NPT News in Review, Vol. 20, No. 1

Editorial: Collective Security Through Disarmament
24 April 2025

By Ray Acheson

The following text is also the introduction to the 2025 NPT Briefing Book.

The 2025 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) will be meeting at a time of global turmoil. Over the past months, international relations have been shaken. The new US regime has become antagonistic towards its former allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) while warming to Russia. In response, NATO members are talking about proliferating nuclear weapons, including through new nuclear sharing arrangements with French and UK nuclear weapons. European governments are also talking about weening themselves off US weapon systems and investing in production of their own arsenals. The European Commission President has called for the mobilisation of 800 billion EUR toward European “rearmament”.

The impacts of these developments on the NPT will be seen soon. But when coupled with other developments, such as some European countries considering withdrawal from the Mine Ban Treaty and support from Western countries for Israel’s ongoing genocide, it is easy to be pessimistic about the prospects of a “successful” PrepCom. Poland’s astonishing comment at the 2023 PrepCom that the security of states cannot be diminished in the pursuit of the goals of the NPT is unfortunately no longer astonishing. It seems instead to have become the dominant perspective of states that support nuclear weapons: they see international law as being out of line with their security interests. Law and multilateralism, which are meant to constrain violence, are being abandoned in the pursuit of imperial ambitions. The world is being dragged back more than a century.

The review cycle so far

So far, this NPT review cycle does not bolster much hope, either. The 2023 PrepCom could not agree to reference the Chair’s summary and recommendations in the procedural report. Iran, backed by Russia and Syria, blocked the summary from being tabled as a working paper or listed in the procedural reports list of documents because they felt it was biased against Iran and in favour of Western states’ positions. While the burial of a Chair’s summary was a new low point even for the NPT, the defence of the summary was disingenuous as well. The states expressing dismay at the rejection of this paper have killed much more meaningful outcomes from NPT meetings in the past.

The outcome of the 2024 PrepCom was slightly better—the Chair’s summary was listed as a working paper in the Committee’s procedural report, though Russia insisted on a footnote clarifying that the summary is not a consensus-based document. Still, stark divisions between nuclear and non-nuclear states persisted throughout the meeting. On the final day, some delegations argued that the revised version of the summary added undue emphasis to positions that undermine nuclear disarmament and said the first version was a more accurate reflection of discussions. The nuclear-armed states, in contrast, seemed happy with the weight given to their positions in the revised text.

This is unsurprising, as the nuclear-armed states and their nuclear-complicit allies have refused to implement Article VI and the NPT’s core agenda of nuclear disarmament. Now, they are openly discussing also violating Articles I and II by proliferating nuclear weapons further. The nuclear-armed states are also continuing to invest billions of dollars in expanding or “upgrading” their arsenals, and some have adjusted their doctrines to allow for use of nuclear weapons in more situations.

Amidst this grim context, some NPT states parties are still trying to do what they can to achieve something. At the 2024 PrepCom, some delegations and civil society groups pushed for peer-reviewed reporting mechanisms and interactive dialogues through which the nuclear-armed states would offer increased transparency about their arsenals. While some of the nuclear-armed states expressed openness to such initiatives, it is hard not to see their willingness to participate in transparency initiatives as a disingenuous way to distract from their failure to disarm. Moreover, not all nuclear-armed states are interested in these initiatives at all. Russia argued the suggestions for enhanced transparency are an attempt to “convert the NPT review process into a tool for oversight and coercion,” while China argued that standardised reporting “will strengthen the strategic superiority of some countries to the detriment of the security interests of others.”

In defence of international law and collective security

The struggle to achieve anything tangible at the last two NPT Review Conferences or either of the PrepComs in the current review cycle does not bode well for this third meeting. But the pressure is on, as this PrepCom is mandated to adopt recommendations for the 2026 Review Conference. The Chair of this PrepCom and states parties should not let past failure or current instabilities hold them back from pursuing ambitious goals to make the world safer. Instead, they should take inspiration from the Third Meeting of States Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), which concluded its work in March 2025 with the adoption of a declaration, decisions for intersessional work, and a procedural report.

The edge that the TPNW meetings have over NPT meetings is that they are not held hostage by countries that believe they have the right to commit massive nuclear violence. Instead, TPNW states parties and signatories continue to believe that international law should constrain violence and that multilateralism is essential to peace and security.

The NPT’s implementation is stymied by its nuclear-armed and nuclear-complicit states parties, which put their perceived security interests above the very real security interests of all countries, all peoples, and the planet. The “national security state” approach of these governments is primed to respond to uncertainty with violence, even though it is violence that led to the uncertainty. The self-fulfilling prophecy or circular loop of harm generated by “national security interests” is never ending—unless we take actions to extract ourselves from or, better yet, completely end the cycle.

This is what TPNW states parties have done by outlawing nuclear weapons. But they didn’t stop there. They have also set up workstreams on nuclear disarmament verification, scientific study, universalising the treaty, developing a gender analysis, amplifying complementarity, and establishing a trust fund to provide for victim assistance and environmental remediation. The TPNW has galvanised work to support survivors of nuclear violence, advance divestment from nuclear weapon production, challenge the school-to-bomb pipeline of higher education, and bring parliamentarians and city councils into the work for nuclear disarmament.

Last year, TPNW members also engaged in consultations to examine their security concerns. This process explicitly critiqued nuclear deterrence theory and the indefinite possession of nuclear weapons. The report on this process concluded that “nuclear deterrence is not a sustainable approach to security. It is built on creating extreme risks and an ethos of fear based on the threat of mutual annihilation and global catastrophic consequences.” On this basis, non-nuclear-armed states have a right and obligation to protect their populations and the planet from such “unpredictable and unsustainable luck-based approaches to security.”

The recognition of rights and obligations of non-nuclear-armed states, and the ongoing work in the TPNW, are directly relevant to the success of the NPT. The collective security approach inscribed in the TPNW should inform the approach of NPT states parties to achieving meaningful outcomes. Across several disarmament forums, many non-nuclear-armed states have described international law as a shield and disarmament as the best defence. Rather than the seeing the NPT and other international law as a hindrance to security, NPT states parties must embrace these treaties and agreements as instruments of collective security: if everyone abides, everyone benefits.

At the TPNW Third Meeting of States Parties, the Costa Rican delegation argued that the TPNW “is more than a legal instrument prohibiting nuclear weapons—it is a testament to the power of international solidarity and an affirmation that states, working together, can construct a safer and more just world.” This is the spirit in which NPT states parties should approach the upcoming PrepCom, and their obligations for nuclear abolition.

[PDF] ()