3 August 2006
The Conference of Disarmament (CD) opened its third session of 2006 on August 3 with the first plenary meeting of the focused debate on Negative Security Assurances (NSAs), the name for nuclear weapon states assuring non nuclear weapon states that nuclear weapons will not be used or threatened against them. Twenty-one states spoke: the Russian Federation, Group of 21, Pakistan, New Agenda Coalition, Nigeria, Morocco, Kenya, India, China, Malaysia, Algeria, Senegal, Belarus, the EU, Italy, Germany, Republic of Korea,Switzerland, Myanmar and Canada.
NSAs: towards total nuclear disarmament
Many states see negative security assurances (NSAs) as a first step and necessary interim measure towards total elimination of all nuclear weapons. Algeria called NSAs a right of non nuclear weapon states, and an ethical, legal and political commitment for the nuclear weapon states in exchange for non nuclear weapon states forgoing the option indefinitely. Pakistan said the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) would not have been extended indefinitely in 1995 without the agreement on NSAs, although Pakistan is not a party to the NPT.
Nigeria, Pakistan, the Group of 21, India, Myanmar, Switzerland, Germany, Malaysia, China, Belarus, Kenya and Morocco all supported a legally binding instrument for negative security assurances. The emergence of new nuclear doctrines, particularly ones that are preemptive, retaliate with nuclear weapons against biological or chemical weapons attacks, and/or target non nuclear weapon states, make negative security assurances more salient and necessary, according to China, Malaysia, Nigeria and Pakistan.
There are different views on how to pursue an international convention to prohibit the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states, but the G21 noted with satisfaction that there has not been any objection in principle to the idea. States disagree over whether to pursue the issue in the CD, in the framework of the NPT, or in a nuclear disarmament convention. If they did pursue it in the CD, they still differ on how to do so.
Where to pursue NSAs
Myanmar called NSAs one of the most crucial elements of an effective, viable and sustainable NPT. Germany said security assurances have been at the heart of the NPT since the treaty's inception. Some states think negotiations on NSAs should be held in the framework of the NPT rather than the Conference on Disarmament. Italy thought the NPT was a more appropriate forum, because only non nuclear weapon states in compliance with the NPT should benefit from such assurances. However, Switzerland pointed out that some states with nuclear weapons are not members of the NPT, and the Conference on Disarmament is the only negotiating forum for disarmament with all nuclear weapons possessors as members. Russia said the CD is the most appropriate venue to work on security assurances, while both China and Canada were willing to negotiate NSAs in the CD or the NPT.
How to pursue NSAs in the CD
While India and Germany supported establishing an ad hoc committee on NSA with the negotiating mandate from the Five Ambassadors' proposal, the Republic of Korea and Italy recommended a discussion mandate as outlined in the Food for Thought Paper put forward by the Netherlands. Russia was willing to not object to a consensus on the Five Ambassadors' proposal, which would include the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee on NSA, or the discussion mandate on NSAs from the food for thought paper. Canada suggested the CD launch negotiations on a Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) while continuing discussion on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) and nuclear disarmament, including negative security assurances. Egypt delivered a statement on behalf of theNew Agenda Coalition focused on nuclear disarmament, and told the CD it must work towards a nuclear weapon free world to remain relevant.
Italy, which prioritizes negotiations on a Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), referred to Article 23 in the CD Rules of Procedure(allowing the Conference to create subsidiary bodies, like an ad hoc committee, but also working groups, technical groups and groups of governmental experts) as a means to deal with this issue in an effective way and enable the conference to get back to work.
The current state of assurances: Security Council Resolutions and Nuclear Weapon Free Zones
Negative Security Assurances have been part of the non-proliferation and disarmament regime since the inception of the NPT, but they are conditional, varied and not necessarily legally binding. Security Council Resolutions 255 (1968) and 984 (1995) both contain security assurances. However, as China pointed out, the resolutions are not a legal instrument and their content is limited. India said the two resolutions are "overburdened with conditions and caveats" and Pakistan explained that "most of the assurances would cease to be operative in an attack on them or their allies". Nigeria said the resolutions have not fulfilled the expectations and requirements of the non-nuclear weapon states.
Legally binding Nuclear Weapon Free Zones treaties ban nuclear weapons from the territories of their states parties. Creating and implementing Nuclear Weapon Free Zones is a way of enhancing negative security assurances on regional basis. However, asSwitzerland pointed out, countries outside the free zones cannot benefit from the regional security assurances and are therefore faced with unequal treatment. Italy and Germany both noted that the tensest regions most in need of negative security assurances do not have nuclear weapon free zone agreements. Pakistan said retaining the right to use nuclear weapons in NATO deterrence posture "is not consistent with the pledges on the NSAs made by its constituent nuclear weapon states."
Malaysia was concerned that not all nuclear weapon states have signed or ratified the Protocols to the Treaty of Bangkok and the Treaty of Pelindaba. China declared its support for a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Southern Hemisphere and adjacent areas, that it had reached an agreement with ASEAN on the protocol to the Southeast Asian NWFZ, and that it had no problem with the current text of the Central Asian NWFZ. Russia supported the draft treaty on a nuclear weapon free zone in Central Asia and shared concern about the failure of the efforts to establish a NWFZ in the Middle East. Italy supported establishing a Middle East NWFZ with a consensual UN General Assembly resolution. Algeria, the only delegation that mentioned the crisis in the Middle East, pointed out that the Israel is the sole obstacle to making the Middle East a NWFZ, and that no one is putting pressure on them when their behavior is threatening the NPT.
The next plenary meeting of the CD will be held Tuesday, 8 August at 10 am.
-Jennifer Nordstrom, Reaching Critical Will and
Beatrice Fihn, Disarmament Intern
Women's International League for Peace and Freedom