely on nuclear deterrence is to accept a perpetual community of fear. That is very far from the community of human worth and understanding foreseen by the United Nations Charter". Members of the Group of 21 also expressed the view that the effective cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament required the participation of all the nuclear-weapon States in multilateral negotiations. In their view, the disparity that might exist between the nuclear arsenals of the two major nuclear-weapon States, on the one hand, and the nuclear arsenals of the other nuclear weapon States, on the other hand, was a matter to be dealt with in the process of multilateral negotiations but could not serve as justification for their absence from a process designed to eliminate the fundamental disparity that existed between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States.
64. A major nuclear-weapon State belonging to the Group of Socialist States put forward the programme of stage-by-stage elimination of nuclear weapons by the end of the century (CD/649) which was contained in its statement of 15 January 1986. The programme called for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons throughout the world in three stages within a specified period of time. The programme envisaged that during the first stage, to be implemented within the next 5-8 years, the two States that possessed the largest nuclear weapon capabilities would reduce by half their nuclear weapons that could reach each other's territories. The first stage would also include the complete elimination of intermediate-range ballistic and cruise missiles of the two major nuclear-weapon States in the European zone. At the same time, those two States would undertake not to transfer their strategic and medium-range missiles to other countries while the other nuclear-weapon States in Europe would pledge not to build-up their respective nuclear armaments. In addition, the two major nuclear-weapon States should agree from the outset to halt all nuclear explosions. According to the programme of 15 January 1986 in the first stage the two major nuclear-weapon States should renounce the development, testing and deployment of space strike weapons. The programme stressed that development of such weapons would cross out the hopes for the reductions in nuclear weapons. In accordance with the programme, other nuclear-weapon States would begin to engage in nuclear disarmament during the second stage which should start not later than 1990 and last 5-7 years. They would pledge to freeze all their nuclear arms and not to station them in the territories of other countries. During this period the two major nuclear-weapon States would continue with the reductions agreed upon during the first stage and also carry out measures designed to eliminate their medium-range nuclear weapons and freeze their tactical nuclear arms. Following the completion of the 50 per cent reduction in the strategic nuclear weapons of the two major nuclear-weapon States, all nuclear-weapon States would eliminate their tactical nuclear arms. There would also be a cessation of nuclear-weapons tests by all nuclear-weapon States. Finally, during the third stage, which would begin not later than 1995, the elimination of all remaining nuclear weapons would be completed and a universal accord would be drawn up to ensure that such weapons would never again come into being. The programme emphasized that the verification of the destruction or limitation of arms would be carried out both by national technical means and through on-site inspections. It also provided that the process of eliminating nuclear weapons should go hand-in-hand with measures relating to other weapons. The proposed programme envisaged the elimination of chemical weapons and the prohibition of other weapons of mass destruction by the year 2000 and emphasized that together with the elimination of weapons of mass destruction from the arsenals of States, the conventional weapons and armed forces should be the object of agreed reductions. This nuclear weapon State pointed out that this programme showed the shortest and most reliable road to the elimination of the nuclear threat not through the development of anything new in particular space strike weapons but through the reduction and elimination of existing ones. It proposed to begin multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament without delay.

65. In response to some comments by other delegations concerning the statement of 15 January 1986 the delegation whose position is described in the preceding paragraph pointed to the proposal of socialist countries for the creation of an overall system of international security, to the provisions of
appropriate parts of the statement of 15 January 1986 and to the Appeal of States Members of the Warsaw Treaty of 11 June 1986 and emphasized its proposals aimed at the speedy reaching of an agreement at the talks on nuclear and space arms. It also noted that it was important to have a road-map for the step-by-step reaching of a world free of nuclear weapons within a concrete time period.

66. Delegations of socialist countries believed that the programme for the achievement of nuclear disarmament by the end of the century put forward by the nuclear-weapon State belonging to the Group (CD/649) was a good starting point for negotiations on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, as contemplated in paragraph 50 of the Final Document. They gave full support to this programme. A group of socialist countries reiterated the primary importance they attached to the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament and noted that they had consistently favoured the holding of multilateral negotiations on the subject within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament. At the same time the socialist States stressed the importance they attached to the progress in the ongoing bilateral negotiations on nuclear and space arms. They continued to support the objectives of the negotiations as stated in the joint USSR-United States statement of 8 January 1985 that is to work out effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on Earth, at limiting and reducing nuclear arms and at strengthening strategic stability. They reiterated their view that bilateral and multilateral negotiations should complement each other and noted that while not regarding it as a substitute for work within an ad hoc committee, the socialist countries viewed the holding of information meetings on the substance of item 2 as a step towards such negotiations. They suggested a number of topics for a structured discussion and stated that they were equally prepared to accept the proposal of the Group of 21. Socialist countries were of the view that the Conference should undertake the task of elaborating the provisions of a programme of nuclear disarmament as envisaged in paragraph 50. They believed that such a programme should be implemented in stages and that each stage, as well, as the programme as a whole, should be completed within a specified period of time as proposed in the statement of 15 January 1986. In their view, in connection with the elaboration of the programme, the Conference on Disarmament should consider a number of questions, such as the clarification of the conditions for the participation of all nuclear-weapon States; the elaboration of the main principles of a process of nuclear disarmament; the consideration and negotiation of specific measures, such as the prohibition of certain types of nuclear weapons, the non-stationing of nuclear-weapons, the cessation of the production, reduction and elimination of weapon-grade fissionable material; the consideration and negotiation of questions relating to nuclear disarmament, including, among them, conventional disarmament; the creation of necessary conditions for the maintenance of national and international security and the avoidance of nuclear war, as well as of war in general; the relationship between the role of the Conference on Disarmament and negotiations relating to nuclear disarmament in other forums and the issue of verification. In connection with the participation of the five nuclear-weapon States in the process of nuclear disarmament, the possibility was suggested of setting up a sub-committee composed of these five States, having a negotiating mandate, with a view to contributing to a multilateral consideration of item 2 by the Conference on Disarmament itself. Socialist countries expressed the view that
the discussion concerning agenda item 2 should be continued in an appropriate
and substantial manner, if possible within an ad hoc committee. They also
noted the relationship between disarmament measures in nuclear and
conventional fields. In this connection, they drew attention to the programme
of action with clear-cut time-frames for the reduction of conventional weapons
and armed forces in Europe put forward at the meeting of the
Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty Member States held at
Budapest on 10-11 June 1986 (CD/700). They also underlined the view that to
prevent the arms race from extending into space was to remove the obstacle to
deep cuts in nuclear weapons. Socialist countries also devoted attention to
the question of concepts of security and stressed that at the present time a
new thinking on the problems of security was needed based on recognition that
neither the arms race nor a nuclear war could be won. In their view the
prenuclear thinking lost its significance on 6 August 1945 and today it was
impossible to ensure one's own security without taking into account the
security of other States. They were convinced that there could be no genuine
security unless it was equal for all and comprehensive. They pointed out that
today the pace of the development of military technology was so high that the
"equilibrium of fear" was ceasing to be a factor of restraint and in this
connection emphasized the urgent need to stop the nuclear-arms race and
proceed to nuclear disarmament.

67. The Group of Western States, including three nuclear-weapon States,
referred to the ongoing bilateral negotiations between the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics and the United States, the subject of which was a complex
of questions concerning space and nuclear arms -- both strategic and
intermediate-range -- with all those questions considered and resolved in their
interrelationship. As stated in the joint United States-Soviet
statement of 8 January 1985, the objective of the negotiations would be to
work out effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space and
terminating it on Earth, at limiting and reducing nuclear arms and at
strengthening strategic stability. The statement also noted that the sides
believed that those negotiations, just as efforts in general to limit and
reduce arms, should lead to the complete elimination of nuclear arms
everywhere. Western States reiterated the view that such negotiations offered
the best means at present for achieving progress in the field of nuclear arms
control and disarmament. They stressed the importance of the summit meeting
between the President of the United States, Ronald Reagan, and the
General-Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev, and noted that they had agreed to accelerate
the work at the bilateral negotiations with a view to accomplishing the tasks
set down in the joint statement of 8 January 1985, and that they had also
called for early progress, in particular in areas where there was common
ground, including the principle of 50 per cent reductions in the nuclear arms
of the United States and the USSR appropriately applied, as well as the idea
of an interim intermediate-range nuclear forces agreement. They were not
convinced that the creation of a subsidiary body on agenda item 2 would
contribute to the cause of nuclear disarmament. In their opinion, as provided
for in the programme of work of the Conference, questions relating to the
agenda item could be and, indeed, already had been addressed at plenary
meetings. They did not share the view that every item on the agenda of the
Conference was ripe for immediate negotiation. They stressed that for
negotiations to stand a chance of success, the subject of negotiations
required careful definition and a precisely agreed objective. They underscored the importance they attached to substantial and verifiable reductions of nuclear weapons. They considered that it was incorrect to interpret paragraph 50 of the Final Document as setting out successive stages in the process of nuclear disarmament. In their view, the paragraph described the targets or objectives to be achieved in that process but did not establish a sequence. Beyond that, they believed it was impractical to attach time frames to the negotiations. They also emphasized that nuclear arms reductions could not be divorced from conventional arms control and disarmament measures and should be pursued so as to enhance international stability and security. Therefore, in their view, progress in the Stockholm Conference on confidence- and security-building measures and disarmament in Europe and in the Vienna talks on mutual and balanced force reductions were also of the highest importance. They recalled that the NATO Foreign Ministers at their meeting in Halifax had underlined the objective of strengthening stability and security in the whole of Europe through increased openness and the establishment of a verifiable, comprehensive and stable balance of conventional forces at lower levels. Western States stated that fundamental to all efforts in this regard was a commitment to uphold the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. They considered that the single most significant way of lessening insecurity and instability in international relations would be for all nations to live up to their obligations under the Charter.

68. With reference to the proposals contained in the statement of 15 January by the nuclear-weapon State belonging to the Socialist Group, one nuclear-weapon State belonging to the Western Group noted that there were elements that appeared to be constructive and other elements that continued to present problems. It welcomed the recognition of the critical importance of verification in negotiating agreements. It stressed that significant reductions in offensive nuclear weapons under negotiation bilaterally should be the first step in the nuclear disarmament process. It reiterated its objective of beginning the reduction process by an agreement on a 50 per cent reduction on each side's offensive nuclear forces appropriately applied, as well as by an agreement on intermediate-range nuclear forces. At the same time, it reiterated its long-held position that the achievement of a world free of nuclear weapons was a process that required the resolution of other serious security issues at the same time, such as the imbalance in conventional and other forces, the need to ensure full compliance with existing and future agreements and the free and peaceful resolution of regional conflicts without outside interference. It further pointed out that there were specific details in the later stages of the programme proposed by the other side that were not appropriate for consideration at this time. Noting the agreement on the objective of ultimately eliminating nuclear weapons, it held that both sides must now focus on equitable and verifiable measures to achieve deep and stabilizing reductions in offensive nuclear forces and must correct those basic conditions that gave rise to the need for reliance on nuclear weapons for deterrence.

69. Another nuclear weapon State belonging to the Western Group stressed the vital importance of the bilateral negotiations between the two Powers having the overwhelming preponderance of nuclear weapons and the greater military capability in outer space. In its view, the priority was success in negotiating substantial reductions in the nuclear weapons of these
two States. It welcomed the agreement to apply the principle of a 50 per cent reduction in strategic nuclear weapons. As regards the programme referred to in paragraph 64, it did not believe that simply describing the goal of a nuclear free world and attaching an arbitrary timetable to it was a practical approach. In its view, what was needed was serious negotiations at the Conference table aimed at achieving real, balanced and verifiable arms control measures across the board on the basis of detailed proposals. With respect to the proposals put forward on 15 January by the nuclear weapon State belonging to the Socialist Group, it noted that one aspect concerned the relation between the bilateral negotiations and the nuclear weapons of other States. It firmly believed that its strategic nuclear forces were not relevant to any possible agreement on intermediate-range nuclear forces in Europe. It considered that the weapons systems concerned were not comparable in their capability or role. Nor, given the minimum nature of its deterrence -- less than 3 per cent of the nuclear forces available to the two major nuclear-weapon States -- did it see any scope for making a contribution to any reductions in the present circumstances. It pointed out, however, that if there were very substantial reductions in the strategic arsenals of the two major nuclear-weapon States and there were no significant changes in defensive capabilities, it would be ready to review its position and consider how best to contribute to arms control in the light of the reduced threat.

70. Still another nuclear-weapon State belonging to the Western Group, while noting that the programme put forward on 15 January had undergone thorough analysis and consideration, stated that it was possible to advance a few observations. In its view, the proposal for large cuts in the nuclear arsenals of the two major nuclear-weapon States aimed in the right direction. However, it considered that to require the two nuclear-weapon States in Europe to freeze their nuclear weapons at the outset, thereby prohibiting maintaining them at the desirable defensive levels would unacceptably jeopardize their security which was based on deterrence of the strong by the weak, according to which the weaker party does not seek in any way to attain parity of means with the stronger but simply to remain in a position to persuade the stronger party not to attack it out of fear of an unacceptable punishment. Beyond that, it pointed out that the existing threat facing western Europe was not only nuclear; it was also conventional and chemical. In view of this situation, it recalled its position that it would be ready to consider, at the appropriate time, participating in effective and verifiable nuclear disarmament, provided the following conditions were met: first, reductions in the nuclear arsenals of the two major nuclear-weapon States to levels such that the gap between their capabilities and those of the other nuclear-weapon States might be considered to have changed in character; second, significant progress in correcting conventional imbalances, particularly in Europe, and complete elimination of the chemical threat; and third, quantitative and qualitative limitation of defensive strategic arms.

71. One nuclear-weapon State, not belonging to any Group, reiterated its call for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. It stressed that the States possessing the largest nuclear arsenals had a special responsibility for nuclear disarmament. It noted that for some years it had been calling on the two major nuclear Powers to take the lead in halting the testing, production and deployment of all types of nuclear weapons and drastically reduce all such weapons and their delivery vehicles. It
considered that in view of the magnitude of their nuclear arsenals, those two States should as a matter of course put an immediate end to the qualitative improvement and quantitative increase of their nuclear weapons and to their deployment in various regions. More importantly, they should substantially reduce all types of nuclear weapons and not only "strategic nuclear weapons" or "weapons capable of reaching each other's territory". In its opinion, reductions of intermediate-range nuclear forces should cover those deployed in Asia, as well as Europe. It further considered that those nuclear weapons subject to reduction should be destroyed and not transferred to other places. It pointed out that in emphasizing the primary responsibility of the two major nuclear-weapon States for nuclear disarmament, it was not shirking its obligations in that regard. It considered that after those two States had halted the testing, production and deployment of all types of nuclear weapons and drastically reduced those weapons, a broadly representative international conference with the participation of all the nuclear-weapon States could be held to discuss measures for further nuclear disarmament and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. It believed that the preparatory work for such a conference could start once the two major nuclear-weapon States had made tangible progress towards the realization of the above-mentioned goal. It considered that the agreement reached by the two major nuclear Powers concerning a 50 per cent reduction in their nuclear weapons constituted a positive development. It agreed that bilateral and multilateral negotiations should complement each other and reiterated its support for the establishment of an ad hoc committee under agenda item 2. In its opinion, conventional disarmament should also be given importance. It was of the view that since conventional and nuclear armaments constituted the basic component parts of the total military strength of the two major nuclear Powers and of the two military blocs and given the fact that they possessed the largest and most sophisticated conventional armaments, it was only natural that they should take the lead in reducing substantially their conventional armaments, particularly their conventional offensive forces.

C. Prevention of Nuclear War, including all related matters

72. The item on the agenda entitled "Prevention of Nuclear War, including all related matters" was considered by the Conference, in accordance with its programme of work, during the periods 17-21 March and 7-11 July 1986.

73. The following documents were submitted to the Conference in connection with the item during the 1986 session

(a) Document CD/688, dated 11 April 1986, submitted by the delegation of Argentina, entitled "Working Paper: Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters".


(c) Document CD/710, dated 8 July 1986, submitted by the delegation of Bulgaria, entitled "Working Paper: Prevention of Nuclear War, including all related matters".
74. In connection with agenda item 3, consultations were held under the President of the Conference to consider an appropriate organizational arrangement to deal with the item, including proposals for the establishment of a subsidiary body, but no agreement could be reached during those consultations.

75. At the 377th plenary meeting on 7 August 1986, the Conference had before it for decision a draft mandate for an ad hoc committee on agenda item 3, proposed by the Group of 21 (CD/515/Rev.2). Under the proposed mandate, the ad hoc committee would, as a first step, consider all proposals relevant to agenda item 3, including appropriate and practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war. The Group of Western Countries stated that it attached great importance to agenda item 3 and recalled that, since 1983, when the item was first inscribed in the agenda, it had repeatedly stated that it was prepared to have a thorough discussion and exchange of views on the subject. The Group had hoped that it would have proved possible to engage in substantive consideration of the item within an appropriate format. It was, therefore, disappointed that the draft mandate contained in CD/515/Rev.2, was once more put to a decision. It was again unable to associate itself with a consensus on it. The Group of 21 expressed its deep disappointment that once again it had been impossible for the Conference to adopt a mandate that would enable it to give proper consideration to the prevention of nuclear war, which was the most acute and urgent task of the present day. The Group also pointed out that the proposed mandate was a well-considered and balanced text that took into account the views of other groups, including the Group of Western countries. The Group of Socialist Countries recalled that last year it had supported the compromise mandate put forward by the Group of 21 and expressed disappointment at what it considered the negative position of Western delegations. The Group of Socialist Countries also expressed disappointment at what it considered the negative position of Western delegations. One nuclear-weapon State not belonging to any group considered that the proposed mandate was reasonable and realistic and, therefore, could serve as a basis for work in an ad hoc committee. Beyond that, it expressed the hope that in the future the sides concerned would adopt a co-operative and flexible attitude on the issue of the mandate, so that an ad hoc committee might be established. As a result of the discussion, the President of the Conference stated that there was then no consensus on the draft mandate contained in CD/515/Rev.2.

76. Many delegations addressed issues concerning the prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters, at plenary meetings of the Conference.

77. The Group of 21 reiterated its conviction that the greatest peril facing the world was the threat to human survival posed by a nuclear weapons and that, consequently, the prevention of a nuclear war was a matter of the highest priority. The Group reaffirmed the conclusion of the Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of non-aligned countries held in New Delhi from 7-12 March 1983, that nuclear weapons more than weapons of war, were instruments of mass annihilation.

78. The Group also recalled that in the Delhi Declaration of 28 January 1985, the Heads of State or Government of Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden and Tanzania emphasized the need for urgent preventive action to exclude
forever the use of nuclear weapons and the occurrence of nuclear war. Members of the Group of 21 noted with concern that the continuing nuclear arms race and the growing risk of an arms race in outer space, heightened the danger of nuclear war. They recognized the importance of the assertion contained in the joint statement issued by General-Secretary Gorbachev and President Reagan at their summit meeting to the effect that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought and urged that it be followed by immediate and concrete measures to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race. While recognizing that nuclear-weapon States had the primary responsibility for avoiding a nuclear war, the Group of 21 also reaffirmed the belief that, in view of the catastrophic consequences that nuclear war would have for mankind as a whole, including the danger of a nuclear Winter, the problem was too important to be left to the nuclear-weapon States alone. The Group stressed that all nations had a vital interest in the pursuit of negotiations of measures for the prevention of nuclear war.

79. Accordingly, the Group called for the implemention of resolution 40/152Q, by which the General Assembly, once again, had requested the Conference on Disarmament to undertake, as a matter of the highest priority, negotiations with a view to achieving agreement on appropriate and practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war and, to that end, to establish an ad hoc committee at the beginning of its 1986 session. At the same time, members of the Group of 21 noted that, in order to accommodate the position of other delegations, the Group had displayed great flexibility with a view to reaching a consensus that would permit a thorough consideration of item 3 within the framework of a subsidiary body.

80. Members of the Group of 21 were of the view that it was inadmissible that the prospect of the annihilation of human civilization was used by some States to promote their security. They held that if nuclear disarmament was to become a reality, nuclear deterrence through a balance of terror had to be discarded. They rejected doctrines of nuclear deterrence. They believed that the concept of the maintenance of peace through deterrence was perhaps the most dangerous collective fallacy that existed. One delegation stated that this doctrine, as it is predicated on the possible use of nuclear weapons, was not compatible, in its view, with articles 2 (4) and 51 of the United Nations Charter. Members of the Group also held that, given the fact that nuclear weapons were instruments of mass annihilation and thus posed a unique threat to human survival, nuclear war could not be placed in the context of the prevention of war in general. In this connection, they expressed concern at initiatives taken in the General Assembly which, in their view, sought to distort the priorities laid down in the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament. They were particularly disturbed by attempts to equate war in general with nuclear war. Members of the Group of 21 stressed anew that the surest way to remove the danger of nuclear war lay in the elimination of nuclear weapons and that, pending the achievement of nuclear disarmament, the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons should be prohibited. The Mexico Declaration of 7 August 1986 was emphasized in this regard, in particular, the proposal of the six nations for a binding international agreement which outlaws every use of nuclear weapons.
81. Other measures were also proposed, such as a moratorium on nuclear-weapon tests with effective verification arrangements and non-extension of the arms race to outer space. In addition, certain confidence-building measures were suggested, including immediate negotiations for the peaceful solution of disputes involving nuclear-weapon States; extension or broadening of existing agreements to establish direct communication among all the nuclear-weapon States and the establishment of a system of crisis control centres, including the five nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States (CD/688). It was also suggested that those measures could be negotiated and adopted individually.

82. A group of socialist countries re-affirmed that the prevention of nuclear war was the most urgent task of today. They reiterated their support for the establishment of an ad hoc committee, as envisaged in General Assembly resolution 40/152Q. Socialist countries believed that, in the present circumstances, it was necessary to create a comprehensive system of international security based on the principle that it is no longer possible to win either the arms race or nuclear war itself. They stressed the importance of the statement at the summit meeting in Geneva between General-Secretary Gorbachev and President Reagan that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought, that any war between the USSR and the United States, whether nuclear or conventional, must be prevented and that the USSR and the United States will not seek to achieve military superiority. In their view, the spirit of Geneva should now be put into practice. They considered that efforts aimed at the prevention of nuclear war would be spurred on if the Soviet-United States declaration on the senselessness of nuclear war were supported by the other nuclear-weapon States and by all countries of the world and if it were consolidated in a suitable form on a multilateral basis. In their Appeal to the member States of NATO and to all European countries for a programme of the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe (CD/700), the Warsaw Treaty member States declared that "they will never, under any circumstances, initiate military actions against any State, whether in Europe or in another region of the world, if they themselves are not victims of aggression". Delegations of socialist countries emphasized that the world of today has become too small and too fragile for wars and a policy of force. It cannot be saved and preserved if States fail to do away with the way of thinking and acting that for centuries has been rooted in the acceptability and permissibility of wars and armed conflicts. To prevent a nuclear war and to ensure equal security is the imperative of today. This is more and more a political task which can be solved only by political means. It is high time to lay a foundation more solid than weapons for relations among States. Socialist countries noted the new disarmament initiatives they had advanced which, in their view, would contribute to the prevention of nuclear war: (i) the complete elimination of nuclear and chemical weapons by the end of the century and the prohibition of space strike weapons, as proposed in the programme put forward by the nuclear weapon State belonging to the group (CD/649) and (ii) the creation of a comprehensive system of international security based on concrete measures to be taken in the military, political, economic and humanitarian spheres. They called for the following measures in the military field, (a) the renunciation of war -- nuclear and conventional -- by the nuclear-weapon States against each other or against third countries; (b) the prevention of an arms race in outer space; (c) the cessation of all nuclear-weapon tests and the complete elimination of nuclear
weapons; (d) the prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons; (e) the renunciation of the development of new means of mass destruction; (f) lowering of levels of military capabilities of States to the limits of reasonable sufficiency; (g) the conclusion of an agreement on the substantial reduction of land forces and tactical air forces of European States and of the corresponding United States and Canadian forces stationed in Europe, as proposed in the programme put forward by the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty; (h) the proportional and balanced reduction of military budgets; and (i) the dissolution of military alliances and, as a step towards that end, the renunciation of their enlargement and of the formation of new ones. Delegations of socialist countries emphasized that nuclear weapons should never be used and that it was suicidal to build inter-State relations on the illusion of attaining superiority in them. They suggested that the explosion even of a small part of the existing nuclear arsenal would become a catastrophe of an irreversible nature and pointed out that in their view a first nuclear strike would doom the attacker as well to an agonizing death from the consequences of the explosion of his own warheads even if there were no retaliatory strike. Socialist countries also suggested that partial or interim measures, including measures on a regional scale, could be of importance for the prevention of nuclear war. In that context, they reiterated their support for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various parts of the world and they recalled that they had addressed an appeal on 8 March 1986 to the States of Europe, the United States and Canada, to implement proposals for the creation of such zones in the European Continent. They also advanced an elaborated proposal for strengthening the security in the Asian and Pacific Ocean region. Beyond that, they held that the creation of chemical-weapon-free zones would help to reduce the danger of war and to prevent the escalation of a conventional military conflict into nuclear war (CD/710). They pointed out that that was the purpose of initiatives for the establishment of chemical-weapon-free zones in Central Europe and the Balkans. Socialist countries also recalled proposals made in previous years (CD/355 and CD/484). They stressed the importance of commitments to the non-first-use of nuclear weapons and reiterated their support for the proposal to conclude a convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons. At the same time, they pointed out that they had proposed the exclusion of the use of force from international relations. They also reiterated their readiness to consider confidence-building measures, such as measures for the prevention of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons and the avoidance of the possibility of surprise attacks. In connection with the two draft resolutions referred to in paragraph 83, delegations of socialist countries emphasized that these drafts were contrary to what had been stated in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

83. Western delegations re-affirmed that they attached the utmost importance to the subject matter covered by agenda item 3 and that they supported a thorough, in-depth and structured consideration of all its aspects in an appropriate format. They reiterated the view that the question of the prevention of nuclear war could not be dealt with in isolation from the underlying basic security situation and that, in their opinion, the question at issue was the prevention of war in the nuclear age in all its dimensions. They emphasized that this comprehensive approach to the prevention of war was in no way designed to belittle the catastrophic consequences and
inadmissibility of a nuclear war. They welcomed the statement at the summit meeting between General-Secretary Gorbachev and President Reagan that the two sides had agreed that a nuclear war can never be won and must never be fought, that they emphasized the importance of preventing any war between them, whether nuclear or conventional, and that they will not seek to achieve military superiority. They stressed that that statement underlined the dual need to address both aspects of conflict, nuclear and conventional, which also applied to the work of the Conference. In their view, that need was clearly reflected in the comprehensive title of the agenda item: "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters". They considered that those related matters were the need to prevent conventional conflict and the interrelationship between nuclear deterrence and conventional force levels. They did not believe that coming to grips with those issues detracted from the importance of nuclear disarmament; rather, in their opinion, the prospects for nuclear disarmament would certainly be improved. Western delegations pointed out that the comprehensiveness of their approach reflected the view that the prevention of nuclear war could not be effectively achieved by individual isolated measures, but only by a complex and multi-faceted political strategy that related to overall State behaviour. They reiterated that strict compliance by all States with the Charter of the United Nations, in particular the obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force and to settle all disputes by peaceful means, was a key element in the prevention of nuclear war. They believed in the need for restraint in the action of States both in the degree of their armament and in the active prevention of the development of situations which could cause dangerous exacerbation of State relations, as well as the avoidance of military confrontations and the outbreak of war. They also stressed the importance of deep and verifiable reductions of nuclear weapons. At the same time they considered that, in dealing with the nuclear threat, it was necessary not to lose sight of the problem posed by the continued build-up of conventional weapons and forces around the world and the threat they posed to international stability. Western delegations further reiterated the significant contribution of confidence-building measures to lessen the danger of war, and thereby nuclear war, and of measures to reduce the risk of the accidental use of nuclear weapons. Reference was made to documents submitted in previous years by Western delegations (CD/357, CD/380, CD/411, CD/578 and CD/581). They also recalled that at the last two sessions of the General Assembly, Western delegations had sponsored draft resolutions bearing a double title: "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters: prevention of war in the nuclear age", which reflected their comprehensive approach to agenda item 3. It was regretted that the 1986 session of the Conference had not provided an opportunity to review the purpose of those draft resolutions.

84. One nuclear-weapon State, not belonging to any group, believed that the effective prevention of nuclear war called for a stable international environment. It believed that it was, therefore, important for the international community to oppose policies of aggression and expansion, as well as hegemonism and power politics in all forms; respect and observe the United Nations Charter and other norms of international relations; renounce the use or threat of force in international relations, settle disputes by peaceful means and honour in good faith the principles of mutual respect of sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful co-existence.
It recalled that it had always held that the fundamental way to the elimination of the nuclear threat and the prevention of nuclear war, lay in the complete and total destruction of all nuclear weapons. At the same time, it pointed out that this was a long-term objective. In its view, at the present time, to reduce the danger of a nuclear war and create conditions for its complete elimination, nuclear-weapon States, and the two major ones in particular, should undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons in any circumstances and should unconditionally pledge not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear-weapon-free zones. On this basis, an international convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons should be concluded, with the participation of all nuclear-weapon States. It further considered that, along with the prevention of nuclear war, conventional wars should also be prevented. It noted, in particular, that the outbreak of a conventional war in areas with a high concentration of nuclear and conventional weapons, involved the danger of escalation into a nuclear war. Therefore, it considered that the two military blocs should reach agreement as early as possible on the drastic reduction of their conventional armed forces and armaments. It believed that the United Nations had an important role to play in the prevention of nuclear war and that, in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly, the Conference on Disarmament should establish an ad hoc committee on the prevention of nuclear war to undertake negotiations with a view to reaching agreement on appropriate and practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war (CD/691).

D. Chemical Weapons

85. The item on the agenda entitled "Chemical Weapons" was considered by the Conference, in accordance with its programme of work, during the periods 24 March-4 April and 14-25 July 1986.

86. The list of new documents presented to the Conference under the agenda item is contained in the Report submitted by the Ad Hoc Committee referred to in the following paragraph.

87. At its 383rd plenary meeting on 28 August 1986, the Conference adopted the Report of the Ad Hoc Committee, re-established by the Conference under the agenda item at its 337th plenary meeting (see paragraph 11 above). That Report (CD/727) is an integral part of this Report and reads as follows:

"I. INTRODUCTION

1. At its 337th plenary meeting on 6 February 1986, the Conference on Disarmament adopted the following decision on the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons (CD/654):

'The Conference on Disarmament, keeping in mind that the negotiation of a Convention should proceed with a view to its final elaboration at the earliest possible date, in accordance with United Nations General Assembly resolutions 39/65 C and 40/92 B, and in discharging its responsibility to conduct as a priority task the negotiations on a multilateral convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction, and to ensure the preparation of the convention, decides to re-establish, in accordance with its rules of procedure, for the duration
of its 1986 session, the Ad Hoc Committee to continue the full and complete process of negotiations, developing and working out the convention, except for its final drafting, taking into account all existing proposals and drafts as well as future initiatives with a view to giving the Conference a possibility to achieve an agreement as soon as possible. This agreement, if possible, or a Report on the progress of the negotiations, should be recorded in the report which this Ad Hoc Committee will submit to the Conference at the end of the second part of its 1986 session.'

"II. ORGANIZATION OF WORK AND DOCUMENTATION"

"2. In accordance with the decision mentioned above (CD/654), Ambassador Ian Cromartie of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland was appointed Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee. Mr. Abdelkader Bensmail, Senior Political Affairs Officer, Department for Disarmament Affairs, continued to serve as Secretary of the Committee, assisted by Mr. Michael Cassandra, Political Affairs Officer, Department for Disarmament Affairs.

"3. The Ad Hoc Committee held 14 meetings from 19 February to 20 August 1986. The Ad Hoc Committee benefited from the inclusion in delegations of national experts. In addition, the Chairman held a number of informal consultations with delegations.

"4. At their request, the Conference on Disarmament decided to invite the representatives of the following States not members of the Conference to participate in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee: Austria, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland and Turkey.

"5. During the 1986 session, the following official documents dealing with chemical weapons were presented to the Conference on Disarmament:

- CD/643, dated 27 September 1985, submitted by the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the German Democratic Republic, entitled 'Letter dated 25 September 1985 addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament from the Permanent Representative of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Deputy Head of the Delegation of the German Democratic Republic transmitting the Joint Text of the Letters sent by Mr. Erich Honecker, General Secretary of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany and Chairman of the Council of State of the German Democratic Republic, and Mr. Lubomir Strougal, Prime Minister of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, to Mr. Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, on 13 September 1985'

- CD/644, dated 21 October 1985, submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany, entitled 'Letter dated 16 October 1985 addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament from the Representative of the Federal Republic of Germany transmitting the Identical Replies of Mr. Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany to the Prime Minister of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Chairman of the Council of State of the German Democratic Republic'
- CD/646, dated 11 December 1986, submitted by the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the German Democratic Republic, entitled 'Letter dated 11 December 1985 addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament from the Permanent Representatives of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the German Democratic Republic transmitting replies to the letters of Mr. Helmut Kohl of 27 September 1985'

- CD/648, dated 10 January 1986, submitted by the People's Republic of Bulgaria and the Socialist Republic of Romania, entitled 'Letter dated 10 January 1986 addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament by the Permanent Representative of the People's Republic of Bulgaria and the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Socialist Republic of Romania transmitting the Declaration Appeal by Nicolae Ceausescu, President of the Socialist Republic of Romania, and Tidor Zhivkov, President of the State Council of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, concerning the creation of a chemical-weapon-free zone in the Balkans' (also issued as CD/CW/WP.128)

- CD/651, dated 31 January 1986, entitled 'Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons on its work during the period 13-31 January 1986'

- CD/654, dated 7 February 1986, entitled 'Decision on the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons'

- CD/664, dated 13 February 1986, submitted by Pakistan, entitled 'Fact-finding under the future chemical weapons convention'

- CD/664/Corr.1, dated 20 February 1986, submitted by Pakistan, entitled 'Fact-finding under the future chemical weapons convention'


- CD/677, dated 12 March 1986, submitted by Canada, entitled 'Letter dated 11 March 1986 addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament from the Permanent Representative of Canada to the Conference on Disarmament, transmitting a Handbook for the Investigations of Allegations of the Use of Chemical or Biological Weapons'

- CD/679, dated 13 March 1986, submitted by Canada, entitled 'Identification of Chemical Substances'

- CD/685, dated 3 April 1986, submitted by the United States of America, entitled 'Amendment to CD/500, Draft Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons' (also issued as CD/CW/WP.132)

- CD/689, dated 11 April 1986, submitted by Canada, entitled 'Letter dated 10 April 1986 addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament from the Permanent Representative of Canada to the Conference on Disarmament, transmitting a Compendium of all Chemical Weapons documentation of the Conference during the period 1983-1985'

- CD/697, dated 20 May 1986, submitted by Belgium, entitled 'Order of Elimination of chemical weapon stocks and method for comparing these stocks: Elements of a possible solution' (also issued as CD/CW/WP.135)

- CD/697/Corr.1, dated 10 June 1986, submitted by Belgium, entitled 'Order of Elimination of chemical weapon stocks and method of comparing these stocks: Elements of a possible solution' (also issued as CD/CW/WP.135/Corr.1 - Arabic and English only)

- CD/698, dated 4 June 1986, submitted by Australia, entitled 'Verification of non-production of chemical weapons and their precursors by the civilian chemical industry: Trial inspection of an Australian chemical facility' (also issued as CD/CW/WP.140)


- CD/706, dated 20 June 1986, submitted by the Netherlands, entitled 'Verification of Non-Production of Chemical Weapons. Report on the Workshop on the verification of a chemical weapons ban, held in the Netherlands from the 4th to the 6th June 1986'
In addition, the following Working Papers were presented to the Ad Hoc Committee:

- CD/CW/WP.128, dated 10 January 1986, submitted by the People's Republic of Bulgaria and the Socialist Republic of Romania, entitled 'Letter dated 10 January 1986 addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament by the Permanent Representative of the People's Republic of Bulgaria and the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Socialist Republic of Romania transmitting the Declaration Appeal by Nicolae Ceausescu, President of the Socialist Republic of Romania, and Tidor Zhivkov, President of the State Council of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, concerning the creation of a chemical-weapon-free zone in the Balkans' (also issued as CD/648)

- CD/CW/WP.129, dated 17 February 1986, submitted by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, entitled 'Outline for the Organization of Work during the 1986 Session'

- CD/CW/WP.129/Rev.1, dated 19 February 1986, submitted by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, entitled 'Outline for the Organization of Work during the 1986 Session'


- CD/CW/WP.131, dated 24 March 1986, submitted by Australia, entitled 'Régimes to Ensure Non-Diversion of Super-Toxic Lethal Chemicals; Possible Approaches'

- CD/CW/WP.132, dated 3 April 1986, submitted by the United States of America, entitled 'Amendment to CD/500, Draft Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons' (also issued as CD/685)
- CD/CW/WP.133, dated 11 April 1986, submitted by the Netherlands, entitled 'An approach to the verification of non-production - substances subject to monitoring in a CW convention'

- CD/CW/WP.134, dated 9 April 1986, submitted by Yugoslavia

- CD/CW/WP.135, dated 20 May 1986, submitted by Belgium, entitled 'Order of Elimination of chemical weapons stocks and method for comparing these stocks; Elements of a possible solution' (also issued as CD/697)

- CD/CW/WP.135/Corr.1, dated 10 June 1986, submitted by Belgium, entitled 'Order of Elimination of chemical weapons stocks and method of comparing these stocks; Elements of a possible solution' (also issued as CD/697/Corr.1 - Arabic and English only)

- CD/CW/WP.136, dated 18 April 1986, submitted by the German Democratic Republic and Poland, entitled 'Working Paper on Article IX'


- CD/CW/WP.139, dated 23 April 1986, entitled 'Report of the Chairman of Working Group B'

- CD/CW/WP.140, dated 4 June 1986, submitted by Australia, entitled 'Verification of non-production of chemical weapons and their precursors by the civilian chemical industry; Trial inspection of an Australian Chemical Facility' (also issued as CD/698)

- CD/CW/WP.141, dated 10 June 1986, submitted by the Netherlands, entitled 'Verification of non-production of Chemical Weapons; Scenario for an experimental inspection'

- CD/CW/WP.142, dated 13 June 1986, submitted by the Netherlands, entitled 'Verification of non-production of Chemical Weapons; Observations on the scenario for an experimental inspection as laid down in CD/CW/WP.141'

- CD/CW/WP.143, dated 1 July 1986, submitted by the Netherlands, entitled 'Verification of non-production of chemical weapons; Existing arrangements for monitoring the civil chemical industry in the Netherlands'

- CD/CW/WP.144, dated 24 June 1986, submitted by the Netherlands, entitled 'Verification of phosphorus - containing nerve agents in waste water'

- CD/CW/WP.145, dated 9 July 1986, submitted by the United States, entitled 'Letter dated 9 July 1986 from the United States Representative to the Conference on Disarmament transmitting a document entitled "Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program" prepared by Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD' (also issued as CD/711)
- CD/CW/WP.146, dated 14 July 1986, submitted by Japan, entitled 'Some Quantitative Aspects of a Chemical Weapons Convention' (also issued as CD/713)
- CD/CW/WP.147, dated 25 July 1986, submitted by the United States of America, entitled 'Movement of Chemical Weapons Stocks'
- CD/CW/WP.148, dated 29 July 1986, submitted by Cuba, entitled 'Definition of the term "capacity"'
- CD/CW/WP.149, dated 1 August 1986, entitled 'Report of Working Group C'
- CD/CW/WP.152, dated 14 August 1986, entitled 'Draft Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons to the Conference on Disarmament'

"III. SUBSTANTIVE WORK DURING THE 1986 SESSION"

"7. In accordance with its mandate, the Ad Hoc Committee continued the negotiation and further elaboration of the Convention, utilizing Appendices I and II of CD/636, CD/651 (Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons on its work during the period 13-31 January 1986) as well as other new proposals presented by delegations. To this effect, it retained the basic structure that was established by the Committee in 1985, and accepted the Chairman's proposal to set up three Working Groups which dealt with specific aspects of the Convention as follows:

(a) Working Group A: Article II (Definitions and Criteria) and Article VI (Permitted Activities)

(Chairman: Mr. Richard Rowe, Australia)

(b) Working Group B: Article III (Declarations), Article IV (Elimination of Chemical Weapons) and Article V (Measures on Chemical Weapons Production Facilities)

(Chairman: Mr. Petar Poptchev, Bulgaria)

(c) Working Group C: Article I (General Provisions on Scope), Article VII (National Implementation Measures), Article VIII (Consultative Committee) and Article IX (Consultation, Co-operation and Fact-Finding). Working Group C was also responsible for the question of herbicides and it was understood that the question of investigation of allegations of use would be dealt with in this Group.

(Chairman: Mr. Noegroho Wisnoemoerti, Indonesia)

The Working Groups concentrated their efforts on the consideration of those specific topics with a view to finding generally acceptable formulations for inclusion in the Convention."
"8. In accordance with the outline for the organization of work during the 1986 session (CD/CW/WP.129/Rev.1) and on the basis of the results achieved in the Working Groups as well as on proposals put forward by the Chairman as a result of his consultations, Appendix I of CD/636 has been revised to reflect the present stage of the negotiations.

"IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

"9. The Appendix to this Report reflects the present stage of negotiations on a Chemical Weapons Convention; however the draft texts contained therein do not bind any delegation.

"10. The Ad Hoc Committee recommends to the Conference on Disarmament:

"(a) that the Appendix to this Report be used for further negotiation and drafting of the Convention;

"(b) that the reports of the Working Groups, as contained in documents CD/CW/WP.149, CD/CW/WP.150 and CD/CW/WP.151, together with other relevant present and future documents of the Conference also be utilized in the further elaboration of the Convention;

"(c) that the Ad Hoc Committee resume its work under the Chairmanship of Ambassador R.I.T. Cromartie (United Kingdom) and under its present mandate for a session of limited duration during the period 12-30 January 1987, that the work cover issues under Articles III, IV, V, VI and IX, and parts of Article II relevant to Articles V and VI; furthermore, that consultations be undertaken on these issues by the Chairman in the meantime in preparation for the resumed session; that for that purpose open-ended consultations of the Ad Hoc Committee be held between 24 November and 17 December 1986 including when necessary meetings with full services, and that the Committee present to the Conference on Disarmament a report on its work during the inter-sessional period;

"(d) that the Ad Hoc Committee be re-established at the outset of the 1987 session with its 1986 mandate and that Ambassador R. Ekeus (Sweden) be appointed as its Chairman.
"APPENDIX

This Appendix is based on Appendix I contained in CD/636 and includes new material produced so far in the 1986 session of the Committee in respect of Articles IV, V, VI, VIII, IX and Annex IV to Article IV.
"Preliminary structure of a Convention on chemical weapons */

"Preamble

I. General provisions on scope

II. Definitions and Criteria

III. Declarations

IV. Chemical weapons

V. Chemical weapons production facilities

VI. Activities not prohibited by the Convention

VII. National implementation measures

VIII. Consultative Committee

IX. Consultations, co-operation and fact finding

X. Assistance

XI. Economic and technological development

XII. Relation to other international agreements

XIII. Amendments

XIV. Duration, withdrawal

XV. Signature, ratification, entry into force

XVI. Languages

Annexes and other documents

*/ Discussions are still continuing on where different issues like verification measures are to be placed under this structure.
"Preamble */

"The States Parties to this Convention

"Determined to act with a view to achieving effective progress towards general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, including the prohibition and elimination of all types of weapons of mass destruction,

"Desiring to contribute to the realization of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

"Recalling that the General Assembly of the United Nations Organization has repeatedly condemned all actions contrary to the principles and objectives of the Protocol for Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925,

"Recognizing that the Convention reaffirms principles and objectives of and obligations assumed under the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925, and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction signed at London, Moscow and Washington on 10 April 1972,

"Bearing in mind the objective contained in Article IX of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction,

"Determined for the sake of all mankind, to completely exclude the possibility of the use of chemical weapons, through the implementation of the provisions of this Convention, thereby complementing the obligations assumed under the Geneva Protocol of June 1925,

"Considering that the achievements in the field of chemistry should be used exclusively for the benefit of mankind,

"Convinced that the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons, and their destruction, represents a necessary step towards the achievement of these common objectives.

"Have agreed as follows:

*/ Some delegations consider that the texts contained in the Preamble require further consideration.
I. GENERAL PROVISIONS ON SCOPE

1. Each State Party undertakes not to:
   - develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain chemical weapons, or transfer, directly or indirectly, chemical weapons to anyone.

2. Each State Party undertakes not to:
   - assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in activities prohibited to Parties under this Convention.

3. Each State Party undertakes not to use chemical weapons. */ **/

4. [Each State Party undertakes not to [conduct other activities in preparation for use of chemical weapons] [engage in any military preparations for use of chemical weapons].]

5. Each State Party undertakes to [destroy] [destroy or divert for permitted purposes] chemical weapons which are in its possession or under its [jurisdiction or] control ***/

6. Each State Party undertakes to [destroy] [destroy or dismantle] chemical weapons production facilities which are in its possession or under its [jurisdiction or] control. ****/

*/ It is understood that this provision is closely linked to the definition of chemical weapons in another part of the Convention, the final formulation of which is yet to be agreed upon. It is also understood that this provision does not apply to the use of toxic chemicals and their precursors for permitted purposes still to be defined and to be provided for in the Convention. This provision is also closely linked to a provision in the Convention to be agreed upon relating to reservations.

***/ The question of herbicides is subject to ongoing consultations. The Chairman of these open-ended consultations has suggested the following formulation for a provision on herbicides: "Each State Party undertakes not to use herbicides as a method of warfare; such a prohibition should not preclude any other use of herbicides".

****/ An alternative formulation and placement of this undertaking is given under "Chemical weapons".

*****/ An alternative formulation and placement of this undertaking is given under "Chemical weapons production facilities".
II. DEFINITIONS AND CRITERIA

"For the purposes of this Convention:

"1./* The term "chemical weapons" shall apply to the following, together or separately: **/

"(i) toxic chemicals, including super-toxic lethal chemicals, other lethal chemicals, other harmful chemicals and their precursors, including key precursors [and key components of binary and/or multicomponent chemical systems for chemical weapons], ***/ except such chemicals intended for permitted purposes as long as the types and quantities involved are consistent with such purposes; ****/

"(ii) munitions and devices, specifically designed to cause death or other harm through the toxic properties of those toxic chemicals, as referred to above, which would be released as a result of the employment of such munitions and devices;

"(iii) any equipment specifically designed for use directly in connection with the employment of such munitions or devices;

"*/ The definitions of chemical weapons are presented on the understanding that problems related to irritants used for law enforcement and riot control, and also to chemicals intended to enhance the effect of the use of chemical weapons if their inclusion in the Convention is agreed could be handled outside the definitions of chemical weapons if this will result in a more clear and understandable definition. Preliminary suggestions to solve these problems are given below and consultations on them will be continued.

"***/ One delegation expressed its reservation on the present formulation of the definition of chemical weapons and on the terminology used in (i) that failed to reflect the general purpose criterion.

"****/ Some delegations consider that further deliberation is required in order to clarify at a later stage of the negotiations the implications of this definition for other parts of the Convention. This applies to other relevant parts of the Appendix. Other delegations consider that key component of binary and/or multicomponent chemical system for chemical weapons means; a component which poses a special risk to the objectives of the Convention as it can be an integral part in a chemical weapons munition or device and can form toxic chemicals at the moment of their employment and possesses the following characteristics: (a) reacts (interacts) rapidly with other component(s) of binary and/or multicomponent chemical system during the munition's flight to the target and gives a high yield of final toxic chemical; (b) plays an important role in determining the toxic properties of the final product; (c) may not be used, or be used only in minimal quantities, for permitted purposes; (d) possesses the stability necessary for long-term storage.

"*****/ One delegation suggests that the term "permitted purposes" should be substituted, where it occurs throughout the Convention, with the term "purposes not prohibited by the Convention".
[The term 'chemical weapons' shall not apply to those chemicals which are not super-toxic lethal, or other lethal chemicals and which are approved by the Consultative Committee for use by a Party for domestic law enforcement and domestic riot control purposes.]

[States Parties agree not to [develop, produce, stockpile or] utilize for chemical weapons chemicals intended to enhance the effect of the use of such weapons.]

"[2. 'Toxic chemicals' means:

"chemicals [however or wherever they are produced], [whether produced in plants, munitions or elsewhere] [regardless of the method and pattern of production] whose toxic properties can be utilized to cause death or temporary or permanent harm, to man or animals involving.]

"[2. 'Toxic chemicals' means:

"any chemical, regardless of its origin or method of production which through its chemical action on life processes can cause death, temporary incapacitation, or permanent harm to man or animals

"Toxic chemicals are divided into the following categories:

"(a) 'super-toxic lethal chemicals', which have a median lethal dose which is less than or equal to 0.5 mg/kg (subcutaneous administration) or 2,000 mg-min/m³ (by inhalation) when measured by an agreed method */ set forth in ...

"(b) 'other lethal chemicals', which have a median lethal dose which is greater than 0.5 mg/kg (subcutaneous administration) or 2,000 mg-min/m³ (by inhalation) and less than or equal to 10 mg/kg (subcutaneous administration) or 20,000 mg-min/m³ (by inhalation) when measured by an agreed method set forth in ...

"[(c) 'other harmful chemicals', being any [toxic] chemicals not covered by (a) or (b) above, [including toxic chemicals which normally cause temporary incapacitation rather than death] [at similar doses to those at which super-toxic lethal chemicals cause death].]

"[and 'other harmful chemicals' has a median lethal dose which is greater than 10 mg/kg (subcutaneous administration) or 20,000 mg-min/m³ (by inhalation).]

*/ It was noted that after such measurements had actually been performed, the figures mentioned in this and the following section might be subject to slight changes in order to cover sulphur mustard gas under the first category.
3. [Permitted purposes] [Purposes not prohibited by the Convention]

[Non-hostile purposes] means:

"(a) industrial, agricultural, research, medical or other peaceful purposes, domestic law enforcement purposes, and military purposes not connected with the use of chemical weapons.

"(b) protective purposes, namely those purposes directly related to protection against chemical weapons; */

4. 'Precursor' means:

a chemical reagent which takes part in the production of a toxic chemical.

"(a) 'Key Precursor' means:

a precursor which poses a significant risk to the objectives of the Convention by virtue of its importance in the production of a toxic chemical.

"It may possess [possesses] the following characteristics:

"(i) It may play [plays] an important role in determining the toxic properties of a [toxic chemicals prohibited by the Convention] [super-toxic lethal chemical].

"(ii) It may be used in one of the chemical reactions at the final stage of formation of the [toxic chemicals prohibited by the Convention] [super-toxic lethal chemical].

"(iii) it may [is] not be used, or [is] used only in minimal quantities, for permitted purposes.] **/

"Key precursors are listed in ...

"For the purpose of the relevant provisions in a Chemical Weapons Convention key precursors should be listed and subject to revisions according to [characteristics] [guidelines].

"Chemicals which are not key precursors but are deemed to pose a [threat] [particular risk] with regard to a Chemical Weapons Convention should be included in a list.

"*/ The suggestion that such permitted protective purposes should relate only to "an adversary's use of" chemical weapons was removed pending a decision on whether in the Convention the question of prohibiting other military preparations for use of chemical weapons than those mentioned under scope should be dealt with.

"**/ One delegation considers that this particular characteristic has primary importance and should be placed first.
"(b) Key component of binary and/or multicomponent chemical systems for chemical weapons means;"

"[a key precursor which forms a toxic chemical in the binary or multicomponent weapons munition or device and which has the following additional characteristics (to be elaborated)];"

5. 'Chemical weapons production facility' means:

- Chemical weapons production facility means [any building or equipment designed, constructed or used [in any degree] for the production of chemical weapons] or for filling chemical weapons.

- Chemical weapons production facility means [any building or any equipment which in any degree was designed, constructed or used since 1 January 1946, for:

"(a) the production for chemical weapons of any toxic chemical, except for those listed in (schedule B), or the production for chemical weapons of any key precursors;] or

"(b) the filling of chemical weapons."
III. DECLARATIONS */

Declarations of chemical weapons 1/ and plans for their elimination 2/ 3/

1. Each State Party undertakes to submit to the Consultative Committee, not later than 30 days after the Convention enters into force for it, declarations stating

(a) whether it possesses or does not possess any chemical weapons on its territory or elsewhere under its jurisdiction or control,

(b) whether it has on its territory any chemical weapons under the jurisdiction or control of anyone else,

(c) whether it has transferred control of chemical weapons since ... or has received such weapons since that date. 4/

2. Each State Party possessing chemical weapons undertakes to submit to the Consultative Committee, not later than 30 days after the Convention enters into force for it, declarations stating the aggregate quantity and detailed composition of its chemical weapons.

3. Each State Party possessing chemical weapons undertakes to submit to the Consultative Committee not later than ... months 5/ after the Convention's entry into force for it, general plans for the elimination of its chemical weapons based on the Principles for the Order of Elimination laid down in Annex IV.

4. Each State Party possessing chemical weapons undertakes to submit to the Consultative Committee declarations stating the locations and detailed inventories of their chemical weapons stocks as well as detailed plans for their elimination. These declarations and plans shall be submitted not later

*/ This session's work on Articles IV and V necessitates the reorganization and redrafting of Article III, which will be undertaken at a later stage.

1/ In accordance with agreed definitions.

2/ In accordance with the provisions in Article IV.

3/ The question of old unknown weapons or stocks which have been left by others without the knowledge of the State Party is not addressed in this Article. It is understood that this question will be dealt with at a later stage of the negotiations at which time the placement in the Convention of the relevant provisions will also be decided.

4/ The view was expressed that past transfers should not be included in the Convention.

5/ Three and six months have been proposed.
than three months before the commencement of each elimination period specified in the Principles for the Order of Elimination in Annex IV, and shall encompass all stocks to be eliminated during the next coming such period.

"5. States Parties shall consult among themselves and through the Consultative Committee, as soon as possible after the declarations made in accordance with paragraph 2 of this Article, with the view to co-ordinating their plans.

"6. The declarations and plans under Article III, paragraphs 1 through 4, shall be made in accordance with Annex III.

"7. Each State Party undertakes to submit to the Consultative Committee annual progress reports on the implementation of the plans for the elimination of chemical weapons and a notification of the completion of the elimination within 30 days thereafter.


"Declarations of chemicals which could be used for chemical weapons purposes but which are intended for permitted purposes 2/

"Declarations of chemical weapons production facilities
(To be elaborated)

"Verification of declarations
(To be elaborated)

1/ Some delegations held the view that overall declarations should be made within 30 days after the Convention's entry into force for a State Party.

2/ In accordance with the organization of work (WP.98) these provisions are to be elaborated in the context of Article VI taking into account inter alia some harmful chemicals, to be elaborated.
"ANNEX III

I. DECLARATIONS OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS

A. Possession or non-possession

1. Possession of chemical weapons on own territory.

Yes .....  
No .....  

2. Possession, jurisdiction or control over chemical weapons elsewhere.

Yes .....  
No .....  

If yes, information about location(s), expressed by name(s) of State(s).

B. Existence on the territory of any chemical weapons under the jurisdiction or control of anyone else

Yes .....  
No .....  

If yes, information about ownership, expressed by name(s) of State(s).

C. Past transfers 1/

"If there has been transfer of control of chemical weapons since ..., or reception of such weapons since that date, the following information shall be provided. To be elaborated.

D. Aggregate quantity and detailed composition of chemical weapons

1. Chemicals

1.1 Toxic chemicals 2/

"In cases involving mixtures of two or more toxic chemicals all such components should be specified as well as the percentage of the mixtures.

---

1/ The view was expressed that past transfers should not be included in the Convention.

2/ In accordance with agreed definition.
### 1.1.1 Super-toxic lethal chemicals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scientific chemical name/ Structural formula and Toxicity (of pure substance)</th>
<th>Bulk</th>
<th>Filled in munition</th>
<th>Total quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chemical A</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemical B</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>etc.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 1.1.2 Other lethal chemicals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scientific chemical name/ Structural formula and Toxicity (of pure substance)</th>
<th>Bulk</th>
<th>Filled in munition</th>
<th>Total quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 1.1.3 Other harmful chemicals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scientific chemical name/ Structural formula and Toxicity (of pure substance) if applicable</th>
<th>Bulk</th>
<th>Filled in munition</th>
<th>Total quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1/ In accordance with agreed definition.

2/ In accordance with the IUPAC (International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry) Nomenclature.

3/ Different views exist whether it is necessary to state both the scientific chemical name and the structural formula in order for the declarations to be unambiguous.

4/ Three different approaches were taken by delegations; (1) Initial purity, (2) Purity of the compound as stored with an approximation of some 10 per cent, (3) That declaration of purity was not necessary.

5/ In accordance with agreed definition, but pending such a definition it is unclear which chemicals to declare in this table.
"1.2 1/

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scientific chemical name/ 2/</th>
<th>Quantity (metric tons)</th>
<th>Number and size of containers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Structural formula 3/</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key precursors for unitary systems 4/</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scientific chemical name/ 2/</th>
<th>Bulk</th>
<th>Filled in munition/ submunition (metric tons)</th>
<th>Total quantity (metric tons)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Structural formula 3/</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Key components] [Key precursors] for multi-component systems 4/5/6/</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

"1/ The view was expressed that these two tables were not necessary and the key precursors and key components could be declared under points 1.1.1, 1.1.2 and 1.1.3 as applicable.

"2/ In accordance with the IUPAC (International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry) Nomenclature.

"3/ Different views exist whether it is necessary to state both the scientific chemical name and the structural formula in order for the declarations to be unambiguous.

"4/ To be declared separately for super-toxic lethal, other lethal and other harmful chemicals.

"5/ Identified in accordance with approaches to be worked out in the context of Article II.

"6/ Some delegations suggested that multicomponent chemical weapons should not be declared as a special category in a separate table.
"1.3 Precursors 1/ in bulk 2/

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scientific chemical name 3/</th>
<th>Quantity (metric tons)</th>
<th>Number and size of containers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Structural formula 4/</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Precursors for unitary systems

Components for multicomponent systems 5/

"1/ Identified in accordance with approaches to be worked out in the context of Article II.

"2/ Some delegations did not consider this table necessary.

"3/ In accordance with the IUPAC (International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry) Nomenclature.

"4/ Different views exist whether it is necessary to state both the scientific chemical name and the structural formula in order for the declarations to be unambiguous.

"5/ Some delegations suggested that multicomponent chemical weapons should not be declared as a special category in a separate table.
**2. Munitions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Calibre (if applicable)</th>
<th>Quantity of unfilled munition/submunition (number of pieces)</th>
<th>Filled munition/submunition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unitary chemical type</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Examples:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shell</td>
<td>155 mm</td>
<td>22,000</td>
<td>13,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cartridge</td>
<td>120 mm</td>
<td>500 warhead bodies</td>
<td>1,000 warheads</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rocket warhead</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,500 submunitions</td>
<td>100 submunitions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Multicomponent chemical type</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Examples:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Binary shells for ... (= name of final reactive product)</td>
<td>155 mm</td>
<td>100 shell bodies</td>
<td>500 (completed shells, components stored separately)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

`Quantity (number of pieces)`

`Chemical fill (in kg per piece of munition/submunition)`

- 2.82 kg of chemical x
- 1.12 kg of chemical y
- 50 kg of chemical Z (50 x 1 kg submunitions)

**3. Other devices**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Quantity of unfilled devices (number of pieces)</th>
<th>Filled devices</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Example: spraytanks)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

`Quantity (number of pieces)`

`Chemical fill (in kg/piece)`

- 3 kg chemical A + B
- 2 kg chemical A
- 1 kg chemical C

1/ Some delegations did not consider this column necessary.
"4. Equipment specifically designed for use directly in connection with the employment of munitions and other devices under points D12 and 3. (Example: single purpose rocket launchers).

"5. Chemicals specifically designed for use directly in connection with the employment of munitions and other devices under points D12 and 3. (Example: thickeners). 1/

"E. Locations and detailed inventories of chemical weapons stocks to be declared before the commencement of each elimination period 2/

"For each stock the following shall be declared:

"1. Location

"Geographical location expressed by ...

"2. Detailed inventory

"Composition and quantities of the chemical weapons shall be declared in accordance with paragraph D of this Annex.

"II. PLANS FOR THE ELIMINATION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS

"A. General plans

"The following chemical weapons shall be eliminated during Elimination Period I: 2/ 3/

"The following chemical weapons shall be eliminated during Elimination Period II: 2/ 3/

etc.

---

1/ Different views exist concerning, if or to what extent such chemicals should be declared. Furthermore, it appears that this question will have to be decided in the light of the final definition of chemical weapons.

2/ Some delegations held the view that overall declarations should be made within 30 days after the Convention's entry into force for a State Party.

3/ Chemical weapons shall be described and amounts indicated in a manner identical to that of the declarations.
"B. Detailed plans

They shall include:

- schedules indicating detailed timeframes, quantities and types of chemical weapons to be destroyed or diverted to permitted purposes \(^1\) in accordance with the Principles for the Elimination laid down in Annex IV,

- location of facilities to be used for destruction or diversion \(^1\) and information confirming that the facilities can consume the quantities to be eliminated within the elimination period,

- methods to be used for the destruction or diversion, \(^1\) as well as the end products,

- plans for verification of the destruction and diversion \(^1\) processes based on the Principles and Methods for the Verification of the Elimination of Chemical Weapons laid down in Annex IV.

\(^1\) One delegation stated that it was unconvinced that diversion was either a practical or economical method for elimination. It may be prepared, however, to review its position in the event a practical system for diversion can be devised, preserving the requirement for effective verification.
"IV. CHEMICAL WEAPONS 1/

1. The provisions of this article shall apply to any and all chemical weapons under the jurisdiction or control 2/ of a State Party, regardless of location, including those on the territory of another State.

2. Each State Party, within 30 days after the Convention enters into force for it, shall submit a declaration which:

(a) specifies the [precise location,] aggregate quantity and detailed inventory of any chemical weapons under its jurisdiction or control;

(b) reports any chemical weapons on its territory under the jurisdiction or control of others, including a State not Party to this Convention; */

(c) specifies any transfer or receipt by the State Party of any chemical weapons since [...] or any transfer of control by that State Party of such weapons; and

(d) provides its general plan for destruction [or diversion] of its chemical weapons.

3. [Each State Party shall, immediately after the declaration under para. 2 of this Article has been submitted, provide access to its chemical weapons for the purpose of systematic international on-site verification of the declaration through on-site inspection. Thereafter, each State Party shall ensure, through access to its chemical weapons for the purpose of systematic international on-site verification and through on-site inspection and continuous monitoring with on-site instruments, that the chemical weapons are not removed except to a destruction facility.]

4. Each State Party shall submit detailed plans for the destruction of chemical weapons not later than ... months before each destruction [diversion] period begins. The detailed plans shall encompass all stocks to be eliminated during the next coming period, and shall include the precise location and the detailed composition of the chemical weapons which are subject to destruction during that period.

5. Each State Party shall:

(a) destroy [or divert] all chemical weapons pursuant to the Order specified in Annex IV, beginning not later than ... months and finishing not later than 10 years after the Convention enters into force for it;

"*/ A question was raised as to the applicability of this subparagraph.

"1/ It is anticipated that a reorganization of Article III will occur and may include identification of material currently in Article/Annex III for possible inclusion into Articles/Annexes IV and V.

"2/ It is agreed that the concept of 'jurisdiction or control' requires additional discussion and elaboration.
"(b) provide information annually regarding the implementation of its plans for destruction [or diversion] of chemical weapons, and

"(c) certify, not later than 30 days after the destruction [or diversion] process has been completed, that all chemical weapons have been destroyed [or diverted].

"6. Each State Party shall provide access to any chemical weapons destruction facilities and the facilities' storage for the purpose of systematic international on-site verification of destruction through the continuous */ presence of inspectors and continuous monitoring with on-site instruments, in accordance with Annex IV. 1/

"7. Any chemical weapons discovered by a State Party after the initial declaration of chemical weapons shall be reported, secured and destroyed, as provided in Annex IV. 2/

"8. All locations where chemical weapons are [stored or] destroyed shall be subject to systematic international on-site verification, through on-site inspection and monitoring with on-site instruments in accordance with Annex IV. 1/

"9. Any State Party which has on its territory chemical weapons which are under the control of a State that is not a Party to this Convention shall ensure that such weapons are removed from its territory not later than ... months after the date on which the Convention entered into force for it.

"10. The declaration, plans and information submitted by each State Party under this article shall be made in accordance with Annex ... and Annex ...

*/ The precise wording to express this concept satisfactorily in some of the languages requires further elaboration.

1/ The provisions of Annex IV, which address verification, require further elaboration.

2/ In view of the complex situations these chemical weapons involve, this issue needs to be further discussed and resolved.
ANNEX IV

I.1/ Principles, methods and organization of the elimination of chemical weapons

A. Destruction of chemical weapons

1. Destruction of chemical weapons means a process by which chemicals are converted in an essentially irreversible way to a form unsuitable for production of chemical weapons, and which in an irreversible manner renders munitions and other devices unusable as such.

Elimination through destruction shall apply to all chemical weapons except those which may be diverted (to be elaborated).

2. Each State Party possessing chemical weapons shall determine how they shall be destroyed, except that the following procedures may not be used; dumping in any body of water, land burial or open-pit burning.

3. The destruction of chemical weapons shall take place at a specifically designated and appropriately designed and equipped facility(ies). [The facility(ies) shall be government property.]

4. The chemical weapons destruction facility shall be constructed and operated in a manner to ensure the destruction of the chemical weapons and that the destruction process can be verified under the provisions of this Convention.

B. Diversion of Chemical Weapons

Diversion of chemical weapons means a process by which chemicals are converted in an essentially irreversible way into end products that may only be used for purposes other than those related to chemical weapons. [Diversion also includes taking super-toxic lethal chemicals from the chemical weapons stocks for use for permitted purposes in quantities up to 1 metric tonne in accordance with Article VI.] 2/

Elimination through diversion may apply to (to be elaborated).

II. Principles and Order of Elimination

1. The elaboration of the Order of Elimination shall build on the undiminished security for all States during the entire elimination stage; confidence building in the early part of the elimination stage; gradual

1/ For some delegations, the question of the applicability of this Annex to obsolete chemical weapons (ordinances) retrieved from the combat zones of World War I will have to be resolved later.

2/ One delegation stated that it was unconvinced that diversion was either a practical or economic method for elimination. It may be prepared, however, to review its position in the event a practical system for diversion can be devised, preserving the requirement for effective verification.
acquisition of experience in the course of destroying chemical weapons stocks and applicability irrespective of the actual composition of the stockpiles and the methods chosen for the elimination of the chemical weapons.

"2. The elimination of chemical weapons stocks shall start for all States Parties possessing chemical weapons simultaneously. The whole elimination stage shall be divided into nine annual periods.

"3. Each State Party shall eliminate not less than one-ninth of its stockpile [in measure of stockpile equivalent and/or equivalent mustard weight] during each elimination period. However, a State Party is not precluded from eliminating its stocks at a faster pace. Each State Party shall determine its detailed plans for each elimination period, as specified in part III of this Annex and shall report annually on the implementation of each elimination period.

"4. Order of Elimination (to be elaborated).

"III. Plans for elimination of chemical weapons

"A. General Plans for elimination of chemical weapons

"1. General Plan for destruction of chemical weapons

"The general plan for destruction of chemical weapons, submitted pursuant to article ... shall specify:

"(a) a general schedule for destruction, giving types and quantities of chemical weapons to be destroyed in each period;

"(b) for each existing or planned CW destruction facility:

- ["name" and address]
- [location]
- chemical weapons intended to be destroyed

"1/ It is considered necessary to elaborate a method for comparing different categories of chemical weapons stocks. The comparison of lethal and harmful chemicals remains unresolved and is subject to further consideration.

"2/ Some delegations expressed the view that the question of the regulation of the elimination of stockpiles needs further and full discussion.

"3/ It has been recognized that the elimination of chemical weapons stocks and the elimination of relevant production facilities should be considered together.

"4/ Some delegations feel that it would be appropriate to introduce the idea of security stockpile levels to meet the security concerns of countries with small stockpiles of chemical weapons.
- method of destruction
- capacity
- expected period of operation
- [products of the destruction process]

"[2. General Plans for diversion of chemical weapons (to be elaborated)]

"B. Detailed Plans for Elimination of chemical weapons

"1. Detailed Plans for Destruction of Chemicals Weapons

"These plans shall be submitted to the Consultative Committee in accordance with Article ... and shall specify:

"(a) the number of chemical weapons destruction facilities and a detailed schedule for the destruction of chemical weapons at each of these facilities;

"(b) the aggregate quantity of each individual type of chemical weapons plans to be destroyed at each facility;

"(c) data about each facility:

- name, postal address, geographical location;
- method of destruction;
- end-products;
- layout plan of the facility;
- technological scheme;
- operation manuals;
- method of storage and volume of the Facility's storage, estimated by types and quantities of chemical weapons;
- types and quantities of chemical weapons kept at the storage during each elimination period;
- the system of verification;
- safety measures in force at the facility;
- living and working conditions for the international inspectors.

"[2. Detailed Plans for Diversion of chemical weapons (to be elaborated)]
IV. Principles and Methods for the Verification of the Elimination of Chemical Weapons

A. Destruction of Chemical Weapons

1. The aim of verification of destruction of chemical weapons stocks shall be:
   - to confirm the identity and quantity of the chemical weapons stocks to be destroyed, and
   - to confirm that these stocks for all practical purposes have been destroyed.

2. After a review of the detailed plans provided in Section III above, the Technical Secretariat, if the need arises, will enter into consultation with the State Party concerned in order to ensure the facility is designed to assure destruction, to allow advanced planning on how verification measures may be applied and that the application of verification measures is consistent with proper facility operation, and to ensure that the facility operation allows appropriate verification.

3. Each State Party should execute a detailed agreement with the Technical Secretariat covering detailed inspection procedures for each facility subject to inspection. (This concept remains to be further elaborated).

4. The inspectors will be granted access to the chemical weapons destruction facility [...] prior to commencement of the active destruction phase, to carry out the engineering review of the facility, to include the facility's construction and layout, the equipment and instruments for measuring and controlling the destruction process, and the checking and testing of the accuracy of the verification equipment.

5. The inspectors will be granted access to conduct their activities at the facility and the facility storage during the entire active phase of destruction. They will conduct their activities in the presence and with the co-operation of representatives of the facility's management and the National Authority if they wish to be present.

6. The inspectors may monitor by either physical observation or devices:
   - (a) the facility storage and the chemical weapons present;
   - (b) the movement of chemical weapons from the storage to the facility;
   - (c) the process of destruction (assuring that no chemical weapons are diverted);
   - (d) the material balance (to be elaborated further), and
   - (e) the accuracy and calibration of the instruments.

7. To the extent consistent with verification needs, verification procedures should make use of information from routine facility operations.
"8. If inspectors detect irregularities which may give rise to doubts they will report the irregularities to the representatives of the facility and the National Authority and request that the situation be resolved. Uncorrected irregularities will be reported to the Executive Council.

"9. After the completion of each period of destruction the Technical Secretariat shall certify the declaration of the National Authority, reporting the completion of destruction of the designated quantity of chemical weapons.

"[B. Diversion of chemical weapons (to be elaborated)]

"V. [Verification of Declarations and Interim Monitoring of Chemical Weapons Stockpiles] */

"*/ Some delegations believe it is necessary to elaborate principles and methods for verifying chemical weapons declarations and for monitoring chemical weapons stockpiles from the time of their declaration until their elimination.
V. CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRODUCTION FACILITIES

1. The provisions of this article shall apply to any and all chemical weapons production facilities under the jurisdiction or control of a State Party, regardless of location.

2. Each State Party with any chemical weapons production facility shall cease immediately all activity at each chemical weapons production facility except that required for closure.

3. No State Party shall construct any new facility or modify any existing facility for the purpose of chemical weapons production or for any other purpose prohibited by the Convention.

4. Each State Party, within 30 days after the Convention enters into force for it, shall submit a declaration which:

(a) specifies any chemical weapons production facilities under its jurisdiction or control, or on its territory under the control of others, including a State not party to this Convention, at any time since [1 January 1946] at the time of entry into force of the Convention;

(b) specifies any transfer or any receipt by the State Party of any equipment for the production of chemical weapons [and documentation relevant to the production of chemical weapons] since [1.1.1946] or any transfer of control by that Party of such equipment [and documentation];

(c) specifies actions to be taken for closure of each chemical weapons production facility;

(d) outlines its general plan for destruction [or reconstruction for peaceful purposes] for each chemical weapons production facility, and

1/ It is anticipated that a reorganization of Article III will occur and may include identification of material currently in Article/Annex III for possible inclusion into Articles/Annexes IV and V.

2/ It is agreed that the concept of "jurisdiction or control" requires additional discussion and elaboration.

3/ It is understood that the above provisions also apply to any facility on the territory of another State [regardless of ownership and form of contract, on the basis of which they have been set up and functioned for the purposes of production of chemical weapons].

4/ Some delegations consider this paragraph redundant.

5/ Some delegations expressed doubts as to the applicability of this phrase.
"(e) outlines its general plan for any temporary conversion of any chemical weapons production facility into a facility for destruction of chemical weapons.

"5. Each State Party shall, immediately after the declaration, under para. 4, has been submitted, provide access to each chemical weapons production facility for the purpose of [systematic] international on-site verification of the declaration through on-site inspection.

"6. Each State Party shall:

"(a) close within three months after the Convention enters into force for it, each chemical weapons production facility in a manner that will render each facility inoperable, and

"(b) provide access to each chemical weapons production facility, subsequent to closure, for the purpose of systematic international on-site verification through periodic on-site inspection and continuous [monitoring by] [use of] on-site instruments in order to ensure that the facility remains closed and is subsequently [dismantled and] destroyed, or [dismantled] [and reconstructed for peaceful purposes].

"7. Each State Party shall submit detailed plans for [destruction] [elimination] of each facility not later than [3 months] before the [destruction] [elimination] [conversion] of the facility begins. 1/

"8. Each State Party shall:

"(a) [destroy] [eliminate] all chemical weapons production facilities pursuant to [the [order] [schedule] specified in] Annex ..., beginning not later that 12 months, and finishing not later than 10 years, after the Convention enters into force for it; 2/

"(b) provide information annually regarding the implementation of its plans for the [destruction] [elimination] of its chemical weapons production facilities, and

"(c) certify, not later than 30 days after the destruction process has been completed, that its chemical weapons production facilities have been [destroyed] [eliminated].

1/ One delegation held the view that the detailed plans in question should be submitted by each State Party within twelve months of the entry into force of the Convention for it.

2/ Some delegations expressed the desire to see the elimination of chemical weapons production facilities at the earliest opportunity.
9. A chemical weapons production facility may be temporarily converted for destruction of chemical weapons. Such a converted facility must be [destroyed] [eliminated] as soon as it is no longer in use for destruction of chemical weapons and, in any case, not later than 10 years after the Convention enters into force for the State Party.

10. [Each State Party shall submit all chemical weapons production facilities] [All chemical weapons production facilities] shall be subject to systematic international on-site verification through on-site inspection and [monitoring with] [use of] on-site instruments in accordance with Annex ...

11. The declaration, plans and information submitted by each State Party under this article shall be made in accordance with Annex ... and Annex ...
"ANNEX V

"I. DECLARATIONS OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRODUCTION FACILITIES 1/

"A. Possession or non-possession 2/

"1. Possession of chemical weapons production facilities on own territory.

   Yes ..... 
   No ..... 

"2. Possession, jurisdiction or control over chemical weapons production facilities elsewhere.

   Yes ..... 
   No ..... 

"If yes, information about location(s), expressed by name(s) of State(s).

"B. Existence on the territory of any chemical weapons production facilities under the jurisdiction or control of anyone else

   Yes ..... 
   No ..... 

"If yes, information about ownership, expressed by name(s) of States(s).

1/ Some delegations stressed that overall declarations should encompass not only production facilities with a production for chemical weapons purposes but also other facilities producing chemicals which can be used for chemical weapons purposes. It is understood that for the time being the paragraphs under the heading "Declarations of chemical weapons production facilities and plans for their elimination" refers only to production facilities with a production for chemical weapons purposes. A separate heading "Declarations of other facilities producing chemicals which can be used for chemical weapons purposes" has been inserted to indicate that the question of declaration of such facilities will need to be worked on.

2/ Some delegations held the view that all States Parties should declare their total production capacity. Other delegations felt that it was not necessary in this context to declare the total production capacity, and therefore that the entire paragraph was not necessary.
"C. Past transfers 1/

"If there has been transfer of equipment or technical documentation 2/ relevant for production of chemical weapons since ..., or reception of such equipment or documentation 2/ since that date, the following information shall be provided.

"(To be elaborated.)

"D. Initial declarations of chemical weapons production facilities

"They shall contain the following information:

"(1) production, stating products by ...

"(2) capacity expressed as ... 3/

"(3)

"(4)

"E. Declarations that all activities related to production of chemical weapons have ceased

"F. Detailed declarations of chemical weapons production facilities

"They shall contain the following information:

"(1) Geographical location expressed by ... 4/

"(2) Chemical names of products produced

"(3) Manufacturing/filling capacity for each substance expressed as ... 3/

"(4)

"(5)

"1/ The view was expressed that past transfers should not be included in the Convention.

"2/ The view was expressed that technical documentation should not be included.

"3/ It was suggested that capacity be expressed as maximum hourly capacity.

"4/ The view was expressed that declaration of location should be made in the context of declarations that production has ceased.
"II. PLANS FOR THE CLOSURE, ELIMINATION AND CONVERSION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRODUCTION FACILITIES

"A. Plans for closure 1/ of chemical weapons production facilities

"B. Plans for temporary conversion of chemical weapons production facilities into chemical weapons destruction facilities

"C. Plans for the elimination of chemical weapons production capacities

1. General plans

"They shall include:

2. Detailed plans

"They shall include:

"D. Plans for elimination of chemical weapons production facilities which have temporarily been converted into chemical weapons destruction facilities

"E. Plans for conversion of chemical weapons production facilities into facilities for production for permitted purposes 2/

"III. DECLARATIONS OF OTHER FACILITIES PRODUCING CHEMICALS WHICH CAN BE USED FOR CHEMICAL WEAPONS PURPOSES 3/

1/ Some delegations expressed the view that ceasing of production and closing of production facilities should be simultaneous. However, other delegations had doubts about the feasibility of this from the point of view of verification of the closure as well as from the point of view of possible temporary conversions of such facilities into facilities for destruction of chemical weapons.

2/ Some delegations held the view that conversion of chemical weapons production facilities into facilities for production for permitted purposes should not take place.

3/ Some delegations stressed that overall declarations should encompass not only production facilities with a production for chemical weapons purposes but also other facilities producing chemicals which can be used for chemical weapons purposes. It is understood that for the time being the paragraphs under the heading "Declarations of chemical weapons production facilities and plans for their elimination" refers only to production facilities with a production for chemical weapons purposes. A separate heading "Declarations of other facilities producing chemicals which can be used for chemical weapons purposes" has been inserted to indicate that the question of declaration of such facilities will need to be worked on.
IV. ELIMINATION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRODUCTION FACILITIES

A State Party shall decide for itself which methods, processes and techniques to use for the elimination of its chemical weapons production facility, if any, in accordance with the principles laid down in this Annex.

A. PRINCIPLES FOR THE ELIMINATION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRODUCTION FACILITIES

All chemical weapons production facilities shall be eliminated through destruction or dismantling. 1/ Chemical weapons production facilities may be temporarily converted into chemical weapons destruction facilities.

1. Destruction of chemical weapons production facilities

Destruction of chemical weapons production facilities means ...

Elimination through destruction shall apply to ...

2. Dismantling of chemical weapons production facilities

Dismantling of chemical weapons production facilities means ...

Elimination through dismantling may apply to ...

3. Elimination of chemical weapons production facilities temporarily converted into chemical weapons destruction facilities

4. Elimination of chemical weapons production facilities through conversion into facilities for production for permitted purposes 2/

B. PRINCIPLES FOR THE ORDER OF ELIMINATION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRODUCTION FACILITIES

(To be elaborated.)

C. PRINCIPLES AND METHODS FOR THE VERIFICATION OF THE CLOSURE AND ELIMINATION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRODUCTION FACILITIES

The detailed arrangements for the actual verification of the elimination shall be worked out in collaboration between the State Party and the Consultative Committee (or its subsidiary organs, as appropriate) in accordance with the following principles:

1/ The view was expressed that pending the definition of chemical weapons production facilities, the possibility for other ways of elimination should be kept open.

2/ Some delegations held the view that conversion of chemical weapons production facilities into facilities for production for permitted purposes should not take place.
"1. Principles and methods for the verification of closure of chemical weapons production facilities
   "(To be elaborated).

"2. Principles and methods for the verification of destruction of chemical weapons production facilities
   "(To be elaborated.)

"3. Principles and methods for the verification of dismantling of chemical weapons production facilities
   "(To be elaborated.)

"4. Principles and methods for the verification of elimination of chemical weapons production facilities which have temporarily been converted into chemical weapons destruction facilities

"5. Principles and methods for the verification of elimination of chemical weapons production facilities through conversion into facilities for production for permitted purposes

1/ Some delegations held the view that conversion of chemical weapons production facilities into facilities for production for permitted purposes should not take place.
VI. ACTIVITIES NOT PROHIBITED BY THE CONVENTION

1. Each State Party:

(a) has the right, subject to the provisions of this Convention, to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, retain, transfer and use toxic chemicals and their precursors for purposes not prohibited by the Convention.

(b) shall ensure that toxic chemicals and their precursors are not developed, produced, otherwise acquired, retained, transferred, or used within its territory or anywhere under its jurisdiction or control for purposes prohibited by the Convention.

2. Toxic Chemicals and Their Precursors:

(a) Toxic chemicals and their precursors considered in Annexes 1, 2 and 3, which could be used for purposes prohibited by the Convention, as well as facilities which produce, process or consume these toxic chemicals or precursors, shall be subject to international monitoring as provided in those Annexes:

Annex VI.1: Super-Toxic Lethal Chemicals and [especially dangerous key precursors] [key components of chemical weapons systems].

Annex VI.2 List [A]: Key Precursors.

Annex VI.3 List [C]: Chemicals produced in large commercial quantities and which could be used for chemical weapons purposes.

(b) The Lists of chemicals contained in the Annexes may be revised as required (the basis and modalities for revision are to be developed).

3. Within 30 days of the entry into force for it, each State Party shall declare data on relevant chemicals and the facilities which produce them, in accordance with Annexes 1, 2 and 3.

4. Each State Party shall make an annual declaration regarding the relevant chemicals in accordance with Annexes 1, 2 and 3.

5. Each State Party undertakes to subject the chemicals and [facility] [facilities] under Annex 1 to the measures contained in that Annex.

6. Each State Party undertakes to subject the chemicals and facilities under Annex 2 to monitoring by data reporting and routine systematic international on-site verification, through on-site inspection and use of on-site instruments as long as production and processing are not impaired.

1/ One delegation considers that the terminology used in this Article and its annexes should be consistent with the final definition of chemical weapons to be agreed upon.
"7. Each State Party undertakes to subject the chemicals and facilities under Annex 3 to monitoring by data reporting.

"8. The provisions of this Article shall be implemented in a manner designed in so far as possible to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of Parties to the Convention or international co-operation in the field of peaceful chemical activities including the international exchange of scientific and technical information and chemicals and equipment for the production, processing or use of chemicals for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of the Convention. 1/

"9. In conducting verification activities, the (Consultative Committee) shall,

"(a) avoid undue interference in the State Party's peaceful chemical activities;

"(b) take every precaution to protect confidential information coming to its knowledge in the implementation of the Convention; and

"(c) require only the minimum amount of information and data necessary for the carrying out of its responsibilities under the Convention.

"10. For the purpose of on-site verification, each State Party shall grant to the (Consultative Committee) access to facilities as required in Annexes 1, 2 and 3.

\footnote{1/ The inclusion of this paragraph in this Article is to be considered further.}
"ANNEX 1

"ARTICLE VI

"Super-Toxic Lethal Chemicals and [especially dangerous key precursors] [key components of chemical weapons systems]

1. (a) The retention, production, acquisition and use of super-toxic lethal chemicals, and [especially dangerous key precursors] [key components of chemical weapons systems] for permitted purposes shall be strictly limited to those amounts which can be justified for such purposes.

"(b) The production and use of all chemicals listed in Schedule [ ] shall be prohibited, except as required for research, medical or protective purposes.

"(c) [Two alternatives for consideration]

"(i) At no time shall the aggregate amount of super-toxic lethal chemicals, and [especially dangerous key precursors] [key components of chemical weapons systems] and key precursors possessed by a State Party for protective purposes exceed 1 metric tonne. The aggregate amount of super-toxic lethal chemicals acquired, withdrawn from chemical weapons stocks and produced for protective purposes shall not exceed 1 metric tonne per year, nor shall the annual amount of super-toxic lethal chemicals used for protective purposes exceed 1 metric tonne.

"(ii) At no time shall the aggregate amount of super-toxic lethal chemicals, and [especially dangerous key precursors] [key components of chemical weapons systems] possessed by a State Party for permitted purposes exceed 1 metric tonne. The aggregate amount of super-toxic lethal chemicals acquired, withdrawn from chemical weapons stocks and produced for permitted purposes shall not exceed 1 metric tonne per year, nor shall the annual amount of super-toxic lethal chemicals used for permitted purposes exceed 1 metric tonne.

2. Single Small-Scale Facility

"(a) Each State Party which produces super-toxic lethal chemicals, and [especially dangerous key precursors] [key components of chemical weapons systems] for [protective] [permitted] purposes shall carry out the production at a single specialized facility, the capacity of which shall be limited by measures to be determined. 1/

"(b) The location and a detailed description of the facility shall be provided to the Consultative Committee no less than 30 days before operations commence.

1/ Some delegations consider that the production of key precursors for protective purposes should be carried out at a single small-scale facility.
"(c) The facility shall be subject to systematic international on-site verification, through on-site inspection and continuous monitoring with on-site instruments.

3. [Other Facilities] 1/

"[To be developed.]

4. Transfers

"[To be developed.]

5. Declarations

"Declarations to be provided by a State Party in relation to Annex 1, under paragraphs 3 and 4 of Article VI, shall include the following information: [To be developed.]

"Schedule [ ] 2/"


1/ Some delegations consider that the production of super-toxic lethal chemicals for permitted purposes (other than protective) could be carried out at facilities other than the single small-scale facility. They consider that any facility producing or using a significant amount of these chemicals would be subject to strict monitoring, including data reporting and systematic international on-site inspection.

2/ The chemicals to be included in this Schedule are to be discussed. Some delegations consider that it is only necessary to list chemicals such as are in category I of CD/CW/WP.133. Other delegations consider that only in the context of elaborating a list of super-toxic lethal chemicals with no use as chemical weapons but which have practical application in pharmaceutical, medical and other civil purposes, could it be determined whether the division of super-toxic lethal chemicals into two categories could be acceptable and useful for the purposes of the Convention.
"ANNEX 2

"ARTICLE VI

"KEY PRECURSOR CHEMICALS 1/

"ANNUAL DECLARATION

"The Annual Declaration to be provided by a State Party under Paragraph [ ] of Article VI shall include:

1. Aggregate data on each of the production, consumption, import and export of each of the key precursor chemicals listed in Schedule [ ].

2. The following information for each facility which produces, processes or consumes more than [ ] tonnes per annum of any of the key precursor chemicals listed in Schedule [ ]: 2/

"Key Precursor Chemical(s)

1(i) the chemical name, [trivial name used by the facility], structural formula, and Chemical Abstracts Service Registry Number.

1(ii) the total amount produced, consumed, imported and exported in the previous calendar year. 3/

"Facility

1(i) the name of the facility and of the owner, company or enterprise operating the facility.

1(ii) the exact location of the facility. 4/

1(iii) whether the facility is dedicated to producing or processing the listed key precursor. 5/

1/ It is understood that there is an integral link between the list, the annual declaration and the verification measures for key precursor chemicals.

2/ The structure of this paragraph is provisional.

3/ Whether the total amount is to be expressed as an exact figure or within a range is to be discussed.

4/ It was suggested that "in a major enterprise" be added.

5/ This requirement needs to be considered further in connection with the question of "capacity".
"(iv) [the main orientation (purpose) of the facility]. 1/

"(v) the capacity (to be defined) of the facility. 2/

"(vi) which of the following activities are performed with regard to the key precursor chemicals:

"(a) production

"(b) processing with conversion into another chemical

"(c) processing without chemical conversion

"(d) other.

"(vii) whether listed key precursors are stored on-site in quantities greater than [ ] tonnes]. 3/

"Application of Chemical(s)

"(i) the purpose(s) for which the key precursor chemical(s) are produced, consumed or processed:

"(a) conversion on-site (specify final product or product type)

"(b) sale 4/ to other domestic industry (specify final product type)

"(c) export of a key precursor (specify which country)

"(d) other.

"3. A State Party shall notify the International Authority of the name and location of any facility which intends, in the year following submission of the Annual Declaration, to produce, process or consume more than [ ] tonnes per annum of any of the chemicals listed in Schedule [ ]. 5/

"Verification

"The facilities referred to in this Annex [shall] [may] be subject to systematic international on-site inspection on a routine basis (measures to be developed).

1/ It was suggested that this aspect could be incorporated in paragraph (vi).

2/ It was suggested that capability should also be considered in relation to capacity.

3/ The question of a threshold requires further consideration.

4/ It has been suggested that "sale" should be replaced by "transfer".

5/ The requirement contained in this provision is to be considered further.
**SCHEDULE [ ]**

**Part I: Initial list of chemicals which satisfy all the three criteria for key precursors**

1. Chemicals containing one P-methyl bond (mainly halides of anhydrides esters and salts)
   - N,N-Dimethylphosphoramidic dichloride
   - Diethyl N,N-dimethylphosphoramidate
   - Bis (2-hydroxethyl) sulphide (thiodiglycol)
   - Arsenic trichloride
   - 2,2-Diphenyl-2-hydroxyacetic acid and its esters
   - Quinuclidin-3-ol

**Types of chemicals to which the chemicals listed in col. 1 belong and among which additional key precursors could be found**

1. Chemicals containing one P-methyl, P-ethyl or P-propyl (normal or iso) bond

**Aggregated list of key precursors (as a result of the discussions) to which régime [A] should be applied**

1. Chemicals containing one P-Methyl, P-Ethyl or P-Propyl (normal or iso) bond (mainly halides of anhydrides, esters and salts).

**Part II: Chemicals which do not meet all the three criteria for key precursors but possess features that would warrant their inclusion as an exception in List [A]**

Types of chemicals to which the chemicals listed in col. 1 belong

**Aggregated list of relevant chemicals (as a result of the discussions) to which régime [A] should be applied**

To be continued (to include other proposals of delegations)

---

"This Schedule is subject to development and revision. Lists [A] and [B] and régime [A] as mentioned in this schedule refer to lists and régimes in CD/651."
Part III

A. Chemicals which according to the views of some delegations satisfy all three criteria 1/ and should be listed in Part I and which according to the views of other delegations do not satisfy all three criteria and may be listed in Part II.

1. N,N-Diisopropylaminoethyl-2-chloride 6/ 1. N,N-disubstituted aminoethyl-2-halides

To be continued (to include other proposals of delegations)

B.

3,3-Dimethylbutan-2-ol 7/ Alkyl, cycloalkyl alcohols etc.

To be continued (to include other proposals of delegations)

1/ The general approach to the criteria is reflected in Article II. The formulations for the criteria are not definitive and are still evolving.

2/ To be elaborated.

3/ The chemical substances in the aggregated list have been placed there on a provisional basis.

It is necessary to consider further:

(a) listing the entire family or only listing specific types of derivatives within the family

(b) possible analogs

(c) use in peaceful industries.

4/ It was pointed out that whether or not régime [A] should be applied to this chemical depends on the nature of régime [A].

5/ This chemical meets all three criteria for a key precursor. However, it is used for military purposes not related to chemical weapons (i.e., electronics). It is necessary to consider further whether régime [A] should be applied or not.

6/ It is necessary to consider further whether this compound meets all three criteria for key precursors and thus should be placed in Part I of List [A] or whether it should be included in Part II of List [A] as an exception.

7/ Views differ as to whether this compound:

(a) meets all three criteria for key precursors

(b) should be placed in Part II of List [A] as an exception, or should be placed in List [B] as an especially dangerous precursor.
ANNEX 3

"ARTICLE VI"

"Chemicals which are produced in large commercial quantities and which could be used for chemical weapons purposes"

"1. ANNUAL DECLARATION"

"The Annual Declaration to be provided by a State Party under paragraph [ ] of Article VI shall include the following information for each of the chemicals listed in Schedule [ ]:

"(i) the chemical name, [trivial name], structural formula and Chemical Abstracts Service Registry Number.

"(ii) the total amount produced, consumed, imported and exported in the previous calendar year.

"(iii) the final product or end use of the chemical in accordance with the following categories (to be developed);

"(iv) for each facility which produces, processes, consumes or transfers one of the chemicals listed in Schedule [ ] (on an industrial scale - to be defined).

"(a) the name of the facility and of the owner, company or enterprise operating the facility.

"(b) the location of the facility.

"(c) the capacity (to be defined) of the facility.

"(d) the approximate amount of production and consumption of the chemical in the previous year (ranges to be specified).

"2. A State Party shall notify the [International Authority] of the name and location of any facility which intends, in the year following submission of the Annual Declaration, to produce, process or consume any of the chemicals listed in Schedule [ ] (on an industrial scale - to be defined). 2/

---

"1/ The relevance of transfers in this connection is to be considered further.

"2/ The requirement contained in this provision is to be considered further."
"Schedule [ ] */

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chemical</th>
<th>CAS Number</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Phosphorus oxychloride</td>
<td>(10025-87-3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phosphorus trichloride</td>
<td>(7719-12-2)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Phosgene</td>
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<td>Cyanogen chloride</td>
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<td>Hydrogen cyanide</td>
<td>(74-90-8)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trichloronitromethane (chloropicrin)</td>
<td>(76-06-2)</td>
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<td>Di- and Trimethyl/ethyl Esters of Phosphorus p(III) Acid:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trimethyl phosphate</td>
<td>(121-45-9)</td>
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<td>Triethyl phosphate</td>
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<tr>
<td>[Sulphur monochloride] 1/</td>
<td>(19925-67-9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Sulphur dichloride] 2/</td>
<td>(19545-99-0)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

"VERIFICATION"

"The verification régime for chemicals listed in Schedule [ ] will
comprise both the provision of data by a State Party to the [International Authority] and the monitoring of that data by the [International Authority]. 3/

"*/ List 'C' in CD/651 refers.

"1/ and 2/ The question of whether or not these chemicals should be
listed in Schedule [ ] is still to be resolved.

"3/ One delegation considers that provision should be made for resort to
an on-site "spot-check" inspection, if required, to verify information supplied by a State Party."
"VII. NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION MEASURES

"Each State Party to this Convention shall adopt any measures it considers necessary in accordance with its constitutional processes to implement this Convention and, in particular, to prohibit and prevent anywhere under its jurisdiction or control any activity that a State Party to this Convention is prohibited from conducting by this Convention.

"In order to implement these obligations, each State Party shall, according to its needs and specific conditions, designate or establish a national authority. */

"Each State Party undertakes to inform the Consultative Committee concerning the national authority and other legislative and administrative measures taken to implement the Convention.

"Each State Party undertakes to co-operate with the Consultative Committee in the exercise of all its functions and in particular to provide assistance to the Consultative Committee including data reporting, assistance for international on-site inspections, provided for in this Convention, and a response to all its requests for the provision of expertise, information and laboratory support.

"National Technical Means **/

*/ It was suggested that guidelines for the functioning of the national authority for the implementation of the Convention be elaborated.

**/ It was suggested that no reference to National Technical Means is needed in a future Convention.
VIII. CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE */

A. Establishment of the Consultative Committee

1. There is hereby established the Consultative Committee.

2. The Consultative Committee shall be the principal organ of the Convention.

3. The first session of the Consultative Committee shall be convened by the Depositary at [venue] not later than 30 days after the entry into force of the Convention.

B. Composition, procedure and decision-making

1. The Consultative Committee shall be composed of all the States Parties to this Convention. Each State Party to this Convention shall have one representative in the Consultative Committee, who may be accompanied by alternates and advisers.

2. The Consultative Committee shall meet in regular annual sessions and in such special sessions as may be convened at the request of ... members of the Consultative Committee or of the Executive Council or as provided in Article IX of the Convention.

3. Sessions shall take place at the seat of the Consultative Committee unless it decides otherwise.

4. The Consultative Committee shall adopt its rules of procedure. At the beginning of each regular session, it shall elect its Chairman and such other officers as may be required. They shall hold office until a new Chairman and other officers are elected at the next regular session.

5. A majority of the members of the Consultative Committee shall constitute a quorum.

6. Each member of the Consultative Committee shall have one vote.

[7. Decisions on questions of procedure, including decisions to convene special sessions of the Consultative Committee, shall be taken by a simple majority.

8. Decisions on questions of substance shall be taken by [a two-third majority] [consensus]. When the issue arises as to whether a question is one of substance or not, that question shall be treated as one of substance unless otherwise decided by the Consultative Committee by the majority required for decisions on questions of substance.]

[7. All decisions shall be taken by a two-third majority.]

Some delegations suggested that the question of how the expenses of the Consultative Committee shall be met needs to be addressed within the Convention at an appropriate time.
"C. Powers and functions

1. The Consultative Committee shall [oversee] [review] the implementation of the Convention, consider any questions or matters relevant to the Convention or relating to the powers and functions of any subsidiary organs [established by the Consultative Committee], foster consultation and co-operation among States Parties [for the advancement of chemical industry for peaceful purposes] and promote the verification of compliance with this Convention.

2. In carrying out its functions [referred to in paragraph 1], the Consultative Committee shall inter alia:

(a) co-operate with the appropriate national authorities of States Parties;

(b) facilitate consultations and co-operation among States Parties at their request;

(c) review scientific and technical developments which could affect the operation of this Convention;

(d) encourage international scientific and technical co-operation in the chemical field for peaceful purposes, [especially with the objective of promoting the advancement of chemical industry in the developing States as provided in Article XI];

(e) carry out all activities relating to measures of verification; for this purpose, the Consultative Committee shall;

(i) specify procedures for systematic international on-site inspection;

(ii) oversee [and carry out] systematic international on-site inspection in accordance with Articles ...;

[(iii) consider and decide on requests to send a fact-finding mission in accordance with Article ...];

(iv) carry out fact-finding activities in accordance with Article IX;

(f) establish and revise as necessary, procedures for exchange of information, for declarations and for technical matters related to the implementation of this Convention;

(g) receive, keep [and make available to States Parties] declarations, plans and notifications presented by States Parties in accordance with Articles ...;

(h) provide a forum for discussion of any questions raised relating to the objectives or the implementation of the Convention;

(i) elect the members of the Executive Council in accordance with Article ...;
"[(j) elect ... (the head of the Secretariat) from among the candidates proposed by members of the Consultative Committee;]

"[(k) appoint inspectors as the staff of the Inspectorate and the head of the Inspectorate;]

"(l) establish, as appropriate, such subsidiary organs as it finds necessary for the exercise of its functions in accordance with this Convention;

"(m) adopt the rules of procedure [of the Executive Council including the method of selecting its Chairman];

"(n) consider and approve the proposed annual budget of the Consultative Committee and its subsidiary organs submitted by the Council;

"(o) consider and approve the reports of the Executive Council;

"(p) after the expiry of a period of ... years from the date of entry into force of this Convention, undertake a review of the operation of this Convention in accordance with Article ... */

"3. The Consultative Committee shall establish an Executive Council [within 45 days after the entry into force of the Convention].

"4. While the Consultative Committee is ultimately responsible for the functions provided for in paragraph 2, it shall delegate the actual implementation of those functions to the Executive Council in accordance with the provisions of this Convention.

"*/ Some delegations were of the view that provisions on review should be more appropriately included in another part of the Convention.
"EXECUTIVE COUNCIL */

"A. Composition, procedure and decision-making

"1. The Executive Council shall consist of [15] States Parties to this Convention elected by the Consultative Committee. [In addition, those permanent members of the Security Council of the United Nations which are parties to the Convention should be represented]. Each member of the Executive Council shall have one representative in the Council, who may be accompanied by alternates and advisers.

"2. The members of the Executive Council shall be elected on the basis of [an appropriate geographic and political balance.]

"3. Election shall take place at regular sessions of the Consultative Committee. Each [elected] member of the Executive Council shall serve for [two] [three] years period, with [five] of the members elected each year.

"4. The Executive Council shall function at the seat of the Consultative Committee.

"[5. A majority of the members of the Executive Council shall constitute a quorum.]

"6. Each member of the Executive Council shall have one vote.

"[7. Decisions on questions of procedure shall be taken by a simple majority.

"8. Decisions on questions of substance shall be taken by [a two-third majority] [consensus]. When the issue arises as to whether a question is one of substance or not, that question shall be treated as one of substance unless otherwise decided by the Council by the majority required for decisions on questions of substance.]

"[7. All decisions shall be taken by a two-third majority.]]

*/ Some delegations believed that the question of placement within the Convention of some of the provisions relating to the functions of the subsidiary organs will have to be considered at a later stage.
"B. Functions */

"1. The Executive Council shall be responsible to the Consultative Committee and shall have delegated authority to discharge the functions of the Consultative Committee as provided in paragraph 1 and paragraph 2 (a) to 2 (h) of Section I Subsection C of this Article.

"2. The Executive Council shall particularly:

"(a) supervise and co-ordinate the activities of the subsidiary organs of the Consultative Committee in implementing the provisions of the Convention;

"(b) ensure the effective implementation of, and compliance with, the Convention;

"(c) propose to the Consultative Committee, as appropriate, the establishment of such subsidiary organs as it finds necessary for the exercise of its functions in accordance with this Convention;

"(d) present reports to the Consultative Committee particularly about the exercise of the functions delegated to it;

"(e) request the ... (head of the Secretariat) when appropriate and necessary, to convene a special meeting of the Consultative Committee;

"[(f) propose to the Consultative Committee the establishment of appropriate mechanisms for directing and supervising the Inspectorate;]

"[(g) propose to the Consultative Committee the appointment of inspectors as the staff of the Inspectorate and appoint among the inspectors the head of the Inspectorate;]

"(h) obtain, keep, and disseminate information submitted by States Parties regarding matters pertaining to the Convention.

"(i) receive requests for information and clarification regarding compliance with the Convention from States Parties, including requests for fact-finding.

"[(j) decide and oversee specific actions to be taken regarding such requests.]

"*/ Some delegations considered that the provisions on the functions of the Executive Council will require further specification in the light of such functions as may be conferred upon the Council in other parts of the Convention, particularly with regard to verification."
"IX. CONSULTATIONS, CO-OPERATION AND FACT-FINDING

1. State Parties shall consult and co-operate, directly among themselves, or through the Consultative Committee or other appropriate international procedures, including procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter, on any matter which may be raised relating to the objectives or the implementation of the provisions of this Convention.

2. States Parties to the Convention shall make every possible effort to clarify and resolve, through exchange of information and consultations among them, any matter which may cause doubt about compliance with this Convention, or which gives rise to concerns about a related matter which may be considered ambiguous. [A Party which receives a request from another Party for clarification of any matter which the requesting Party believes causes such doubts or concerns shall provide the requesting Party, within ... days of the request, with information sufficient to answer the doubts or concerns raised along with an explanation on how the information provided resolves the matter.] Nothing in this Convention affects the right of any two or more States Parties to this Convention to arrange by mutual consent for inspections or any other procedures among themselves to clarify and resolve any matter which may cause doubts about compliance or gives rise to concerns about a related matter which may be considered ambiguous. Such arrangements shall not affect the rights and obligations of any State Party under other provisions of this Convention.

"Procedure for requesting clarification

3. A State Party shall have the right to request the Executive Council to assist in clarifying any situation which may be considered ambiguous or which gives rise to doubts about the compliance of another State Party with the Convention. The Executive Council shall provide appropriate information and data in its possession relevant to the situation which can dispel such doubts, whilst [taking every precaution in] protecting commercial and industrial secrets and other confidential information coming to its knowledge in the implementation of the Convention.

4. A State Party shall have the right to request the Executive Council to obtain clarification from another State Party on any situation which may be considered ambiguous or which gives rise to doubts about its compliance with the Convention. In such a case, the following shall apply:

"(a) The Executive Council shall forward the request for clarification to the State Party concerned within [24 hours] of its receipt.

"(b) The requested State Party shall provide the clarification to the Executive Council within [seven days] of the receipt of the request.

"(c) The Executive Council shall forward the clarification to the requesting State Party within [24 hours] of its receipt.

"(d) In the event that the requesting State Party deems the clarification to be inadequate, it may request the Executive Council to obtain from the requested State Party further clarification.
"(e) For the purpose of obtaining further clarification requested under paragraph 2 (d), the Executive Council may set up a group of experts to examine all available information and data relevant to the situation causing the doubt. The group of experts shall submit a factual report to the Executive Council on its findings.

"(f) Should the requesting State Party consider the clarification obtained under paragraphs 2 (d) and 2 (e) to be unsatisfactory, it may request a special meeting of the Executive Council in which States Parties involved not members of the Executive Council shall be entitled to take part in accordance with provisions in Article ... In such a special meeting, the Executive Council shall consider the matter and may recommend any measure it deems appropriate to cope with the situation.

"5. A State Party shall have the right to request the Executive Council to clarify any situation which has been considered ambiguous or has given rise to doubts about its compliance with the Convention. The Executive Council shall respond by providing such assistance as appropriate.

"6. The Executive Council shall inform the States Parties to this Convention about any request for clarification provided in this Article.

"7. [If the doubts or concerns of a State Party about compliance have not been resolved within [two months] after the submission of the request for clarification to the Executive Council, or it believes its doubts warrant urgent consideration, without necessarily exercising its right to the challenge procedure, it may request a special session of the Consultative Committee in accordance with Article ... In such a special session, the Consultative Committee shall consider the matter and may recommend any measure it deems appropriate to cope with the situation.]
"Procedure for requesting a fact-finding mission

"The further contents of Article IX remain to be elaborated.*/ **/ ***/

"*/ The text in Annex III of the Report of Working Group C contained in CD/CW/WP.149 dealing with procedures for challenge inspection in its present form in some instances has narrowed down differences. In the view of many delegations the text reflects the current stage of negotiations. It requires further substantive work. Other material on fact-finding and challenge inspection can be found in documents CD/294, CD/334, CD/416, CD/443, CD/500, CD/539, CD/664, CD/685, CD/715, CD/CW/WP.120 and CD/CW/WP.136.

"**/ Many delegations felt that the text contained in Annex III of the Report of Working Group C, which is the product of intensive negotiations and consultations during the 1986 session, should have been duly included in the final report of the Ad Hoc Committee. They deeply regretted, therefore, that lack of consensus prevented the Committee from doing so and were of the view that such text should be the basis for future work on the crucial issue of challenge inspection.

"***/ In the opinion of other delegations, differences between positions on challenge inspection are still great, and the current state of negotiations on this issue is reflected in the many proposals that have been put forth.
"X. ASSISTANCE

"XI. ECONOMIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT

"XII. RELATION TO OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS */

"Nothing in this Convention will be interpreted as in any way impairing the obligations assumed under the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925 and in the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, signed at London, Moscow and Washington on 10 April 1972.

"XIII. AMENDMENTS

"XIV. DURATION, WITHDRAWAL */

"The withdrawal of a State Party from this Convention shall not in any way affect the duty of States to continue fulfilling the obligations assumed under any relevant rules of international law, particularly the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925.

"XV. SIGNATURE, RATIFICATION, ENTRY INTO FORCE

"XVI. LANGUAGES

"Annexes and other documents

"Preparatory Commission"

"*/ Some delegations consider that the texts contained above require further consideration."
E. Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space

88. The item on the agenda entitled "Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space" was considered by the Conference, in accordance with its programme of work, during the periods 3-14 March and 30 June-4 July 1986.

89. The list of documents presented to the Conference during its 1986 session under the agenda item is contained in the Report submitted by the Ad Hoc Committee referred to in the following paragraph.

90. At its 383rd plenary meeting, on 28 August 1986, the Conference adopted the Report of the Ad Hoc Committee re-established by the Conference under the agenda item at its 359th plenary meeting (see paragraph 11 above). That Report (CD/726) is an integral part of this Report and reads as follows:

"1. At its 359th plenary meeting on 24 April 1986, the Conference on Disarmament adopted the following decision:

   'In the exercise of its responsibilities as the multilateral disarmament negotiating forum in accordance with paragraph 120 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the Conference on Disarmament decides to re-establish an Ad Hoc Committee under Item 5 of its agenda entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space".

   The Conference requests the Ad Hoc Committee, in discharging that responsibility, to continue to examine, and to identify, through substantive and general consideration, issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

   The Ad Hoc Committee in carrying out this work, will take into account all existing agreements, existing proposals and future initiatives as well as developments which have taken place since the establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee, in 1985, and report on the progress of its work to the Conference on Disarmament before the end of its 1986 session.'

II. Organization of work and documents

"2. At its 359th plenary meeting on 24 April 1986, the Conference on Disarmament appointed Ambassador Luvsandorjiin Bayart (Mongolia) as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee. Miss Aida Luisa Levin, Senior Political Affairs Officer, United Nations Department of Disarmament Affairs, continued to serve as the Committee's Secretary.

"3. The Ad Hoc Committee held 16 meetings between 25 April and 19 August 1986.

"4. At their request, the Conference on Disarmament decided to invite the representatives of the following States not members of the Conference to participate in the meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee: Austria, Denmark, Finland, Greece, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain and Turkey.
5. In addition to the documents of the previous session 1/, the Ad Hoc Committee had before it the following documents relating to the agenda item submitted to the Conference on Disarmament during the 1986 session:

CD/678 Letter dated 11 March 1986 addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament from the Permanent Representative of Canada to the Conference on Disarmament, transmitting a compendium of working papers on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space and statements made in plenary on that subject;

CD/694 Mandate for an Ad Hoc Committee under item 5 of the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament entitled, 'Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space';

CD/708 Proposal relating to the prevention of an arms race in outer space; international instrument to supplement the ABM Treaty, submitted by Pakistan (also issued as CD/OS/WP.12);

CD/709/Rev.1 Draft definition of space strike weapons, working paper submitted by Venezuela (also issued as CD/OS/WP.13/Rev.1);

CD/716 'Terminology relevant to arms control and outer space', working paper submitted by Canada (also issued as CD/OS/WP.15);

CD/723 Letter dated 13 August 1986 addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament by Representatives of Argentina, India, Mexico and Sweden, transmitting two documents entitled 'Declaration of Mexico' and 'Document issued at the Mexico Summit on Verification Measures', adopted at Ixtapa, Mexico, on 7 August 1986.

In addition, the Committee had before it the following working papers:

CD/OS/WP.10 Programme of work proposed by the Group of 21;

CD/OS/WP.11 1986 Programme of work;

CD/OS/WP.12 Proposal relating to the prevention of an arms race in outer space; international instrument to supplement the ABM Treaty, submitted by Pakistan (also issued as CD/708);

CD/OS/WP.13/Rev.1 Draft definition of space strike weapons, working paper submitted by Venezuela (also issued as CD/709/Rev.1);

1/ The list of documents of the previous session may be found in the 1985 report of the Ad Hoc Committee, which is an integral part of the report of the Conference on Disarmament (CD/642).
"III. Substantive work during the 1986 Session

6. Following an initial exchange of views, the Ad Hoc Committee, at its sixth meeting on 24 June 1986, adopted the following programme of work for the 1986 session (CD/OS/WP.11):

1. Examination and identification of issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space;

2. Existing agreements relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space;

3. Existing proposals and future initiatives on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

In carrying out its work, the Ad Hoc Committee will take into account developments which have taken place since the establishment of the Committee in 1985.'

7. The Ad Hoc Committee agreed that in discharging the tasks set forth in its mandate, it would give equal treatment to the subjects covered therein. Accordingly, the Committee further agreed to allocate the same number of meetings to each of those subjects, namely, issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space, existing agreements and existing proposals and future initiatives. A final summing-up meeting also took place.

8. Pursuant to the programme of work, delegations examined and identified various issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

9. Many delegations reaffirmed that outer space is the common heritage of mankind and should be confined exclusively for peaceful uses to promote the scientific, economic and social development of all nations. Some delegations noted with concern that there is a very real threat that research and development programmes of the two major space Powers and the dynamics of their military competition is being extended into outer space, leading to the development, testing, production and possible deployment of weapons systems and their components adaptable for use in, towards, or from space and to the unleashing of an irreversible competition in the field of space weaponry. Furthermore, they emphasized that an arms race in outer space would undermine existing agreements relating to outer space as well as arms limitation, apart from jeopardizing the disarmament process as a whole, while noting that the development of space weapons technologies by the major Powers and their allies
will have an impact which could lead to a qualitative improvement of and linkages with other weapon technologies with dangerous consequences for non-aligned and neutral countries as well as for international peace and security. Accordingly, they stressed the urgency of the task of preventing the 'weaponization' of space. At the same time, these delegations drew attention to the existing military uses of space. It was stated that satellites which performed such functions as monitoring, surveillance, intelligence-gathering, navigation, communication and early warning and provided support to weapons systems and to military operations on Earth were directly linked to the security concerns of the two major space Powers and their allies with dangerous consequences for international peace and security. The view was expressed that to ensure against the inequitable and discriminatory use of such satellites vis-à-vis non-aligned and neutral States their operation should be placed under an international agency.

"10. Furthermore, some delegations stated that the majority of space objects now in orbit, while not meant as weapons or as weapons platforms, served military functions and constituted integral parts of weapon systems on Earth and of strategic doctrines associated with the use of nuclear weapons. Those delegations also drew the attention of the Ad Hoc Committee to the fact that there had been instances where satellites had been used in support of military operations against developing countries. In this view, that situation, which had important implications for the security of most countries, did not reflect recognition of the common interest of all States in the progress of the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful uses, as stated in the preamble of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty.

"11. Some delegations also identified the issues and activities relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space to be dealt with in the Ad Hoc Committee as: weapon systems in space or directed against targets in space, and support of weapon systems and military operations on earth and surveillance systems.

"12. Delegations of a group of socialist countries fully shared the view that outer space is the common heritage of mankind and that, consequently, its exploration and use should be preserved for exclusively peaceful purposes in order to promote the scientific, economic and social development of all countries. They noted that up to the present outer space had been an area free of weapons. Those delegations emphasized, however, the impending danger of the spread of the arms race to outer space which, in their view, would step up the arms race in other spheres and would make reductions in nuclear arsenals impossible. They held that the key to the prevention of such an arms race lay in preventing the emergence of a new type of weapons, namely, space strike weapons. They considered that the prohibition of space-strike weapons, including ASAT weapons, space-based ABM systems and space-to-Earth class weapons would be an effective and secure way to prevent all possibilities for the introduction of weapons into outer space. In their view, conditions at present were suitable for banning such weapons, since they had not yet been introduced in the arsenals of States. They also underlined the importance of maintaining relevant agreements, in particular, the 1972 ABM Treaty. They believed that international cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space should be an alternative to the arms race in space.
13. Other delegations, while sharing the concern about the prevention of an arms race in outer space, stated that outer space was not, nor had been, immune from utilization by existing weapons or military systems. On the other hand, some such military activities have contributed to strategic stability and arms control and thus to the maintenance of international peace and security. They reiterated the view that the first task that required attention was to establish common ground on which activities were permitted and which ones were prohibited. In addition, these delegations considered that issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space could not be examined in isolation but should be approached in the wider context of the global process of disarmament. They stated that deployment of space-based BMD systems is not an imminent event. They considered that any such deployment would have to be a matter for negotiation, given existing treaty obligations. They underlined the importance of a thorough examination of issues relating to verification of and compliance with existing, as well as potential future, international agreements.

14. One delegation fully subscribed to the objective of the non-militarization of outer space and its use exclusively for peaceful purposes which, in its opinion, called for the limitation and prohibition of both space weapons and military satellites. It considered that, in view of its complexity, the problem of the limitation and prohibition of military satellites should be dealt with at a future time and that, at the present stage, efforts should focus on preventing the 'weaponization' of space, i.e., the prohibition of the development, testing, production, deployment and use of any space weapons and the thorough destruction of existing ones.

15. Delegations examined various multilateral and bilateral instruments, inter alia, the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water (1963), the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (1967), the Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space (1968), the Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (1971), the Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (1972), the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (1972), the Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Nuclear War (1973), the Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space (1975), the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (1977) and the Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and other Celestial Bodies (1979).

16. It was noted that, as recognized in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, activities in the exploration and use of outer space should be carried out in accordance with international law, including the Charter of the United Nations. Some delegations underscored the importance of the Charter provisions, in particular those concerning the non-use of force, namely, articles 2(4) and 51. They stated that provisions of such agreements prohibited any aggressive acts in outer space and, accordingly, afforded a
substantial degree of protection to space objects. Other delegations, while acknowledging the importance of the provisions of the United Nations Charter relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space, rejected the view according to which article 51 of the Charter could be interpreted as justifying the use of space weapons for defensive purposes or the possession of defensive systems based on the use of space weapons. Furthermore, in regard to the reference to article 51 of the Charter, they reiterated that this article could not be invoked to legitimize the use or threat of use of force in or from outer space. Those delegations also held that norms concerning the non-use of force did not and, by their nature, could not prevent an arms race in outer space, since they did not preclude the development, testing and deployment of space weapons. In this context, they also noted that the agreed objective was not to regulate an arms race in outer space but rather to prevent it, and that any attempt to justify the introduction of weapons in that environment contradicted that objective.

"17. Various delegations, while recognizing the value of the legal restraints imposed by the existing régime, considered that there was a clear need to amplify and strengthen that régime to ensure that outer space would not become an arena for the arms race and would be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. Some delegations stressed that existing agreements did not contain provisions prohibiting the development, testing, production and deployment of space weapons and held that, consequently, there was an urgent need to strengthen, improve and amplify the legal framework relating to outer space and to conclude an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, to prevent an arms race in all its aspects in outer space. With respect to the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, it was stated that some of its basic concepts remain imprecise. It was also noted that under the Treaty the concept of demilitarization only applied to the Moon and other celestial bodies and that, in the case of outer space itself, the Treaty's prohibition covered only the placement in orbit around the earth of any object carrying nuclear weapons or any other kind of weapons of mass destructions, or the stationing of such weapons in outer space, in any other manner. Thus, in their view, the Treaty left considerable room for various military activities in outer space, including the deployment of a wide range of weapons, in particular ASAT weapons as well as BMD weapon systems adaptable for use in ASAT modes. It was also stressed that rapid ongoing developments in space weapons technology could erode existing space law, perhaps leading ultimately to its redundancy. In this context, they stressed that the existing international instruments, though still of positive significance, can no longer meet today's needs and, consequently, were inadequate for the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The need, therefore, arises to conclude new international agreements.

"18. Some delegations stressed that in order to identify the lacunae that might exist in the legal régime governing outer space, it was necessary to reach a clear and common understanding of what that régime did and did not permit. In their opinion, outer space was analogous to other environments beyond national jurisdiction, such as the high seas, where non-aggressive military activities were permitted under the existing legal régime. These delegations were also of the view that the area of terminology required further study to achieve greater precision, for example, the vagueness and imprecision of the term 'weaponization' was highlighted. In that connection, they referred to document CD/OS/ WP.15 which, in their opinion, could be a
basis for future work. These delegations also considered that broader participation in existing multilateral agreements and strict observance of both multilateral and bilateral agreements would strengthen the legal régime applicable to outer space.

"19. One delegation, in addition to associating itself fully with the points in the previous paragraph, added that it viewed effective arms control in outer space as an attainable quest and one to which it was committed. It believed that the existing legal régime was adequate to deal with current challenges to arms control in outer space; however, full compliance with relevant agreements in force was essential.

"20. However, some delegations noted that the existing treaties do not establish unambiguously that outer space is the common heritage of mankind which should be used exclusively for peaceful purposes.

"21. Consideration was given to a number of proposals submitted during 1986 (CD/OS/WP.16 and Add.1) as well as to earlier ones. 2/

"22. Some delegations stressed that the main objective of the Conference on Disarmament should be the comprehensive prohibition of the development, testing, production and deployment of space weapons. Until the realization of such a comprehensive goal, to prevent an arms race in all its aspects in outer space efforts should concurrently also be directed towards the adoption of partial measures, such as a ban on ASAT weapons and their components, as well as systems adaptable for use in an ASAT mode that are not prohibited under existing agreements.

"23. Delegations of a group of socialist countries stressed the need to block completely all possible channels for the extension of an arms race to outer space on the basis of the proposed draft treaty on the prohibition of the use of force in outer space and from space against Earth. Taking into account the position of other delegations with respect to the comprehensive solution to the problem of preventing an arms race in outer space, they were ready to adopt partial steps, leading towards this final goal. In their view, one of such steps could be a conclusion of international agreement on the immunity of artificial satellites and on the prohibition of development, testing and deployment of new ASAT systems and on the destruction of existing such systems.

"24. Various delegations considered that efforts in the Ad Hoc Committee should be directed towards the objective of prohibiting the emergence of space weapons and several definitions of space weapons were put forward for consideration by the Committee (CD/OS/WP.13/Rev.1 and CD/OS/WP.14/Rev.1 and Add.1). Some of these delegations placed particular emphasis on the prohibition of "space strike weapons". In the course of the analysis of the proposed definitions, some delegations identified common elements which, in their view, provided a good basis for reaching a mutually acceptable understanding of the term. Other delegations stated that they viewed with concern proposals to define selectively and then seek to ban so-called "space weapons" or "space strike weapons". They further maintained that the latter

2/ References to proposals submitted in previous years may be found in the 1985 report of the Ad Hoc Committee, which is an integral part of the Conference's report to the General Assembly (CD/642).
term lacked technical precision and could not be considered as a useful analytical tool for further deliberations. With reference to that view, some other delegations stated that some preliminary work may be needed to define the weapons to be prohibited by an agreement or agreements to prevent an arms race in all its aspects in outer space, and that the cooperation of all States concerned would be necessary to achieve a degree of technical precision of such definitions which is acceptable to all. Those delegations stressed that a uniform opinion on what constitutes space weapons, the enunciation of their characteristics and of their principal elements would greatly contribute to facilitating the work of the Conference on this subject. They also stressed the need to define with precision the scope of item 5 as a first step to advancing in the process of negotiation on the item.

"25. Various delegations focussed attention on the question of the prohibition of anti-satellite weapons. It was suggested by some delegations that pending the conclusion of an agreement thereon, the space Powers should agree on a moratorium on the development, testing and deployment of ASAT weapons. In this connection, some delegations recalled that one State had declared and observed a moratorium on the first launching of anti-satellite weapons into outer space.

"26. Other delegations noted that a ban on ASAT weapons raised a number of very complex and difficult questions, inter alia, the definition of anti-satellite weapons, the problem of dual purpose space objects, the problems inherent in the fact that ABM and ASAT technologies and capabilities shared common elements and verification difficulties.

"27. Some delegations, while noting that in the prevailing international environment it may not be possible to circumvent the difficulties that exist in the way of comprehensive multilateral agreement or agreements to prevent an arms race in outer space that is threatened by ASAT weapons and the development of BMD systems, proposed that all technologically advanced States, capable of using outer space, could adopt an international instrument to supplement the 1972 ABM Treaty, as an interim confidence-building measure, pending the conclusion of more comprehensive arrangements (CD/OS/WP.12).

"28. Various delegations suggested the possibility of multilateralizing the provisions of existing bilateral agreements relating to the immunity of satellites. Some delegations provided detailed views to the effect that the wide range of new technologies that have an inherent anti-satellite potential make it exceedingly difficult to solve the problem of an adequate protection of manned and unmanned space objects by the prohibition of a specific weapons category. Therefore, a much broader approach was needed centered around a possible legal régime for the protection of satellites supplemented by confidence-building measures in the form of a "rules of the road" agreement.

"29. One delegation proposed examination of each of the various ways to render a satellite inoperative and prescriptions of suitable measures to protect satellites from non-destructive interference with their functioning, on the one hand, and from dedicated ASAT weapons on the other. That delegation stated that the major military powers should manifest the basic political will to drop the ASAT-option from their global strategy and, to that end, enable the Conference on Disarmament to work for agreements banning further testing and deployment of ASAT weapons as well as dismantling of existing systems.
"30. The proposal was made by one delegation that active discussion be entered into on measures to protect from attack all satellites - and their associated ground stations - that contribute to strategic stability and to verification of arms control arrangements. Reference was also made to this proposal by other delegations.

"31. Some delegations were of the view that international peace and security could not be allowed to depend on such concepts as strategic stability for they lay at the heart of the action/reaction process that perpetuated the nuclear arms race and with it the danger of the annihilation of mankind.

"32. Another idea put forward was that the General Assembly should address the question of developing a régime for the protection of satellites for peaceful purposes in the appropriate forum.

"33. Some delegations emphasized that all aspects of the arms race in outer space should be dealt with in order to achieve a comprehensive régime to prevent an arms race in outer space. In their view, the principles of demilitarization should be extended to encompass outer space as a whole.

"34. Some delegations stressed the fundamental importance and complexity of verification in relation to possible additional measures relating to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. They stated that verification was a basic issue, particularly as the vital national security interests of States were involved. They were of the view that in this context there were particular problems caused by the vastness of space, the possibility of concealment of certain systems on earth, and the limitations of existing technology. Verification methods must be tailor-made to suit the circumstances of individual agreements. In their view, the issue of verification required deeper study. Other delegations, while recognizing the importance of verification, stated that it did not pose insurmountable difficulties. They further maintained that the subject should not be dealt with in the abstract but, in line with paragraph 31 of the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament, should be examined in the context of negotiations on specific agreements. Some delegations stated that verification of compliance could be provided by national technical means and international verification procedures, including the opening of laboratories for inspection. In their view, a proposed world space organization could also be entrusted with the verification of future agreements to prevent an arms race in outer space. A number of delegations considered that verification functions should be entrusted to an international agency so as to provide the international community with an independent capability to verify compliance with space-related disarmament agreements. In this connection, some delegations referred to the proposal for the establishment of an international satellite monitoring agency.

"35. Some delegations believed that consideration should be given to ways and means of strengthening and devising new confidence-building measures. They considered that strengthening the 1975 Registration Convention was desirable, and that provisions of other conventions designed to allow an exchange of information could be implemented more fully. Some delegations also mentioned as worthy of consideration the elaboration of a 'rules-of-the-road' agreement and the establishment of a system of space-signalling on the model of practice at sea.
"36. Some delegations stated that they would continue to consider measures relating to the prevention of an arms race in outer space that met the following criteria: verifiability, equitability and compatibility with national security interests. In their view, at present the proposals for immediate negotiations that had been put forward in the Committee did not satisfy these criteria.

"37. One delegation seriously questioned such a position whereby serious proposals made by various delegations were dismissed without even receiving proper consideration. That delegation particularly regretted the advancing of arbitrary general criteria even for consideration of specific proposals.

"38. Some delegations emphasized that the space Powers must demonstrate the necessary political will, not only to avoid an arms race in outer space, but also to recognize that the pursuit of their perceived interests in this sphere cannot take precedence over the interests of the international community. They believed that questions relating to the prevention of an arms race in outer space should be considered from a perspective that fully reflected the concerns and interest of all nations.

"39. Some delegations considered that, in view of the advanced technology involved in the exploration and use of outer space, and the fact that only a few States were in a position to benefit therefrom, it was necessary in the consideration of proposals to contemplate ways and means of strengthening international cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space, so that all States would have access without discrimination to space technology to promote their economic and social development according to their needs, interests and priorities. In this context, attention was drawn to the proposal for a stage-by-stage programme of common practical actions for the peaceful exploitation of outer space.

"40. Various delegations drew attention to different proposals for the establishment of an international space agency, such as a world space organization, to promote the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes as well as to verify disarmament agreements.

"41. A number of delegations considered that greater technical knowledge of issues relating to the prevention of an arms race in outer space would permit the Committee to work more effectively, for which purpose, data provided must be credible and transparent. Some delegations reiterated their support for the establishment of a group of experts, if necessary, outside the framework of the Ad Hoc Committee to provide expertise and guidance in preventing the weaponization of outer space. Other delegations also considered that the work of the Committee would benefit from information provided by the major space Powers on their activities in outer space, as well as on the on-going bilateral negotiations.

"42. The importance of the bilateral negotiations was generally acknowledged. Many also stressed the need for a multilateral approach to issues relating to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Some delegations stressed that work at the multilateral level should be constructive in terms of, and complementary to, progress in the bilateral negotiations. Other delegations emphasized that the vital interests of all nations were at stake in the
prevention of an arms race in outer space. Consequently, they believed that, without detracting from the bilateral process, multilateral negotiations were indispensable and that the Conference on Disarmament, as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, had the primary role in the negotiation of a multilateral agreement or agreements, as appropriate, for the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects.

"43. In the opinion of various delegations, deliberations in the Ad Hoc Committee revealed that the existing legal régime was not sufficient to guard against the danger of the extension of the arms race into outer space and that, consequently, additional measures were needed. In their view, the scope of existing legal instruments should be self-evident. If, however, doubts about their interpretation was being raised they could be resolved only in the process of fresh negotiations. Some delegations noted that there were common elements in the proposals put forward, particularly as regards the ban of ASAT weapons and the definition of space weapons, which would facilitate the task of arriving at an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, to prevent an arms race in outer space. Other delegations were of the view that it was necessary to continue the examination of issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space that had not been sufficiently identified. They believed that only through a general consensus on such issues would it be possible to place further options in a viable framework. They considered that some of the proposals put forward were most pertinent, but believed that they required further detailed elaboration in their technical structure, as well as in parallel obligations, such as compliance and verification.

"44. Many delegations underlined that the task entrusted to the Ad Hoc Committee for 1986 had been completed. They, however, regretted the inability of the Committee this year to systematically identify the specific measures necessary to prevent an arms race in outer space while research and development of space weapons continued apace. They, therefore, considered that at the next session of the Conference, the Committee should begin negotiations with a view to the conclusion of an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, to prevent an arms race in outer space, as specifically stated in resolution 40/87 adopted by an overwhelming majority in the General Assembly. Other delegations stressed the adequacy of the 1986 mandate to continue substantive work on this item. In their view, it was relevant and realistic and permitted a considerable amount of concrete work.

"IV. Conclusion

"45. The Ad Hoc Committee, bearing in mind the task entrusted to it of examining and identifying issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space, held a wide-ranging exchange of views which contributed to identifying and clarifying a number of issues and to a better understanding of the various positions. It was recognized that the legal régime applicable to outer space played a significant role in the prevention of an arms race in that environment and the need to reinforce that régime was underlined. In addition, the importance of strict compliance with existing agreements, both bilateral and multilateral, was stressed. There was also recognition of the common interest of mankind in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes. In this context, the importance of paragraph 80 of the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament, which
states that 'in order to prevent an arms race in outer space, further measures should be taken and appropriate international negotiations held in accordance with the spirit of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies', was recognized.

"46. There was general recognition of the importance and urgency of preventing an arms race in outer space and readiness to contribute to that objective. Consequently, it was agreed that no effort should be spared to assure that substantive work on this agenda item will continue at the next session of the Conference. It was recommended that the Conference on Disarmament re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space with an adequate mandate at the beginning of the 1987 session."

F. Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States Against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons

91. The item on the agenda entitled "Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States Against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons" was considered by the Conference, in accordance with its programme of work, during the periods 7-11 April and 28 July-1 August 1986.

92. The Conference had before it the documents of previous annual sessions relating to the agenda item.

93. In connection with agenda item 6, consultations were held under the guidance of the President of the Conference during the first part of the session, in order to explore ways and means to overcome the difficulties encountered in its work in carrying out negotiations on the question, including the issue of the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee. In an oral report on the results of these consultations, the President for the month of February informed the Conference that some delegations had expressed the view that there was no point in resuming discussion unless the position of the nuclear-weapon States had changed or developed in any way on this question. There was a proposal that the President consult with the nuclear-weapon States on their positions and that he report to plenary on the outcome of his discussions. The President had undertaken some consultations with nuclear-weapon States. These consultations had suggested to him, however, that the position of nuclear weapon States that prevailed last year had not changed. It was clear that the position of nuclear-weapon States was seen to be of considerable importance in the consideration of this item by the Conference.

94. Consultations under the guidance of successive presidents continued during the second part of the session on the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on this item. These consultations also considered the related question of the appointment of the Chairman. The President of the Conference for the month of July reported that it was generally agreed that, because the session was already well advanced, the question of the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee and the appointment of the Chairman would be taken up at the beginning of the 1987 session.
95. Several delegations addressed various issues relating to the question at plenary meetings of the Conference, underlining, in particular, the great importance they continued to attach to the need for the international community to elaborate effective assurances for non-nuclear weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

96. Members of the Group of 21 continued to believe that the most effective guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons was nuclear disarmament and the prohibition of nuclear weapons. In their view, until nuclear weapons were eliminated, nuclear weapon states had an obligation to guarantee in an internationally binding instrument that non-nuclear weapon states would not be attacked or threatened with nuclear weapons. They expressed their disappointment at the lack of progress on the question and reiterated their appeal to the nuclear powers to re-examine their unilaterally declared policies and positions relating to arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Some of them noted that security assurances to non-nuclear weapon states was the least nuclear-weapon states could expect to give in exchange for the commitment by other states under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Others were of the view that security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States should be without qualification and pre-conditions, not subject to divergent interpretations and unlimited in scope, application and duration. It was also stated by a member of the Group that negative security assurances and the withdrawal of nuclear forces from the vicinity of a region, in conjunction with arrangements for nuclear weapon-free zones, could contain the external nuclear threat to a region.

97. Members of the Group of socialist countries shared the belief that the most effective guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons was nuclear disarmament and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. They believed that until that objective was achieved on a universal basis, it was imperative for the international community to develop effective measures to ensure the security of non-nuclear-weapon States. Those delegations strongly favoured conclusion of an international legally binding instrument to assure non-nuclear-weapon States having no nuclear weapons on their territories against the use or threat of use of such weapons. They pointed out that the unilateral declaration made by the nuclear-weapon State belonging to the Group, is a credible and unconditional assurance which meets the security concerns of the non-nuclear-weapon States. They supported also measures, either unilateral or multilateral, providing for negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to nuclear-weapon-free zone arrangements. Those delegations expressed their disappointment at the lack of progress on the question.

98. Another group of delegations, including three nuclear weapon states, drew attention to the unilateral declarations made by those states, which they regard as credible and reliable and which amount to firm declarations of policy. They expressed readiness to continue discussion of the item in an Ad Hoc Committee, though acknowledging that previous experience had shown the difficulties involved in elaborating an international convention on the subject.
99. A nuclear-weapon state, not belonging to any Group, expressed the view that the most effective security guarantee to non-nuclear-weapon States was the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. It held that, pending nuclear disarmament, all nuclear-weapon states should undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states and nuclear-free zones. It reiterated that it unconditionally assumed such an obligation. It also supported all efforts conducive to reaching an agreement on effective international arrangements in this regard.

G. New Types of Weapons of Mass Destruction and New Systems of Such Weapons; Radiological Weapons

100. The item on the agenda entitled "New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons" was considered by the Conference, in accordance with its programme of work, during the periods 14-18 April and 4-8 August 1986.

101. The list of documents presented to the Conference during its 1986 session under the agenda item is contained in the Report submitted by the Ad Hoc Committee referred to in the following paragraph.

102. At its 383rd plenary meeting on 28 August 1986, the Conference adopted the Report of the Ad Hoc Committee re-established by the Conference under the agenda item at its 344th plenary meeting (see paragraph 11 above). That Report (CD/722), is an integral part of this Report and reads as follows:

"I. INTRODUCTION

1. In accordance with the decision taken by the Conference on Disarmament at its 344th plenary meeting held on 4 March 1986, as contained in document CD/674, the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons was re-established, for the duration of the 1986 session, with a view to reaching agreement on a convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons. The Conference further decided that the Ad Hoc Committee would report to it on the progress of its work before the conclusion of the 1986 session.

II. ORGANIZATION OF WORK AND DOCUMENTATION

2. At its 344th plenary meeting on 4 March 1986, the Conference on Disarmament appointed Ambassador Carlos Lechuga Hevia of Cuba as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee. Mr. Victor Slipchenko, United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs, continued to serve as Secretary of the Ad Hoc Committee.

3. The Ad Hoc Committee held 17 meetings from 7 March to 11 August 1986. In addition, the Chairman held a number of informal consultations with delegations.

4. At their request, the representatives of the following States not members of the Conference on Disarmament participated in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee: Finland, Greece, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland and Turkey.
5. In carrying out its mandate, the Ad Hoc Committee took into account paragraph 76 of the Final Document of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament. It also took into consideration the relevant recommendations of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, in particular those adopted in connection with the Second Disarmament Decade in 1980. In addition to various resolutions adopted by the General Assembly on the subject at its previous sessions, the Ad Hoc Committee took into account in particular resolution 40/94 D of the General Assembly of 12 December 1985. Paragraphs 1 to 4 of that resolution read as follows:

1. Takes note of that part of the report of the Conference on Disarmament on its 1985 session that deals with the question of radiological weapons, in particular the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons;

2. Takes note also of the recommendation of the Conference on Disarmament that the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons should be re-established at the beginning of its 1986 session and that the annex to the report of the Ad Hoc Committee should be considered as a basis for further work;

3. Recognizes that the work accomplished by the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons in 1985 made a further contribution to the solution of the issues entrusted to it;

4. Requests the Conference on Disarmament to continue its negotiations on the subject with a view to a prompt conclusion of its work, taking into account all proposals presented to the Conference to this end, the result of which should be submitted to the General Assembly at its forty-first session.

6. In addition to the documents of previous sessions, the Ad Hoc Committee had before it the following new documents for consideration:

- CD/RW/WP.68, dated 21 March 1986, entitled 'Method and Programme of Work'
- CD/RW/WP.69, dated 20 March 1986, submitted by Argentina, entitled 'Scope'
"III. WORK DURING THE 1986 SESSION

At its 4th meeting on 25 March, the Ad Hoc Committee adopted the method and programme of work for its 1986 session. Accordingly, it agreed to continue on the basis of the 'unitary' approach to the two major questions that had been before it for a number of years, i.e., the prohibition of radiological weapons in the 'traditional' sense and the prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities. It further agreed to continue to consider both questions without dividing its work into two separate 'tracks' and without giving priority to either of them, on the understanding that that decision was without prejudice to; the final positions of delegations on a treaty or treaties as such; the 'link' between the above two questions; delegations' position on the appropriate manner of dealing with them; and to any other approaches and questions which might be presented. The Ad Hoc Committee also decided that the programme of work for its 1986 session would be the same as in 1985 and would include the following issues:

- definitions and criteria;
- scope;
- peaceful uses;
- cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament;
- compliance and verification.

The Committee agreed to consider the annex to document CD/635 as a basis for its work in 1986, in accordance with its 1985 report, as well as all existing proposals and future initiatives.

In accordance with its programme of work, the Ad Hoc Committee devoted six meetings to the exchange of views on all items included in the programme. At its 8th meeting on 21 April 1986, the Committee decided, on the suggestion of its Chairman, to set up three contact groups on the issues of scope and definitions, peaceful uses and cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, and verification and compliance, co-ordinated by Ambassador Rolf Ekèus of Sweden, Ambassador Dávid Meiszter of Hungary and Ambassador Richard Butler of Australia, respectively.
9. The contact group on the issues of scope and definitions held five meetings open to all delegations. On the basis of document CD/635 and an exchange of views, a paper on draft elements which could be included in a treaty was prepared by the co-ordinator and examined by the contact group, some elements being further elaborated. Differences remained, however, on a number of issues and formulations. Therefore, alternative formulations and points of view on the various questions considered in the paper prepared by the co-ordinator were submitted to the contact group. The co-ordinator's report in CD/RW/WP.70/Rev.1 reflects his efforts to find a compromise text.

10. The contact group on the issues of peaceful uses and cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament held three meetings. The contact group considered as a basis for its work relevant parts of the Annex to document CD/635 and took into account other proposals and initiatives. Efforts were made to overcome differences with a view to reaching agreement wherever possible. Working paper CD/RW/WP.71/Rev.1 submitted to the Ad Hoc Committee by the co-ordinator reflects the outcome of the consultations. Further work is needed on both issues for which CD/RW/WP.71/Rev.1 may provide a good basis.

11. The co-ordinator of the contact group on the issues of verification and compliance prepared a paper with a view to facilitating consultations on these issues. This paper (CD/RW/WP.72) was referred to in subsequent informal consultations. At the conclusion of these consultations two main points, among others, were clear. First, some delegations believed that there were basic issues involved in the area of verification and compliance which needed to be resolved. Second, it was recognized that, in any case, further consideration of the issues of verification and compliance was contingent upon the resolution of issues under consideration in the contact group dealing with scope and definitions.

12. The documents referred to in paragraphs 9, 10 and 11 above do not prejudge the final positions of delegations, are not binding on any delegation and do not question the validity of existing proposals or preclude future initiatives.

IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

13. The work done by the Ad Hoc Committee in 1986 was useful in terms of the mandate entrusted to it. It was clearly revealed, however, that considerable differences of substance and approach continue to exist with regard to both the important subjects under consideration. It is therefore recommended that the Conference on Disarmament should re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons at the beginning of its 1987 session which should, inter alia, consider the ways and means of how best to proceed further. It is also recommended that the documents referred to in paragraphs 6, 9, 10 and 11 above as well as any other relevant documents and proposals should be considered as a basis for future work of the Ad Hoc Committee in accordance with its 1986 report.

103. The Conference continued to consider the question of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons at its plenary and informal meetings.
104. In accordance with its programme of work, dealing with the consideration of the question of the establishment of subsidiary bodies on items of its agenda, the Conference held, at the beginning of the first part of the session, a number of informal consultations on a proposal to convene a group of qualified experts with a view to identifying any new types of weapons of mass destruction and making, as appropriate, recommendations on undertaking specific negotiations on the identified types of such weapons, as requested by the United Nations General Assembly in its resolution 40/90 of 12 December 1985. This proposal was supported by the group of Socialist States and many members of the Group of 21. It was generally recognized that it would be a most serious development and a great danger to international peace and security if any new kind of weapon of mass destruction were invented and deployed. Western delegations stated that, as no new types of weapons of mass destruction had been identified since 1948 nor was their existence imminent, the practice followed thus far of holding informal meetings of the Conference from time to time was the most appropriate one to deal with this question. No consensus could be reached on the convening of a group of qualified experts during the 1986 session.

105. A proposal was put forward to ban the development of non-nuclear weapons based on new physical principles whose destructive capacity was close to that of nuclear arms and other means of mass destruction.

H. Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament

106. The item on the agenda entitled "Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament" was considered by the Conference, in accordance with its programme of work, during the periods 7-11 April and 28 July-1 August 1986.

107. At its 383rd plenary meeting on 28 August 1986, the Conference adopted the Report of the Ad Hoc Committee, which resumed its work in accordance with the provisions of its mandate (see paragraph 11 above). That Report (CD/728), is an integral part of this Report and reads as follows:

"I. Organization of work and documents

"1. In accordance with the provisions of its mandate, as adopted by the Conference on Disarmament at its 245th plenary meeting, on 28 February 1984, the Ad Hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament resumed its work on 20 February 1986 under the Chairmanship of Ambassador Alfonso Garcia Robles (Mexico). Miss Aida Luisa Levin, Senior Political Affairs Officer, United Nations Department of Disarmament Affairs served as the Committee's Secretary.

"2. The Ad Hoc Committee held 21 meetings between 20 February and 25 August 1986.

"3. At their request, the Conference on Disarmament decided to invite the representatives of the following States not members of the Conference to participate in the meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee: Bangladesh, Finland, Greece, Norway, Portugal, Spain and Turkey."
"4. In addition to the documents of previous sessions relating to the agenda item, the Ad Hoc Committee had before it the following documents submitted by member States in the course of the 1986 session:

CD/CPD/WP.83 Working paper of a group of socialist countries on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament

CD/CPD/WP.84 Text for the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, submitted by France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Norway, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America

CD/CPD/WP.85 Working paper submitted by the delegation of the USSR

"II. Substantive work during the 1986 session

"5. In pursuing the elaboration of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, the Ad Hoc Committee took as the basis of its work the text annexed to its 1985 report (CD/634), which was an integral part of the Conference's report to the fortieth session of the General Assembly (CD/642).

"6. The Ad Hoc Committee continued to concentrate its work on the resolution of various outstanding questions. As in 1985, Contact Groups, open to all interested delegations, were established to resolve existing differences with respect to certain texts in Chapter V, 'Measures and stages of implementation'. A Contact Group was also set up to deal with paragraph 6 of the Introduction and paragraph 5 of Chapter VI, 'Machinery and Procedures'. In addition, consultations were held under the guidance of the Chairman.

"7. Intensive efforts were made in the Contact Groups and in the consultations held by the Chairman with a view to reconciling differences and reaching agreement on paragraphs of the Programme that remained outstanding. While the relevant texts continue to reflect points of differences, the areas of disagreement were narrowed and, in some cases, considerable progress was made towards harmonizing positions. The results of the work are contained in the annex to this report. It was understood that delegations could not take final positions until agreement was reached on outstanding points of difficulty and until the document was complete.

"III. Conclusion

"8. In the time available to it during the 1986 session, despite intensive efforts, the Ad Hoc Committee was not able to resolve all outstanding issues. In view of that fact, and bearing in mind that under resolution 40/152 D the Conference on Disarmament had been requested to submit to the General Assembly a complete draft of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament at its forty-first session, at the suggestion of the Chairman, consideration was given to the desirability of continuing the work during the first part of the 1987 session with a view to completing the elaboration of a draft of the Programme at that time and submitting it to the General Assembly before the closing of the forty-first session. Taking into account the progress achieved during the 1986 session, the Committee agreed to recommend to the Conference
that work on the elaboration of the Programme be resumed at the beginning of
the 1987 session for the purpose of completing the Committee's task during the
first part of the 1987 session and submitting it to the General Assembly at
that time.

"Note

1/ The list of documents may be found in the reports of the previous
Ad Hoc Working Group and in the 1985 report of the Ad Hoc Committee, which are
an integral part of the reports of the Committee on Disarmament and of the
Conference on Disarmament respectively (CD/139, CD/228, CD/292, CD/335 and
CD/642).
"Annex"

"[Draft Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament]

"[Texts for the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament]"

"I. Introduction */

"1. The threat to the very survival of mankind posed by the existence of nuclear weapons and the continuing arms race, which already in 1978 gave rise to the justified alarm of the General Assembly, far from disappearing has considerably increased during the four years that have elapsed since the holding of its first special session devoted to disarmament. It was thus natural not to unduly delay the convening of the second special session, which, with the same purpose as the first, had been explicitly provided for in the Final Document of that session.

"2. Both in the general debate of this second special session of the Assembly, in which an impressive number of Heads of State or Government and Ministers of Foreign Affairs participated, as well as in the deliberations of the Ad Hoc Committee and the Working Groups, it became evident that there had been no erosion in the support of all fundamental conclusions of the Final Document, such as the following:

"(a) The objective of security, which is an inseparable element of peace, has always been one of the most profound aspirations of humanity. Yet the accumulation of weapons, particularly nuclear weapons, today constitutes much more a threat than a protection for the future of mankind since, far from helping to strengthen international security, it on the contrary weakens it, and since existing arsenals of nuclear weapons alone are sufficient to destroy all life on earth.

"(b) The arms race, particularly in its nuclear aspect, runs counter to efforts to achieve further relaxation of international tension, to establish international relations based on peaceful coexistence and trust between all States, and to develop broad international co-operation and understanding. The arms race impedes the realization of the purposes, and is incompatible with the principles, of the Charter of the United Nations, especially respect for sovereignty, refraining from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, the peaceful settlement of disputes and non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of States. On the other hand, progress on détente and progress on disarmament mutually complement and strengthen each other.

*/ Draft prepared by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee during the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament in his capacity as Chairman of the Working Group on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament established at that session. No conclusions regarding this draft were reached by the Ad Hoc Committee."
"(c) Military expenditures are reaching ever higher levels, the highest percentage of which can be attributed to the nuclear-weapon States and most of their allies, with prospects of further expansion and the danger of further increases in the expenditures of other countries. The hundreds of billions of dollars spent annually on the manufacture or improvement of weapons are in sombre and dramatic contrast to the want and poverty in which two thirds of the world's population live. This colossal waste of resources is even more serious in that it diverts to military purposes not only material but also technical and human resources which are urgently needed for development in all countries, particularly in the developing countries.

"(d) Enduring international peace and security cannot be built on the accumulation of weaponry by military alliances nor be sustained by a precarious balance of deterrence or doctrines of strategic superiority. Genuine and lasting peace can only be created through the effective implementation of the security system provided for in the Charter of the United Nations and the speedy and substantial reduction of arms and armed forces, by international agreement and mutual example, leading ultimately to general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

"3. It was undoubtedly for reasons like the above that, in one of the last paragraphs of the Programme of Action outlined in the Final Document, the General Assembly decided that the implementation of the priorities defined therein should lead to general and complete disarmament under effective international control, which "remains the ultimate goal of all efforts exerted in the field of disarmament". The Assembly completed this statement adding that the negotiations on general and complete disarmament shall be conducted concurrently with negotiations on partial measures of disarmament and deciding that, with this purpose in mind, the Committee on Disarmament should undertake the elaboration of a "comprehensive programme of disarmament encompassing all measures thought to be advisable in order to ensure that the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control becomes a reality in a world in which international peace and security prevail and in which the new international economic order is strengthened and consolidated".

"4. The General Assembly did not only stress several times the importance of this goal which it called the "ultimate goal" of all disarmament efforts. On more than one occasion it stated also its opinion as to which should be the "immediate goal" defining it as "the elimination of the danger of a nuclear war and the implementation of measures to halt the arms race and clear the path towards lasting peace".

"5. Bearing in mind those antecedents and taking as the main basis for its deliberations the draft transmitted by the Committee on Disarmament, the General Assembly has elaborated this Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, which received the approval by consensus of all the States Members of the United Nations which participated in its second special session devoted to disarmament. In addition to the present introduction, the Programme comprises five chapters whose titles, clearly indicative of their contents, are the following: "Objectives", "Principles", "Priorities", "Measures and stages of implementation", and "Machinery and procedures".
6. [It has not been possible to reach agreement for the Comprehensive Programme to become a treaty, as some States would have preferred in order to make its provisions legally binding. There has been, however, unanimous support for the idea that all necessary steps must be taken to enhance the political and moral value of the Programme. It has thus been agreed that a special copy of the Programme shall be carried by a personal representative of the Secretary-General to the capitals of all States Members of the United Nations, in order to have it signed by the respective heads of State or Government. This symbolic act will be a clear sign that this time there is the required "political will" to proceed along the road of uninterrupted negotiations in good faith in the field of disarmament. Should there be some States where constitutional obstacles prevent recourse to the above procedures, alternative methods of similar significance should be employed. Thus the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, although not a treaty in itself, would indeed become a source of numerous successive treaties thanks to which mankind may start the twenty-first century in conditions totally different from those that prevail at present and are the cause of deepest concern.]

"[This Programme is adopted by consensus by the United Nations General Assembly. Through the adoption of the Programme all Member States of the United Nations express their willingness to make every effort possible to implement the measures contained in the Programme and to work toward the realization as soon as possible of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.]

"[It has been recommended that possible adoption of a declaration expressing Member States' determination to observe the Programme in good faith shall be considered at the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament in ( ) after formal adoption of the Programme by the General Assembly.]

"[Through the adoption of the Programme by consensus the States Members of the United Nations express their willingness to negotiate in good faith and to make every effort to implement the measures contained in the Programme with a view to reaching general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. Following the adoption of the Programme a personal representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations should visit the capitals of the States Members to have the Programme signed at a high level.]

II. Objectives

1. The immediate objectives of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament should be to eliminate the danger of war, in particular nuclear war, the prevention of which remains the most acute and urgent task of the present day, to implement measures to halt and reverse the arms race, in particular the nuclear arms race, and to clear the path towards lasting peace. To this end, the Programme will also aim:

"*/ Some delegations stated that this text was submitted in the Committee at the last moment and was not considered. They expressed reservations as to the inclusion of this text in the draft Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament.
- To maintain and further the momentum generated by the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament;

- To initiate or engage in further negotiations, to expedite the halting of the arms race in all its aspects, in particular the nuclear arms race;

- To consolidate and develop the results reflected in agreements and treaties achieved so far, relevant to the problems of disarmament;

- To open and accelerate the process of genuine disarmament on an internationally agreed basis.

"2. The ultimate objective of the Comprehensive Programme is to ensure that general and complete disarmament under effective international control becomes a reality in a world in which international peace and security prevail and in which the new international economic order is fully achieved.

"3. Throughout the implementation of the Programme towards the progressive reduction and final elimination of armaments and armed forces, the following objectives should be pursued;

- To strengthen international peace and security, as well as the security of individual States, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations;

- To contribute to the safeguarding of the sovereignty and independence of all States;

- To make, through the implementation of the Programme, an effective contribution to the economic and social development of States, in particular developing States;

- To increase international confidence and relaxation of international tension;

- To establish international relations based on peaceful coexistence and trust between all States, and to develop broad international co-operation and understanding with a view to promoting conditions favourable to the implementation of the Programme;

- To mobilize world public opinion in favour of disarmament, through balanced, factual and objective information and education in all regions of the world, so as to generate further understanding and support for the efforts to halt the arms race and achieve disarmament.

"III. Principles

"1. */ The Members of the United Nations are fully aware of the conviction of their peoples that the question of general and complete disarmament is of utmost importance and that peace, security and economic and social development are indivisible, and they have therefore recognized that the corresponding obligations and responsibilities are universal.

"*/ The placement of this paragraph in the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament will be determined later.
"2. */ The ending of the arms race and the achievement of real disarmament are tasks of primary importance and urgency.

"3. */ Progress on détente and progress on disarmament mutually complement and strengthen each other.

"4. */ All States Members of the United Nations reaffirm their full commitment to the purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and their obligation strictly to observe its principles as well as other relevant and generally accepted principles of international law relating to the maintenance of international peace and security. They stress the special importance of refraining from the threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or against peoples under colonial or foreign domination seeking to exercise their right to self-determination and to achieve independence, non-acquisition and non-annexation of territories by force and non-recognition of such acquisition or annexation, non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of other States, the inviolability of international frontiers, and the peaceful settlement of disputes, having regard to the inherent right of States to individual and corrective self-defence in accordance with the Charter.

"5. In order to create favourable conditions for success in the disarmament process, all States should strictly abide by the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, refrain from actions which might adversely affect efforts in the field of disarmament, and display a constructive approach to negotiations and the political will to reach agreements.

"6. */ The arms race, particularly in its nuclear aspect, runs counter to efforts to achieve further relaxation of international tension, to establish international relations based on peaceful coexistence and trust between all States, and to develop broad international co-operation and understanding. The arms race impedes the realization of the purposes, and is incompatible with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, especially respect for sovereignty, refraining from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, the peaceful settlement of disputes and non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of States.

"7. Significant progress in disarmament, including nuclear disarmament, would be facilitated by parallel measures to strengthen the security of States and to improve the international situation in general.

"8. Disarmament, relaxation of international tension, respect for the right to self-determination and national independence, the peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the strengthening of international peace and security are directly related to each other. Progress in any of these spheres has a beneficial effect on all of them; in turn, failure in one sphere has negative effects on others.

"*/ The placement of this paragraph in the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament will be determined later.
9. */ Enduring international peace and security cannot be built on the accumulation of weaponry by military alliances or be sustained by a precarious balance of deterrence or doctrines of strategic superiority. Genuine and lasting peace can only be created through the effective implementation of the security system provided for in the Charter of the United Nations and the speedy and substantial reduction of arms and armed forces, by international agreement and mutual example, leading ultimately to general and complete disarmament under effective international control. At the same time, the causes of the arms race and threats to peace must be reduced and to this end effective action should be taken to eliminate tensions and settle disputes by peaceful means.

10. Progress in disarmament should be accompanied by measures to strengthen institutions for maintaining peace and the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means.

11. Negotiations should be based on the strict observance of the purposes and principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, with full recognition of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament and reflecting the vital interest of all the peoples of the world in this sphere.

12. Since the process of disarmament affects the vital security interests of all States, they must all be actively concerned with and contribute to the measures of disarmament and arms limitation, which have an essential part to play in maintaining and strengthening international security.

13. All the peoples of the world have a vital interest in the success of disarmament negotiations. Consequently, all States have the duty to contribute to efforts in the field of disarmament. All States have the right to participate in disarmament negotiations. They have the right to participate on an equal footing in those multilateral disarmament negotiations which have a direct bearing on their national security.

14. In a world of finite resources, there is a close relationship between expenditure on armaments and economic and social development. The continuation of the arms race is detrimental to and incompatible with the implementation of the new international economic order based on justice, equity and co-operation. Consequently, there is a close relationship between disarmament and development. Progress in the former would help greatly in the realization of the latter and resources released as a result of the implementation of disarmament measures should be devoted to the economic and social development of all nations and contribute to the bridging of the economic gap between developed and developing countries.

15. Disarmament and arms limitation, particularly in the nuclear field, are essential for the prevention of the danger of nuclear war and the strengthening of international peace and security and for the economic and social advancement of all peoples, thus facilitating the achievement of the new international economic order.

*/ The placement of this paragraph in the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament will be determined later.
16. Nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of civilization.

17. The adoption of disarmament measures should take place in such an equitable and balanced manner as to ensure the right of each State to security and to ensure that no individual State or group of States may obtain advantages over others at any stage. At each stage the objective should be undiminished security at the lowest possible level of armaments and military forces.

18. In accordance with the Charter, the United Nations has a central role and primary responsibility in the sphere of disarmament. In order effectively to discharge this role and facilitate and encourage all measures in this field, the United Nations should be kept appropriately informed of all steps in this field, whether unilateral, bilateral, regional or multilateral, without prejudice to the progress of negotiations.

19. The process of nuclear disarmament should be carried out in such a way, and requires measures to ensure, that the security of all States is guaranteed at progressively lower levels of nuclear armaments, taking into account the relative qualitative and quantitative importance of the existing arsenals of the nuclear-weapon States and other States concerned.

20. Significant progress in nuclear disarmament would be facilitated both by parallel political or international legal measures to strengthen the security of States and by progress in the limitation and reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments of the nuclear-weapon States and other States in the regions concerned.

21. Together with negotiations on nuclear disarmament measures, negotiations should be carried out on the balanced reduction of armed forces and of conventional armaments, based on the principle of undiminished security of the parties with a view to promoting or enhancing stability at a lower military level, taking into account the need of all States to protect their security. These negotiations should be conducted with particular emphasis on armed forces and conventional weapons of nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant countries.

22. While disarmament is the responsibility of all States, all the nuclear-weapon States have the primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament and, together with other militarily significant States, for halting and reversing the arms race. It is therefore important to secure their active participation.

23. In the task of achieving the goals of nuclear disarmament, all the nuclear-weapon States, in particular those among them which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, bear a special responsibility.

/* The placement of this paragraph in the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament will be determined later.*/
"24. An acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations for nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States should be strictly observed.

"25. Disarmament and arms limitation agreements should provide for adequate measures of verification satisfactory to all parties concerned in order to create the necessary confidence and ensure that they are being observed by all parties. The form and modalities of the verification to be provided for in any specific agreement depend upon and should be determined by the purposes, scope and nature of the agreement. Agreements should provide for the participation of parties directly or through the United Nations system in the verification process. Where appropriate, a combination of several methods of verification as well as other compliance procedures should be employed. Every effort should be made to develop appropriate methods and procedures which are non-discriminatory and which do not unduly interfere with the internal affairs of other States or jeopardize their economic and social development or prejudice their security.

"26. Negotiations on partial measures of disarmament should be conducted concurrently with negotiations on more comprehensive measures and should be followed by negotiations leading to a treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

"27. Qualitative and quantitative disarmament measures are both important for halting the arms race. Efforts to that end must include negotiations on the limitation and cessation of the qualitative improvement of armaments, especially weapons of mass destruction and the development of new means of warfare so that ultimately scientific and technological achievements may be used solely for peaceful purposes.

"28. Universality of disarmament agreements helps create confidence among States. When multilateral agreements in the field of disarmament are negotiated, every effort should be made to ensure that they are universally acceptable. The full compliance of all parties with the provisions contained in such agreements would contribute to the attainment of that goal.

"29. All States, in particular nuclear-weapon States, should consider various proposals designed to secure the avoidance of the use of nuclear weapons, and the prevention of nuclear war. In this context, while noting the declarations made by nuclear-weapon States, effective arrangements, as appropriate, to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons could strengthen the security of those States and international peace and security.

"30. */ The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of agreements or arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the zone concerned and the full compliance with those agreements or arrangements, thus ensuring that the zones are genuinely free from nuclear weapons, and respect for such zones by nuclear-weapon States constitute an important disarmament measure.

*/ The placement of this paragraph in the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament will be determined later.
"31. Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is a matter of universal concern. Measures of disarmament must be consistent with the inalienable right of all States, without discrimination, to develop, acquire and use nuclear technology, equipment and materials for the peaceful use of nuclear energy and to determine their peaceful nuclear programmes in accordance with their national priorities, needs and interests, bearing in mind the need to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. International co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be conducted under agreed and appropriate international safeguards applied on a non-discriminatory basis.

"32. As security and stability should be assured in all regions taking into account the specific needs and requirements of their respective situations, bilateral and regional disarmament negotiations may also play an important role and could facilitate negotiations of multilateral agreements in the field of disarmament.

"33. Agreements or other measures should be resolutely pursued on a bilateral, regional and multilateral basis with the aim of strengthening peace and security at a lower level of forces, by the limitation and reduction of armed forces and of conventional weapons, taking into account the need of States to protect their security, bearing in mind the inherent right of self-defence embodied in the Charter of the United Nations and without prejudice to the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples in accordance with the Charter, and the need to ensure balance at each stage and undiminished security of all States.

"34. Bilateral, regional and multilateral consultations and conferences should be held where appropriate conditions exist with the participation of all the countries concerned for the consideration of different aspects of conventional disarmament, such as the initiative envisaged in the Declaration of Ayacucho subscribed to by eight Latin American countries on 9 December 1974.

"35. */ It is essential that not only Governments but also the peoples of the world recognize and understand the dangers in the present situation. In order that an international conscience may develop and that world public opinion may exercise a positive influence, the United Nations should increase the dissemination of information on the armaments race and disarmament with the full co-operation of Member States.

"36. */ Draft multilateral disarmament conventions should be subjected to the normal procedures applicable in the law of treaties. Those submitted to the General Assembly for its commendation should be subject to full review by the Assembly.

"37. Collateral measures in both the nuclear and conventional fields, together with other measures specifically designed to build confidence, should be undertaken in order to contribute to the creation of favourable conditions for the adoption of additional disarmament measures and to further the relaxation of international tension.

"*/ The placement of this paragraph in the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament will be determined later.
"38. */ Taking further steps in the field of disarmament and other measures aimed at promoting international peace and security would be facilitated by carrying out studies by the Secretary-General in this field with appropriate assistance from governmental or consultant experts.

"39. */ In particular, publicity should be given to the decisions of the special sessions of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

"IV. Priorities

1. In the implementation of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament for the achievement of general and complete disarmament under effective international control as the ultimate goal, the priorities which reflect the urgency attached to the measures for negotiations are:

- nuclear weapons;
- other weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons;
- conventional weapons, including any which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects; and
- reduction of armed forces.

2. Effective measures of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war have the highest priority. Along with negotiations on these measures, effective measures should be negotiated to prohibit or prevent the development, production or use of other weapons of mass destruction, as well as on the balanced reduction of armed forces and of conventional armaments.

3. Nothing should preclude States from conducting negotiations on all priority items concurrently. Bearing in mind these priorities, negotiations should be pursued on all measures which would lead to general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

*/ The placement of this paragraph in the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament will be determined later.
"V. Measures and stages of implementation */

"First stage */

"DISARMAMENT MEASURES

"A. Nuclear weapons

1. Nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of civilization. It is essential to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race in all its aspects in order to avert the danger of war involving nuclear weapons. The ultimate goal in this context is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

"In the task of achieving the goals of nuclear disarmament, all the nuclear-weapon States, in particular those among them which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, bear a special responsibility.

"The process of nuclear disarmament should be carried out in such a way, and requires measures to ensure, that the security of all States is guaranteed at progressively lower levels of nuclear armaments, taking into account the relative qualitative and quantitative importance of the existing arsenals of the nuclear-weapon States and other States concerned.

*/ The heading is without prejudice to the position of delegations with respect to questions relating to stages of implementation. The following text has been considered for eventual inclusion in the chapter on Machinery and Procedures:

"All efforts will be made by States, particularly through the conduct of negotiations in good faith on specific disarmament measures, to achieve the goal of General and Complete Disarmament, as defined in the Comprehensive Programme, by the year 2000. In order to assure continued progress towards the full realization of this ultimate goal, a special session of the General Assembly shall be convened periodically to review the implementation of the measures included in the various stages of the Comprehensive Programme. The first such special session of the General Assembly shall be held in (1987) (1988) (1989), and will: (a) review the implementation of the measures included in the first stage of the Comprehensive Programme; (b) consider the readjustments that need to be made in the Programme in the light of the review and the steps that need to be taken to stimulate progress in its implementation; (c) elaborate in more concrete terms the measures to be implemented in the second stage of the Programme, taking into account the progress made so far and other developments in international relations, as well as science and technology; and (d) decide on the time for the next special session to review the implementation of the measures included, and adjusted as necessary, in the second stage of the Comprehensive Programme, with the understanding that such session would be held not later than six years after the first.
2. The achievement of nuclear disarmament will require urgent negotiation of agreements at appropriate stages and with adequate measures of verification satisfactory to the States concerned for:

"(a) Cessation of the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear-weapon systems;

"(b) Cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, and of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes;

"(c) A comprehensive, phased programme with agreed time-frames, whenever feasible, for progressive and balanced reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, leading to their ultimate and complete elimination at the earliest possible time.

"Consideration can be given in the course of the negotiations to mutual and agreed limitation or prohibition, without prejudice to the security of any State, of any types of nuclear armaments.

3. Nuclear test ban:

"The cessation of nuclear-weapon testing by all States within the framework of an effective nuclear disarmament process would be in the interest of mankind. */ It would make a significant contribution to the aim of ending the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and the development of new types of such weapons and of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. [Therefore, all efforts should be made to conclude, as an important part of the process of nuclear disarmament, a multilateral nuclear test ban treaty at the earliest possible date.] [Therefore, it is necessary to make all efforts for the elaboration of a multilateral treaty on a nuclear test ban at the earliest possible date.] [Therefore, negotiations should be immediately initiated for the urgent conclusion of a nuclear test ban treaty.] [It is necessary to undertake all possible efforts and immediately hold negotiations for the urgent elaboration of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests; before the conclusion of such a treaty all nuclear-weapon States should declare a moratorium on all nuclear explosions.] [It is therefore necessary as an important part of the process of nuclear disarmament to make every effort to achieve an effective and verifiable multilateral treaty on a nuclear test ban at the earliest practical date.]

4. Pending the conclusion of further agreements relating to nuclear disarmament the USSR and the United States should, on a reciprocal basis, continue to refrain from actions which would undercut existing strategic arms agreements concluded between them.

*/ Some delegations reserved their position with respect to the first sentence of this text.
"5. Negotiations between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on nuclear and space arms:

"The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have expressed consciousness of their special responsibility for maintaining peace and have agreed that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. The agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union to accelerate the work at their bilateral nuclear and space arms negotiations has been widely welcomed. In this context nations of the world have endorsed the proclaimed objective of these negotiations and have stressed the importance of their being pursued with utmost despatch with the objective of reaching early agreements. In this regard the United States and the Soviet Union should also continue to keep in view the following:

"(a) The objective to work out effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on earth as well as limiting and reducing nuclear arms.

"(b) The need to take fully into account the security interests of all states.

"(c) The need to display a spirit of flexibility and to maintain equal and undiminished security for all at constantly decreasing levels of armaments and the principle that neither side should seek to achieve military superiority over the other.

"(d) The requirement for effective measures for verification of compliance with agreements.

"(e) The fact that while reductions in the nuclear arsenals of the United States and the USSR are directly to be negotiated and effected by the two sides involved, the overall subject of nuclear disarmament is of world-wide concern since nuclear weapons and their accumulation pose a threat not only to their possessors and their allies but every other nation.

"(f) [The repeated affirmations of the United Nations General Assembly to the effect that bilateral negotiations do not detract from the need for appropriate multilateral negotiating efforts for nuclear disarmament.] [The widely held conviction that the bilateral and multilateral negotiations complement each other.]

"(g) The need to keep the United Nations General Assembly and the Conference on Disarmament appropriately informed of the state of negotiations, inter alia, in view of the responsibilities entrusted to these bodies as well as the universal desire for progress towards disarmament.

"The Soviet Union and the United States, having agreed to accelerate the pace of their bilateral negotiations, should exert every effort to achieve agreements on substantial reductions in their nuclear arsenals to be implemented during the initial phase of the disarmament process, which should be as brief as possible. In this context, the two sides have already agreed on the principle of 50 per cent reductions in their nuclear arms appropriately applied, as well as the idea of an interim INF agreement. During this initial phase other agreements helpful to the overall disarmament process should also be concluded and put into effect."
"Following is the text of the Joint United States-Soviet statement which was issued on 8 January 1985, regarding their negotiations on nuclear and space arms:

'As previously agreed, a meeting was held on 7 and 8 January 1985 in Geneva between George P. Shultz, the United States Secretary of State, and Andrei A. Gromyko, Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU, First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR.

During the meeting they discussed the subject and objectives of the forthcoming United States-Soviet negotiations on nuclear and space arms.

The sides agree that the subject of the negotiations will be a complex of questions concerning space and nuclear arms - both strategic and intermediate-range - with all these questions considered and resolved in their interrelationship.

The objective of the negotiations will be to work out effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on earth, at limiting and reducing nuclear arms, and at strengthening strategic stability. The negotiations will be conducted by a delegation from each side divided into three groups.

The sides believe that ultimately the forthcoming negotiations, just as efforts in general to limit and reduce arms, should lead to the complete elimination of nuclear arms everywhere.

The date of the beginning of the negotiations and the site of these negotiations will be agreed through diplomatic channels within one month.'

"6. Multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament: */

"The urgent initiation of multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations is of vital interest to the nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States. The conclusion of multilateral disarmament agreements would be facilitated by substantial progress in the bilateral negotiations in this area between the States which possess the most important arsenals and have a special responsibility in the field of nuclear disarmament. Also, multilateral negotiations are particularly important to achieve significant and universal progress toward the achievement of nuclear disarmament. This will require negotiation of agreements at appropriate stages, taking due account of the relative quantitative and qualitative importance of existing arsenals and the necessity of maintaining the undiminished security of all States, nuclear and non-nuclear, at each stage, and with adequate measures of verification satisfactory to all parties concerned, for the cessation of the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear-weapon systems, for the cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery and for the reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery.

*/ One delegation reserved its position on the text of paragraph 6 pending the preparation of the text of paragraph 5. Two delegations reserved their position on the text of paragraph 6.
"In the course of such negotiations, a combination of the measures as detailed in paragraph 2 above, or a combination of different elements of such measures, could be considered.

"The overall objective of the measures for nuclear disarmament outlined in the preceding paragraphs for negotiation during the first stage of the Comprehensive Programme, and of those included in subsequent stages, would be to achieve qualitative and quantitative limitations on and significant reductions of the nuclear-weapon arsenals existing at the beginning of the stage.

"7. Avoidance of the use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war:

"[There is today an international consensus that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. There is no objective of greater importance than the prevention of nuclear war. The surest way to remove the danger of nuclear war and the use of nuclear weapons is nuclear disarmament and elimination of nuclear weapons. [All Member States recognize the need to prevent war, especially because war can escalate to nuclear war. As an important step in improving international security and reducing the risk of war, including nuclear war, the nuclear weapon States with the most important nuclear arsenals should seek deep and verifiable reductions in their nuclear arsenals [to equal levels in a more stable configuration].] Pending the achievement of nuclear disarmament for which negotiations should be relentlessly pursued all States should co-operate for the adoption of practical and appropriate measures to prevent the outbreak of a nuclear war and to avoid the use of nuclear weapons.

"In this context account should be taken of existing undertakings by nuclear weapon States about no-first-use of nuclear weapons as well as about non-use of any weapons except in response to an attack. In addition, it should be borne in mind that the situation in the wake of any use of nuclear weapons cannot be limited or controlled and would leave to a global war endangering the very survival of human civilization as it is known. It is therefore incumbent on all States, in particular, nuclear weapon States to ensure that their future actions, policies and agreements [rule out the use of nuclear weapons.] [are conducive to the elimination of nuclear weapons].]

"8. Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons:

"The nuclear-weapon States should take steps to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Bearing in mind the declarations made by the nuclear weapon States, efforts should be pursued to conclude, as appropriate, effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

"9. Nuclear non-proliferation:

"It is imperative, as an integral part of the effort to halt and reverse the arms race, to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The goal of nuclear non-proliferation is on the one hand to prevent the emergence of any additional nuclear-weapon States besides the existing five nuclear-weapon States, and on the other progressively to reduce and eventually eliminate
nuclear weapons altogether. This involves obligations and responsibilities on the part of both nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States, the former undertaking to stop the nuclear arms race and to achieve nuclear disarmament by urgent application of the measures outlined in the relevant paragraphs of the Final Document, and all States undertaking to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

"Effective measures can and should be taken at the national level and through international agreements to minimize the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons without jeopardizing energy supplies or the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Therefore, the nuclear-weapon States and the non-nuclear-weapon States should jointly take further steps to develop an international consensus of ways and means, on a universal and non-discriminatory basis, to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

"Full implementation of all the provisions of existing instruments on non-proliferation, such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and/or the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) and the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty */ by States parties to those instruments will be an important contribution to this end. Adherence to such instruments has increased in recent years and the hope has been expressed by the parties that this trend might continue.

"Non-proliferation measures should not jeopardize the full exercise of the inalienable rights of all States to apply and develop their programmes for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for economic and social development in conformity with their priorities, interests and needs. All States should also have access to and be free to acquire technology, equipment and materials for peaceful uses of nuclear energy, taking into account the particular needs of the developing countries. International co-operation in this field should be under agreed and appropriate international safeguards applied through the International Atomic Energy Agency on a non-discriminatory basis in order to prevent effectively the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

"Each country's choices and decisions in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be respected without jeopardizing their respective fuel cycle policies or international co-operation, agreements and contracts for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, provided that the agreed safeguard measures mentioned above are applied.

"In accordance with the principles and provisions of General Assembly resolution 32/50 of 8 December 1977, international co-operation for the promotion of the transfer and utilization of nuclear technology for economic and social development, especially in the developing countries, should be strengthened.

*/ Two delegations reserved their position on the reference to the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty.
"10. Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones:

"The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of agreements or arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned constitute an important disarmament measure and should be encouraged with the ultimate objective of achieving a world entirely free of nuclear weapons, taking into account the characteristics of each region. The States participating in such zones should undertake to comply fully with all the objectives, purposes and principles of the agreements or arrangements establishing the zones, thus ensuring that they are genuinely free from nuclear weapons. The nuclear-weapon States are called upon to give undertakings, the modalities of which are to be negotiated, in particular:

(i) to respect strictly the status of the nuclear-weapon-free zone;
(ii) to refrain from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against the States of the zone.

"(a) Adoption by the States concerned of all relevant measures to ensure the full application of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco), taking into account the views expressed on the adherence to it at the tenth special session of the General Assembly, the General Conference of OPANAL and other relevant fora, and including ratification of additional Protocol I by all States concerned.

"(b) Adoption by the States concerned of all relevant measures to ensure the entry into force and the full application of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty and including the signature and ratification of the three Protocols to the Treaty by all States concerned once they are open for signature.

"(c) In Africa, the Organization of African Unity has affirmed the denuclearization of the continent. The United Nations General Assembly in successive resolutions has supported the African initiative for the denuclearization of the continent and at its tenth special session the General Assembly, by consensus, called upon the Security Council to take appropriate effective steps to prevent the frustration of this objective.

"(d) The establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East in compliance with General Assembly resolution 35/147 would greatly enhance international peace and security. Pending the establishment of such a zone in the region, States of the region should solemnly declare that they will refrain on a reciprocal basis from producing, acquiring or in any other way possessing nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices and from permitting the stationing of nuclear weapons on their territory by any third party, and agree to place all their nuclear activities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. Consideration should be given to a Security Council role in advancing the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

"(e) All States in the region of South Asia have expressed their determination to keep their countries free of nuclear weapons. No action should be taken by them which might deviate from that objective. In this context, the question of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia has been dealt with in several resolutions of the General Assembly, which is keeping the subject under consideration."
“(f) Efforts to create nuclear-weapon-free zones in other regions of the world should be promoted at the initiative of States which intend to become part of the zone.

“(g) Ensuring that the zones are genuinely free from nuclear weapons and respect for such zones by nuclear-weapon States constitute an important disarmament measure.

"B. Other Weapons of Mass Destruction"

"1. All States should adhere to the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925.

"2. All States which have not yet done so should consider adhering to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction.

"3. It is necessary to make all possible efforts for the early conclusion of an international convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons and on their destruction.

"4. An international treaty on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons should be concluded, bearing in mind the negotiations under way in the Committee on Disarmament and all proposals made in connection therewith.

"5. Effective measures should be taken to avoid the danger and prevent the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction based on new scientific principles and achievements. Efforts should be appropriately pursued aiming at the prohibition of such types and systems of weapons. Specific agreements could be concluded on particular types of new weapons of mass destruction which may be identified. */ This question should be kept under continuing review.

"C. Conventional weapons and armed forces"

"1. Together with negotiations on nuclear disarmament measures, the limitation and gradual reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons should be resolutely pursued within the framework of progress towards general and complete disarmament. States with the largest military arsenals have a special responsibility in pursuing the process of conventional armaments reductions.

*/ Since this sentence was proposed late in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee, some delegations reserved their position on its inclusion in the draft Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament.
2. */ In view of the present situation where the concentration of troops and armaments in Europe **/ has reached an especially high level, it is necessary to strengthen strategic stability through the establishment, at a significantly lower level, of a stable, comprehensive and verifiable balance of conventional forces. The more stable situation should be achieved by agreements on appropriate and mutual reductions and limitations in the whole of Europe and on effective confidence- and security-building measures, taking into account the need to dispel the mutual suspicion and distrust accumulated over many years.

"Such steps should ensure undiminished security of all States with full respect for the security interests and independence of all States, including those outside military alliances.

"By achieving progress in the negotiations presently under way in Vienna and Stockholm, the parties concerned would make tangible contribution to reducing tensions and the strengthening of peace in the region. Further negotiations should be undertaken as appropriate.

"***/ Of great significance would be the successful completion of the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, the first stage of which is being held in Stockholm and devoted to the negotiation and adoption of a set of mutually complimentary confidence- and security-building measures designed to reduce the risk of military confrontation in Europe. On the basis of equality of rights, balance and reciprocity, equal respect for the security interests of all CSCE participating States, and of their respective obligations concerning confidence- and security-building measures and disarmament in Europe, these confidence- and security-building measures will cover the whole of Europe as well as the adjoining sea area ****/ and air space. They will be of military significance and politically binding and will be provided with adequate forms of verification which correspond to their content. As far as the adjoining sea area ****/ and air space is concerned, the measures will be applicable to the military activities of all the participating States taking place there...

"*/ The mentioning of Vienna negotiations and the Stockholm Conference under the heading "Conventional weapons and armed forces" is without prejudice to the content of talks in those fora.

"***/ With the common understanding that this does not refer to neutral and non-aligned States.

"****/ This subparagraph is open for further consideration in the light of the outcome of the Stockholm Conference.

"*****/ In this context, the notion of adjoining sea area is understood to refer also to ocean areas adjoining Europe.
whenever these activities affect security in Europe as well as constitute a part of activities taking place within the whole of Europe as referred to above, which they will agree to notify. */

"3. Agreements or other measures should be resolutely pursued on a bilateral, regional and multilateral basis with the aim of strengthening peace and security at a lower level of forces, by the limitation and reduction of armed forces and of conventional weapons, taking into account the need of States to protect their security, bearing in mind the inherent right of self-defence embodied in the Charter of the United Nations and without prejudice to the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples in accordance with the Charter and the need to ensure balance at each stage and undiminished security of all States. Such measures might include the following:

"(a) Bilateral, regional and multilateral consultations and conferences should be held where appropriate conditions exist with the participation of all the countries concerned for the consideration of different aspects of conventional disarmament, such as the initiative envisaged in the Declaration of Ayacucho subscribed to by eight Latin American countries on 9 December 1974.

"(b) Consultations should be carried out among major arms suppliers and recipient countries on the limitation of all types of international transfer of conventional weapons, based in particular on the principle of undiminished security of the parties with a view to promoting or enhancing stability at a lower military level, taking into account the need of all States to protect their security as well as the inalienable right to self-determination and independence of peoples under colonial or foreign domination and the obligations of States to respect that right, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States.

"4. Prohibition or restrictions of use of certain conventional weapons, including those which may cause unnecessary suffering or which may have indiscriminate effects:

"(a) Adherence by all States to the agreement adopted by the United Nations Conference on Prohibition or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects.

"(b) Broadening of the prohibition or restrictions of use of certain conventional weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects, either through amendments to the existing Protocols or through the conclusion of additional Protocols, in accordance with Article 8 of the Convention on Prohibition or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects.

*/ Some delegations reserved their position on the inclusion of this sentence in the draft Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament.
"(c) The result of the above-mentioned Conference should be considered by all States, especially producer States, in regard to the question of the transfer of such weapons to other States.

"D. Military budgets"

"1. Gradual reduction of military budgets on a mutually agreed basis, for example, in absolute figures or in terms of percentage points, particularly by nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States, would be a measure that would contribute to the curbing of the arms race and would increase the possibilities of reallocation of resources now being used for military purposes to economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries.

"2. The basis for implementing this measure will have to be agreed by all participating States and will require ways and means of its implementation acceptable to all of them, taking account of the problems involved in assessing the relative significance of reductions as among different States and with due regard to the proposals of States on all the aspects of reduction of military budgets.

"3. The General Assembly should continue to consider what concrete steps should be taken to facilitate the reduction of military budgets, bearing in mind the relevant proposals and documents of the United Nations on this question.

"E. Related measures"

"1. Further steps to prohibit military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques:

"Review of the need for a further prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques with a view to the adoption of further measures to eliminate the danger to mankind from such use.

"2. Further steps to prevent an arms race on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof:

"Consideration of further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof in order to promote the peaceful use of, and to avoid an arms race in, that environment, taking into account, as appropriate, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the proposals made during the First and Second Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, as well as any relevant technological developments.

"3. */ In order to prevent an arms race in outer space, further measures should be taken and appropriate international negotiations held in accordance

"*/ The placement of this paragraph in the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament will be determined later.
with the spirit of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies.

"All States, in particular those with major space capabilities, should contribute actively to the objective of the peaceful use of outer space and take immediate measures to prevent an arms race in outer space in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international co-operation and understanding. */

"To this end all effective efforts should be made both bilaterally and multilaterally.

"In this regard bilateral negotiations have been undertaken and should be continued to work out effective agreements on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

"Efforts should be made by the Conference on Disarmament in the exercise of its responsibilities in accordance with paragraph 120 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament and which has [a] [the] primary role in the negotiation of [any] multilateral agreement or agreements, as appropriate, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. **/

"4. The establishment of zones of peace [and the strengthening of peace and security in various regions]: ***/

"The establishment of zones of peace in various regions of the world under appropriate conditions, to be clearly defined and determined freely by the States concerned in the zone, taking into account the characteristics of the zone and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and in conformity with international law, can contribute to strengthening the security of States within such zones and to international peace and security as a whole.

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*/ Some delegations reserved their position on the first two paragraphs until the language of this entire section is completed and its placement resolved.

**/ Many delegations consider that the first paragraph, which reproduces paragraph 80 of the final document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, should be supplemented to reflect that present urgency and importance of the subject. They further consider that it should occupy a more prominent place in the Programme and, to that end, propose that it be included as subsection B in the section "Disarmament measures", under the heading "Space arms". Other delegations are considering the placement of this paragraph pending the balance of the overall document.

***/ Measures related to the Asian and Pacific Ocean region were also proposed.
"(a) South-East Asia:

"In the interest of the promotion of peace, stability and co-operation in South-East Asia, steps should be taken by all States of the region, primarily those States most directly interested, through consultations and dialogue among themselves, towards the early establishment of a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality in South-East Asia, which would be consistent with the Political Declaration of the Seventh Summit Conference of the Non-Aligned Countries in New Delhi, held in March 1983. */

"(b) Indian Ocean:

"Achievement of the objectives of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace would be a substantial contribution to the strengthening of international peace and security.

"There is agreement within the United Nations for practical steps to be taken to establish a Zone of Peace in the Indian Ocean region.

"Practical steps should be taken within the United Nations Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean to prepare for an early Conference, as a necessary step towards establishing a zone of peace.

"Taking into account the political and security climate in the region, the Ad Hoc Committee should complete its preparatory work relating to the Conference on the Indian Ocean to enable the Conference to be opened at a date not later than 1988 to be decided by the Committee in consultation with the host country. Such preparatory work would comprise organizational matters and substantive issues, including the provisional agenda for the Conference, rules of procedure, participation, stages of conference, level of representation, documentation, consideration of appropriate arrangements for any international agreements that may ultimately be reached for the maintenance of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace and the preparation of the draft final document of the Conference.

"The Ad Hoc Committee should, at the same time, seek the necessary harmonization of views on remaining relevant issues.

"The creation of a zone of peace requires the active participation of and full co-operation among the littoral and hinterland States, the permanent members of the Security Council and the major maritime users to ensure conditions of peace and security based on the purposes and principles of the Charter, as well as the general principles of international law.

"The creation of a zone of peace also requires respect for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the littoral and hinterland States.

*/ One delegation reserved its position on this text pending the receipt of instructions.
"(c) Mediterranean:

[Bearing in mind that security in the Mediterranean region is closely linked with European security and with international peace and security, positive steps should be taken by all States concerned to ensure peace, security and co-operation in the Mediterranean region.

"To this end further efforts are necessary for the reduction of tensions and of armaments; for strengthening of confidence; for the creation of conditions of security and fruitful co-operation in all fields for all countries and peoples of the Mediterranean, on the basis of the principles of sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, security, non-intervention and non-interference, non-violation of international borders, non-use of force or threat of use of force, the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force, peaceful settlement of disputes and respect for permanent sovereignty over natural resources; for the promotion of just and viable solutions of existing problems and crisis in the area on the basis of the provisions of the Charter and of relevant resolutions of the United Nations, the withdrawal of foreign forces of occupation and the right of peoples under colonial or foreign domination to self-determination and independence.

"All States of the Mediterranean region and other concerned States should co-operate to define and implement, as appropriate, such steps and measures which should be conducive for creating conditions of peace, security and co-operation in the Mediterranean region in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and with the provisions of the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

"In this connection note is taken of the commitments assumed by the participants of the meeting of the Mediterranean members of the Movement of the Non-Aligned Countries held at Valletta, Malta in 1984, with the objective of contributing to peace and security in the region.] */

"[Bearing in mind that security in the Mediterranean region is closely linked with security in Europe and in the other adjacent regions, and with international peace and security, positive steps should be taken by all States concerned to ensure peace, security and co-operation in the Mediterranean region.

"To this end, further efforts are necessary to reduce tensions and reverse the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race, to strengthen mutual confidence and to find just and lasting solutions to crises, in order to create conditions of security and peace and to promote co-operation in all fields of mutual interest to all countries and peoples of the Mediterranean, on the basis of the provisions of the Charter, the relevant resolutions of the United Nations and the principles of international law.

*/ There was a proposal for the convening of a conference on the Mediterranean region.
"All States of the Mediterranean region and other concerned States should co-operate to define and implement, as appropriate, measures conducive to the creation of a zone of peace, security and co-operation in the Mediterranean.

"In this connection, note is taken of the commitments assumed by the participants in the meeting of the Mediterranean members of the Movement of the Non-Aligned Countries held at Valletta, Malta, in 1984."

"OTHER MEASURES"

"1. Confidence-building measures"

"In order to facilitate the process of disarmament, it is necessary to take measures and pursue policies to strengthen international peace and security and to build confidence among States. Commitment to confidence-building measures could significantly contribute to preparing for further progress in disarmament. For this purpose, measures such as the following, and other measures yet to be agreed upon, should be undertaken:

"(a) The prevention of attacks which take place by accident, miscalculation or communications failure by taking steps to improve communications between Governments, particularly in areas of tensions, by the establishment of "hot lines" and other methods of reducing the risk of conflict;

"(b) States should assess the possible implications of their military research and development for existing agreements as well as for further efforts in the field of disarmament.

"2. Prevention of the use of force in international relations"

"(a) Strict adherence and full commitment by all States Members of the United Nations to the purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and their obligation strictly to observe its principles as well as other relevant and generally accepted principles of international law relating to the maintenance of international peace and security, in particular the principles of refraining from the threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of any States or against peoples under colonial or foreign domination seeking to exercise their right to self-determination and to achieve independence, non-acquisition and non-annexation of territories by force and non-recognition of such acquisition or annexation, non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of other States; the inviolability of international frontiers; and the peaceful settlement of disputes, having regard to the inherent right of States to individual and collective self-defence in accordance with the Charter.

"(b) Strengthening the role of the United Nations in the maintenance of international peace and security and full implementation of the decisions of the Security Council by all States Members of the United Nations in accordance with their obligations under Article 25 of the United Nations Charter.

"*/ There was a proposal for the convening of a conference on the Mediterranean region.
3. Mobilization of world public opinion in favour of disarmament

"In order to mobilize world public opinion in favour of disarmament, the specific measures set forth below, designed to increase the dissemination of information about the armaments race and the efforts to halt and reverse it, should be adopted in all regions of the world in a balanced, factual and objective manner:

"(a) Throughout the implementation of the programme, therefore, governmental and non-governmental information organs of Member States and those of the United Nations and its specialized agencies as well as non-governmental organizations should, as appropriate, undertake further programmes of information relating to the danger of the armaments race as well as to disarmament efforts and negotiations and their results, particularly by means of annual activities conducted in connection with Disarmament Week. These actions should constitute a programme to further alert world opinion to the danger of war in general and nuclear war in particular.

"(b) With a view to contributing to a greater understanding and awareness of the problems created by the armaments race and of the need for disarmament, Governments and governmental and non-governmental international organizations are urged to take steps to develop programmes of education for disarmament and peace studies at all levels.

"(c) The World Disarmament Campaign, which was solemnly launched by the General Assembly at the opening meeting of its second special session devoted to disarmament, should provide an opportunity for discussion and debate in all countries on all points of view relating to disarmament issues, objectives and conditions. The Campaign has three primary purposes: to inform, to educate and to generate public understanding and support for the objectives of the United Nations in the field of arms limitation and disarmament.

"(d) As part of the process of facilitating the consideration of issues in the field of disarmament, studies on specific questions should be undertaken on the decision of the General Assembly, when necessary for preparing the ground for negotiations or reaching agreement. Also, studies pursued under the auspices of the United Nations, in particular by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research could bring a useful contribution to the knowledge and exploration of disarmament problems, especially in the long term.

"(e) Member States should be encouraged to ensure a better flow of information with regard to the various aspects of disarmament, to avoid dissemination of false and tendentious information concerning armaments, and to concentrate on the danger of escalation of the armaments race and on the need for general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

"(f) In particular publicity should be given to the decisions of the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, especially the Final Document of the first special session.

"*/ The placement of this paragraph in the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament will be determined later.
4. Verification */

(a) In order to facilitate the conclusion and effective implementation of disarmament agreements and to create confidence, States should accept appropriate provisions for verification in such agreements.

[(b) In the context of international disarmament negotiations, the problem of verification should be further examined and adequate methods and procedures in this field be considered. Every effort should be made to develop appropriate methods and procedures which are non-discriminatory and which do not unduly interfere with the internal affairs of other States or jeopardize their economic and social development.] **/

[The Member States are conscious of the urgent need to reach agreements on arms limitation and disarmament measures capable of contributing to the maintenance of peace and security. They are convinced that, if such measures are to be effective, they must be fair and balanced, acceptable to all parties, their substance must be clear, and compliance with them must be evident. These States reaffirm their conviction, as expressed in the Final Document adopted by consensus at the first special session devoted to disarmament, that in order to facilitate the conclusion and effective implementation of disarmament agreements and to create confidence, States should accept appropriate provisions for verification in such agreements.

"The importance of effective verification in the process of general and complete disarmament is threefold, as an indispensable foundation of legal commitments that are not only complied with but are seen by all parties to be complied with, as one of the essential principles upon which ongoing progress towards disarmament is based, and as an indispensable part of specific agreements to be negotiated or which are being negotiated as highlighted in the Comprehensive Programme.

"The Member States are particularly mindful of the fundamental importance of full implementation and strict observance of agreements on arms limitation and disarmament if individual nations and the international community are to derive enhanced security from them. They stress that any violation of such agreements not only adversely affects the security of States parties but can also create security risks for other States relying on the constraints and

*/ Some delegations held that in view of the fundamental importance of this subject the paragraphs under this heading should be placed either as an introduction to chapter V or as a new section E following "D. Military budgets". Other delegations held that since verification does not constitute a disarmament measure this subject should be covered, as appropriate, in the chapter on principles. Still other delegations believed that the subject of verification had been adequately covered by paragraph 25 of the chapter on Principles. One delegation held that the paragraphs under this heading should form part of Chapter VI (Machinery and Procedures).

**/ The final placement of the second sentence of this paragraph will be determined later.
commitments stipulated in those agreements. They stress further that any weakening of confidence in such agreements diminishes their contribution to global or regional stability and to further disarmament and arms limitation efforts, and undermines the credibility and effectiveness of the international legal system.

"The Member States urge States parties to arms limitation and disarmament agreements to implement and comply with the entirety of the provisions subscribed to. They call upon all States to give serious consideration to the implications of non-compliance or unresolved questions concerning compliance with those obligations for international security and stability, as well as for the prospects for further progress in the field of disarmament.

"All efforts aimed at the resolution of non-compliance questions should be supported, with a view towards encouraging strict observance of the provisions subscribed to and maintaining or restoring the integrity of arms limitation or disarmament agreements."**

"DISARMAMENT AND DEVELOPMENT"

"1. In view of the relationship between expenditure on armaments and economic and social development, the implementation of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament should make an effective contribution to economic and social development of all States, in particular of the developing countries. In this context, it is of particular significance that substantial progress in disarmament should be made in accordance with the responsibility that each State bears in the field of disarmament, so that real resources now being used for military purposes can be released to economic and social development in the world, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries.

"2. Disarmament would contribute over the long term to the effective economic and social development of all States, in particular developing countries, by contributing towards reducing the economic disparities between developed and developing countries and establishing the new international economic order on the basis of justice, equity and co-operation and towards solving other global problems.

"3. The Secretary-General shall periodically submit reports to the General Assembly on the economic and social consequences of the armaments race and its extremely harmful effects on world peace and security.

"DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY"

"1. Progress in disarmament should be accompanied by measures to strengthen institutions for maintaining peace and the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means. During and after the implementation of the programme of general and complete disarmament, there should be taken, in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the necessary measures to maintain international peace and security, including the

**/ This text represents the proposal of some States belonging to one United Nations regional group.
obligation of States to place at the disposal of the United Nations agreed manpower necessary for an international peace force to be equipped with agreed types of armaments. Arrangements for the use of this force should ensure that the United Nations can effectively deter or suppress any threat or use of arms in violation of the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

"Intermediate Stage */

"[1. The intermediate stage should start no later than 1990 and last five to seven years.

2. The USSR and the United States should go on with the reduction agreed upon during the first stage and also carry out further measures designed to eliminate their medium-range nuclear weapons and freeze their tactical nuclear systems.

3. Other nuclear-weapon States should pledge to freeze all their nuclear weapons and also not to station them in the territories of other countries.

4. All nuclear-weapon States should eliminate their tactical nuclear arms, i.e. weapons having a range (or radius of action) of up to 1,000 km. This measure should be taken after the completion by the USSR and the United States of the 50 per cent reduction of their nuclear weapons that can reach each other's territory.

5. The Soviet-American accord on the prohibition of space-strike weapons should become multilateral with the mandatory participation in it of major industrial States.

6. All nuclear-weapon States should cease nuclear-weapon tests.

7. There should be a ban on the development of non-nuclear weapons based on new physical principles, whose destructive capacity is close to that of nuclear arms or other weapons of mass destruction.] */

"Last stage */

"[1. The last stage should begin no later than 1995. During this stage the elimination of all remaining nuclear weapons should be completed. By the end of 1999 there should be no more nuclear weapons on earth.

2. A universal accord should be worked out to ensure that nuclear weapons never again come into being.

3. The last stage should be completed by the end of 1999.] */

*/ The heading is without prejudice to the position of delegations with respect to questions relating to stages of implementation.

"**/ Some delegations reserved their position on these paragraphs which represent the position of one group of States.
"VI. Machinery and Procedures"

"1. The United Nations, in accordance with the Charter, should continue to have a central role and primary responsibility in the sphere of disarmament.

"2. Negotiations on multilateral measures of disarmament envisaged in the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament should, as a rule, be conducted in the Committee on Disarmament, the single multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament.

"3. Bilateral and regional disarmament negotiations may also play an important role and could facilitate negotiations of multilateral agreements in the field of disarmament.

"4. The United Nations should be kept duly informed through the General Assembly, or any other appropriate United Nations channel reaching all Members of the Organization, of all disarmament efforts outside its aegis without prejudice to the progress of negotiations.

"5. [All efforts will be made by States, particularly through the conduct of negotiations in good faith on specific disarmament measures, to achieve the goal of General and Complete Disarmament, as defined in the Comprehensive Programme, by the year 2000. In order to assure continued progress towards the full realization of this ultimate goal, a special session of the General Assembly shall be convened periodically to review the implementation of the measures included in the various stage of the Comprehensive Programme. The first such special session of the General Assembly shall be held in (1987) (1988) (1989), and will: (a) review the implementation of the measures included in the first stage of the Comprehensive Programme; (b) consider the readjustments that need to be made in the Programme in the light of the review and the steps that need to be taken to stimulate progress in its implementation; (c) elaborate in more concrete terms the measures to be implemented in the second stage of the Programme, taking into account the progress made so far and other developments in international relations, as well as science and technology; and (d) decide on the time for the next special session to review the implementation of the measures included, and adjusted as necessary, in the second stage of the Comprehensive Programme, with the understanding that such session would be held not later than six years after the first.]*/

"[All efforts will be made by States, particularly through the conduct of negotiations in good faith on specific disarmament measures, to achieve the goal of General and Complete Disarmament under effective international control, as described in the Comprehensive Programme. In order to assure

"*/ One delegation felt that the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament should not institutionalize holding a future special session of the General Assembly in order to review its implementation."
continued progress towards the full realization of this ultimate goal, the implementation of the measures included in the Comprehensive Programme shall be periodically reviewed at special sessions of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. The first review of this kind should take place not later than five years after the adoption of the Programme and will:

"(a) review the progress made in the implementation of measures of the Comprehensive Programme;

"(b) consider the readjustments that need to be made in the Programme in the light of the review and the steps that need to be taken to stimulate progress in its implementation;

"(c) elaborate in more concrete terms further measures which may be necessary as part of the programme, taking into account the progress made so far and other developments in international relations, as well as science and technology; and

"(d) decide on the date for the next special session to review the further implementation of the Comprehensive Programme, with the understanding that such a further review would be undertaken not later than six years after the first."

"*/ [The Programme has three stages; the first stage, the intermediate stage and the last stage. The objective of the last stage is to achieve the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

"The first stage would be as comprehensive as possible and contain as many disarmament measures as can be envisaged within the foreseeable future.

"Those measures which would not have been implemented at the end of the first stage will be included in the intermediate stage. All States should make maximum efforts with a view to implementing as many of the initial disarmament measures as possible by the end of the first stage."

"*/ [The Programme has three stages; the first stage, the intermediate stage and the last stage. Each stage, as well as the programme as a whole, is to be implemented in its respective time-frame, it being understood that, as provided for above, such time-frames are indicative and may be adjusted as necessary by the General Assembly at the special sessions convened at the end of each stage to review the implementation of the Programme.

"The first stage, as described in the programme, comprises certain priority measures that must be implemented before the end of the stage, such as Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, appropriate and practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war, measures for the cessation of the nuclear arms race to be followed immediately by substantial reductions of nuclear weapons, agreement or agreements, as appropriate, for the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects and a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

"*/ The issues dealt with in this text remain open. Its placement in the programme will be considered later.
"The intermediate stage comprises the measures necessary to prepare for the last stage, in particular, measures for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. The last stage comprises the measures necessary to assure that, by the end of the stage, general and complete disarmament will have been achieved and that States will only have at their disposal those non-nuclear forces, armaments, facilities and establishments as are agreed to be necessary to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of its citizens and to support and provide agreed manpower for a United Nations peace force.

"[The Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament has three stages: the first stage, the intermediate stage and the last stage. The first stage should have a duration of 5-8 years, the intermediate stage - 5-7 years and the target date for the implementation of the Programme in its totality should be the year 2000. It is understood that such time frames are indicative and may be adjusted as necessary by the General Assembly at the special sessions convened at the end of each stage to review, inter alia, the implementation of the Programme. The main measures to be implemented during the intermediate and last stages are contained in the appropriate sections of Chapter V. It is understood that the comprehensive content of subsequent stages will be elaborated as the first stage draws to its end by the Conference on Disarmament and adopted by the United Nations General Assembly at its special sessions.]*/

"**/ [The Programme has three stages: the first stage, the intermediate stage and the last stage. The objective of the last stage is to achieve the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. All efforts should be made with a view to implementing each stage, as well as the Programme as a whole, within its respective time-frame, it being understood that such time-frames are indicative and may be adjusted as necessary during the periodic reviews of the implementation of the Programme as provided for below.

"The first stage is intended to be as comprehensive as possible and to contain as many disarmament measures as can be envisaged in the foreseeable future. All States should make maximum efforts to implement certain priority measures before the end of the first stage - such as .................. - and to implement by the end of the stage as many of the other measures included therein.

"Those measures that have not been implemented by the end of the first stage will be included in the intermediate stage. In addition, the intermediate stage comprises the measures necessary to prepare for the last stage, in particular, measures for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

"*/ Some delegations stated that this text was submitted in the Committee at the last moment and was not considered. They expressed reservations as to the inclusion of this text in the draft Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament.

"**/ The issues dealt with in this text remain open. Its placement in the programme will be considered later.
The last stage comprises the measures necessary to assure that, by the end of the stage, general and complete disarmament will have been achieved and States will only have at their disposal those non-nuclear forces, armaments, facilities and establishments as are agreed to be necessary to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of its citizens and to support and provide agreed manpower for a United Nations peace force.

All efforts should be made by States, particularly through the conduct of negotiations in good faith on specific disarmament measures, to achieve the goal of general and complete disarmament, as defined in the Comprehensive Programme. In order to assure continued progress towards the full realization of this ultimate goal, there shall be periodic reviews - including at special sessions of the General Assembly - of the implementation of the measures included in the various stages of the Comprehensive Programme. The first such review will take place within six years of the adoption of the Programme and will:

(a) review the implementation of measures included in the first stage of the Comprehensive Programme;

(b) consider the readjustments that need to be made in the Programme in the light of the review and the steps that need to be taken to stimulate progress in its implementation;

(c) as appropriate, elaborate in more concrete terms the measures to be implemented in the second stage of the Programme, taking into account the progress made so far and other developments in international relations, as well as science and technology; and

(d) recommend the date of the next review of the implementation of the measures included, and adjusted as necessary, in the second stage of the Comprehensive Programme, with the understanding that such a review would take place not later than six years after the first.

6. In addition to the periodic reviews to be carried out at special sessions, there should be an annual review of the implementation of the Programme. Therefore, an item entitled "Review of the implementation of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament" should be annually included on the agenda of the regular sessions of the General Assembly. To facilitate the work of the Assembly in this regard, the Secretary-General should annually submit a report to the General Assembly on progress in the implementation of the Programme.

7. During its annual review, or at its periodic special sessions to review the implementation of the Comprehensive programme of Disarmament, the General Assembly may, as appropriate, consider and recommend further measures and procedures to enhance the implementation of the Programme.

8. In the implementation of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, the Disarmament Commission shall continue functioning as a deliberative body, a
subsidiary organ of the General Assembly, and shall consider and make recommendations on various problems in the field of disarmament.

"9. Proposals listed in paragraph 125 of the Final Document of the first special session and annex II of the Concluding Document of the second special session devoted to disarmament should be considered, and decisions taken, at an appropriate time.

"10. At the earliest appropriate time, a world disarmament conference should be convened with universal participation and with adequate preparation."

I. Consideration of Other Areas Dealing with the Cessation of the Arms Race and Disarmament and Other Relevant Measures

108. During its 1986 session, the Conference also had before it the following documents:


(b) Document CD/707, dated 25 June 1986, submitted by the delegation of Canada, entitled "Text of the Canadian Response to the United Nations Secretary-General Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 40/152 on the Subject of Verification".

J. Consideration and Adoption of the Annual Report of the Conference and any other Report as appropriate to the General Assembly of the United Nations

109. The item on the agenda entitled "Consideration and adoption of the Annual Report of the Conference and any other Report as appropriate to the General Assembly of the United Nations" was considered by the Conference, in accordance with its programme of work, from 11 to 29 August 1986.

110. The present Report, as adopted by the Conference on 29 August 1986, is transmitted by the President on behalf of the Conference on Disarmament.

J. Alan Beesley
Canada
President of the Conference