24 August 2006

In the 24 August Conference on Disarmament (CD), Dr. Tariq Rauf, head of the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) Verification and Security Policy, discussed fissile materials and verification of a Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty. The Conference then went into an informal meeting, where member states could ask questions and discuss the issue with the IAEA representatives. Verification is one of the contentious issues in an FMCT, and the International Atomic Energy Agency has the most technical expertise on it.

Following the informal plenary, the Conference returned to its formal plenary session, and resumed its discussion on Transparency in Armaments (TIA). Australia, United Kingdom, Turkey, Pakistan, Poland, Switzerland, France, Netherlands, Israel, Algeria and Syria made statements.

The IAEA and FMCT Verification
In 1993, the UN General Assembly requested the IAEA help examine verification arrangements for a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices (resolution A/RES/48/75). The IAEA has since carried out studies of verification requirements, considered different verification options and prepared preliminary estimates of the resources needed for their implementation.

Dr Tariq Rauf explained that in the IAEA's view, verifying compliance with an FMCT would provide assurance against any new production of weapon-usable fissile material and the diversion of fissile material from the civilian nuclear fuel cycle.

The IAEA Safeguards
The IAEA already carries out comprehensive safeguards applied under a number of different agreements and arrangements. Under the nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), the IAEA verifies that the "peaceful use" of nuclear energy commitments made under the NPT (the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement or similar agreements) are kept.

There are 183 non-nuclear weapon states parties to the NPT, and they have all committed to not manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons. These states have also agreed to submit all nuclear material in all nuclear activities to IAEA safeguards (Article III of the NPT). This Comprehensive Safeguard Agreement (CSA) was deemed inadequate after the discovery of an extensive clandestine nuclear weapon programme in Iraq, and in order to strengthen it, an additional protocol was developed. The additional protocol extended the authority of the IAEA to require states to provide additional information, access and technology. The additional protocol has been signed by 109 States and is in force in 77 States. To ensure more effective verification, the IAEA has established a Committee on Safeguards (Committee of 25) to examine additional ways and means to strengthen the system.

The nuclear weapon states under the NPT (France, China, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States) have voluntary safeguards agreements. These voluntary agreements do not place implementation obligations on the state or the IAEA. They also allow the state to withdraw nuclear materials and facilities from the state-drawn list the IAEA can check for safeguard implementation. Today, the IAEA safeguards enrichment plants in China and the UK. All nuclear facilities in France and the UK are subject of EURATOM safeguards under the Treaty of Rome, except of course those facilities that are dedicated to nuclear weapon programmes and naval reactor programmes. All five nuclear weapon states have signed additional protocols, and China, France and the UK have brought them into force.

The three remaining non-NPT states (India, Israel and Pakistan) are also safeguarded by the IAEA. These safeguards were established prior to the NPT and only cover research and power reactors, and components like nuclear fuel or heavy water.

The IAEA has also been a part of the Trilateral Initiative with Russia and the United States. The Trilateral Initiative is intended to establish a verification system under which states possessing nuclear weapons could submit excess weapon material. The states decide what materials to submit, but once the material is submitted to IAEA verification it would be irrevocable, and inspections would be obligatory.

The IAEA and a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty
A treaty banning the production of fissile material would strengthen Article VI of the NPT: "Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament." It would cap fissile materials for nuclear weapons where they are, and, depending on its provisions, could make disarmament irreversible.

According to the IAEA, in order to provide the FMCT with a high level of assurance, the verification system should apply to the entire fuel cycle and be geared to detect undeclared fissile material production facilities. Dr. Rauf said any fissile material produced after the entry into force of an FMCT would presumably be subject to safeguards during processing, use and in storage. The IAEA has been developing verification arrangements that would protect classified information, including remote sensing, environmental sampling at a site or in its vicinity, and managed access inspections.

The IAEA advised the CD weigh the costs and benefits of various levels of verification, and recommended a comprehensive system. A less resource intensive alternative would reduce non-proliferation and disarmament benefits. The more limited and less costly alternatives considered by the IAEA provided significantly lower levels of assurance. The IAEA estimated the cost for a verification system somewhere between 50-150 million Euros.

Transparency in Armaments
The structured debate on Transparency in Armaments continued after the IAEA presentation. Algeria said this item was a cornerstone of all of the items discussed this year. It was not possible to talk about nuclear disarmament, Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS), FMCT or Negative Security Assurances (NSAs) without having clear transparency measures to establish the necessary confidence between states.

Pakistan said although the UN Register on Conventional Arms and UN Standardized Instrument for Reporting on Military Expenditures have been successful, they have not prevented world military expenditures in 2005 from reaching 1.1 trillion dollars, or 2.5 % of the world Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Ambassador Masood Khan also said transparency could act as an early warning mechanism and referenced a SIPRI report identifying a sharp increase in defense spending in Pakistan's immediate neighborhood. "By using it (TIA) appropriately, some moral pressure can be brought to bear on states responsible for destabilizing arms transfers." Pakistan also noted that areas with the most tension have the least transparency. Yesterday, India insisted transparency measures be voluntary and with respect to states' right to self defense.

Syria expressed its readiness to adhere to a general consensus on a programme of work for the Conference on the basis of the Five Ambassadors' proposal, which would include the appointment of a Special Coordinator on TIA. Syria also said transparency in armaments had to take into account the right of states to self-defense under the United Nations Charter.

Crisis in the Middle East
Israel and Syria engaged in a debate on the current situation in the Middle East. Syria said some delegations had talked about international peace and security while they helped Israel commit war crimes by providing Israel with cluster bombs and missiles used against Lebanese civilians. According to Syria, these states also stopped the Security Council from acting, thereby allowing Israel to continue the war, and prohibited the Security Council from condemning Israel's bombing the UN site and killing UN staff. These states remind us constantly that they care for human rights but still reject the decision of the Human Rights Council when they condemned the war, Syria continued.

Israel replied that it was odd to get lectured by a state known to provide terror groups like Hizbollah with weapons. This was clearly reflected in the reports of the Security Council, including the failure to implement resolution 1559, and was now standing in the way of resolution 1701 which impeded the transfer of arms to Hizbollah.

Syria also used its right of reply, stating that if Israel was concerned about the implementation of United Nations resolutions, a large number calling on Israel had not been implemented. The country that violated international law on a daily basis had no right to lecture others. Syria also suggested Israel amend its policies.

Man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS)
Several states discussed MANPADS in the context of Transparency in Armaments. A number of speakers said these weapons are legitimate when used by states, but are a significant threat to global civil aviation and international peace-keeping efforts if used by non-state actors. Echoing the US National Rifle Association's mantra "guns don't kill people, people kill people", Israel said, "It is not the sword that kills but rather the hand in which it is used."

Last year the General Assembly encouraged states to enact or improve legislation, regulations, procedures and stockpile management practices to exercise effective control over MANPADS (Resolution 60/77). The Netherlands agreed that national legislation is the best way to prevent unauthorised use of MANPADS. Australia and the UK called the 2003 Wassenaar Arrangement "Elements for Export Controls of Man-Portable Air Defense Systems" the gold standard for export controls.

France said there is serious potential to discuss MANPADS in the CD, and that the subject deserved the entire attention of the Conference. According to Switzerland, regional organizations are more appropriate to implement operational projects like the destruction of stocks, while the elaboration of norms and standards requires a universal application. Australia, whose Foreign Ministry launched a major diplomatic initiative on MANPADS last year, has proposed MANPADS for discussion in the CD for two reasons. First, they hope the CD will identify additional measures states could take to counter this threat. Second, the CD could use this as an opportunity to demonstrate it is capable of addressing the evolving global security environment and concerns of the international community.

Turkey said discussing MANPADS in the CD could prove useful, but MANPADS or any other new issues can not be a substitute for the four core issues on the CD agenda. Syria opposed included new issues like MANPADS on the agenda since the CD has not made progress on the four core issues on which it should be focusing.

The next plenary meeting will be held on Thursday 31 August, and will be devoted to a general debate. The meeting will be followed by an informal meeting, where Slovakian CD President Ambassador Anton Pinter will present a draft of the CD report to the General Assembly.

Beatrice Fihn, Disarmament Intern
Women's International League for Peace and Freedo