First Committee Monitor, Vol. 22, No. 5
Editorial: Multilateralism, Not Militarism
2 November 2024
By Ray Acheson
This past week, the First Committee finished discussions on other measures for disarmament, regional disarmament and security, disarmament machinery, and outer space, and then began taking action on nuclear weapon-related resolutions. Throughout it all, the inevitable contradiction between multilateralism and militarisation persisted: in an international diplomatic forum where the vast majority of states are working to establish multilateral solutions to global problems, the most militarised states in the world tried repeatedly to assert their dominance, blaming other states for the world’s ills and attempting to pressure other delegations to vote in line with their interests. Fortunately, since the First Committee is democratic and does not allow vetoes, multilateralism in some senses “won”. But militarisation is still prevailing outside of the conference room. The actions transpiring at the First Committee must translate into real world action to prevent more death and destruction.
Studying nuclear war
One of the most telling examples of the competition between militarism and multilateralism was the Friday night vote on draft resolution L.39, “Nuclear war effects and scientific research.” This proposal from Ireland and Aotearoa New Zealand to establish a panel of 21 scientific experts to produce a UN study on the physical effects and societal consequences of a nuclear war was met with enthusiasm by the vast majority of UN member states, 144 of which voted in favour of the text. Only three states voted against the resolution—nuclear-armed France, Russia, and the United Kingdom. Most other nuclear-armed states—Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, India, Israel, Pakistan, and the United States—abstained, while China voted in favour. Some nuclear-armed supporters in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) abstained, but some voted in favour. France and the UK’s reported attempts to get NATO members to vote against the resolution failed, likely because the willful suppression of scientific information about the use of nuclear weapons was a line that they were not willing to cross.
In a statement before the vote, Ireland and Aotearoa New Zealand explained that the new study, which will report to the First Committee in 2027, “will deliver a stronger evidence base that will inform the world and contribute to constructive dialogue with a view to convergence in work on nuclear disarmament and arms control,” and that it will also strengthen the taboo against nuclear weapons. This is exactly the kind of task the First Committee can undertake to make a difference in the real world. The fact that certain nuclear-armed states do not want this study to be undertaken shows that they know exactly how devastating their weapons of mass destruction are and do not want this information reaching the public.
Inequality of violence
Of course, a UN study is not enough on its own to end the era of nuclear weapons, but it will be a useful tool to build support in this direction, including by mobilising public attention to this issue. Without prejudging the results of the study, it is likely that once updated information about the effects of nuclear war is more widely available, the decisions by these governments to continue investing in nuclear weapons and wielding them through “deterrence” doctrines and nuclear force postures will be exposed for the dangerous political gamble that this is, which will help build momentum for the elimination of nuclear weapons.
Any steps we can take in this direction are desperately needed. As demonstrated during this past week’s thematic debates, the divisions and tensions described in earlier editions of the First Committee Monitor are continuing to crescendo. Nuclear-armed states continue to throw their weight around, blaming others for the violence they inflict.
During the regional disarmament discussion, the United States asserted that “Russia is to blame for most of the current damage to the current security architecture” while Russia said “the ‘collective West’ has finally chosen the path of forceful dominance in the world.” In reality, both are undertaking actions the other describes as dangerous or destabilising, including nuclear weapon modernisation and sharing, sending weapons to governments violating international law, using or selling prohibited weapon systems, developing new technologies of violence, and more.
When it comes to wars of aggressions, Western countries are quick to rightly condemn Russia’s war against Ukraine, but much more tepid in their response to Israel’s genocide of Palestine and attempts to expand its war throughout the Middle East. For example, Estonia argued that “Russia’s blatant lies and imperial and neo-colonial ambitions have led to a dangerous re-emergence of mentality we all thought had remained in the dustbin of history.” But only Arab states and Iran described Israeli aggressions in a similar way, despite the fact that Israel is a settler colonial state that has made clear through its actions and statements that its intent is genocide, which has been found plausible by the International Court of Justice.
This past week at the First Committee, the Israeli delegation’s language further illuminated this genocidal intent. In its right of replies on 30 October, when talking about the necessity of defeating “terrorism,” the Israeli representative stopped speaking about Hamas and started speaking about Palestinians. It asserted, “Over the past year, the Palestinians and their allies attempt[ed] to deny us everything,” and that “the Palestinians and their allies, especially the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran, are busy re-enacting vile Holocaust inversion fantasies.” Israel’s officials often try to claim, as they have earlier in this First Committee session, that the problem is Hamas and they don’t want to harm Palestinian civilians; this already demonstrably false pretense is unmasked by this language.
In addition, Israel claimed in its right of replies that it “remains fully committed to facilitate the continuous flow of aid to Gaza” the same week that it banned the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) from operating in Israel, which will make it impossible for the agency to access the West Bank or Gaza or transport assistance through Israel. Yet no Western states took the floor to challenge these remarks or actions, leaving Jordan and other states of the region to push back once again. France, in its regional disarmament statement, did call on Israel to stop its military escalation and urged an immediate ceasefire in both Lebanon and Gaza. So did the United Kingdom, but it is still transferring weapon parts and components to Israel, including for the F-35 fighter jet, which undermines its calls for a ceasefire and expressions of concern.
The point is that there is clearly an inequality in how the violence of some states is treated compared to others. This is not a new revelation by any means; rather, it is a persistent problem that has led directly to the whole world inching closer to global conflagration. “The conflicts that are shaking and rattling the world are worrying and saddening,” said Cameroon in its regional disarmament statement, adding that these conflicts “express the omnipresent bellicose nature of certain internal and regional behaviors that structure and amplify the militarization of regions and the world and, despite the pacifist voluntarism chanted loudly by all, harden public policies towards all-out armament in risk areas.” Cameroon warned, “This situation is a blow to global serenity and stability, which every day further weakens the oath promise by the peoples of the United Nations in the Charter to no longer take the chaotic path of war.”
Chaos in outer space
But the heavily militarised states are not even content with the chaotic path of war on Earth—they are also inching towards war in outer space, perhaps even nuclear war. And here again they are each blaming the other for dragging the world closer to this horrific possibility. It’s challenging to explain how out of hand the outer space issue has become in the First Committee, but here’s a summary.
Earlier this year, US government officials began warning of a nuclear-powered or nuclear-armed anti-satellite capability they believe Russia is developing. Russia denied the claims, but then vetoed a US-Japan led resolution in the UN Security Council in April that set out to reaffirm the Outer Space Treaty’s prohibition of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in outer space. So, the US and Japan brought that resolution here to the First Committee, where no state has a veto.
Draft resolution L.7 affirms the obligation of all states parties to fully comply with the Outer Space Treaty, “including not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner.” The resolution also urges states to take what the United States described as “the next logical step” by not developing nuclear weapons or any other kinds of WMD that are specifically designed to be placed in orbit, installed on celestial bodies, or stationed in outer space.
In response, Russia tabled two resolutions containing proposed amendments to L.7. In L.78, Russia proposes adding a new operative paragraph that calls on states “to take urgent measures to prevent for all time the placement of weapons in outer space and the threat or use of force in outer space, from space against Earth and from Earth against objects in outer space;” and to “seek through negotiations the early elaboration of appropriate reliably verifiable legally binding multilateral agreements.” In L.79, Russia proposes amendments to operative paragraph 4 in the US resolution to expand it beyond WMD to include “any type of weapons” and to include additional commitments not to test or place weapons in orbit.
In both cases, Russia is trying to broaden the scope of the resolution—to take it beyond WMD to cover all weapons, to take it beyond developing outer space weapons to include testing and placing such weapons in orbit, to take it beyond just weapons in space to preventing the use of force from or into space, and to take it beyond a commitment to a legally binding treaty. In a joint statement with others, Russia called upon all states to “refrain from attempts to use outer space for purposes of an armed confrontation and policies aimed at achieving military superiority and dominance in outer space;” to “take urgent measures to prevent for all time the placement of weapons in outer space and the threat or use of force in outer space, from space against Earth and from Earth against objects in outer space;” and to do so through legally binding agreements.
The US delegation claimed that it “continuously engaged in good faith to incorporate significant feedback from all states through informal, bilateral, and regional group consultations.” It argued that the draft “has accommodated as many comments as possible without changing the core focus and intent of the resolution.” In this spirit, the US tabled a new version of L.7 on 30 October, which added a paragraph that indicates further measures to prevent an arms race in outer space “could involve a combination of legally binding obligations and political commitments, and could relate to, inter alia, the threat or use of force against outer space objects, prohibiting the placement of weapons in outer space, preventing the possibility of the extension of armed conflict into outer space, as well as measures and efforts to reduce the risk of tensions arising from misperceptions and miscalculations.” L.77/Rev.1 also adds “testing” to the paragraph recalling states parties’ obligations under the treaties related to nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons.
It remains to be seen how Russia will respond to these changes. But the contest over WMD in space is not the only resolutionary struggle in the First Committee in relation to outer space. There are also usually contestations around Russia’s resolutions about transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities (L.58) and no first placement of weapons in outer space (L.59), which tend to be in competition with a UK-led resolution on reducing space threats through norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviours (L.75). There’s also an annual resolution, L.3, on preventing an arms race in outer space (PAROS), but it’s the only thing that almost every government can agree on (except Israel).
The different approaches to space security in these resolutions then spill over into the work streams the First Committee sets up. Last year, the First Committee established two tracks of work on outer space: a Russian-led Open-ended Working Group (OEWG) on further practical measures for the prevention of an arms race in outer space from 2024–2028 (established through resolution 78/238 and reflected this year in draft resolution L.6), and another OEWG on reducing space threats through norms, rules, and principles of responsible of behaviours from 2025–2026 (established through resolution 78/20).
This year, the sponsors of those competing tracks have tabled their respective texts—but in addition, Brazil, Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and Sri Lanka have tabled a resolution (L.61/Rev.1) calling for a merging of the two groups. Brazil argued that the failures to reach consensus in past working groups on outer space “stem, first and foremost, from a generalized lack of trust between major players.” But, it emphasised, another key reason for this persistent impasse is the fact that the debate on PAROS and space security “has long been subjected to conceptual misalignments and false dichotomies.”
Brazil argued that the two streams of work on PAROS would impose a massive financial burden on all UN member states and create a challenge for adequate participation by many states. “But above all,” Brazil pointed out, “given their different mandates, objectives and timeframes, the chances that the two OEWGs might work in a harmonious and complementary manner are very slim.” Thus, merging the two OEWGs could help unify the discussion tracks by incorporating the mandates of both OEWGs “into a single deliberative body that will be able to address PAROS in all its aspects.”
Many states supported this approach, with most emphasising the importance of the merged OEWG being open to the participation of civil society, academics, and industry. Several delegations agreed that, as Pakistan said, “a comprehensive approach that includes a dual focus on both capabilities and behaviours offers the best pathway for progress, as has been the case in several legally-binding and non-legally binding measures developed in other fields of disarmament.”
Getting to disarmament
Action on the outer space resolutions will take place next week. Regardless of how the votes go here in the First Committee, though, urgent action is needed to prevent arms racing in outer space—and to prevent the development of other high-tech weapons like autonomous weapon systems, artificial intelligence-enabled weapon systems, and more. Even more urgent action is required to end to the conflicts being waged right now, by ending arms transfers, achieving ceasefires and peace agreements, and by engaging in demilitarisation and the reduction of military spending.
In its regional disarmament statement, Timor-Leste said it “champions a world where resources are devoted to development rather than warfare,” which “reflects a collective call to prioritize humanity over conflict, emphasizing that peace requires not only the absence of war but the presence of justice and the fulfilment of human needs.” This is the only way forward for our world. The First Committee has one more week to help get us there.
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